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ON THE HISTORIA AUGUSTA.

PART II.

Maximini 20 :

Maximum ex praefecto urbi et qui plurimas dignitates praecipue gessisset.

Casaubon and Gruter both notice the strangeness of *praecipue*; but whereas Gruter thought it might possibly = *eximie*, Casaubon supposed a word like *militares* to have fallen out after *dignitates*, comparing Herodian vii. 10, 4 : τούτων δ' ἦν ὁ μὲν Μάξιμος ἔν τε πολλαῖς στρατοπέδων ἀρχαῖς γενόμενος τῆς τε Ῥωμαίων πόλεως ἑπαρχος καταστάς. If Capitolinus was following Herodian here, the word which *praecipue* seems designed to qualify may well have been *in castris* or *castrenses*.

Gord. 14 :

sacrati conmiliones, immo etiam mi consecranei.

Götz, *Thesaur. Glossar. Emendatarum*, p. 260 : consacraneus συμμύστης.

15 :

luctus †deinde mentem atque animum fatigaret.

This clause is preceded by three others equally depending on *cum* : hence *deinde* should probably be changed to *denique*.

Gord. Iun. 1 (17 Peter II., p. 42, ed.²) :

ad probandam generis qualitatem alii hoc ꝑesse desiderunt.ꝑ

Salmasius' *edisserunt* seems rather a formal word for the occasion. Perhaps *esse desiderunt* is a mere corruption
ads

of *asserunt*, the regular word used in similar cases by the writers of *Hist. Aug.*—e.g. : Gord. Tert. 22, annos agentem ut plerique adserunt xi, ut non nulli xiii . . . nam xxii^{do} anno eum perisse (Cordus) adserit. Max. et Balbin. 16 historicis asserentibus.

Gord. Iun. 21 :

The writer of the Lives of the Gordiani tres, after saying that he had read in Vulcatius Terentianus an assertion that the eldest of the three was like Augustus in face, voice, and stature, the second like the great Pompeius, but more stout, the third like Scipio Asiaticus, adds :

quod pro ꝑsui administrasneꝑ tacendum esse non credidi.

admiratione is an old and generally received emendation: *sui* should be, I believe, *avi*. The respect which the oldest and grandfather of the other two Gordians commanded was such as to call for the preservation of the tradition not only of his own resemblance to Augustus, but of his son's to Pompeius, and of his grandson's to Scipio.

Max. et Balbin. 5 :

quare ꝑueluti senatus ei homini quod non licebat nouae familiae imperium tamen detulit.

Perhaps *uolenter*—a word used by Apuleius.

Gallieni 3 :

iuuenem occiderunt missoque per murum corpore Odenato se omnes †affatim dederunt.

Eyssenhardt and Iordan alter *affatim* to *statim*. Is it not possible that *affatim* had this meaning? At any rate, it is glossed so (Götz, p. 39) *affatim*: *statim continuo uel abundanter*, and *continuo mox*: though Götz explains this *statim* as an error for *satis*.

5 :

Gothori . . . Macedoniam uastauerunt Thessalonicam obsederunt neque usquam quies mediocriter salutem ostentare est.

Bährens seems right in conjecturing *saltem* for *salutem*. I see no cause for suspecting the genuineness of *quies*: whether *ostentare* <se> or *ostentari* was written by the historian makes little difference: between *ostentare* and *est* a participle, perhaps *uisa*, has fallen out: neque usquam quies mediocriter saltem ostentare <se> uisa est.

8 :

carpenta cum mimis et omni genere histrionum, pugiles †flacculis non ueritate pugillantes.

Salmasius defended *flacculis* as diminutive of the adj. *flaccus*. 'Pilas istas uel pugillos qui in morem pilae laxae et flaccidae circum ponebantur brachiis pugillantium, flacculas a Trebellio uocatas arbitror, si pilas intelligamus; aut *flacculos* si pugillos.' More probably it is a substantive, and either a corruption or a misspelling of *flocculos*, dim. of *floccus*. Flocks or shreds of wool or other soft materials would naturally be used to deaden the force of the blows dealt in a sham boxing-bout.

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materials of which they were composed. See Rich, *Companion to the Latin Dictionary*, s. v. On this marble the inscription was written.

11. The Greek original of the epigram here translated or rather paraphrased in Latin is given as follows in the *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum* iii. p. 1027 :

Κλαύδιος Αὐρεόλῳ μετὰ δῆμιον Ἄρεα Καῖσαρ
τὰ κτέρεια, θνητῶν ὡς θέμις, ἐνδίδοσι·
τῷ γὰρ καὶ ζωὴν· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐθέλησε φρόνημα
πᾶσιν ἐπιβρῆτοισ τοῦ στρατοῦ ἀντίβιον·
κεῖνος δ' οἰκτίρμων καὶ σώματος ἔσχατ' ὀπίζων
Αὐρεόλου γέφυραν εἷσατο τήν τε ταφήν.

Dona sepulchrorum uictor post multa tyranni
Proelia iam felix Claudius Aureolum
Munere prosequitur mortali et iure superstes
Uiuere quem uellet si pateretur amor
Militis egregii, uitam qui iure negauit
Omnibus indignis et magis Aureolo.
Ille tamen clemens qui corporis ultima seruans
Et pontem Aureoli dedicat et tumulum.

Dona both B and P; *Dono* Salmasius, explaining 'Claudius uictor post multa tyranni proelia iam felix et iure superstes dono sepulchrorum prosequitur Aureolum, munere mortali.'

Burmann rightly called in question *Donδ*, as the epigram is quite innocent of false quantities, and *Dono* must here be abl. of *donum*. I believe *Dona* to be an accus. like *Aeneas haec de Danaïs uictoribus arma*, the verb being suppressed, and its place supplied by a new construction *munere prosequitur. mortali* seems more properly to belong to *iure* than *munere*: 'honours with a gift which is the rightful privilege of mortals,' i.e. *munere* (sepulchri) quod mortalibus iure conceditur, θνητῶν ὡς θέμις. *militis egregii*

appears to refer to the soldiers collectively, who are called virtuous from their firm opposition to tyrannical pretenders like Aureolus. This is the obvious meaning of the corresponding Greek, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐθέλησε φρόνημα τοῦ στρατοῦ ἀντίβιον πᾶσιν ἐπιρρήτοις; for Salmasius showed from Hesychius and Glossaries that ἐπιρρήτος = αἰσχρός, ἐπίψογος, ἐπονείδιστος. The awkward change of the nominatives, uiuere quem uellet (Claudius) si pateretur amor militis egregii, qui (miles) iure negauit uitam indignis et praecipue Aureolo, is very noticeable, but is less misleading from the distinct opposition of *ille* (Claudius) in the last distich. *corporis ultima seruans*, 'observing the last dues of burial,' is a poor but intelligible translation of σώματος ἔσχατ' ὀπίζων, 'reverencing the last remains of the body.'

12 :

sed ad facta aut quantum in bellis unius ualet fortitudo

Obrecht *fata*; Bährens *haut*. Rightly, I imagine: for Salmasius' transposition, *aut in bellis quantum*, is scarcely justifiable, 'for influencing destiny a single man's courage has not the same power which it has in conducting war.'

15 :

Zenobia is described as

mulier omnium nobilissima orientalium feminarum, et ut Cornelius Capitolinus adserit, saepeditissimam.

So B¹ P¹; *saepeditissinam* B². The vulgate correction, *speciosissima*, though accepted by Peter, as well as by Eyssenhardt and Jordan, is widely removed from the letters. Casaubon's *expeditissima*, 'most ready for action,' is plausible rather than convincing. Possibly *sapientissima* is the right word. In c. 29 Zenobia's acquaintance with languages is mentioned, also with history: both might be included under *sapientissima*.

20 :

diuinos honores Pisoni decerno, patres conscripti, Gallienum et Valerianum et Saloninum imperatores nostros ¶imperaturos esse confido.

Perhaps *ita paraturos*.

24 :

In the house of the two Tetrici was a mosaic in which Aurelian

pictus est utrique praetextam tribuens et senatoriam dignitatem, accipiens ab his sceptrum coronam ¶cycli picturiae de museo.

Perhaps *cycladem in picturis de museo*.

Forcellini quotes from an inscription *opere museo exornauit* where it = *musiuo*.

Claudius 3 :

quid ¶bouum barbarorum nostri uidere maiores.

bouum rather than *boum* : the longer form is found in Varro R. R. and elsewhere. See Neue-Wagener i. 426.

11 fin. :

in quo bello ¶quod gestum est equitum Dalmatarum ingens extitit uirtus.

quoad seems more than probable.

Aurelianus 3 :

Anacharsis Scytha.

Phaedr. Fab. Prolog. iii. 52 Si Phryx Aesopus potuit, Anacharsis Scytha.

4 :

adeo ut aliquando marito suo iurgans ingesserit.

ingesserit = *exprobrarit*.

5 :

fuerunt et postea multa omina iam †militantis futuri ut res monstrauit imperii.

militante, or better *militanti*.

7 :

Si uis tribunus esse immo si uis uiuere manus militum contine. nemo pullum alienum rapiat.

This reference to the tendency of soldiers to lay hands on poultry recurs Pesc. Nig. 10. It is, I believe, the explanation of a much-disputed verse at the end of the *Dirae*, or rather *Lydia* (so Ribbeck) :

Tantam, uita, meae chortis fecere rapinam

Ut maneam quod uix oculis cognoscere possis.

‘They (the soldiers) have plundered my farm-yard (by carrying off the fowls) so cruelly, my dear, that I remain a mere shadow of what I was, scarcely recognizable.’

Ib. :

torquem brachialem anulum adponat, equum et sagmarium suum defricet, caput animalis non uendat.

brachialem here supports the retention of the same form in Claud. 14 *brachialem unam unciarum septem*, where Casaubon, followed by Eyssenhardt, preferred *brachiale*. *capitum* = κάπητόν, ‘provender.’ Hesych. κάπητόν. παράβλημα ἀλόγων.

Ib. :

alter alteri quasi †in nemo quasi seruus obsequatur.

i memo impubes is a gloss recorded by Forcellini ; but the explanation of it is quite doubtful. The sense would suit, if it could be shown (1) that such a word existed ; (2) that its meaning is rightly defined by the gloss. Or is *in nemo* a misspelling or miswriting of *inimmo* ? Then the sentence

might have run originally *alter alteri quasi in <ferior> (or minor) immo quasi seruus obsequatur.*

10. From a letter of the emperor Valerian to Aurelian :

‘ Si esset alius Aureliane iucundissime qui Ulpii Criniti uicem posset implere tecum de eius uirtute ac sedulitate conferrem. †nunc tecum requirere potuissem suscipe bellum a parte Nicopolis.

Perhaps *nunc cum tecum requirere non potuissem, suscipe b. a p. N.*, nearly as Petschenig, *nunc tu, cum requirere non potuissem, suscipe.*

13 :

togam pictam, subarmalem profundum.

Subarmalem BP, seems rightly retained by Peter against Casaubon's *subarmale*. Götz, p. 303 *subarmalis*, *μασχαλιστήρ*.

19 :

sero ad fatalia iussa respicimus more languentium qui ad summos medicos nisi in summa desperatione non mittunt, perinde quasi peritioribus uiris maior facienda sit cura.

The meaning seems to be ‘as if the more skilful the physician, the more he was bound to cure the case.’

23. Aurelian made a promise to his soldiers not to leave a dog in Tyana. He took the city by the treachery of a wealthy Tyanian named Heraclammon. The soldiers demanded the destruction of Tyana. Aurelian replied: ‘I said I would not leave a dog in Tyana. Kill all the dogs.’ Then follow these words :

grande principis dictum grandius militum uocatum nam uocatum principis quo praeda negabatur ciuitas servabatur totus exercitus. ita quasi ditaretur accepit.

This passage is strangely vitiated ; but the sense seems to be that the soldiers either misunderstood or professed

to misunderstand Aurelian's words, as a permission to do anything they pleased with Tyana.

That some words have fallen out is indicated by the form of the sentence *grande dictum grandius*; and that these words expressed the satisfaction of the army is conveyed in *quasi ditaretur accepit*.

Vocatum was corrected by Salmasius to *iocatum*; this may have been written over *dictum* as an explanatory gloss, and afterwards worked into the frame of the sentence. The meaning will be clear if we write *grande principis dictum grandius militum* [gaudium secutum est]: *nam iocatum principis*, κ. τ. λ. To Aurelian's lofty humour the soldiers replied with equal good-humour, accepting it universally as a license to unlimited plunder.

16. In a letter excusing the execution of the traitor Heraclammon, who was very rich, Aurelian writes:

diuitem hominem negare non possum sed cuius bona eius liberi reddidi.

liberi B¹P¹, no doubt a corruption of *liberis*. But the sentence still remains not quite clear. I think *erant* has been omitted after *cuius*.

24 :

haec ego et a grauibis uiris comperi in Ulpiae bibliothecae libris relegi et pro maiestate Apollonii magis credidi.

In *relegi* the prefix has lost its meaning, and so in Orientius' Common. ii. 407, at tu cum relegis (legis A) nostrum quicumque libellum, if my conj. is right. Bellanger, however, in his new and conscientious edition (1903), prefers Bährens' *quando legis*.

Ib. :

ipse autem si uita suppetit atque ipsius uiri fauor (fauori B)

†iuscuerit (ius cūerit B *ante rasuram*) breuiter saltem tanti uiri facta in litteras mittam.

fauor iuuerit Salmasius; *fauor nos iuuerit* Peter. Neither is convincing. I offer *fauor insecutus erit*.

28 :

quasi nescias Cleopatram reginam perire maluisse quam in qualibet uiuere †dignitate.

indignitate is an easy suggestion.

34 :

religati manibus captiui poteraecesserunt.

So P; B has *poterecesserunt*. Perhaps religatis (so most editors) manibus post terga captiui praecesserunt (this last as Salmasius). *poter* is the remains of *poster(ga)*.

38 :

quasi fatale quiddam mihi (mini BP) sit ut omnia bella quaecunque gessero omnes motus †ingrauescant.

Salmasius' view that *ingrauescant* is active is supported by the gloss *ingrauesco* ἐπιβαρῶ (Götz, p. 577). Yet it is not impossible that after *ut* and before *omnia* the word *in*, palaeographically often confused with *ut*, has been dropped.

49 :

calceos mullos et cereos et albos et hederacios uiris omnibus tulit mulieribus reliquit.

In Prob. 13 fin., tantum his praedae barbaricae tulit quantum ipsi Romani abstulerant, *tulit* seems to mean 'took from.' Is it possible that in Aurel. 49 the sense is not that A. allowed every male indifferently to use shoes of a reddish, wax, white, or ivy-green colour (so Lécritvain, *Étude sur l'histoire Auguste*, p. 365), but *forbade* the use

of such shoes to all males, leaving them to be used by women only?

Tacit. 2 :

quae illa concordia militum, quanta populo quies! quam †*curauis* senatus auctoritas fuit!

curauis is so strange as a corruption of *grauis*, that it might seem better explained as *curabilis*, 'curative.'

Ib. :

speciatim in monumentis publicis inserenda etiam posteris humani generis stupenda moderatio.

Madvig's *ad posteros* is unnecessary: the dative is constructed closely with *stupenda*. The words seem to show that in the much-disputed passage Trigint. Tyr. ix. quam (epistulam) ego repertam in †*athenicis* inserendam putaui, *athenicis*, whatever it means, is probably to be constructed with *inserendam*, not with *repertam*. That *athenicis* = *authenticis* is very problematical.

6 :

nutritorem timeat respiciat ad nutricem †*mag(n)arum* magistralium ictibus terrorique subiaceat.

Peter very ingeniously conj. *uirgarum*, yet not so certainly as to preclude other possibilities. Persius iii. 18 uses *mamma* of a nurse, *iratus mammae lallare recusas*. The word is frequently found in inscriptions (O. Iahn). Possibly then *mammaram* may be the original which BP corrupt into *magarum* (B) or *magnarum* (P¹).

8 :

librum elephantinum.

Forcellini accepts Salmasius' interpr. 'ivory.' It seems strange that Vopiscus should use so puzzling a word when

he might have said *eboreum*. The *particularity* of the statement, that the book was to be found in the Ulpan Library, cupboard 6 (*in armario sexto*), points to a *very* unusual material: such a material would be the skin of an elephant, perhaps the outer skin, perhaps the caul, as Scaliger supposed.

10 :

ne lectorum incuria deperiret librum per annos singulos decies scribi publicitus in \dagger euicos archist \dagger iussit et in bybliothe \dagger ecis poni.

Vopiscus is speaking of the historian Tacitus, whom the emperor of that name counted among his ancestors, and took care to have his histories copied and deposited in the public libraries. Scaliger conj. *in aeuicis* or *ciuicis archiis*, Casaubon *in cunctis archiis*, Obrecht *in demosiarchiis*, Unger *in iconographiis*. I suggest *in eicosi archiis*. We might suppose there was a registry or record office, containing twenty ($\epsilon\acute{\iota}\kappa\omicron\sigma\iota$) copying-chambers.

Florianus 3 :

ne dies hora momentum aliquid sibi uindicaret in me necessitate fatali ac Probo indicto deperirem.

Can Mirabeau have taken from this his famous ‘un jour, une heure, un instant’?

Probus 4 :

uini ueteris diurnos sextarios decem cum larido \dagger bolulaci salis olerum lignorum quantum sat est.

Perhaps *bolbi acidi*, ‘onion steeped in vinegar.’

Ib. 7 :

adesto igitur nostris necessitatibus tuae familiae adsere ut soles r. publicam.

It is usual to punctuate after *necessitatibus*; but *morally* it would hardly be matter of praise that Probus should

vindicate the State, and help it in its needs, in the interest of his own family; and *grammatically* the antithesis is more effective if *nostris n., tuae familiae* both depend on *adesto*.

Ib. 13 :

contra urbes Romanas et castra in solo barbarico posuit atque illic milites collocavit.

I think this may be right as the MSS. have it. 'Opposite the Roman cities he erected camps besides, on territory belonging to the barbarians, and in these camps stationed a military force.'

16 :

barbarorum qui apud Isauros sunt uel per terrorem uel per urbanitatem loca ingressus est.

Salmasius explained *per urbanitatem* as 'non inuitis barbaris, de gré et de courtoisie'; an older reading was *per uoluntatem*. It may have been *per uanitatem*, 'to show off.'

22 :

Conferenti mihi cum aliis imperatoribus principem Probum, omnibus prope Romanis ducibus . . . intellego hunc uirum parem fuisse.

A construction *κατὰ σύνεσιν*, of a truly Thucydidean type, but by no means common in *Hist. Aug.*

Saturninus 7 :

sunt enim Aegyptii ut satis nosti *†uenti* uentosi furibundi iactantes iniuriosi.

For *uenti* I suggest *lenti*, as in Catull. lxiv. 183 *quine fugit lentos incuruans gurgite remos*, where *uentos* is the reading of GR and most MSS. The meaning of *lenti* as applied to the Egyptians would be 'vindictive,' 'deliberate or settled in their resentment,' much as Suetonius

Tiber. 57 speaks of the emperor Tiberius' *saeva ac lenta natura*.

Firmus 1 :

quare etiam quoque aetiam si non tamen minima fuerit cura ut . . . non taceremus.

The sentence has become involved and confused. It may have been originally somewhat as follows:—

quare nobis quoque, etiam si in tantum non fuerit, non tamen minima fuit cura ut . . . non taceremus.

Ib. 3. In this chapter the word *additis* is spelt *aditis* in BP, and the word *aditis* (participle of *adire*) *additis*. There is nothing very astonishing in this; but the one seems to confirm the other, and leads me to doubt the otherwise seductive emendation of Eyssenhardt and Peter, *adductus* for BP's *additis*. The words are *Appeninis* (*Aponinis* Casaubon) *sortibus additis*; the word *adire* might well be used of consulting any kind of oracle.

Carus 8 fin. :

unde fuit fama emersit fulmine interemptum eum.

Peter conj. *unde subito fama emersit*. Is it not more likely that either *fuit* or *emersit* was originally a gloss on the other? *fuit* seems right enough. I would bracket *emersit* as an explanation which at a later stage of the transcription became part of the text.

Ib. 11 :

quo mortuo cum oculos dolere coepisset, quod illi aegritudinis genus nimia ut pote confecto familiarissimum fuit.

Perhaps *nimirum potu*.

Carinus 18 :

quod idcirco dixi nequis a me rem tantam requireret, maxime cum uel uiuorum principum uita non sine reprehensione dicatur.

Here again the words have become transposed in the course of the transmission, *cum uiuorum uel maxime principum*. 'I mention Claudius Eusthenius, Diocletian's secretary, as the authority for the lives of Diocletian, Maximianus, Galerius, Constantius, to prevent anyone looking for such information from me. It is not to be expected that *I* should write the lives of contemporaneous emperors, since such biographies are in an especial degree open to censure.'

diuorum for *uiuorum* seems to me improbable.

ROBINSON ELLIS.

ON ATTIC PROSE RHYTHM.

THE nature and essence of Greek prose rhythm is generally held to be one of the most obscure subjects in classical philology. That such a thing existed in cultivated prose is not to be denied, because Aristotle has a whole chapter on it (*Rhetorics*, III. 8); but as his description is neither complete nor very clear, there seems to be a chasm between this theory and the practice of Attic orators and other writers. If he had but given some examples, as he does in other parts of his *Rhetorics*, that might help us a good deal; as it is, we are left to ourselves in applying the theory to the facts, and consequently very few persons have attempted to do it. For this there is still another reason, namely, that very few persons possess a natural aptitude for these questions. Even concerning poetry, beyond its simplest metrical forms, the same want of a trained ear is generally apparent. Nevertheless, we shall see that the difficulties, great as they may be, are by no means insurmountable.

The only way of rationally discussing any subject whatever is that taught by Plato: we must try to define it first, and after that may proceed to description and application. Unfortunately, Aristotle gives no definition of rhythm, neither in this chapter nor elsewhere in his

remaining works. But other writers supply that want; and one thing is clear from Aristotle himself, that he makes no distinction between poetical and prose rhythm as far as the general nature of rhythm itself is concerned. So, when we read in Plato (*Leg.* II., 653 E) that rhythm is an order in movements (τάξις ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσιν), and when we find quoted from Aristotle's disciple, Aristoxenus, that it is an order of times or of fractions of time (χρόνων τάξις), and, again, that it is a system composed of fractions of time (σύστημα συγκείμενον ἐκ χρόνων),¹ we may be sure that this must apply as well to prose rhythm as to poetical rhythm. Still more explicit is the definition quoted from a certain Leophantus: "a composition of fractions of time, viewed as analogous to and symmetrical with one another" (χρόνων σύνθεσις κατὰ ἀναλογίαν τε καὶ συμμετρίαν πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς θεωρουμένων).² It is therefore an abuse of the word if anybody speaks of prose rhythm without reference to a definite order (whatever it may be) in the longs and shorts, and to analogy and symmetry between the particles of the composition. There are a very definite analogy and a clear symmetry between the first verse of the *Iliad* and the second, and the fractions of time existing in them have been brought into a definite order; otherwise there would be in them neither metre nor rhythm. Now that metre is excluded from prose, we shall presently see; but as rhythm, according to Aristotle, is required, an order is required, without which there would not be rhythm, but the contrary, ἀρρυθμία.

It is astonishing to see that one of the chief philologists now living in Germany, von Wilamowitz, in one of his most recent books, declares that Thrasy-machus, who was

¹ Scholia in *Hermogenem* v. 454 Walz; Psellus Προλαμβάνοντα εἰς τὴν ῥυθμικὴν ἐπιστήμην (which is an extract from Aristoxenus), § 3.

² Bacchius Εἰσαγωγή τέχνης μουσικῆς, p. 23, Meibom.

the first inventor of prose rhythm, did nothing else but introduce longs and shorts into prose, without any analogy or symmetry.¹ When there is a decided will not to acknowledge a thing, a man does not shrink from any absurdity. That longs and shorts existed in daily conversation, as soon as more than one syllable was pronounced, is self-evident; nor does it need demonstration that the total absence of analogy and symmetry is incompatible with any notion of rhythm. The corresponding word in modern music is 'time'; and it is again self-evident that musical 'time' is not given by the mere distinction of notes of different measure, but that an order is required. Either prose rhythm is no rhythm at all, or it has its analogy, its symmetry, its order, or perhaps its analogies and symmetries and orders: see a little below on μεταβολή.

The next step in our way is to distinguish between rhythm and metre; for Aristotle distinctly teaches that as rhythm is required for prose, so metre is alien to it. The same was the teaching of Isocrates,² and generally of all the ancient theorists. Now, rhythm is the general word, and metre signifies a certain species, at least according to the ancient and classical use of these terms. A series of dactyls or equivalent spondees, for instance, continued indefinitely, is of course rhythmical; but when there is a marked incision after every sixth foot, and the whole composition may be divided by the measure (μέτρον) of six feet, it is not only rhythmical, but also metrical. The metres are, as the ancients say, definite sections (τμήματα) of rhythms.³ Prose could not be prose, if it admitted metres.

¹ v. Wilamowitz, *Die griech. Literatur*, p. 65, in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, published under the editorship of P. Hinneberg.

² See Syrianus in *Hermog.* I. 28, 30, Rabe (ὁ λόγος μὴ λόγος ἔστω· ξηρὸν γάρ· μήτε ἑμμετρος· καταφανὲς γάρ· ἀλλὰ

μεμείχθω παντὶ ρυθμῷ μάλιστα).

³ Plato, *Leg.* 810 B., Aristotle, *Rhet.* III. 8, p. 1408 b 28 (ῥυθμός, οὐ καὶ τὰ μέτρα τμητά, better τμήματα with Bywater): cp. *Poetics*, c. 4, p. 1448 b 21 (μόρια τῶν ρυθμῶν).

But this is by no means enough. Not even then would it be prose if it were composed after the fashion of *Τελαμώνιε παῖ τῆς ἀμφιρύτου κ.τ.έ.*, that is to say in anapæstic systems. These systems are prevented from being called metrical, because every last colon is shorter than the measure by one long syllable, or one short and one long: *σὲ μὲν εὖ πράσσοντ' ἐπιχαίρω*. In prose, therefore, the same rhythm must not be continued indeterminately, but only up to a certain point, *μέχρι του*, as Aristotle says.¹ After that, a change of rhythm (*μεταβολή*) must take place. We may easily convince ourselves that these negative precepts are in harmony with the facts.

At this point the difficulties begin; for Aristotle's precepts do not carry us farther. He turns to the question, which rhythm is the best for prose, whether the dactyl, or the trochee, or the iamb, or the pæon (which he eventually prefers), and then there is an end of the discussion. Now, are there really long sequences of pæons (— ∪ ∪ ∪, or ∪ ∪ ∪ —)—not too long, of course—to be found in Attic orators? or else in Aristotle's own elaborate prose, as in the *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία*? By no means. He must mean something when he says that the orators, as a matter of fact, make use of the first pæon; and it is true that Isocrates' *Panegyricus*, which in Aristotle's mind was the masterpiece of oratory, begins with one pæon and one similar foot, a choriamb: *Πολλάκις ἐ|θαύμασα τῶν|*. But the next feet are quite different, and pæonic composition is not dominant, either in Isocrates, or in Demosthenes, or in Aristotle himself. Nevertheless, Isocrates himself, in more than one passage, speaks of his *ῥυθμοί*²; and one of his disciples, Naucrates, as Cicero relates, gave him the praise of having bound prose by rhythms, instead of the loose composition of the ancients, and of

¹ *Rhet.* III. 8, p. 1408 b 31.

Philipp. 2 f. (ταῖς περὶ τὴν λέξιν εὐρυ-

² Isocrates κατὰ σοφιστῶν 16 (τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς). Cp. *Antid.* 46.
ὀνόμασιν εὐρύθμως καὶ μουσικῶς εἰπεῖν).

having given it in that way a great charm for the ear.¹ We must believe, therefore, that there existed a very marked and very sensible difference between ancient unrhythmical prose and the modern rhythmical prose of those days; and it is obvious that the pæon and the choriamb *πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα τῶν* are in no perceptible relation to so splendid an achievement.

It is, however, fortunate that Theophrastus, in his lost book *Περὶ λέξεως*, said something more on the subject than his master, and that Cicero has preserved us part of what he said—at least, in substance. Firstly, to the four rhythms mentioned by Aristotle he added the anapæst; secondly, he comprehended by one designation a vast deal of other rhythms; and thirdly, he recognizes these rhythms not only in lyric poetry, but also in cultivated prose. The words, as related by Cicero (*de Orat.* III. 185), are these: *ex istis modis, quibus hic usitatus versus* (the hexameter) *efficitur, post anapaestus, procerior quidam numerus* (cp. § 191), *effloruit; inde ille licentior et divitior fluxit dithyrambus, cuius membra et pedes, ut ait idem, sunt in omni locupletiori oratione diffusa*. The dithyramb was the lyric poetry of those days; it had, without strophic composition, a variety of rhythms, which are called by Theophrastus *κῶλα* (*membra*) and *πόδες* (*pedes*); we may suppose that any combination of longs and shorts, not exceeding a certain length, was admitted into that kind of composition under these designations. Dionysius uses the terms *ῥυθμός* and *πούς* indifferently²; Aristophanes calls a glyconic a *πούς* (see *Frogs*, 1322): *περίβαλλ' ὦ τέκνον ὠλένας. ὁρᾷς τὸν πόδα τοῦτον*; whilst metricians call it a *κῶλον*. So we are entitled to call by the same names the

¹ Cicero, *de Orat.* III. 173 (ut in-
conditam antiquorum dicendi consue-
tudinem delectationis atque aurium
caussa, quemadmodum scribit discipulus
eius N., numeris adstringeret): cp.
Orat. 170, where the same passage is

given without N.'s name, but more
fully.

² Dionys. Hal. *περὶ συνθέσεως*,
p. 104 R.: *τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καλῶ πόδα καὶ
ῥυθμόν*.

words following in the *Panegyricus* after the first two feet: τὰς πανηγύρεις συναγαγόντων, _υ_ _υ_ _υ_υ_υ_ _ _ , without anxiously caring to dissolve them into simple metrical feet; and we may even extend that πούς a little further by adding the spondee καὶ τοὺς. We really now are quite near the solution of the problem, and have only to consider the composition of dithyrambs and other astrophic lyric poetry a little more carefully. A mixture of all kinds of rhythm, free from the bond of strophic composition, necessarily will look more like ἀρρυθμία than like εὐρυθμία, unless there be introduced another species of analogy and symmetry, these being essential to any rhythmical structure. In strophic composition, the first member is like, let me say, the tenth, and the second like the eleventh, and so on—the correspondence is *distant*; but in astrophic, the first member is like, let me say, the second, and the third like the fourth, and so on—the correspondence is *near*. This doctrine is not pronounced by any ancient metrician; but it is unconsciously followed by everybody who tries to supply or otherwise to correct a piece of astrophic lyric poetry. I might illustrate it from Timotheus' Πέρσαι; but it is simpler to make use of Aristotle's pæan on Hermias, the text of which receives some fresh emendations from Didymus' recently-published commentary on Demosthenes, being quoted there at full length. (1) Ἄρετὰ πολύμοχθε γένει βροτέψ,¹ (2) θήραμα κάλλιστον βίψ. There is no correspondence between (1) and (2); but the correspondence is even nearer: Ἄρετὰ πολύμο- = -χθε γένει βροτέψ; θήραμα κάλ- = -λιστον βίψ. (3) σᾶς περὶ παρθένε μορφᾶς (4) καὶ θανεῖν ζηλωτὸς ἐν Ἑλλάδι πότμος (5) καὶ πόνους τλῆναι μαλεροὺς ἀκάμαντας (6) τοῖον ἐπὶ φρένα βάλλεις: (3 = 6) - υ υ - υ υ - - ; (4 = 5) - υ - - - υ υ - υ υ - - . (7) καρπὸν ἰσαθάνατον² χρυσοῦ τε κρεῖσσω (8) καὶ γονέων μαλακαυγήτοιό θ' ὕπνου: (7 = 8) - υ υ - υ υ

¹ Didymus, instead of βροτείψ.

ἀθ. (and by conjecture v. Wilamowitz).

² The same for κ. εἰς ἀθ. or καρπὸν τ'

---υ--. (9) σοῦ γ' ἔνεκεν καὶ ὁ Δῖος Ἡρακλῆς Λήδας τε κόροι
 (10) πόλλ' ἀνέτλασαν ἐπ' ἔργοις σὰν ἀγρεύοντες δύναμιν¹:
 (9 = 10) -υυ-υυ-υ-υ---υυ-. (11) σοῖς τε πόθοισιν² Ἀχιλλεὺς
 Αἴ- (12) -ας τ' Αἴδαο δόμους ἦλθον: (11 = 12) -υυ-υυ---.
 (13) σᾶς δ' ἔνεκεν φιλίου μορφᾶς Ἀταρνέος (14) ἔντροφος
 ἀελίου χήρωσεν αὐγὰς: (13 = 14 = 7 = 8) -υυ-υυ---υ-.-.
 (15) τοιγὰρ αὐοίδιμον ἔργοις (16) ἀθάνατόν τέ μιν αὐξήσουσι
 Μοῦσαι, (17) Μναμοσύνας θύγατρες, Δι- (18) -ὸς ξενίου σέβας
 αὔξου- (19) -σαι φιλίας τε γέρας βεβαίου: (15 = 17 = 18 = 3 = 4)
 -υυ-υυ-.-; 16 = 13 f.; (19) -υυ-υυ-υ-.-, this last member
 being without a corresponding one, and at the same time
 (like 1) alien to the κατ' ἐνόπλιον εἶδος (see HERMATH. xxx.,
 163 ff.). It would be easy to restore something like 16:
 -σαι φιλίας τε γέρας <κλεινὸν> βεβαίου; but, on the other hand,
 it is not impossible that the last colon intentionally stands
 for itself. The facts to be deduced from this astrophic
 poem are these. The corresponding pieces of the com-
 position are sometimes parts of the same member (1, 2).
 They are not always immediately contiguous: see 3 ff.
 (a bb a), 14 ff. (ab ab b). They may exceed the length of a
 rhythmical colon, as 9, 10, the form of the correspondence
 being ab ab (-υυ-υυ-υ a, = 3, 6; -υ---υυ- b). Now,
 Thrasy-machus and his successors did nothing else but
 transfer this kind of composition into prose, only lessening
 the resemblance between the distant members; for Aristotle,
 writing in the κατ' ἐνόπλιον εἶδος, makes use of very few
 forms; and a direct imitation in prose would be con-
 spicuously poetical. Isocrates, as we saw, begins by
 πολλάκις ἐ- = -θαύμασα τῶν, -υυυ; but his next rhythms
 are quite different: τὰς πανηγυρεῖς συναγαγόντων καὶ τοὺς |
 γυμνικοὺς ἀγῶνας καταστησάντων, -υ-υ-υυ-.-. Whilst

¹ The restoration of these lines is uncertain. Diels, in his edition of *Did.*:
 σοῦ γ' ἔνεκ' οὐκ Διὸς Ἡρακλέης κ.τ.έ.,
 -υυ-υυ-(-)-υ-.-υυ-.

² *Did.* (πόθοισι[ν]); for the rhythms
 cp. Pind., *Pyth.* 1. 2, μὲν βάσις ἀγλαίας
 ἀρχά.

the poet, if he likes, may remain in the same εἶδος throughout the composition, the prosaist is bound continually to mix the εἶδη, in order to avoid τὸ ἀπίθανον, as Aristotle says, or τὸ καταφανές, as Isocrates. That is to say, the speech would lose credit, if the speaker manifestly showed himself as being in fact something like a poet.

Of general theory, there is not much more to be said. Of course the common prosody was observed by prosaists as well as by poets; a part of this is the shortening of long vowels or diphthongs in hiatus before a beginning vowel. Not all prosaists permitted themselves the hiatus: many, like Isocrates, avoided it with anxious care, rarely making use even of the legitimate elision. But these are things treated long ago (especially by Benseler) and firmly established; something more is to be said on the coincidence of the rhythmical division with the division of the sentences. In Aristotle's pæan there is generally coincidence, but not without exceptions; it is not even necessary that the end of a rhythm coincides with the end of a word. See 17, 18: Μναμοσύνας θύγατρες Δι|ὸς ξενίου σέβας αὖξου|σαι φιλίας κ.τ.έ. The fact is well known from strophic poetry; and in Pindar, not even the end of a strophe regularly coincides with the end of a sentence or of a clause of sentence. See Olymp. III. 25f.: δὴ τότ' ἐς γαῖαν πορεύειν θυμὸς ὦρμα (a various reading ὦρμαιν', with elision) | (end of strophe) Ἰστρίαν νιν, ἔνθα Λατοῦς κ.τ.έ. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in his book *On Composition*, proves, from Homer, and Euripides, and Simonides, that the poets rather aimed at producing a discrepancy between the metrical (or rhythmical) division and the division of the sentences.¹ Likewise, in Attic elaborate prose, it is impossible to make a rhythmical analysis without this license. It was my own error, for a long time, that I

¹ Dionys., *De Compos.* c. xxvi. (last chapter).

confounded different ages, and transferred Cicero's and Dionysius' theory of the division of prose into cola, universally acknowledged at that time, to the Attic time, when the theory of periods and cola was just beginning. Attic rhythm and Roman rhythm are different things; and it is not my intention here to speak of the latter, the basis of which was the division into cola. But, on the other hand, it is equally true of the ancient poets, that they made coincide (or suffered to coincide) both divisions in a large measure, which was always the natural tendency of poets, in all countries and in all ages. So, in prose, a regular discrepancy between the two divisions must make the rhythms both obscure and rough. They were not meant to be perceived by the hearer; but they were meant to be felt, and to produce in him an unconscious impression of harmony and symmetry; this impression was liable to be disturbed if there never was a natural pause at the end of a rhythm, and if the natural pauses were continually breaking up the rhythms.

I briefly mention an unpleasant fact. In my book on Attic prose-rhythms (Leipzig: Teubner, 1901), I made the rhythms still more obscure by allowing them to overlap into each other, not on any principle, but because I imagined that I could not analyse without that license. As a matter of fact, it is never required; but every rhythm begins exactly where the former has ceased. In my second book (on Asianic and Roman prose-rhythms; Leipzig: Deichert, 1905), I have corrected myself, and analysed part of the texts according to the correct method.

I am bound to state, nevertheless, that it is by no means an easy task to analyse an Attic prose text. But I may add at once, that it is no more easy to analyse the text of Timotheus' *Πέρσαι*, which, in the old manuscript on papyrus, is written like prose. No doubt the difficulties chiefly consist in the corruptions of the text; but

are Attic prose authors to be regarded as exempt from the common fate of books handed down by transcription? Nobody thinks so. If, then, there are corruptions, these must affect the rhythms as well as the sense, and frequently the former without damaging the latter; a different order of the words is generally harmless for the sense, but by no means for the rhythm. Therefore, I cannot rationally be blamed for introducing some alterations into the texts I analyse; on the contrary, if I could do without any alteration, whilst the texts notoriously are not quite the same as originally, that would be a strong proof against my theory. In some cases, I found, by means of rhythmical analysis, a correction which constitutes a manifest improvement of the text. I shall begin with such a case, and at the same time with one of the oldest authors who wrote in rhythms—namely, with *Lysias*.

Lysias, Περὶ τοῦ σηκοῦ (VII.) § 18 ff. I may begin at any point; and since the first words of § 18 are not without critical difficulty, I begin with γείτονας. The first rhythms are: γείτονας οἱ (υ) οὐ μόνον ἀλλήλων ταῦτ' = ἴσασιν ἃ πᾶσιν ὁρᾶν ἔξεστιν, υ υ υ υ _ υ υ _ _ _ υ. It is to be noticed that not only the last syllable of rhythms is indifferent, but also the first, if the rhythm begins with an iamb, for which a spondee as well may stand; and secondly, that in all Attic prosaists the *dactyl and the tribrach may be interchanged*. This exception to the general rule, which enjoins exact correspondence, seems to be due to the first syllable of the dactyl being somewhat shortened in common pronunciation, and moreover not to be utterly alien to poetry itself.¹ Ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀποκρυπτόμε|-(a)-θα μηδέν' εἰδέναι| (b) καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων πυν|-(c)-θάνονται; ἐμοὶ τοίνυν| (c) τούτων οἱ μὲν

¹ This pronunciation is attested by Dionysius (*De Compas.* p. 142, cp. 109) for the Homeric verse Od. λ, 598, αἶτις ἔπειτα πέδονδε κ.τ.έ. Rossbach, *Metrik*,

3rd ed. p. 10. In Euripides, *Phæn.* 196, ἀσπιδοφέρμονα θίασον ξυοπλον corresponds to _ υ υ _ υ υ _ υ υ _ υ υ of the antistrophe.

φίλοι | (b)οί δὲ διάφοροι περὶ τῶν ἐμῶν | (a). The scheme of correspondence is *abccba*; *a* _ υ υ υ υ _ υ υ _ υ υ; *b* υ _ υ _ υ _; *c* υ υ υ υ _ _ _ . The correspondence of *bb* is less exact than it ought to be; but also the construction ἀποκρυπτόμεθα μηδέν' εἰδέναι has provoked many conjectures. As some rare infractions of the strict rule of correspondence seem undeniable—cp. above on Isocrates *Paneg.* § 1—I should not venture to alter the text.¹ Τυγχάνουσιν | ὄντες· οὗς ἐ | - (dd)-χρῆν τοῦτον παρα- | (e)-σχέσθαι μάρτυρας | (e): *d* _ υ _ υ, *e* _ _ _ υ _ . Καὶ μὴ μόνον οὕτως τολμηρὰς = κατηγορίας ποιῆσθ(αι), ὅς φησ(ι), υ _ υ υ _ _ _ _ . The -αι in the inflexions of the verb may be elided as in Homer and the comic poets. Ὡς ἐγὼ μὲν παρει- | -στήκῃ, οἱ δ' οἰκέται | ἐξέτεμνον τὰ πρέμν(a), thrice _ υ _ _ υ _ , giving a series of six cretics. Παρειστήκη instead of -κεῖν has been rightly restored by van Herwerden, this being the form of older Atticism. Ἀναθέμενος δ' ὁ βοηλάτης | ὥχετ' ἀπάγων τὰ ξύλα. Ἀναθέμενος δ' = ὥχετ' ἀπάγων, -ηλάτης = τὰ ξύλα; but for ὁ βο- there is no correspondence. But also, for the sense, the last words are both abundant and defective: τὰ ξύλα and τὰ πρέμνα are identical, and whither the logs were carried is not stated. *Insert ἐπὶ before τὰ ξύλα, and rhythm and sense will be alike perfect; τὰ ξύλα now is that part of the market where wood was sold.* This conjecture met with the entire approval of my friend Dr. Photiades of Smyrna, who hastened to ask my leave to publish it in the Ἀθηνᾶ. We may still go on: (§ 20) καίτοι ὦ Νικόμαχε = χρῆν σε [τότε] καὶ παρακαλεῖν; τοὺς παριόντας μάρτυρας = καὶ φανερόν ποιεῖν τὸ πρᾶ-; -γμα, καὶ ἐμοὶ μὲν ἂν οὐ- = -δεμίαν ἀπολογί- (μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἂν the Palatinus); -αν ὑπέλιπες, αὐτὸς δ' εἰ = μὲν σοῖ ἐχθρὸς ἦ (υ; ἦ instead of ἦν van Herwerden; as necessary as παρειστήκη above) ἐν τούτῳ, _ υ υ υ υ _ _ _; τῷ τρόπῳ ἦσθ' ἂν με τετιμω- | (a, _ υ υ _ _ υ υ _ _) -ρημένος· εἰ δὲ (b, _ υ υ _ υ, = *a* last part) |

¹ Thucyd. II. 53, 1, ἀ πρότερον ἀπεκρύπτετο μὴ καθ' ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν is compared.

τῆς πόλεως ἔνεκ' (οἱ εἶνεκ') ἔπραττες | (α), οὕτως ἐξελέγξας |
 (c, _ _ _ υ _ _) οὐκ ἐδόκεις ἄν | (b; ἄν ἐδόκεις Palat.) εἶναι συκο-
 φάντης | (c). (§ 21) εἰ δὲ κερδαί- = -νειν ἐβούλου; τότε ἄν <καὶ ἔ>¹
 πλείστον ἔλαβες· φανεροῦ = γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ πράγματος οὐδεμίαν,
 υ _ _ _ υ υ υ _ υ υ υ; ἄλλην ἡγούμην [ἄν] = εἶναί μοι σωτη-; -ρίαν
 ἦ = σὲ πείσαι; τούτων τοίνυν οὐ- (= εἶναί μοι σωτη- above);
 -δὲν ποίησας (οἱ ποήσας) διὰ τοὺς σοὺς λόγους = ἀξιοῖς μ' ἀπο-
 λίσαι (Palat. ἀπολέσθαι; supply τούτους, the judges), καὶ
 κατη-, _ υ _ _ υ υ _ _ υ _; -γορεῖς ὡς ὑπὸ τῆς = ἐμῆς δυνάμει;
 καὶ τῶν ἐμῶν χρημάτων οὐδεὶς ἐθέλει = σοι μαρτυρεῖν. καίτοι εἰ
 φήσας ἔμ' ἰδεῖν (Reiske: φῆς μὴ δεῖν, Palat.; I have written
 ἔμ' instead of μ'), _ _ υ _ _ υ _ _ υ υ _; τὴν μορίαν ἀφανί-
 (α) | -ζοντα τοὺς (b) | ἐννέ' ἄρ- (b) | -χοντας ἐπήγαγες ἦ (α);
 ἄλλους τινὰς = τῶν ἐξ Ἀρεί-; -ου πάγου, οὐκ = ἄν ἐτέρων; ἔδει
 σοι μαρτύρων, (c) οὗτοι (Muretus instead of οὕτω) γὰρ [ἄν σοι]
 συνῆ- (d) -δεσαν ἀληθῆ λέγον- (e) | = -τι, οἵπερ καὶ δια- (c) | -γι-
 γνώσκειν ἔμελ- (d) -λον περὶ τοῦ πράγματος (e; cde = cde).

A smooth analysis like this, without any violent altera-
 tions, seems to me a cogent proof of the theory for any
 impartial reader; for it is impossible to make the members
 and particles of a speech agree in such a way, without
 the general warrant of the author. I say the general
 warrant; for there cannot be a special warrant for each
 single alteration.

Still more important is the emendation suggested by
 the rhythms in *Demosthenes'* second Olynthiac, § 6.² I begin
 with § 5: Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπίορκον | (α) κἄπιστον καλεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ |
 (b) τὰ πεπραγμένα δεικνύναι | (c) λοιδορίαν τις ἄν | (d) φήσειεν
 κενὴν δικαίως· | (b) τὸ δὲ πάνθ' ὅσα πρόποτ' ἔ- | (c) -πραξε
 διεξιόντ' | (d) ἐφ' ἅπασιν [τούτοις] ἐλέγχειν | (α) καὶ βραχέως
 λόγου | (d). The first rhythm (α) is almost like (c), only
 shorter by one syllable: υ υ _ υ υ _ _ α, υ υ _ υ υ _ υ _ c; (d) is

¹ Like καὶ μάλιστα, καὶ πάντῃ, etc.

van Herwerden (Utrecht, 1902), p. 25

² I have treated this passage in:
 Album gratulatorium in honorem H.

ff., unfortunately still with overlapping;
 see above, p. 26.

= (c) minus the first two syllables, (υυ) _ υυ _ υυ. There is some doubt about the last rhythm but one: I have bracketed the superfluous *τούτοις*, instead of which the variant *τοιούτων* gives a better sense, but no convenient rhythm. The next rhythms are quite clear: *συμβαίνει δεῖσθαι* | (e) *καὶ δυοῖν ἔνεχ'* *ἡγοῦμαι* *συμ-* (f) | *-φέρειν εἰρῆσθαι* | (e), *τοῦ τ' ἐκείνον ὅπερ* *κἀληθὲς* | (f), υ _ _ _ _ | _ υ _ υυ _ _ _ υ. The assonance *δεῖσθαι-εἰρῆσθαι* shows the well-known tendency to reinforce rhythmical likeness by likeness of sound—a tendency which is as common in rhythmical prose as it is in lyric poetry. *Ὑπάρχει φαῦ* | *λον φαίνεσθαι* | , υ _ _ _ ; *καὶ τοὺς ὑπερεκπῆπληγμέ-*, the rhythm f minus the first syllable. Then *-νους ὡς ἄμαχον τινα τὸν Φίλιππον* | *ἰδεῖν ὅτι πάντα διεξελήλυ-*, υ _ υυ _ υυ _ υυ ; *-θεν οἷς πρότερον πα-* = *-ρακρουόμενος με-*, that is to say, like the beginning of the next rhythm, this being a frequent case, that either the beginning of a rhythm is repeated before it, or its end after it. (Πα)*ρακρουόμενος μέγας ηὐξήθη* (g) *καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἦκει* | (h) *τὴν τελευτὴν [τὰ πράγματα] αὐτῷ* | (h). *ἐγὼ γὰρ ὦ* (υ) *ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι* | (g, υ _ υυ _ υυ _ _ _). How can Demosthenes possibly say that Philip's power had come (*ἦκει*) to an immediate end? But the rhythms clearly exclude *τὰ πράγματα*, and now *πάντα* becomes the subject of *ἦκει*, as it was the subject of *διεξελήλυθεν*. Commonly (and already in the scholia) Philip is regarded as the subject; but Demosthenes' use of *διεξεληλυθῆναι* points to another way: *πάντα δ' ἤδη διεξεληλύθει ταῦτα τὰς τῶν νόμων, ὑπωμοσίαι καὶ παραγραφαί, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτ' ἦν ὑπόλοιπον*, XXI. 84, "was exhausted," just as here. This is an important improvement of the text, and is entirely due to the rhythms; for I myself, in my last edition of Rehdantz' commentary (1894), although I had found the true sense of *διεξελήλυθεν*, had not hit upon cancelling *τὰ πράγματα*. But it is not this correction which I spoke of, but another still more important. *Σφύδρ' ἂν ἡγοόμην* | = *-δρες Ἀθηναῖοι* (end of the precedent rhythm);

καὐτὸς φοβερόν <τε> | (i) τὸν Φίλιππον καὶ θαυμαστόν, εἰ τὰ
 δίκαι- | - (k)-α πράττονθ' ἐώ- | (l) -ρων ἡνέκμητον· | (l) νυν<ι>
 δὲ θεωρῶν | (i) καὶ σκοπῶν εὐρίσκω τὴν μὲν ἡμετέραν | (k, _ υ _ _ _ _ ,
 _ υ _ υ υ _) εὐήθειαν τὸ κατ' ἀρχάς, ὅτ' Ὀλυνθίους | ἀπήλαυνόν
 τινες ἐνθένδε, βουλομένους ἡμῖν διαλεχθῆναι κ.τ.έ. Although
 εὐήθειαν τὸ κατ' ἀρχάς is = ἀπήλαυνόν τινες ἐνθένδε, the rest does
 not yield to analysis, *unless we substitute 'the Amphipolitans'*
for 'the Olynthians,' in accordance with I. 8: εὐήθειαν τὸ κατ'
ἀρχάς, ὅτ' Ἀμφιπολίτας = ἀπήλαυνόν τινες ἐνθένδε βουλομένους
ἡ-, υ _ _ _ υ υ _ _ , υ _ υ υ _ _ . When I proposed this correction
 to Professor Edward Meyer, then my colleague, he declared
 that "it seemed evident, because we knew nothing of the
 Olynthians being at that time in treaty with Athens, nor
 was that likely anyway." As the speech is an Ὀλυνθιακός,
 and the Olynthians are mentioned a little below, the error
 of the scribe is easy to explain, and Ἀμφιπολίτας—τὴν
 Ἀμφίπολιν below are quite in accordance with each other.
 The next rhythms are: (ἡ)μῖν διαλεχθῆναι, τῷ | (m) τὴν
 Ἀμφίπολιν φά- | (end of what precedes m, -δε βουλομένους
 ἡ- = ὅτ' Ἀμφιπολίτας) -σκειν παραδώσειν καὶ τῷ (τῷ vulg.,
 τὸ SF; I combine both readings) | (m) τὸ θρυλούμενον |
 (n) ποτ' ἀπόρρη | - (o) -τον ἐκεῖνο | (o) κατασκευάσαι | (n). The
 author seems to take the whole piece τὸ θρυλούμενον . . .
 κατασκευάσαι as a whole; for he repeats the latter part of it:
 -πόρρητον ἐκεῖνο κατασκευάσαι | = τούτῳ προσαγαγόμενον, τὴν δ'
 Ὀλυν-, _ _ υ υ υ υ υ _ _ υ _ . Then, -θίων φίλιαν μετὰ ταῦτα τῷ
 Ποτεί- | , the same rhythm, but that before the cretic one
 syllable is inserted: υ _ υ υ _ υ υ _ , υ, _ υ _ , which is perhaps
 compensated by the pause existing before τὴν δ' Ὀλυν- in the
 corresponding member. (Ποτεί)δαιαν οὔσαν ἡμετέραν ἐξελεῖν
 καὶ <τῷ> τοὺς | (p, _ υ _ υ _ υ υ _ , _ υ _ _ _ _) μὲν πρότερον συμμά-
 χους ἡμᾶς | (q, _ υ υ _ _ υ _ _ _) ἀδικῆσαι, παραδοῦναι δ' ἐκείνοις |
 (r, υ υ _ _ υ υ _ _ υ _ _), Θετταλοὺς δὲ νῦν τὰ τελευταῖα τῷ Μαγνησί- |
 (p) -αν παραδώσειν ὑποσχέσθαι | (q), καὶ τὸν Φωκικὸν πόλεμον
 πολεμήσειν | (s, _ _ _ υ _ υ υ _ υ υ _ _) ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἀναδέξασθ(αι).

ἔλως δ' οὐ- | (τ) -δεῖς ἐσθ' ὄντιν' οὐ πεφενάκις ἐκεῖνος (ς). These rhythms are clear enough; and they decidedly protect ὑμᾶς, which I have omitted and Butcher has bracketed. Our reasons for this are rather strong: for the Athenians had never been Philip's allies; but the Athenian inhabitants of Potidaea had been (see VII. 10); and the scholiast rightly explains *συμμάχους* by τοὺς Ποτιδαίαντας. So it seems that we must write χῦμᾶς, which satisfies both the sense and the rhythms.

I do not proceed further. It is evident that we have also Demosthenes' general warrant to analyse his text into corresponding rhythms. His rhythms, at least in this passage, are grander than those of Lysias, the dactyls and anapæsts abounding, although within one rhythm more than two of them are never combined, in accordance with Isocrates' practice¹ and with Aristotle's theory, who holds dactyls to be too grand for prose (Rhet. III., 8, p. 1408, b, 32). By a rule of his own, Demosthenes, as much as possible, avoids the tribrach, as broken and inconsistent with the character of dignified public speech. In the passage analysed above there is but one tribrach (*προσαγαγόμενον*), which the orator could not avoid, as he cannot avoid *Μακεδονία*, *πολέμιος*, and many other words with a tribrach. In the same way, the same foot entered into tragedy: not even Aeschylus was able wholly to banish it. On the contrary, Plato, more especially in his later writings, is very fond of this foot, as suiting the loose character of conversation. I must say something more of Plato, who, with Demosthenes, is the other great master of rhythmic prose.²

As a matter of fact, rhythmical composition is to be found everywhere in Plato, as well in his earliest writings as in his latest, although there is a marked difference

¹ See *Rhythmen der attischen Kunstprosa*, 157 ff., 192 ff.

² Dionysius Hal., *De compos.*, p. 117 R.

between the former and the latter regarding the hiatus. At first Plato altogether neglects what others attended to, and both elision of short vowels and shortening of long ones (or diphthongs) are continually employed; but the last writings—that is to say, the *Laws*, *Sophistes*, *Politicus*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Philebus*—show much greater care, at least concerning long vowels and diphthongs. I shall take an instance of Plato's rhythms from the very first dialogue in our collection, the *Euthyphron*.

Euthyphr. 15 D (conclusion of the dialogue). Εἰπὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν· | οἴσθα γὰρ εἴ- | -περ τις ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων, | κοῦκ ἀφετέ-,
 _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ ; -ος ἂν εἴης (E instead of εἶ) ὥσ- | -περ ὁ
 Πρωτεύς, πρὶν | ἂν εἴπῃς. | εἰ γάρ μὴ | , _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ ; ἤδησθα
 σαφῶς τό θ' ὅσιον καὶ τὸ | ἀνόσιον οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἂν ποτ',
 _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ ; ἐπεχείρησας | ὑπὲρ ἀνδρὸς θη- (_ _ _ _ , =
 -ος ἂν εἴης ὥσ- | -περ ὁ Πρωτεύς, πρὶν above); -τὸς ἀνδρα πρε- |
 -σβύτην πατέ- | (_ _ _ _) -ρα διωκάθειν | φόνοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ |
 (_ _ _ _) [τοὺς] θεοὺς (οἱ ἀλλὰ τοὺς | θεοὺς <τ'>) ἂν ἔδεισας
 παρακινδυνεύ- (= ἀνόσιον οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἂν ποτ'); -ειν, μὴ οὐκ
 ὀρθῶς | αὐτὸ ποιήσης | (_ _ _ _) καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡσχύνθης (α)
 | . νῦν δ' εὔ (_) οἶδ' ὅτι σαφῶς οἶη (β) | εἰδέναι τό θ' ὅσιον καὶ μή (β) |
 εἴπ' οὖν ὦ βέλτιστ' Εὐθύφρον (α) | · καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύψῃς, τι αὐθ'
 ἡγῇ | . The last colon contains (for the fourth time) the
 rhythm _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ; καὶ τοὺς κ.τ.έ. and εἴπ' οὖν κ.τ.έ. (α)
 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ; νῦν δ' and εἰδέναι κ.τ.έ. (β) _ _ _ _ _ _ . ΕΥΘ.
 Εἰσαῦθις τοίνυν ὦ Σώκρα- | -τες νῦν γὰρ σπεύδω ποι, καί μοι
 (= εἴπ' οὖν ὦ βέλτιστ' Εὐθύφρον); ὦρα ἀπιέναῖ. (ΣΩ) οἶα
 ποι- | -εἰς ὦ (_) ἑταῖρε· ἀπ' ἐλπίδος με | καταβαλὼν μεγάλης
 ἀπέρχῃ, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (_), without elision in ἑταῖρε. 'Εταῖρ'
 <δτ'> ἀπ' ? Ἦν εἶχον, ὥς παρὰ σοῦ | μαθὼν τά θ' ὅσια καὶ,
 _ _ _ _ _ _ . The next colon (or cola) μὴ καὶ τῆς πρὸς
 Μέλητον γραφῆς | ἀπαλλάξομ(αι) ἐνδειξά- agrees with the
 corresponding member of the sentence, which is the last
 of the dialogue: (αὐ)τὰ, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον | [ὅτι]
 (bracketed by Schanz and also by Burnet) ἄμεινον βιωσοίμην,

$\sigma _ _ _ \sigma _ _ \sigma _ _ _ | \sigma _ _ \sigma _ _ _ \sigma$. The intermediate part of the sentence is analysed thus: $-\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\varsigma \ \epsilon\kappa\epsilon\iota\nu\omega\ \delta\tau\iota \ | \ \sigma\omicron\phi\omicron\varsigma \ \eta\delta\eta \ <\tau\omicron\iota\ \dot{\iota}> \ | \ \pi\alpha\rho' \ \epsilon\upsilon\theta\upsilon\phi\rho\omicron\nu\omicron\varsigma \ \tau\grave{\alpha} \ \theta\epsilon\iota\alpha \ | \ \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\nu\alpha \ \kappa\alpha\iota \ \delta\tau\iota \ \omicron\upsilon- \ | \ -\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\theta' \ \upsilon\pi' \ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\nu\omicron\iota\alpha\varsigma \ | \ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\sigma\chi\epsilon\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\zeta\omega \ \omicron\upsilon\delta\grave{\epsilon} \ | \ \kappa\alpha\iota\nu\omicron\tau\omicron\mu\omega \ \pi\epsilon\rho\iota \ \alpha\upsilon(\tau\acute{\alpha}), \ \sigma\sigma\sigma\sigma\sigma\sigma\sigma\sigma \ (a), \ \sigma\sigma _ _ _ (b), \ \sigma _ \sigma\sigma _ \sigma _ \sigma \ (c) \text{ twice, and lastly, again, } _ \sigma\sigma _ \sigma\sigma _ = a \ (a \ b \ c \ a \ b \ c \ a).$

The enormous difference between this most graceful composition and the Demosthenic hardly needs a commentary. The tribrachs are very numerous, and contribute a great deal to that character. In many passages, both of Plato and of Demosthenes, the character of the rhythms is even mimetic, varying in strict accordance with the subject; but it would take too much space to illustrate this here; and I have given many instances in my books, to which I may refer the reader.¹ He will do still better if he pursues the subject by himself; for the field of inquiry extends widely in all directions. But he must not shirk taking pains and devoting time, at least if he is to find more than single correspondences, which are easily met with. Besides, he must possess a natural aptitude for rhythm, and a thorough training in prosody. In a well-known big German book, which deals with prose rhythm as well as with many other easier topics, the following prosodies are found: $\acute{\omicron} \ \delta\grave{\epsilon} \ \sigma\tau\rho\alpha\tau\eta\gamma\omicron\varsigma \ \sigma\sigma\sigma _ \sigma$, $\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\gamma\nu\omega\sigma\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\nu \ \sigma\sigma _ \sigma _$, $\eta\delta\iota\omicron\nu$ (in Attic prose) $_ \sigma\sigma$, $\tau\omicron\iota\alpha\nu\tau\acute{\iota} _ _ \sigma$, $\text{Μαγνησίαν} \ \sigma _ \sigma _$, $\text{Μίδου} _ _$. The same author states, as self-evident, that a cretic may have the form of a molossus ($_ _ _$), and for proof refers to Quintilian IX. 4, 48, where nothing of the kind is to be found. I am fully entitled to decline such men as judges of my theories: they lack the necessary knowledge.

F. BLASS.

¹ See the Index ("Mimetischer Rhythmus") in my latter book, and in the former, pp. 87 ff., 169 ff., 175, 192, 194.

NOTES ON APULEIUS' *METAMORPHOSES*.

THE following are a few conjectures and remarks which occurred to me when reading through the *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius. Among the very considerable amount of recent literature on this interesting writer, the most instructive works are, I think, Christian Lütjohann's *Kritische Beiträge zu Apuleius' Metamorphosen* in the third volume of the 'Acta Societatis Philologicæ Lipsiensis,' 1873, pp. 445-504, and Erwin Rohde's *Zu Apuleius* in 'Rheinisches Museum,' xl. (1885), pp. 66-113.

i. 2.

Isto accepto sititor alioquin novitatis "Immo vero" inquam "impertite sermones non quidem curiosum sed qui velim scire vel cuncta vel certe plurima."

Eyssenhardt reads *curioso*: but probably the right reading is that indicated by Oudendorp and Heinsius, *impertite sermones*. *Non quidem curiosus sum, sed, &c.* (Oud. reads *impartire*, as he supposes the words of Lucius to be addressed only to the relator of the wonder, and not to both travellers—a view rightly rejected by Hildebrand). The regular construction of *impertire* in Apul. is with acc. of the thing. As far as I know, it is only once used with the abl., Apol. 97, *non modo heredem non reliquit* (sc. *filiam Rufini*) *sed ne honesto quidem legato impertivit*. For the sentiment, Price quotes St. Augustine, Confessions, ii. 6, *Curiositas affectare videtur studium scientiæ*.

36 NOTES ON APULEIUS' METAMORPHOSES.

i. 13.

At bona Panthia "quin igitur" inquit, "soror, hunc primum bacchatim discerpimus."

We should perhaps add *Meroe* after *soror*. She called her companion *soror Panthia*. Aristomenes continues his narrative thus *Ad haec Meroe—sic enim reapse nomen eius tunc fabulis Socratis convenire sentiebam—'immo' ait, &c.* Now unless Panthia had named her, Aristomenes would not have been able to know that it was really Meroe; and the word *nomen* shows that she must have been named.

ii. 5.

haec tibi trepido et cavenda censes. Nam et illa urit perpetuum et tu per aetatem et pulcritudinem capax eius es.

Byrrhena is telling Lucius of the fate of those on whom Pamphile casts the eyes of her desire. But *urit* can hardly be right. It is transitive, and no object is expressed: for *perpetuum* is plainly adverbial. Blümner (*Mélanges Nicole*, p. 26) alters to *uritur*, but this is too mild a word. We should probably read *prurit*.

ii. 6.

et voto diutino poteris fabulis miseris explere pectus.

That Oudendorp is right in reading *miris* seems indubitable. Lucian's¹ words are (§ 5) ἄγε δὴ σὺ, ὁ φάσκων ἐπιθυμεῖν ταύτης τῆς παραδόξου θέας, ἔγειρέ μοι σεαυτόν. But it was rather to satiate himself with wondrous sights and activities than with wondrous tales that Lucius was eager. It would be preferable to read *fabulosis miris*, taking the latter word substantively.

A few lines later, for *verum enim puero*, perhaps, we

¹ Or whoever was the author of the Lucian's works.
treatise Λούκιος § Όρες, printed among

should read *verum enim perverso*. That *perverso* is not found elsewhere need not disturb us in Apuleius. Koziol (*Der Stil des L. Apuleius*, p. 282) quotes many adverbs used only by Apuleius; and an excessively strong asseveration like this is suited to the excitement of Lucius.

ii. 19.

Frequens ibi numerus epulorum et utpote apud primatem feminam flos ipse civitatis. Opipares citro et ebore nitentes lecti aureis vestibibus iniecti, ampli calices, &c.

The couches and the cups are spoken of, but not apparently the tables. The clause *opipares . . . nitentes* can hardly refer to the *lecti*;¹ for all the other features of the feast (*calices, diribitores, calamistrati pueri*) are put at the beginning of their several clauses: so that Rohde is undoubtedly right in supposing that clause to refer to tables. He adds *mensae* before *opipares*. Better add *orbes*, as the similarity in form to *opipares* may have caused its loss. For the Roman passion for splendid tables, see Mayor's most learned notes on Juvenal i. 137-139. The tables of Byrrhena were of citrus wood with ivory feet, cp. Dio Cass. lxi. 10. 3. For the form *opiparis* (of two terminations) cp. i. 24: vi. 19: vii. 11: ix. 16.

ii. 25.

iam ecce crepusculum et nox provecta et nox altior et dein concubia altiora et iam nox intempesta mihique oppido formido cumulator quidem, cum repente introrepens mustela contra me constitit optutumque acerrimum in me destituit ut tantillula animalis prae nimia sui fiducia mihi turbarit animum.

It is worth printing this effective sentence, which tends to make one "creepy," in order to show the literary skill

¹ Of course *lecti* were also at times made of citrus wood: cp. Pers. i. 52 *nec quicquid denique lectis scribitur in citreis.*

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of Apuleius. There is a slight awkwardness in the words *mihiq̄ue . . . cumulatior quidem* which Vliet has felt. He reads *mihiq̄ue <iam> oppido formid<anti formid>o cumulatior quidem*. I should prefer simply to transpose *formido* and *oppido*, and put a comma after *formido*.

For *destituit* = *defixit*, the edd. refer to C. Gracchus ap. Gell. x. 3. 3 *palus destitutus est in foro*.

ii. 26.

sic in modum superbi iuvenis Adoni vel †musteuats pipletist
laceratus atque discerptus domo proturbor.

That the references are to Pentheus and Orpheus may be considered certain. Hence for *Adoni* Salmasius rightly substituted *Aonii*, an adj. often applied to what was Boeotian, e. g. Statius (Theb. iv. 410) calls Tiresias *Aonius vates*. In the corrupt words it is plain that *vats* stands for *vatis*, which is found in ϕ . What *mustei* conceals is not certain: Dilthey and Eyssenhardt approve of *mystae*, Beroaldus *Musaei*, Rohde *mystici*, Scioppius *musici*; and this is, I think, the most probable conjecture. As the adjective is *Pimpleus* or *Pipleus*, not *Pipleis*, we must read *Piplei*. The *-is* is probably the remnant of *dis-*: so that the whole passage would run *iuvenis Aonii vel musici vatis Piplei dislaceratus atque discerptus*. For *musicus* applied to a poet cp. Ausonius Epist. 7 (ii) init. (= p. 230, Peiper) *Versus meos utili et conscio sibi pudore celatos carmine tuo et sermone praemissis dum putas elici, repressisti: nam qui ipse facundus et musicus editionis alienae prolectat audaciam, consilio, quo suadet, exterret*: cp. Epist. 25 (21) fin. (= p. 272. 46, Peiper). In Ter. Heaut. Prol. 23, it refers to the dramatic branch of poetry.

ii. 28.

da brevem solis usuram et in aeternum conditis oculis modicam lucem infunde. Non obnitimur . . . nec terrae rem suam denegamus, sed ad ultionis solacium exiguum vitae spatium deprecamur.

Rohde seems right in supposing that something is lost after *obnitimur*, and has suggested *fato*, comparing iv. 21 *vitam fato reddidit*; or *neci* (Rhein. Mus., 1876, p. 148), which might have fallen out owing to *nec*, but which can hardly be personified. Possibly *Libitinae*, the concluding letters of which have a close resemblance to those of *obnitimur*; cp. Hor. Carm. iii. 30. 6; Juv. 12. 122.

iii. 2.

nam inter tot milia populi circumsedentis nemo prorsum qui non risu dirrumperetur aderat.

The people were not seated, so that *circumsedentis* must be wrong. Price suggested *circumfluentis*, comparing iv. 20 *populi circumfluentis turbelis immisceor*; and this is adopted by Vliet. Hildebrand conjectures *circumstrepentis*. Others *circum sequentis*, or *sidentis*, or *stantis*, or *fundentis se*. Lütjohann (p. 484) proposes *circumsecus incedentis*, as *circumsecus* is a favourite word of Apuleius, cp. ii. 15: v. 17: xi. 16. (Indeed the word appears to be found only in Apuleius, if we may believe the Dictionaries and Koziol, p. 282.) But perhaps the simplest alteration is *circumdensentis*. A few lines before we have *civitas omnis . . . mira densitate nos insequitur*.

iii. 4.

facile vos edocebo me discrimen capitis non meo merito sed rationabilis indignationis eventu fortuito tantam criminis invidiam frustra sustinere.

The balance of the sentence requires that there should

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be a verb with *non meo merito*. Rohde accordingly adds *subire*. The omission will be better explained if we read *meo <mereri> merito*; and we further obtain an Apuleian alliteration. For alliteration in Apuleius cp. Kretschmann (*De Latinitate L. Apulei*, 1865), p. 11 ff., esp. p. 14.

iii. 10.

hi gaudii nimietate gratulari, illi dolorem ventris manuum compressione sedare: et certe laetitia delibuti meque respectantes cuncti theatro facessunt.

Vliet is right in saying that *gratulari* is "vix sanum." No doubt *gratulari* can mean 'to congratulate oneself' and so 'to rejoice,' but that is a somewhat flat expression here; cp. vii. 26 *serae vindictae gratulabar*: ix. 22 *laboris libertatem gratulabar* (two passages which show the different constructions of the word in Apuleius); Apol. 1 *gratulor . . . quod mihi copia et facultas . . . obtigit*: 41 *quod ego gratulor nescire istos*: Flor. 16, p. 73 *vir cui omnes provinciae quadriiuges et seiuges currus ubique gentium ponere gratulantur*. Here we require a word of a comic and jocular nature, expressing some outward action to correspond with 'holding their sides' (as we say) with laughter. I suggest *graculare*, a word formed from *graculus*, 'a jackdaw.' Many such words are found in the *Carmen de Philomela* (Bährens, P. L. M. v. 363 ff.), e.g. 23 *Grus gruit*: 35 *cuculi cuculant*: 37 *Bubilat . . . bubo*: 41 *ululant ululae*: 42 *butio butit*: 53 *barrus barrit*: 62 *grillus grillat*. The chief objection that may be made to this is that *fringulire*, 'to chirp,' is the word applied by the author of this poem to the sound made by the jackdaw (*graculus*). But that word is applied by Apuleius to the note of the blackbird: cp. Flor. 17, p. 81 *merulae in remotis tesquis fringultiunt*; and the note of the blackbird and the 'caw' of the jackdaw can hardly be indicated by the same word. I think

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Apuleius coined *graculare* to indicate 'to caw' or 'to cackle.' The diminutive *gracillo* is perhaps applied to the cluck of the hen in the poem mentioned above l. 25 *cucurrire solet gallus, gallina gracillat* (where, however, Bährens reads *cacillat*).

v. 4.

atque, ut est natura redditum, novitas per assiduam consuetudinem delectationem ei commendarat.

This is the reading of the MSS., and Vliet ought to have retained it; for *novitas* means the 'unusualness' of Psyche's whole surroundings. Such surroundings naturally at first would cause alarm; but when nothing ill occurred, they became pleasant. It is not necessary to take *novitas* in the sense of the state of affairs at their inception; indeed *per assiduam consuetudinem* would render such an interpretation a contradiction in terms. The use of *redditum* is familiar to readers of Lucretius; cp. Munro on ii. 96. The most ingenious emendation of the passage is that of Schröter, quoted by Jahn,¹ *in delectationem se commutarat*; but it is unnecessary.

v. 6.

et imprimens oscula suasoria et ingerens verba mulcentia et ingerens membra co. entia.

The second *ingerens* must be wrong. The ordinary correction is *iungens*. One Oxford MS. reads *inserens*, which seems a very good emendation; and this is adopted by Vliet. Certainly the rhythm of the sentence suggests that some compound of *in-* with the second syllable short is the word required. Oudendorp's correction of *ingerens* (before *verba*) into *inferens* is, I think,

¹ Apulei Psyche et Cupido recensuit Ad. Michaelis) 1895.
et emendavit Otto Jahn (ed. 4 by

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needless: we want a word like *ingerens*, which expresses the impetuosity and earnestness with which Psyche presses her endearments. The margin of F has *conhibentia* for *co. entia*, and this is the reading of ϕ , and of most inferior MSS. The objection to *conhibentia* is that *cohibere* is a transitive verb, and does not very well express the idea of limbs clinging fast-locked together. The reading of Lütjohann (p. 461), *cogentia*,¹ is happy, as it expresses the double idea of 'compressing' (physically) and 'constraining' (assent on Cupid's part), and thus harmonizes with *suasoria* and *mulcentia*.

V. 14.

Psyche non ita ut pridem parvula et ipsa iam mater es.

Editors follow Lütjohann (p. 462) in omitting *ut*. Of course *non ita pridem* 'not so long ago' is found, e.g. Apol. 72. Still perhaps *ut* can be defended. We might translate 'Psyche, not as a while ago our little Psyche, why, you actually (i.e. even you, our little Psyche) are already a mother,' a natural address from elder sisters. The tenderness of the diminutive thus comes out. For *et ipsa* cp. 17 *tu quidem felix et ipsa tanti mali ignorantia beata sedes*: 22 *iam et ipsum lumen lucernae vacillabat*: 23 *et quasi basiare et ipsa* (sc. *lucerna*) *gestiebat*.

V. 29.

cum eius comas quas istis manibus meis subinde aureo nitore perstrinxi deraserit.

I quote this passage chiefly to notice the wonderfully ingenious emendation of Heinsius *Arabo nidore perunxi*, who compares ii. 9 (*capillus*) *cum guttis Arabicis obunctus* and Ovid Heroid. 15. 76 *Non Arabo noster rore capillus olet*.

¹ Jahn (ed. Michaelis) says that *cogentia* is the reading of F: but query.

Yet it is difficult to believe it necessary; and the words of the MSS. seem the more beautiful, 'I touched with a golden gleam.' For *nitor* cp. ii. 9 init. *capillis color gratus et nitor splendidus*. The dark-haired peoples of the south admired light hair. But I would prefer to read *pertinxi* 'I steeped in golden gleam'; the indignation of Venus required a strong word. It is really no objection that *pertinguo* is not elsewhere found. The number of ἀπαξ εἰρημένα in Apuleius is great. (See Koziol, Der Stil des L. Apuleius, pp. 277-280, for the verbs. He quotes, as an example of such verbs compounded with *per-*, *perquiescere* viii. 22.)

vi. 11.

Interim Cupido solus interioris domus tunicit cubiculi custodia clausus cohercebatur acriter.

For the corrupt *unici* many emendations have been advanced:—*intimi* (Rohde), *aurei* (Vliet, who compares vi. 29), *gunaecei*, omitting *cubiculi* (Traube, a reading undeservedly praised by Weyman), *muniti* (Price), *invii* (Heinsius), *minuti* (Hildebrand). I should prefer *vicini*. The lovers were *sub uno tecto separati*, as is stated a few lines further on.

vi. 14.

Dextra laevaue cautibus cavatis proserpunt et longa colla porrecti saevi dracones.

Lütjohann ejects the *et*, and Michaelis and Vliet follow him. Weyman thinks that probably *strepunt* or *stridunt* is lost after *et*. Possibly *saeviunt* is lost before *saevi*. The fierce dragons crawl out of the rocks, and stretch out their long necks, and exhibit whatever form of fierceness belongs to dragons. The word *saevire* is applied to their teeth in the next chapter.

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vii. 6.

procuratorem principis ducenaria perfunctum, dehinc fortuna tristiore decussum, praetereuntem me orato fueram adgressus.

Hardly any passage in Apuleius is more discussed than this. The general view adopts some alteration like *deo meo irato* (Haupt), *deo irato* (Crusius), *meo fato* (Bursian), *Marte deo irato* (Vliet). Perhaps *me orato* is nothing more than *morato*, 'slowly,' 'in a dilatory manner,' and goes with *praetereuntem*. The official would not be in any hurry to reach his place of exile. As far as I know the positive is not found elsewhere. The Dictionaries quote a comparative *moratius* from Seneca, Q.N. vi. 14. 3 *neque enim in nobis febris alias partes moratius impellit sed per omnia pari aequalitate discurrit*, where, however, the best MS. reads *mordatius* (i.e. *mordacius*). Still a considerable number of MSS. give *moratius* (see Fickert's note). Even if no vestige of a parallel were found, yet an adverb *morato* would be defensible; for it is correctly formed, and it is not likely that it would be much in use. We should not expect to find such an adverb in English as 'lingeringly,' except very rarely.

vii. 9.

Nam et ipse quosdam lenones pridem cognitos habeo, quorum poterit unus magnis equidem talentis, ut arbitror, puellam istam praestinare, condigne natalibus suis fornicem processuram nec in similem fugam discursuram.

The usual emendation is *perpessuram*. Hildebrand seems to think that the text can be retained in the sense of 'will proceed into a *fornix*,' accusative of motion without a preposition, but confesses that he cannot quote a parallel. Rohde reads *fornicem professuram*, a strange expression, for which he compares *professus amicum*

Hor. Ep. i. 18. 2, which is itself at best only an approximate parallel, and requires us to take *fornix* = the occupants of a *fornix*,—a use found, as far as I know, in only one passage, and that a violent lampoon (Suet. Caes. 49). Even Haupt's *possessuram* is hardly satisfactory. Rather *fornice proessuram*. The *meretrices* often used to sit before their cells: cp. Ovid Pont. 2. 3. 20 *Prostat et in quaestu pro meretrice sedet*; and Plaut. Poen. 266 calls them *prosedas*, on which Paulus p. 226. 2 *prosedas meretrices Plautus appellat quae ante stabula sedeant; eadem et prostibulae*; and Plautus goes on to speak of *quae tibi olant stabulum stratumque, sellam et sessibulum merum*. And this is the best meaning to give to *sella* in Juv. 3. 136. For *c* found for *s*, cp. ii. 12 where *celebris* in the MSS. seems to be a mistake for *salubris*.

vii. 12.

Cuncti denique sed prorsus omnes vino sepulti iacebant omnes partim mortui.

So F: but ϕ has *omnes parati morti*, which is surely a conjecture. Oudendorp, with his wonted ingenuity, supposes that *omnes* is out of place, and reads *Cum denique omnes, sed prorsus omnes, vino sepulti iacebant, parati morti*. For *iacebant omnes* Rohde reads *iacebant ad somnos* (a strange expression), *partim mortui*; and quotes parallels (iv. 22: ix. 9) from the commentators of *partim* used without a correlative *partim*. But we can adhere to the tradition of F, and read, according to the indication of Eyssenhardt, *omnes partes* (or perhaps *omnis partis*) *mortui*. 'The whole lot of them, aye, absolutely every one, lay buried in drink, dead in all their limbs.' They were, in short, 'dead' drunk: *vino sepulti* is from Vergil Aen. iii. 630. Eyssenhardt's reading *omnem partim mortui* retains the archaic accusative of *pars*, for which see Neue-Wagener i³ 313 ff.

vii. 15 and 17.

frondosoque baculo subinde castigans.

A cudgel from which the leaves were not taken would not be a very formidable instrument from the ass's point of view. This consideration does not appear to have struck anyone except Blümner, who reads (Philologus, 1896, p. 350) *nodosoque*. But that word would hardly have been corrupted into *frondosoque*. Rather *ponderosoque*. If *er* was represented by a mark above the line, and that mark became obliterated, *pondosoque* would readily have been corrupted into *frondosoque*.

In the seventeenth chapter, where poor Lucius is again cudgelled, we read *fustium quoque crebris ictibus perclive dedolabar*. The inferior MSS. give *persepe* or *prosepe*. Lütjohann (p. 501) reads *prolixè* 'abundantly,' a word much used by Apuleius: Hildebrand, *perdite*. The latter is more probable, as *prolixè* is somewhat tautologous after *crebris ictibus*, not to speak of its being far from the MS. reading. Perhaps we should read *perdiu*, the *e* being added when *d* became *cl*; or could it be *per diem*, 'the live-long day'? cp. ix. 5 *at ego misera per nox et per diem lanificio nervos meos contorqueo*: also vii. 15 fin. *mihi vero per diem laboriosae machinae attento*, where Vliet need not have added *totum* after *diem*.

vii. 20.

et arridens addidit 'quo usque ergo frustra pascemus inigninum istum?'

The atrocious boy who was put to drive Lucius set fire to the load he carried; and he only escaped by rolling in a pool of water near at hand. The boy said the ass had stumbled near a fire, and set his pack ablaze, and then added with a laugh this remark, which is plainly of a jocular nature. The usual reading is *igninum*, the correc-

tion in the margin of ϕ , which seems to mean 'blazing,' *ignitum*—the termination being the same as in *divinus* according to Hildebrand. But if so, where is the joke? I think we should read *ignivum*, a jocular formation from *ignis*, and almost the same in form as *ignavum*. Epithets connoting laziness, *piger*, *ignavus*, are the stock epithets for asses. The ass is now not a 'lazy' but a 'blazy' ass. The pleasantries of rustics are often not over-subtle. A not wholly dissimilar joke, in a sentence similar to this, is found in viii. 23 *quem ad finem cantherium istum venui frustra subiciemus . . . nec quicquam amplius quam rudera-rium cribrum*, 'a rubbish sieve,' the skin of the ass is so full of holes that it could only be used for the coarsest kind of sieve, to sift *rudera*, the rubbish of ruined buildings. But there would seem to be a jocular reference to *rudere*, 'to bray.' For the ass's skin used as a sieve, cp. iii. 29 *caedentes hinc inde miserum corium nec cribris iam idoneum relinquunt*.

vii. 24.

Tali sententia mediis Orci manibus extractus sed extremae poenae reservatus maerebam et in novissima parte corporis totum me peritulum deflebam.

They determined not to kill the ass, but to emasculate him, owing to his amorous propensities. Probably then we should read *navissima*. This seems less extravagant than the conjecture of Heinsius *nobilissima*, besides being nearer to the MSS. In vi. 1 the MSS. vary between *naviter* and *noviter*.

vii. 27.

Est enim congruens pessimis conatibus contra noxiam conscientiam sperare securitatem.

This reading *sperare* would seem to mean 'to hope for safety in order to still a guilty conscience.' Vliet

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alters to *parare*, quoting Tac. Agric. 16 fin. *caritatem paraverat loco auctoritatis*.

I think we should read *superare*, 'that there should be plenty of freedom from anxiety,' or 'of assurance of impunity,' in order to stifle a guilty conscience. This use of *superare* hardly requires defence; cp. Plaut. Amph. 709 *Num tibi aut stultitia accessit aut superat superbia?* A similar meaning attaches to *superesse*, e.g. Juv. 13. 109 *nam cum magna malae superest audacia causae Creditur a multis fiducia*.

viii. 4.

et primum quidem canum procaciores, quae comminus contulerant vestigium, genis hac illac iactatis consecras interficit (sc. aper).

Is not this a strange use of *genae*? The glosses notice *maxillae* as a synonym (Corp. Gloss. Lat. iv. 522. 21); and Pliny N. H. xi. 157 says *Infra oculos malae homini tantum quas prisci genas vocabat*; but even there *malae* are the cheeks and not the jaws, as is proved by the quotation from the XII Tables which follows. We should perhaps read *genuinis* 'tusks'; cp. chapter 5 fin. *prosectu dentium*.

The same difficulty seems to occur at vi. 15 *inter genas saevientium dentium*, in which passage Heinsius ejected *dentium* and read *genuinos*.

viii. 9.

Ecce rursus improvidae voluptatis detestabilis petitor aures obseratas de nuptiis obtundens aderat.

This is the reading apparently of the inferior MSS. In F it is *imperoruide*, and in ϕ *impetoruide*. That we should read *impetu*, as is done by Lütjohann (p. 485) and Blümner (p. 34), seems certain. In *ruide* the former scholar finds *turbidae* and the latter *auido*. Perhaps the word is a very strong one, *rabidae*.

viii. 12.

Ultrices habetis pronubas et orbitatem comitem et perpetuae conscientiae stimulum.

This is the conclusion of the melodramatic, though fine, speech of Charite before blinding Thrasyllus. *Orbitatem* means 'blindness'; cp. v. 9 *En orba et saeva et iniqua Fortuna*, and Corp. Gloss. Lat. ii. 139. 39 *Orbus* πηρός, ὀρφανός, τυφλός. The passage as it stands says that 'blindness will be thy companion, and serve as sting for ever to thy consciousness of guilt.'

But the balance of this very rhetorical peroration is thus broken. I think some words like *constantem famulum* have been lost after *stimulum*; and indeed in one MS. quoted by Hildebrand *famulum* is found instead of *stimulum*.

viii. 19.

at ille diu capite quassante (So F.: quassanti ϕ).

Vliet needlessly alters to *quassato*. No doubt, Apuleius uses the past participle elsewhere, e.g. ii. 24; but Vliet himself quotes iii. 26 and iv. 29, where *capite quassanti* is found; cp. also Plaut. Bacch. 305 *capitibus quassantibus*; Asin. 403 *quassanti capite*.

ix. 32.

ac dum fodiens dum irrigans ceteroque incurvus labore deservit ego tantisper, &c.

Oudendorp wishes to read *labori*, which appears in the margin of an Oxford MS. Hildebrand thinks *deservit* is used absolutely. So, too, apparently does Eyssenhardt. Vliet adds *quaestui* before *deservit*. Perhaps *deservit* <*vitae*> 'slaved for bare subsistence.' For *vita* = 'subsistence' cp. Plaut. Stich. 462 *vitam repperit*; and also, perhaps, Ter. Phorm. 363 *quoi opera vita erat*. Apuleius uses *deservire* elsewhere with a dative, vii. 27 *voracitati deservit*.

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ix. 33.

una de cetera cohorte gallina per mediam cursitans aream clangore genuino velut ovum parere gestiens personabat.

It is not plain what *cetera* can mean. Cornelissen alters to *cristata*, an epithet belonging to cocks rather than to hens. More probably *extera*, 'from the outer yard': cp. *cohors exterior* in Varro R. R. i. 13. 3.

ix. 39.

'Nam et hic ipse' aiebat 'iners asellus et nihilo minus morboque detestabili caducus,' &c.

As *morboque*, and not *morbo*, is the reading of F¹φ, it is plain that an adjective is lost before it; not to speak of there being no contrast between the laziness of the ass and his liability to fits. Lütjohann (p. 468) adds *ferox*, comparing viii. 23 fin. Rather *minax*, which was lost after *minus*. For *et* before *hic* we should perhaps read *ecce* or *en*, if we do not eject it with Lütjohann (p. 495, note).

x. 2.

et languore simulato vulnus animi mentitur in corporis valetudine.

This is generally interpreted 'she conceals her mental wound by the assumption of bodily illness'; but this use of *in* with the abl. in the sense of the abl. of means is hardly defensible by such usages in connexion with an adjective, as 2. 2 *senex iam gravis in annis*: 2. 11 *vini cadum in aetate pretiosi*, as Lütjohann (p. 457, note) has rightly pointed out. However, it is difficult to follow Lütjohann in accepting Bernhardt's correction *mentitur in corporis valetudinem* 'she falsely makes the mental wound appear to be bodily illness,' lit. 'falsely turns into.'¹

¹ We must certainly not read *vertitur* (Hermes, xxix. 310, 311).
in corporis valetudinem with Blümner

More satisfactory is the reading of Price *mentitur corporis invaletudinem* (or *valetudinem*, the *in* being either a mere interpolation, or a remnant of the *-m*); and we might take *vulnus animi* as the nominative, 'the heart-wound falsely assumes the appearance of bodily ailment.' This use of *mentiri* with acc. is fairly common: viii. 2 *amici fidelissimi personam mentiebatur*: ix. 23 *intrepidum mentita vultum*: xi. 8 *incessu perfluo feminam mentiebatur*. Price seems to take the woman as nominative to *mentitur*; but one would expect an infinitive *esse* to be expressed, as a second predicate without a verb is seldom (if ever) found after a verb of assumption such as *mentiri* and *simulare*, unless the direct accusative is the reflexive pronoun.

x. 25.

acerrimaeque bilis noxio furore perfusus.

Oudendorp conjectured *aterrimae*, and this is adopted by Vliet. No doubt, allusion is made by medical writers and others to black bile (e.g. in Celsus often: Cic. Tusc. iii. 11: Seneca, Epist. 94. 17) cp. *χολή μέλαινα* and *μελαγχολικός*. But the superlative is not elsewhere found; and so Oudendorp's emendation is rightly rejected by Hildebrand. The Greek writers speak of *πικρόχολος*, and *acris* is applied to *bilis* in Pers. 2. 13 *namque est scabiosus et acri Bile tumet*, and in Amm. xix. 12. 5 *imperatorem, qui . . . acri felle concaluit*.

xi. 3.

. . . multicolor bysso tenui pertexta.

In the brilliant representation of Isis, this is the beginning of the description of her dress. Something is plainly lost. Because very specific adjectives such as *bombycina*, *Coa*, &c., can be used of garments without the substantive's being added, it does not at all follow that a very general adjective like *multicolor* can be so

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used, especially when the several parts of the attire of the goddess are being discussed in order. Bursian adds *vestis*, and Vliet adds *vestis tunica*. I think we should add *multicia tunica*. The dress of Isis would seem, from her statues, to have been of some light stuff of fine texture, and so perhaps muslin, which appears to be what *multicia* means: the Schol. on Juv. 2. 66 says that *multicia* are 'vestes molliori textas subtemine quibus solent uti puellae.' It is uncertain what the derivation of the word is, whether for *multilicia* (cp. Corp. Gloss. Lat. v. 524. 7: 573. 13 cp. 653. 5 *multitia genus vestis pluribus coloribus confecta*), or *multi-icia* (from *icere* 'to strike home' of the threads of the woof), τὸ πολυσπάθητον ἱμάτιον. See Salmasius on Vopisc. Aurel. 12 *tunicas multicias viriles decem*. If we make the insertion suggested, the reason for its loss in the MSS. is plain.

xi. 9.

magnus praeterea sexus utriusque numerus lucernis taedis cereis et alio genere facium, lumine siderum caelestium stirpem propitiantes.

Vulcanius omitted *lumine*, which certainly seems superfluous. In the margin of F we find *facti luminis*—a proof that even the copyist of F felt the corruption. Lütjohann (p. 490) reads *luminosam* for *lumine*, comparing xi. 5 *coeli luminosa culmina: 10 viri . . . lintheae vestis candore puro luminosi*. Price had already suggested *luminoso*. Possibly *alienigeno facium lumine* 'with the foreign light of torches.' The kinds of torches were foreign, doubtless Oriental. Or *alienigeno* might mean simply 'varied,' 'diverse.'

xi. 10.

manibus ambabus gerebat altaria id est auxilia quibus nomen dedit proprium deae summatis auxiliaris providentia.

Only very few commentators regard *id est auxilia* as

a gloss. Apuleius did not expect that all his readers would know that the technical term for the altars of Isis was 'Succours,' and accordingly added the information. It would be better, however, if we could suppose that the words came in after *proprium*. That 'succour' was the principal feature of the benign action of Isis may be seen from her speech in Ovid Met. ix. 699 *dea sum auxiliaris opemque Exorata fero*: so that one must hesitate before accepting *auxillas* (cp. Paul. ex Fest. p. 24 *auxilla olla parvula*), the conjecture of Kaibel (Hermes xxxv. (1900) p. 203).

xi. 13.

dentes saxei redeunt ad humanam minutiem et, quae me potissimum cruciabat ante, cauda nusquam.

This is the conclusion of the description of the re-transformation of Lucius into a human being. After *nusquam*, the Dorville MS. and some others have *comparuit*, which a late hand had inserted in F. But it was not originally in F; nor is it in ϕ . So Vliet's conjecture *comparet* is doubtful, though *comparere nusquam* is found elsewhere in Apuleius, e.g. viii. 21; ix. 15. I suggest *et quae me potissimum cruciabat ante, <ecce> cauda nusquam*. The ellipse of the verb after *ecce* is natural; and a certain vividness, appropriate to the climax of the description, is thereby secured.

xi. 18.

familiares . . . varie quisque munerabundi ad meum festinant illico diurnum reducemque ab inferis conspectum.

Hildebrand defends *diurnum* thus:—*Diurnum* omne est quod ad diem pertinet: *diurnus* igitur *conspectus* is nominatur, qui die quasi est, ut nocturni et diurni labores ii qui diu noctuque fiunt. *Diurnus* hic optime opponitur sequentibus verbis *ab inferis reducem*. But *diurnus* means

'belonging to the day-time,' as opposed to the night-time; and Lucius had now the human form both by night and day. *Divinum*, the reading of some inferior MSS., can hardly mean 'heaven-granted,' or be taken in the sense of the 'human form divine.' The readings of Brandt (*redivivum*) and N. Heinsius (*recidivum*) introduce mere tautology. Perhaps we should read *ad meum festinant illum cotidianum reducemque ab inferis conspectum* (or perhaps *illico cotidianum*) 'that ordinary (everyday) form of mine which had returned from the dead.' Some of the inferior MSS. read *diutinum* or *diuturnum*, which may contain the *ti* of *cotidianum*.

xi. 30.

rursus denique qua raro capillo collegii vetustissimi . . . munia non obumbrato vel oblecto calvitio sed quoquo versus obvio gaudens obibam.

That *raro* is a corruption of *raso* may be considered certain. Oudendorp conjectured *quaqua raso*, contrasted with *capillum semirasi* (ix. 12). Eyssenhardt reads *abraso*. Rather, perhaps, *quam raso* 'entirely shaved.' For this use of *quam* with a participle cp. ii. 17 *crinibus quam dissolutis*; and with adjectives, iii. 5 *heus pueri, quam maribus animis et viribus alacribus dormientes adgrediamur*, and iv. 3 *me loro quam valido ad ansulam quandam destinatum* ('bound'): with an adverb, ix. 19 *quam procul semotus*. The use of *perquam* in this sense is frequent, e.g. Apol. 63.

L. C. PURSER.

ON AN EARLY LATIN-ENGLISH-BASQUE DICTIONARY.¹

IN Edward Lhuyd's Welsh Preface to his *Archæologia Britannica* (published 1707) occurs the following passage, for the translation of which I am indebted to Prof. Anwyl: "And just as I found, after comparing them, the one part [i.e. of the Irish Vocabulary] corresponding to Welsh, so, through reading the New Testament, and some papers which I received from the learned physician, Dr. Edward Brown, written in the language of the Cantabrians, I found abundant evidence that the other part [i.e. of the Irish Vocabulary] was the old tongue of Spain; for though there is much of that old tongue in the present one [i.e. modern Irish], yet it has been better preserved by the Cantabrians. Henceforth the reason for calling the British men of Ireland (Gwerddonwyr) 'Gwyddelod,' and those of Spain 'Skuidied' (Scoti) is that the old Welsh books call the Picts 'Y Gwyddydd Fichtied'; and the Picts were undoubtedly old Britons, as is evident (apart from their Latin and Irish names) from the names of the rivers and mountains in the lowlands of Scotland, where they lived. And it is probable that they are there still (in spite of losing their language), intermingled with the 'Skuidied' (Scoti), the Britons of Strathclyde, the old English, the Norsemen, and the Normans. For calling the Irish of Spain 'Skuidied' there is no lack of authority, because they themselves continually call by the name of 'Kin-Scuit' the tribesmen who came from Spain. It is not

¹ I communicated a short account of this to *Notes and Queries*, Aug. 19, 1905.

necessary to say anything further about the 'Gwyddelod'; and concerning the 'Skuidied' it is only necessary to compare the old tongue of Spain and modern Irish (a thing which cannot be done here, except in the few following words, where the language of the 'Skuidied' is first, and the Cantabrian is put after the Welsh)." I need not quote the list of words which follows.

The confidence with which this great scholar affirms the close affinity of Irish and Cantabrian, i.e. Basque, will raise a smile. However, in the pursuit of this will-o'-the-wisp, Lhuyd seems to have directed the compilation of a Latin-English-Basque Dictionary, which exists (in MS. of course) among Lhuyd's MSS. in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin. It is written on the interleaves of a copy of Plunket's Latin-Irish Dictionary, the original of which is in Archbishop Marsh's Library, Dublin.

It is interesting as a literary curiosity, and is, if not the first, almost the first, attempt at a reversing Basque dictionary.

How far Lhuyd himself is responsible for it, it is hard to say. Certainly the Latin words have not been supplied by him, but by someone ignorant of Latin. The words of the Preface would, however, lead us to suppose that the Basque words, with their alleged English equivalents, are due to him; yet these also show some curious blunders. Indeed, the method of compilation is not such as one would expect from a scholar. The compiler has taken Leizarraga's translation of the New Testament, printed at La Rochelle in 1571 (reprinted Strassburg, 1900, and London, 1903). This is in the dialect of Lower Navarre, and was translated from the Genevan French Testament, not, however, without correction from the Greek, as Mr. Dodgson has observed. Taking this, then, as his basis, the compiler collated it with the English Authorised Version, equating Basque words with English, often erroneously. It is

obvious that such a method was full of pitfalls, into which he frequently fell. A reader unacquainted with the English Bible would be puzzled to account for such entries as the following :—

Moror, delay, ethortera (= to come).

Sepes, hedge, ceçan (= was).

Otium, leisure, etzutén (= non habebant).

Mos, fashion, egundano (= usque diem).

Hospito, entertain, ahanz (= forgetful).

Vulnero, wound, lot ceçaten (= they did wound)¹; lagun gazte (= jeunes compagnons).

But when we have discovered the secret of the compiler's method, we are able to detect the source of these errors.

The first is from Matt. xxiv. 48, 'luçatzen du ene nabussiac ethortera,' 'my lord delayeth his coming,' 'met long tems à venir,' where 'delayeth' = 'luçatzen du.'

The second is from Mark xii. 1, where 'ingura ceçan hessiz' closely follows the French 'l'environna d'une haye,' 'hessiz' meaning 'by a hedge,' the English having 'set a hedge about it.' The order of the words misled the compiler.

The third instance was suggested by Mark vi. 31, 'iateco aicinaric-ere etzutén' = 'they had no leisure so much as to eat.'

'Egundano' for 'fashion' is from Mark ii. 12: 'we never saw it after this fashion,' where 'never' is represented by 'egundano . . . ez.' The French is 'nous ne vîmes jamais une telle chose,' which the Basque follows. There is no equivalent for 'fashion' in either text, so the compiler was trapped.

'Ahanz' for 'entertain' is from Heb. xiii. 2, 'Be not forgetful to entertain strangers,' where the French has

¹ Oddly enough, Irish 'lot' = 'vulnus.'

‘n’oubliez point l’hospitalité,’ literally rendered by Leïçar-raga ‘hospitalitatea eztaquiçuela ahanz.’ This is an astonishing instance, as the first word so plainly means ‘hospitality.’ Yet, perhaps, a more extraordinary case is that under ‘*congruo*, agree, eztravät eguiten,’ which words mean ‘I do not,’ and are taken from Matt. xx. 13, ‘Friend, I do thee no wrong,’ ‘adisquideá, eztrauät hiri bidegaberíc eguiten,’ where ‘agree’ is in the following sentence, and is represented by ‘accordatu.’

‘Lagun gazte,’ for ‘vulnero,’ was taken from Acts v. 6, ‘The young men arose, wound him up, and carried him out, and buried him.’ The French is ‘quelques jeunes compagnons se levans le prirent . . .,’ which the Basque closely follows—‘iaquiric lagun gazte batzuc har ceçaten hura . . .’ Here is a composite error, ‘lagun gazte’ being first mistaken for an equivalent of ‘wound’ = ‘did wind,’ and then the latter confused with ‘wound’ = ‘vulnero’ (I may observe that for ‘vulnus’ is given correctly ‘çauria,’ the -a of definition being, of course, not understood). This is an instance of a class of errors arising from the compiler’s ignorance of Latin. His plan seems to have been to look up the English words in an English-Latin Dictionary, probably Littleton’s, which was in vogue at the time, or an abridgment of it, if one existed. Hence he confounds words spelled alike, or similarly, but with different meaning, giving, for example, ‘guelçurrúnac’ (= ‘renes’) as an equivalent for ‘retinacula’; ‘acarus’ for ‘peça chipi’ (‘small piece’), the widow’s ‘mite’; ‘ne’ for ‘chipiena,’ ‘least’ (an alternative spelling for ‘lest’ in Littleton); ‘gormandiçac’ (= ‘revellings’) for ‘revelatio, revealings.’

Of course, he confounds verbs with nouns and adjectives: for example, ‘genus, gender, engendratzen’ (= ‘engender’). Again, he confounds words not spelled alike, but beginning with similar sounds, as if his eye wandered from one word in the Dictionary to its neighbour. Thus,

he confounds 'bread, brass'; 'graff, grass'; 'glass, gladness'; 'dine, diligence'; 'such, suck'; 'hundred, hungred.' Hence we have such entries as: 'aes, brass, cobre, ogui'; 'centum, hundred, esiun [copyist's error for ehun], gossez.'

It must be remembered that at the date of this compilation Basque grammar was unknown; in fact, no one had any conception of an agglutinative language such as Basque.

Notwithstanding these portentous blunders, the compiler is much oftener right than wrong; and a reversing Basque dictionary of any kind is so difficult to procure, that I thought it worth while to go through the whole of the compilation, eliminating the errors, and supplying references for every word to Leizarraga's New Testament. I have also inserted some additional words, which are distinguished by a star, and have omitted many merely borrowed words. The remarks are, of course, mine. The resulting vocabulary comprises nearly every word in the Testament. I omit the English, except where ambiguity might exist, and I retain the old spelling. (M. van Eys' Dictionnaire Français-Basque is referred to as v. E.)

II.—A Partial Latin-Basque Dictionary, containing perhaps most of the words in the New Testament.

***Abeo**, ioan, Matt. ii. 9, Luke xiii. 31.

Abhinc, *henceforth*, hemendic, John i. 5; oraindanic, Luke v. 10, Acts xviii. 6.

Abhorreo, gaitzetzi, Rom. xii. 9.

Abjicio, iraitz, Matt. xiii. 48.

Aboleo, deseguin, 2 Tim. i. 10.

***Abstergeo**, ichucatzen, Luke vii. 38, John xiii. 5, -caturen, Rev. vii. 17.

***Abundans**, frango, Luke xv. 17.

N.B.—In John x. 24 'frangoqui' = 'franchement.'

Accendo, irachequi, Luke xii. 49.

Acies, *edge (of sword)*, aho, Rev. i. 16. But see below, III., under **Ao**.

Acutus, çorrotz, Rev. i. 16.

***Adduco**, erekar, Acts xxv. 6 ; ekarri, Acts xix. 37.

Adhaereo, eratchequi, Rom. xii. 9.

***Adjuvo**, lagun eguin, Luke v. 7. *See* hel aquio ene incredulitateari, "subvien à mon incredulité," Mark ix. 24 ; hel aquigu, "aide nous," Mark ix. 22 ; hel çaquizquigute, "aidez-nous," Acts xxi. 28 : cf. v. Eys s.v. el.

***Adultero**, adulterio iauquiten, Matt. v. 32, Luke xvi. 18.

Aegrotus, gaizqui, Matt. iv. 24 ; *eri, Mark vi. 5, 56.

***Aequalis**, bardin, Rev. xxi. 16.

Aerarius, *coppersmith*, cobre-arotz, 2 Tim. iv. 14.

Aestas, *summer*, uda, Matt. xxiv. 32.

Aestus, *heat*, bero, Matt. xx. 12.

Aetas, adin, Luke ii. 36.

Agnus, bildots, John i. 29.

Ala, hegal, Matt. xxiii. 37 ; Rev. xii. 14.

Albus, churi, Matt. v. 36.

***Alienigena**, *stranger*, arrotz, Luke xvii. 18.

Alimentum, iate, Acts vii. 11.

***Alioquin**, ezpere, John xiv. 11.

***Aliquando**, noizpait, Eph. ii. 13, Col. iii. 7.

Aliquis, norbait, Luke viii. 46 ; cembeit, 1 Cor. xv. 35.

Aliqui, batzu, Acts xvii. 5, xix. 9.

***Aliquid**, cerbait, Heb. viii. 3, Rev. ii. 4.

***Alius**, berce, Luke ix. 59.

Altercatio, gudu, Matt. x. 35.

Altitudo, goratassun, Rom. viii. 38 (39). There is a difference in the numbering.

Altus, gora, Rev. xxi. 12.

***Amare**, *bitterly*, mingui, Matt. xxvi. 75.

Amaritudo, *samindura, Eph. iv. 31 ; karmine, Acts viii. 23.

Amarus, karmindu, Rev. viii. 11 ; karmin, Rev. x. 9 (v. E. writes 'kharmin') ; samin, James iii. 14 ; min, James iii. 11.

- Ambulo**, ebiltzen, Matt. xi. 5 ; *imper.* ebil adi, Matt. ix. 5 ;
 habil, Matt. ix. 6.
- Amicus**, adisquide, Matt. xxvi. 50.
- * **Amo**, on eristi, 1 John iii. 11, John xiii. 34 ; onhesten, -iren,
 Mark xii. 33.
- Amoveo**, *kendu, Acts xiii. 22, Luke xvi. 4.
- Amplector**, bessarcatu, Acts xx. 1, 10.
- * **An**, *whether*, eya, Mark iii. 2.
- Ancilla**, nescato, Luke i. 38, 48.
- Angulus**, cantoin, Matt. xxi. 42.
- Augustus**, herssi, Matt. vii. 14.
- Anima**, arima (soul), Luke i. 46 ; (life) John xiii. 37.
- * **Animaequus**, sporça, Mark x. 49.
- Annulus**, erhaztun, Luke xv. 22.
- Annus**, urthe, Luke iii. 1.
- Ante**, “ *devant*,” aitzinean, 2 Cor. v. 10.
- Aperio**, irequi, Matt. xxv. 11.
- Apertus**, irequi, John i. 51, Acts xvi. 27. v. E. says, “ en
 1. *ideki* (= irequi) est ouvrir.”
- Appareo**, aguer, Col. iii. 4 ; aguerturen, Matt. xxiv. 30 ;
 agueri, Matt. vi. 16.
- * **Apud**, ‘ *chez*,’ baithan, John i. 1, 39.
- Aqua**, ur, John xix. 34.
- Aquila**, arrano, Matt. xxiv. 28.
- Aratrum**, golde, Luke ix. 62.
- * **Ardeo**, izeki, John v. 35, Rev. iv. 5.
- Area**, *threshing-floor*, *aire* larrain, Matt. iii. 12. (v. E.
 gives this as Biscayan.)
- Argentum**, *çilhar, Acts xix. 24 : (*coined money*) diru, Matt.
 xxvi. 15, “ diru *peça*” ; (also = piece of silver, ἀργύριον,
 Matt. xxvii. 3, 5, 9).
- Aridus**, leihor, Matt. xii. 43 ; eyhar, Luke xxiii. 31 ; *of
 withered hand*, Matt. xii. 10.
- Armentum**, urdalde, Matt. viii. 30.
- Aroma**, ussain, Luke xxiii. 56, xxiv. 1.

- ***Arripio**, harrapatzen, John vi. 15.
- ***As**, dirutcho, Matt. x. 29, Luke xii. 6 (“pite,” “farthing”).
Ascendo, *igaiten, John i. 51; *igan, John iii. 13.
- ***Asinus**, asto, Matt. xxi. 2.
Asper, ikeçu, Luke iii. 5.
Aspergo, barreyatu, Heb. ix. 13; ihizten, Heb. ix. 19.
Aspicio, *miratzen, 2 Cor. iii. 18: *see* ‘inspicio’; beguiesten, Matt. v. 28.
- ***Astragalus**, *cheville*, aztal, Acts iii. 7.
Attollo, *goraturen, Jas. iv. 10: altcha, Acts iv. 24, xiv. 11.
Audax, ausart, Rom. xv. 18.
Audio, ençuten, Matt. xiii. 13, 14, 15.
Ave, “*bien te soit*,” ungui hel daquiala, Matt. xxvi. 49, xxvii. 29.
Avia, amasso, 2 Tim. i. 5.
Avis, *hegazti, Rev. xviii. 2; chori, Luke xiii. 19.
Auris, beharri, Matt. xiii. 15, 2 Tim. iv. 3.
Aurum, urrhe, Matt. ii. 11.
Auscullo, behatzen, Acts xii. 13; *imper.* beha, Mark vii. 14.
- Baculus**, uhe, Matt. x. 10; makil, Mark vi. 8.
- ***Beatus**, dohatsu, Matt. v. 3.
Bene, ungui, Matt. xxv. 21 (‘ongi,’ v. E.).
- ***Bibo**, edan, Matt. xxvi. 27, xxvii. 34.
Blandio, lausengu, 1 Thess. ii. 5.
Bonus: *vir bonus*, unguieguile, Rom. v. 7, “homme de bien.”
Bonus, on, Matt. vii. 11.
Bonum, “*le bien*,” ungui, Rom. xii. 9.
Brevis, labur, 1 Cor. vii. 29.
- ***Brevio**, laburtu, laburturen, Matt. xxiv. 22.
- ***Byssus**, ceta, Luke xvi. 19. *See* ‘zetha’ in III.
- Cadaver**, sarrasqui, Matt. xxiv. 28.
Cado, erori, erorten, Rev. xiv. 8; eroriren, Luke xxi. 24.
Caecus, itsu, Matt. ix. 27.

- Caedes**, heriotz, Acts viii. 32 ; hiltze, Acts ix. 1 ; (*of cattle for food*), haraquin, Rom. viii. 35.
- * **Caedo**, piccatzen, Luke xiii. 7.
- Caelum**, ceru, Matt. v. 18 (ceruä).
- * **Calamus**, canabera, Matt. xi. 7 ('roseau sauvage,' Azkue).
- Calceus**, çapata, Matt. iii. 11.
- Calcitro**, ostico eguiten, Acts ix. 5.
- Calefacio**, berotzen, Mark xiv. 54.
- Calvarium**, bur-heçur leku, Matt. xxvii. 33.
- Calumniator**, gaitzerraile, 1 Tim. iii. 11 ("médisantes").
- * **Calor**, bero, Matt. xx. 12.
- Calx**, *heel*, oindogora, John xiii. 18.
- * **Candidus**, churi, Matt. v. 36.
- Canis**, or, Matt. vii. 6, Luke xvi. 21 ; chakur (*dimin.*), Matt. xv. 27.
- * **Cano**, *crow* (*of a cock*), ioren, John xiii. 38 ; io, John xviii. 27, Matt. xxvi. 74, 75.
- * **Capillus**, bilo, Matt. v. 36.
- Capio**, har, hartu, John viii. 59, xii. 13, xiii. 4.
- Capra**, aker, Matt. xxv. 32, 33.
- Caput**, buru, Luke vii. 38.
- Carbo**, ikatz, John xviii. 18 (ikatz kambor = ἀνθρακία).
- Carus**, maite, Luke vii. 2.
- Castra**, campo, Rev. xx. 9 ; tente, Heb. xiii. 11.
- Canda**, buztan, Rev. xii. 4.
- Caveo**, beguiratu, Matt. vii. 15.
- Celer**, laster, 2 Pet. ii. 1 ; lehiati, James i. 19.
- Cena**, affari, Luke xiv. 16.
- Ceno**, affalduren, Rev. iii. 20.
- Centum**, ehun, Matt. xviii. 12.
- * **Cervix**, garhondo, Acts vii. 51.
- Cesso**, guelditzen, gueldituren, Eph. i. 16, Acts xiii. 10.
- Cibus**, vianda, Matt. iii. 4 ; vici, Matt. x. 10 ; vitança, Matt. xxiv. 45, James ii. 15.
- Cinis**, hauts, Matt. xi. 21.

- Circum**, inguruä, Rev. iv. 6, vii. 11.
Cito, *lehiatuqui, Luke xix. 5.
Clamor, oihu, Acts xii. 22; heyagora, Acts xxiii. 9.
Clausus, ertsi, Luke xi. 7.
***Clavis**, gako, Matt. xvi. 19.
Clavus, *nail*, itze, John xx. 25.
***Coacte**, *par contrainte*, gogoz garaitic, 1 Pet. v. 2.
Coenum, istil, 2 Pet. ii. 22.
***Coepi**, has, Matt. iv. 17; hassi, Acts i. 1.
Cogo, bortchatu, Matt. v. 41.
Cognatus, ahaide, Luke ii. 44.
Cognomen, *surname*, icen goiticoz, Acts i. 23.
Colligo, bilduren, Matt. xiii. 41; biltzen, Matt. vi. 26;
imper. bil, Matt. xiii. 30.
Collis, mendisca, Luke iii. 5.
Collum, leppo, Matt. xviii. 6.
Colo, *cultivate*, lancen, Heb. vi. 7.
Columba, usso columba, Matt. iii. 16, Luke iii. 22, John i. 32.
Columna, habe, 1 Tim. iii. 15.
***Comburo**, erre, 1 Cor. xiii. 3.
***Comminuo**, chehaturen, chehecaturen, Matt. xxi. 44, Luke xx. 18.
Committo, *entrust*, fidaturen, Luke xvi. 11.
Compedes, cepoac, Mark v. 4. (The French has "ceps.")
***Comprehendo**, *saisir*, atchequi, Matt. xxvi. 48; "çatchetzate hari," "saisissez-le." Cf. Matt. xxi. 38, "gatchetzan," "nous saisissons."
***Compunctio cordis**, bihotz-chimico, Acts ii. 37.
Conculco, *ohondicaturen, Rev. xi. 2, Matt. v. 13.
Conditio, esque, Luke xiv. 32.
***Confiteor**, aithor, John i. 20.
Conservo, emparaturen, 2 Tim. iv. 18.
Contamino, satsutzen, Matt. xv. 18.
Contemno, menospreciaturen, Matt. vi. 24.

Contendo, iharduquiren, Matt. xii. 19 ; emplega, Rom. xv. 30.

***Contingo**, *happen*, guerthatu, Mark ii. 22. *See Evenio*.

Continuus, ardurazco, Rom. ix. 2.

***Convivium**, *a company at table*, mahaintar, Luke ix. 14.

Cor, bihotz, Matt. xiii. 15.

Coriarius, larru appainçale, Acts x. 6.

Corona, coroa, Matt. xxvii. 29.

Corpus, gorputz, Mark v. 29.

Corvus, bele, Luke xii. 24.

Cranium, bur-heçur, Matt. xxvii. 33.

Cras, bihar, Luke xiii. 32.

Crassum facio, guicendu, Acts xxviii. 27.

***Creator**, creaçale, Rom. i. 25, 1 Pet. iv. 19.

Creditor, hartzedun, Luke vii. 41.

Credo, sinhets, sinhesten, sinhetsi, John iv. 21, Matt. ix. 28, John xx. 29.

Cresco, handitzen, Matt. vi. 28.

Crimen, hoguen, Acts xxv. 18, 27.

Crinis, bilo, John xi. 2.

Crumena, mulsa, Luke, x. 4, xxii. 25.

Crus, çango, John xix. 31.

***Cubo**, etzan, John v. 6.

Culex, eltzo, Matt. xxiii. 24.

Cunctor, berancen, 2 Pet. ii. 3.

Cupidus, guthicioso, 1 Tim. iii. 3, 8.

Cupio, guthiciaturen, Rom. vii. 7.

Cura, arrangura, 1 Cor. vii. 21 ; **artha*, Matt. vi. 25, 2 Cor. viii. 16.

Curro, laster eguin, Matt. xxviii. 8.

***Cursus**, laster, Heb. xii. 1.

***Cursim**, lasterca, Mark ix. 25.

Damnum, calte, Acts xxvii. 21.

***Debilis**, hebain, Matt. xv. 30.

- Debitum**, çor, Matt. xviii. 28.
Decipulum, laço, Rom. xi. 9.
***Deinde**, guero, 1 Cor. xv. 24.
Deliciae, atseguin, Rom. vii. 22, Heb. xi. 25.
***Deliramentum**, erguelqueri, Luke xxiv. 11.
***Denique**, gaineracoáz, 1 Thess. iv. 1, 2 Thess. iii. 1.
Dens, hortz, Matt. v. 38.
***Deorsum**, beherera, Acts xx. 9, Matt. iv. 6.
Deprimo, beheratu, Luke xiv. 11.
***Derideo**, truffatzen, Luke viii. 53, Matt. xxvii. 29 (cf. Span. 'trufar'); irri, Mark v. 40; escarnia, Matt. xx. 19.
Descendo, iauts, iausten, Mark xv. 32.
***Descendo** (*of rain*), erori, Matt. vii. 25.
***Descende**, haitsa, Luke xix. 5.
Desero, utziten, Acts xxi. 21.
Detego, aguerturen, Matt. x. 26.
Detineo, eduki, 2 Thess. ii. 6.
***Detractio**, *evil speaking*, gaizquierraite, 2 Cor. xii. 20.
Dexter, escui, Matt. vi. 3.
Devoro, iresten, Matt. xxiii. 14.
Deus, Iainco, *passim*.
***Deversor**, *lodge*, ostatu, Matt. xxi. 17, Acts xxi. 16.
Diabolus, *deabru, John x. 21 (mammon, abratassun, MS.).
Dico, erran, John i. 46, *et passim*.
***Dicit**, dio, John vi. 42.
Dies, egun, Matt. xx. 2, 6.
Difficilis, gaitz, Mark x. 24, 2 Pet. iii. 16 ("b. l. difficile," v. E.); gogor, Acts ix. 5.
Digitus, erhi, Luke xi. 20.
Dimidium, erdi, Luke xix. 8.
***Dimitto**, utziten, Luke ii. 29, "orain utziten duc eure cerbitzaria eure hitzaren araura baquez."
Dirigo, chuchentzen, 1 Thess. iii. 11, Luke i. 79.
***Dirumpor**, leher eguin, Acts i. 18: cf. Acts v. 33, vii. 54; lehertsen, Mark ii. 22.

- Discedo**, *retira*, Matt. viii. 34.
- ***Discerpo**, *çathicatzen*, Mark ix. 26.
- Discepto**, *iharduquiten*, Matt. xvi. 7, 8.
- ***Discindo**, *çathicatu*, *çatitu*, Mark ix. 26, Acts xiv. 14; *erdira*, Matt. xxvii. 51. (v. E. says 'erdira' is only used figuratively.)
- Disco**, *ikasi*, Matt ix. 13.
- ***Dispersi**, *barreya*, Acts viii. 1.
- Diu**, *long while*, *dembora lucez*, Luke viii. 27, Acts xiv. 3.
- Diu**, *long ago*, *aspaldi*, Matt. xi. 21.
- Dives**, *abrats*, Luke xvi. 1, 19.
- Divitiae**, *abrastassun*, Matt. vi. 24.
- Divulgo**, *barreyatu*, Matt. ix. 31.
- Do**, *eman*, *emaiten*, John vi. 32, iii. 34.
- ***Da**, *masc.*, *indac*, John iv. 15; *fem.* *indan*, ib. 7; *iguc*, Matt. vi. 11. **Date**, *eyeçue*, Matt. xiv. 16.
- Doceo**, *iracatsiren*, Matt. v. 19; *iracasten*, Acts i. 1; *imper.* *iracats*, Luke xi. 1.
- Dolus**, *celata*, Eph. vi. 11.
- ***Domina**, *andre*, 2 John 1.
- Dominus**, = *Lord*, *iaun*, Matt. vii. 21, xxiv. 42.
- Domine**, = *Sir*, *iauná*, Matt. xxi. 30.
- Dominus**, = *lord* (in the sense of 'master,') *nabussi*, Matt. xxiv. 46, 50, Acts xvi. 19.
- ***Domo**, *vñ.*, *hetzen*, *heci*, James iii. 7.
- Domus**, *etche*, Matt. viii. 14.
- Donec**, **artean*, Luke xix. 13; -no (as suffix), 1 Cor. xi. 26.
- ***Dormio**, *lo etzan* (*atzan*), Mark xiv. 37; John xi. 11.
- ***Dubito**, *dudatzen*, James i. 6.
- Dubium**, **falta*, Acts xxviii. 4, "falta gabe" = "certainment"; *dudata*, John x. 24; Gal. iv. 20.
- ***Dubius**, *duda*, Matt. xxviii. 17.
- ***Dulcis**, *ezti*, Rev. x. 8, 9,
- Dumus**, *berro*, Luke xx. 37, Acts vii. 35: cf. v. Eys.

- ***Durus**, gogor, Acts vii. 51 ; “ genda garhondo gogorac,” “ gens de col roide.”
- ***Duriter** (*of hearing*), gogorqui, Matt. xiii. 15 ; “ beharriéz gogorqui ençun ukan duté,” “ ils ont ouï dur de leurs oreilles.” In the same quotation, Acts xxviii. 27, “ gothorqui ” appears for “ gogorqui.”

- Ebrietas**, hordiqueria, Luke xxi. 34.
- Ebrinus**, hordi, 1 Cor. xi. 21.
- ***Ecoe**, *voilà*, hara, Matt. xii. 47 ; *voici*, huna, Matt. xii. 46, 49.
- ***Ecclesia**, eliza, Acts xx. 28.
- Edo**, *eat*, ian, iaten, 1 Cor. viii. 8, 7, 10.
- Effundo**, issuri, Matt. xxvi. 28 ; issurten, Mark ii. 22 ; erautsi, Acts ii. 33.
- Egestas**, behar, Luke xv. 14.
- Ego**, ni, Rom. vii. 25.
- ***Ego ipse**, ni neuror, 1 Cor. ix. 6, Rom. vii. 25.
- ***Ejicio**, egotzen, Matt. xxi. 12.
- ***Electio**, *choice*, hauta, Phil. i. 22.
- ***Eligo**, hautatzen, Luke xiv. 7.
- Emo**, erosten, Matt. xiv. 15, Mark xv. 46.
- Io**, ioan, ioaiten, Matt. xix. 22, viii. 31.
- Equus**, çaldi, Rev. vi. 2.
- ***Ergo**, bada, Rom. v. 1 ; beraz, Rom. viii. 1. (‘ Beraz ’ frequently after ‘ cergatic ’ in questions.)
- ***Eripio**, *take away*, edequi, Matt. v. 40.
- Error**, huts, Matt. xxii. 29.
- ***Evado**, *escape*, itzuriren, Matt. xxiii. 33.
- Evello**, idoqui, Matt. v. 29, vii. 4.
- ***Evenio**, *happen*, *avenir*, heltzen, 1 Cor. x. 11 ; guerthaturen, Luke xix. 15.
- ***Everro**, escobatzen, Luke xv. 8.
- ***Eversus**, *swept out*, escobaturic, Matt. xii. 44.
- Exalto**, altchatu, Matt. xi. 23 ; goraturen, Matt. xxiii. 12.
- ***Excito e somno**, iratzar, Luke viii. 24, Acts xii. 7.

- ***Exeo**, ilki, Matt. x. 14, Luke xiii. 31.
- ***Exercitus**, campo, Heb. xi. 34.
- Exorabilis**, maneioso, James iii. 17.
- Expergisoor**, iratzar, Eph. v. 14.
- Experimentum**, *proof*, phorogança, 2 Cor. viii. 24.
- ***Exspuo**, thu eguin, Matt. xxvi. 67.
- Exstinguo**, iraungui, Mark ix. 43.
- Extendo**, *enlarge*, *luçatzen, Matt. xxiii. 5; *stretch out* (*hands*), hedatu, Matt. xii. 13, Rom. x. 21.
- Extra**, *campotic, Heb. xiii. 12; *lekora, Heb. xiii. 11, 13, Matt. xii. 46.
- ***Extremus digitus**, erhi moco, Luke xvi. 24.
- ***Extrinsecus**, lekoreco, 1 Pet. iii. 3. v. E. cites P. for lekora = *hors*.

- ***Fabricator**, eguile, Heb. xi. 10.
- Fabula**, elhe, 1 Tim. i. 4.
- Facies**, beguitharte, Matt. vi. 17.
- Facilis**, *errach, Matt. xix. 24 (*compar.* errachago), erratchago, Matt. ix. 5.
- Facio**, eguin, John i. 3; eguiten, John viii. 53.
- Facio**, **cause*, ari, Luke ix. 39 (“çathicatzen dic haguna dariola,” “le dérompt en le faisant écumer”); eraci, John xv. 15, Rev. iii. 21.
- ***Factor**, eguile, James i. 23.
- ***Facultas**, *ability*, anci, Matt. xxv. 15; ahal, Acts xi. 29.
- Falx**, iguitey, Rev. xiv. 14.
- Fames**, gosse, Luke iv. 25, xv. 14.
- Familia**, ahaidetassun, Eph. iii. 15 (“parenté”).
- Farina**, irin, Matt. xiii. 33.
- Fasciae**, *trocha, Luke ii. 7.
- Favus**, ezti orrace, Luke xxiv. 42.
- Febris**, helgaitz, Matt. viii. 14.
- Fel**, behaçun, Matt. xxvii. 34.
- Femina**, eme, Matt. xix. 4.

- Femur**, ichter, Rev. xix. 16.
- ***Fenestra**, leiho, Acts xx. 9.
- Fenum**, belhar, 1 Cor. iii. 12.
- Ferio**, io, ioiten, Matt. xxvi. 51, 68, John xviii. 23.
- ***Pere**, quasi, Acts xiii. 44, xix. 26, Heb. ix. 22.
- Fermentum**, altchagarri, Matt. xiii. 33.
- Fero**, eraman, eramaiten, Luke vii. 12.
- Ferrum**, burdin, Rev. ii. 27.
- Ferus**, bassa, Mark i. 13.
- ***Fessus**, unhatu, John iv. 6.
- ***Festinanter**, lehiatequi, Luke xix. 6.
- Festuca**, fits, Matt. vii. 3, 5.
- Figulus**, tupinaguile, Matt. xxvii. 10 ; lur-tupinaguile, Rom. ix. 21 : cf. v. Eys, s.v., dupin = tupin, "pot en fer."
- Filius**, seme, John i. 34.
- Filia**, alaba, John xii. 15.
- Fimbria**, ezpaina, Matt. ix. 20. *See Ora.*
- Fimus**, gorotz, Phil. iii. 8 ; ungarri, Luke xiii. 8.
- Finio**, acaba, Acts xx. 24.
- ***Fio**, içan da, 2 Cor. xii. 11 ; "erho içan naiz"; ioan (*go*), Mark ix. 18, "eyarthu dihoac," "devient sec"; bilhatzen, Matt. xiii. 32 ; "arbore bilhatzen da." Cf. also eguin, 1 Cor. iii. 18, "erro eguin bedi."
- Fistula**, chirula, 1 Cor. xiv. 7 ("hautbois," Fr.).
- Flaccesco**, chimaldu, James i. 11. *See v. E., 'zimel.'*
- Flagellum**, açote, John ii. 15.
- Flamma**, gar, Luke xvi. 24.
- Flo**, eraunsi, erauntsi, Matt. vii. 25, "eraunsi ukan duté haicéc," "les vents ont soufflé"; John iii. 8, vi. 18 : cf. v. Eys.
- Floreo**, arrapherdatu, Phil. iv. 10 ("vous êtes reverdis").
- ***Fluo**, iariaturen, John vii. 38.
- ***Fluxus**, iariatze, Luke viii. 44.
- Fodio**, aitzurtu, Luke xiii. 8 : cf. Luke xvi. 3.
- Foedus**, *foul, sale*, satsu, Mark ix. 25, Rev. xviii. 2.

- Fons**, ithurri, Mark v. 29, James iii. 11.
Formosus, eder, Matt. xxiii. 27, James i. 11.
Fornax, labe, Matt. xiii. 42.
Fortasse, *aguian, Acts xvii. 27, Philem. 15.
***Fortis**, borthiz, Luke xi. 21, 22 ; erscon, 2 Cor. xiii. 9.
Fortuito, “ par rencontre,” encontruz, Luke x. 31.
Fossa, hobi, Matt. xv. 14.
***Fragor**, habarrots, 2 Pet. iii. 10.
Frango, hautsi, hautsiren, Mark viii. 19.
Frater, anaye, Matt. v. 22.
Fraus, *fraude*, enganio, Mark vii. 22.
***Fremo**, mutinatu, Acts iv. 25, “ ont frémi.”
Frigidus, hotz, Matt. x. 42.
Frons, *leaf*, hosto, Matt. xxi. 19.
Frons, *forehead*, belar, Rev. xiv. 9.
Fru mentum, ogui bihi, Mark iv. 28.
Fugio, ihes eguin, Matt. ii. 13.
Fulgur, chismista, Matt. xxiv. 27 : cf. v. E. chimista, “ A Baigorri on dit *chismista*”: see also Azkue s.v. “*šismista*.”
Fumus, ke, Rev. ix. 2.
Fur, ohoin, Matt. xxiv. 43.
Furiosus, *raging*, *forcené*, minthuric, Acts xxvi. 11.
Furnus, labe, Matt. vi. 30.
Furor, v. ebatsi, ebaisten, Mark x. 19, Matt. vi. 19.
***Furor**, s. eraucimendu, Luke vi. 11.
Furtum, ohoinqueri, Matt. xv. 19.
- Gallina**, oillo, Matt. xxiii. 37.
Gallus, oillar, Matt. xxvi. 34, 74.
Gaudium, bozcario, Matt. xiii. 20 ; atseguin, Heb. xi. 25.
Gena, mathela, Luke vi. 29.
Genu, belhaur, Matt. xxvii. 29 ; belhaun, Rom. xi. 4, xiv. 11.
Genus, *sort*, mota, Matt. xiii. 47.
Gladus, ezpata, Luke xxi. 24.

- Grabbatum**, ohe, Matt. ix. 6.
Gr. parvum, ohetchoa, Luke v. 19.
Gramen, belhar, Matt. vi. 30.
Grando, babaçuça, Rev. viii. 7.
Granum, bihi, "mustarda bihi," Matt. xiii. 31 ; "ogui bihi, John xii. 24.
***Gratus**, gogaraco, Acts vii. 20. The translation seems to follow the Latin. The Greek is ἀσπείρος ; the French "excellemment beau," *see* v. E. ; gogagarri, 1 Cor. ii. 4.
Gratia, *thanks*, esquer, 1 Cor. xv. 57.
Gravida, içor, Matt. i. 18, 23, Luke ii. 5.
Grex, arthalde, Matt. xxvi. 31 ; tropel, Luke xii. 32.
Gusto, dastaturen, Luke xiv. 24, Matt. xvi. 28.
***Gutta**, chorta, Luke xxii. 44.
Guttur, *eztarri, Rom. iii. 13.
- Habitatio**, egoitza, John xiv. 23.
Haedus, pitina, Luke xv. 29.
***Haurio**, *draw* (water), idoqui, idoquiten, John iv. 11, 15.
Herbae, belharrac, Matt. xiii. 32.
Heri, atzo, John iv. 52.
Hic, *here*, hemen, Matt. xxiv. 23.
Hiems, negu, Matt. xxiv. 20.
***Hodie**, egun, Luke xiii. 32.
Homicida, guicerhaile, 1 Tim. i. 9.
***Homicidium**, heriotze, Mark xv. 7 ; guiça-erhaitec, Gal. v. 21.
Homo, guiçon, *passim*.
Honor, ohore, Rom. xiii. 7.
Honoro, ohoratzen, John v. 23.
Hora, oren, Matt. xxiv. 36.
Hortus, baratze, John xviii. 1.
Hospes, *host*, ostatu, Rom. xvi. 23, Luke x. 35.
***Hospes**, *stranger*, arrotz, Matt. xxv. 35.

Hospitium, *guest-chamber*, *ostatu*, Mark xiv. 14; *inn*, *ostaleri*, Luke x. 34.

Hostis, *etsai*, Matt. xiii. 25, Luke xix. 27 : cf. v. E., s.v. *zai*.

***Humilitas**, *petitesse*, *low estate*, *beheratassun*, Luke i. 48.

Humerus, *sorbalda*, Luke xv. 5; *soin*, Matt. xxiii. 4.

Humor, *hecetassun*, Luke viii. 6.

***Iacio**, *aurdigui*, John viii. 7; *aurthitei*, *ibid.* 59; *iraizten*, Acts xxii. 23; *iraitsi*, Rev. xii. 10; *egotzi*, Matt. iv. 6, Luke iv. 29.

Iactus lapidis, *a stone's cast*, *harri iraitzi*, Luke xxii. 41.

Iaculum, *gueci*, Eph. vi. 16.

Iam, *already*, **ia*, Mark xv. 44, John xix. 33, Matt. xvii. 12;

**gaurguero*, John xi. 39.

***Iampridem**, *haraitzen*, Acts xv. 7.

***Idcirco**, *halacotz*, John viii. 47.

Ieiunium, *baru*, Acts xxvii. 9.

Ignavus, *lacho*, Matt. xxv. 26; *nagui*, Rom. xii. 11, Heb. v.

11. *See notchalent*, Heb. vi. 12.

Ignis, *su*, Eph. vi. 16, Heb. x. 27.

Ignis, *suz eraichequi*, Eph. vi. 16 (*see* v. E. *irazeki*).

Ignosco, *barkaturen*, Matt. vi. 14.

Illoque, *see irretio*; **subst.*, *hatzemaile*, Luke v. 10.

Iluvies, **satsutassun*, 1 Pet. iii. 21.

Imber, *uria*, Luke xii. 54.

Immergo, *hundatzen*, 1 Tim. vi. 9 : cf. v. E., s.v. *ondo*.

Immundus. *See Foedus*.

***Impedio**, *hinder*, *empatchatu*, 1 Thess. ii. 18.

Impleo, *bethe*, *bethetzen*, John ii. 7.

Importunitas, *muthiritassun*, Luke xi. 8.

Improbo, *arbuyatu*, 1 Pet. ii. 4, 7.

***Inauratus**, *urrhestatu*, Rev. xvii. 4.

***Incendo**, *irachequi*, Luke xii. 49.

Inclino (*genua*), *gurtzen* (*belhaunac*), Eph. iii. 14 : *gur* (*belhaun*), Phil. ii. 10.

Inclinare se, gurtu, John viii. 6, 8. v. E. has "*gurtu, gurtzen*, g. l. saluer, incliner la tête en saluant."

Incurvus, makur, Luke iii. 5.

Indignatio, bekaitz, Matt. xx. 24; gaitzi, Matt. xxvi. 8.

Indoctus, letra-gabe, Acts iv. 13.

Iners, alfer, Matt. xx. 3, 6.

Infans, haourtcho, Mark ix. 36, 37; haour chipi, Luke xviii. 11.

Inferior, mendreago, 2 Cor. xii. 13.

Infirmitas, eritassun, Luke xiii. 11; erharçun, Mark i. 34.

Inflatus, hantu, 1 Cor. iv. 19.

Inimicitia, etsaigo, Eph. ii. 15, 16; etsayetassun, James iv. 4.

Inimicus, etsay. *See Hostis.*

Initium. *See Principium.*

Iniuria, bidegabe, Acts vii. 24, Matt. xx. 13; gaizqui, Acts vii. 26, 27.

***Insanus**, erho, Acts xii. 15.

***Insero**, *graft*, charthatu, charthatzen, charthaturen, Rom. xi. 17, 23.

Insidiae, celata, Acts xxiii. 16, 21.

***Insidus**, gueçat, Matt. v. 13.

***Insuper**, guehiago, Heb. xi. 36.

***Inspicio**, miratu, James i. 25.

***Insufflo**, hatseman, John xx. 22.

Intelligo, aditzen, Matt. xiii. 13.

Intendo (oculos), fincatu, Luke iv. 20.

Inter, *artean, James iii. 13.

***Inter se**, elkarri, Acts ii. 12.

***Intra**, barne, Luke xi. 7.

Interior, barneco, Eph. iii. 16.

***Intingo**, busti, John xiii. 26; busta, Luke xvi. 24.

Intro, *enter*, sarthu, Acts iii. 2.

Invenio, eriden, erideiten, Matt. i. 18, vii. 14.

Inventor, erideile, Rom. i. 30.

***Invite**, gogoz garaitic, 1 Cor. ix. 17 (contre ma volonté), "à contre-cœur"; Heb. xiii. 17, "à regret"; 1 Pet. v. 2, "par contrainte." v. E. remarks on the first passage "l'emploi de *garaitic* n'est pas clair ici."

Inutilis, alfer, Matt. xxv. 30.

Ipsē, bere, John viii. 4; bera, John vi. 6.

Ira, asserre, Mark iii. 5.

Irascor, asserretzen, Matt. v. 22.

Irrepo, forratzen, 2 Tim. iii. 6.

Irretio, hatzaman, Matt. xxii. 15.

***Irrideo**, escarnia, Matt. xx. 19.

Iter, bide, Luke ix. 3, xi. 6.

Ingun, uztarri, Matt. xi. 29.

Iuramentum, cin, Matt. xiv. 9.

Ius, çucen, Rev. xxii. 14.

***Iustum**, bide, Luke xii. 57; "nola ceuron buruz-ere eztuçue iugeatzen bide dena?" Matt. xx. 4, "bide datena emanen drauçuet," "ce qui sera de raison."

Iuvenca, biga, Heb. ix. 13.

Iuvenis, gazte, Tit. ii. 4, 1 John ii. 13.

Iunior, gazteago, John xxi. 18.

Inventus, gaztetassun, 1 Tim. iv. 12.

Labium, ezpaina, Mark vii. 6, 1 Cor. xiv. 21.

Labor, neque, 1 Thess. ii. 9; travaillu, 1 Thess. ii. 9.

Laboro, nekatzen. Matt. vi. 28.

Lac, ezne, 1 Cor. iii. 2, Heb. v. 12, 13.

Lacrima, nigar, Mark ix. 24, Luke vii. 38.

Laetitia, alegrança, Luke i. 14. *See Gaudium.*

Lambo, limicatzen, Luke xvi. 21.

Lamentatio, deithore, Matt. xi. 17, "eressiz cantatu drauçuegu, eta eztuçue deithoreric eguin": cf. Luke vii. 32, where 'nigarric' replaces 'deithoreric.' v. E. says deithore = "lamentation pour les morts." Perhaps L's rendering was suggested by the Greek ἐθρηνήσαμεν in the first clause: cf. Rev. xviii. 9.

Lampas, çuci, Rev. viii. 10.

Lana, ille, Rev. i. 14.

Lancea, dardo, John xix. 34.

Laqueus, laço, Luke xxi. 35.

Lascivus, bridá largatu, 1 Tim. v. 11.

Latus, *s. side*, alde, Mark x. 1; (*of a person*) seihets, John xix. 34, xx. 20, 25, 27.

Latus, *adj. broad*, çabal, Matt. vii. 13.

Lavo, ikuz, Matt. vi. 17, Luke v. 2; garbi, garbitzen, John ix. 7, "ohá garbitzera Siloe . . . eta garbi cedin." v. E. has "garbitu, garbitzen, nettoyer."

Lectus, *bed*, ohe, Matt. ix. 6.

Lego, *read*, iracurri, iracurtzen, Col. iv. 16, Luke vi. 3, iv. 16.

***Leniter**, emequi, Acts xxvii. 13.

Leo, lehoin, 1 Pet. v. 8.

Leprosus, sorhayo, Matt. viii. 2.

Levis, *light*, arin, Matt. xi. 30.

Lex, legue, Matt. v. 17.

Liber, *book*, liburu, Matt. i. 1.

Liber, *adj. free*, libre, Gal. iii. 28.

Libra, *pound*, *libera, John xii. 3, xix. 39 (marco, Luke xix. 13, is from the French "marc," *ibid.*, = half pound).

Liberatio, deliurança, Luke iv. 19.

***Libero**, largatzen, Matt. xxvii. 15.

Libido, guthici, Matt. v. 28, Rom. vii. 7.

***Licet**, sori da, John v. 10.

***Ligo**, *v. lothuren*, Matt. xviii. 18; esteca, Matt. xii. 29.

Ligatus, estecatu, Matt. xxi. 2.

***Lignum**, egur, 1 Cor. iii. 12; çur, 2 Tim. ii. 20 (unciric), "çurezcoric," (des vaisseaux) "de bois." v. E. for "zur" gives "bois de construction."

Lingua, mihi, Mark vii. 33.

Linteam, mihisse, Mark xv. 46, Acts x. 11.

Linteolum, "*linge*," oihal, Luke xix. 20.

Linum, liho, Matt. xii. 20, Rev. xv. 6.

Lia, gudu, Rom. xiii. 13, 1 Cor. iii. 3.

Litus, bazter, John xxi. 4, Acts xxi. 5.

***Litus maris**, itsas costa, Matt. xiii. 2, Heb. xi. 12.

Locus, leku, Luke xi. 1.

Locusta, othi, Matt. iii. 4.

Lolium hiraca, Matt. xiii. 25.

***Longus**, luce, Mark xii. 38.

Longitudo, lucetassun, Eph. iii. 18.

***Loquela**, minçatze, Matt. xxvi. 73.

Loquor, minçaturen, John xiv. 30.

***Loquens**, minço, John iv. 26.

Lorum, hedé, Acts xxii. 25.

Luceo, arguituren, Matt. xiii. 43.

Lucror, irabazi, Phil. iii. 8.

Lucrum, irabaizte, 1 Tim. iii. 3, 8.

***Luctatio**, borroca, Eph. vi. 12.

***Ludo**, dostatzen, 2 Pet. ii. 13.

***Ludus**, dosteta, 1 Cor. x. 7.

Lumbi, guerrunce, Acts ii. 30 ("reins," Fr.), *pl.* Eph. vi. 14.

v. E. has "*gerruntzak* g. les reins, los lomos, selon M. Eguren . . . selon P. *gerruntzea* signifie 'le lieu de la ceinture.'"

Luna, ilhargui, Col. ii. 16.

Lupus, otso, John x. 12.

Lux, argui, John i. 4.

Magnus, handi, Matt. v. 12.

Maiores, aitzinecoac, 2 Tim. i. 3.

Male, gaizqui, Rom. xiii. 10 ; gaichtoqui, Matt. ix. 4.

***Maledictio**, gaitzerraite, 1 Pet. ii. 1.

Maledico, *maradicatzen, James iii. 9.

Malefactor, gaizquiguile, Luke xxiii. 33 ; gaizqui-eguile, John xviii. 30.

Malus, gaichto, Matt. v. 45.

- ***Mane**, *in the morning*, goicean, Mark xiii. 35. **Bene mane**,
guciz goiz, Mark xvi. 2.
- Maneo**, egon, Matt. x. 11 (çaudete : *see* v. Eys, Dict.),
xv. 32, John xv. 11.
- Manus**, escu, Mark iii. 1.
- Mare**, itsasso, Rev. xxi. 1 ; ilsas, Mark vi. 48, Matt. xviii. 6.
- Maritus**, senhar, Luke ii. 36, John iv. 17, 18.
- Mas**, ar, Luke ii. 23, Matt. xix. 4.
- Massa**, orhe, Rom. ix. 21.
- Mater**, ama, Matt. x. 35.
- Medius**, *erdi, Rev. viii. 13.
- ***Medio**, artean, Matt. xiv. 24, "itsassoaren artean," "au
milieu de la mer" : cf. Luke xxiii. 45, "templeco velá
erdira cedin artetic," "la voile du temple se fendit
par le milieu" : Luke iv. 30, "hayén artetic," "par le
milieu d'eux."
- Mel**, ezti, Matt. iii. 4.
- Melior**, *hobe, Heb. xi. 35 ; *hobeago, Heb. xi. 16.
- ***Melius**, *adv.* hobe, 1 Cor. ix. 15 ; hobequi, 1 Cor. vii. 38.
- Mendacium**, gueçur, John viii. 44.
- Mendax**, gueçurti, John viii. 44.
- ***Mendico**, esque ebiltzen, Luke xvi. 3.
- Mens**, *adimendu, Rom. vii. 25.
- Mente sana**, adimendu onetaco, 2 Cor. v. 13.
- Mensa**, mahain, Matt. xv. 27.
- Mensis**, hilebethe, Rev. ix. 15, xxii. 2. Luke i. 26 ; hil,
Luke i. 36.
- Mensura**, neurri, 2 Cor. x. 16.
- Merces**, sari, Luke x. 7, John iv. 36 ; alocairu, Matt. xx. 8,
James v. 4.
- ***Mereor**, mereci, Matt. xxvi. 66.
- Meretrix**, paillarda, James ii. 25.
- Meridies**, *noon*, egu-erdi, Acts xxii. 6.
- Meridio**, egunáren-erdian, Acts xxvi. 13.
- Meridies**, *south*, egu-erdi, Matt. xii. 42.

- Messis**, uzta, Luke x. 2.
- * **Meta**, chede, Phil. iii. 14.
- Meto**, biltzen, Luke xix. 21, John iv. 38; errequeita, errequeitatzen, Rev. xiv. 16, Matt. vi. 26, James v. 4.
- * **Mica**, *miette*, appur, Matt. xv. 27.
- Minatio**, mehatchu, Acts iv. 29.
- Minister**, muthil, Matt. xx. 26.
- Minor**, *v. threaten*, mehatchu, Acts iv. 26.
- Minor**, *adj. less*, chipien, Mark iv. 31, Heō. vii. 7.
- * **Minus**, *adv.* gutiago, 2 Cor. xii. 15.
- * **Mirabilis**, miregarri, 1 Cor. iv. 9.
- Miror**, mirets, miretsiren, Acts xiii. 41, Rev. xvii. 8; mireste, Rev. xvii. 6.
- * **Misceo** nahassi, nahaste, Luke xiii. 1, Matt. xxvii. 34.
- Miser**, dohacabe, Rev. iii. 17.
- * **Misericors**, gogabera, James v. 11.
- Mitis**, eme, 1 Thess. ii. 7, Matt. xi. 29.
- Mitto**, irion, Matt. ix. 38; *igorri, igorriren, Luke iv. 43, Matt. xiii. 41; igor, Acts ix. 30.
- Modius**, gaitzuru, Matt. v. 15.
- Mola**, *millstone*, errota harri, Rev. xviii. 21; asto-errota (= meule d'âne = *μύλος ὀνικός*), Matt. xviii. 6.
- * **Mola**, *mill*, errota, Matt. xxiv. 41.
- Molo**, *ehaiten, Luke xvii. 35; *ehoren, Matt. xxiv. 41.
- Mons**, mendi, Matt. v. 1.
- Monstro**, eracuts, eracutsiren, Luke v. 14, vi. 47.
- Morbus**, eritassun, Matt. iv. 23; *erharçun, Mark i. 34.
- Morior**, hiltzen, Luke vii. 2.
- Moror**, *lucatzzen, Matt. xxiv. 48; *berant, Acts ix. 38.
- Mors**, herio, Matt. xv. 4, 1 Cor. xv. 54.
- Mortuus**, hil, Matt. ii. 19, 20.
- Moveor**, higitzen, John v. 3, Acts xvii. 28.
- * **Mugitus** (*of a lion*), orro, Rev. x. 2; marruma, 1 Pet. v. 8.
- * **Multitudo**, gendalde, Acts ii. 6; genđetze, Mark xv. 31.
- * **Mundo**, *vb.*, chahutzen, Matt. xxiii. 25.

- Mundus**, *adj. clean*, *chahu, Matt. viii. 3.
- ***Musca**, eltzo, Matt. xxiii. 24.
- Mutuor**, maillebatu, Matt. v. 42. v. E. has maillegatu, "du prov. malevar."
- Nam**, ecen, Matt. vi. 21. *Passim.*
- Nascor**, iayo, Luke ii. 11, John ix. 19; *sortu, John ix. 2.
- ***Nativitas**, sortze, John ix. 1.
- Navis**, unci (= ontzi), Luke v. 3.
- Nebula**, lanho, Acts xiii. 11.
- Necessitas**, behar, Luke xxiii. 17.
- Necto**, lothu, Acts x. 11.
- Nego**, ukatu, Matt. x. 33.
- ***Nemo**, nehor ez, John iii. 13.
- ***Nenia**, eressi (?), Luke vii. 32.
- Neo**, iruten, Matt. vi. 28.
- ***Nescienter**, etzaquiteleric, Heb. xiii. 2.
- ***Nictus** (oculi), *clin d'œil*, begui keinu, 1 Cor. xv. 52.
- Nidus**, ohatse, Matt. viii. 20, Luke ix. 58.
- Niger**, beltz, Matt. v. 36.
- ***Nihil**, deus ez, John i. 3.
- ***Nimis**, sobera, Acts xxvi. 11.
- Nisi**, *unless*, *ezpada, John iii. 2, vi. 44.
- ***Nisi**, *except, sinon (after negatives)*, baicen, John x. 10.
- Nix**, elhur, Matt. xxviii. 3.
- No**, nando, igueri, Acts xxvii. 42, 43, "mana ceçan igueri ahal laiditenac." v. E. renders igeri "en trempe, en nage," but thinks it is an adj. Azkue renders "nageant."
- ***Nomen**, icen, Luke i. 13.
- Nosco**, eçaguturen, Matt. vii. 16; eçagut, Luke xxiv. 31.
- Novem**, bedratzi, Luke xvii. 17.
- Novus**, berri, Matt. ix. 17.
- Nox**, gau, Matt. xxvi. 31.
- Nubes**, hodey, Matt. xvii. 5; Rev. x. 1.

***Nubo**, ezcondu, 1 Tim. v. 11. Also = ducere (uxorem),
Matt. xxii. 25.

***Nuditas**, billuzgorritassun, Rev. iii. 18.

Nudus, billuci, Matt. xxv. 36, xxvii. 28; billuzgorri, Rev.
iii. 17.

***Num**, ala, John vii. 48, 51; 1 Cor. ix. 9.

Nunc, orain, 2 Cor. vi. 2.

Nuper, aitzinchetic, Acts xviii. 2.

Nuptiæ, ezteyak, John ii. 1; *sing.* eztey, Matt. xxii. 12.

Nurus, errena, Matt. x. 35, Luke xii. 53.

Nutrio, haci, Acts vii. 20; hatzen, Matt. vi. 26. v. E., *s.v.*
as, gives *hazten*.

Nutrix, *unhide, 1 Thess. ii. 7.

Obliviosus, ahance, ahanzcor, James i. 25.

Obliviscor, ahanz, Heb. xiii. 2.

Obsecro, *othoitz, Luke viii. 28.

Observe, *garder*, beguiratzen, Matt. xxviii. 20.

***Observe**, *observer*, *watch*, gogoatzen, Mark iii. 2.

Obtineo, ardiets, Rom. xi. 31.

***Obturo**, *stop (ears, mouth)*, boça, boçatu, Acts vii. 57, Rom.
iii. 19, Heb. xi. 33.

***Obviam eo**, aitzinera ilki, Matt. viii. 34, Luke xiv. 31.

Occido, *slay*, hilen, Luke xi. 49.

Occulto, estali, Matt. xi. 25; gorde, Matt. xiii. 33.

Occupo, *saisir*, gatchetzan, Matt. xxi. 38.

Occurro, *meet*, *bathu, bathuren, Mark xiv. 13, Luke xvii. 12.

***Octavus**, çortzigarren, 2 Pet. ii. 5.

Octo, çortzi, Luke ix. 28.

Octodecim, hemeçortzi, Luke xiii. 4.

Oculus, begui, Matt. vi. 22.

Odi, gaitzetziren, Luke vi. 22; gaitz eritziren, Matt. v. 43.

Odor, urrin, John xii. 3.

Offa, ahamen, John xiii. 26.

Officium, *devoir*, *duty*, beñar, Luke xvii. 10, Rom. xv. 27.

***Oleo male**, kirestu, John xi. 39.

Olim, aspaldi, Matt. xi. 21.

Omitto, utziten, Matt. xxiii. 23.

Omnis, gucia, Eph. i. 22; oro, Rev. xviii. 2, Matt. iv. 4.

Onus, carga, Gal. vi. 5.

Opes, onác, Acts xix. 25 : cf. Luke viii. 3; ***onhassun**, Luke xv. 30.

Opinio, uste, Luke vii. 43.

Oportet, behar, Acts ix. 6.

Opportunus, ***carazco**, Mark vi. 21.

Opus, *need*, behar, Matt. iii. 14.

Ora, *border*, *bord*, ***ezpaina**, Mark vi. 56, "arropa ezpaina."

See Labium. v. E., as an argument for the spelling *espaina*, 'lip,' with s, as in the dialects b. and l., says, "d'autant plus que bord (d'un habit) se dit en lab. *espaina*." Cf. "abillamendu ezpaina," Matt. ix. 20, xiv. 36. The Vulg. in each case has "fimbria."

Oratio, *oration*, harenga, Acts xii. 21.

Ornatus, *furnished*, appaindu, Mark xiv. 15.

Orno, *make ready*, appain, *ibid.*, Matt. xxv. 7.

Oro, othoitz. *See Obsecro.*

Os, oris, aho, Matt. xii. 34, Luke vi. 45.

Os, ossis, heçur, John xix. 36.

Osculor, pot eguin, Matt. xxvi. 48, 49.

Osculum, pot, 1 Pet. v. 14, 1 Cor. xvi. 20.

Ostiarus, borthalçaina, John x. 3, Mark xiii. 34.

Ostium, bortha, John x. 1.

Otium, ***aicina**, Mark vi. 31, "iateco aicinaric-ere etzutén."

Ovile, ardién arthegui, John x. 1.

Ovis, ardi, Matt. xxvi. 31.

Ovum, arraultze, Luke xi. 12.

***Paene**, hurrensu, Acts xxvi. 28, 29. v. Eys, s.v. urz, has "hurrentsu," saying, "nous n'avons pas d'exemple à citer, mais hurrentsu doit être un adjectif." Azkue only refers to Pouvrean. ●

- ***Palpo**, hazta, Luke xxiv. 39 ; hastatu, Acts xvii. 27.
- ***Panis**, ogui, Matt. xxvi. 26.
- Par**, *adj.*, bardin, Matt. xx. 12, John v. 18.
- Par**, *s.*, *pair*, pare, Luke ii. 24.
- ***Parce**, cekenqui, 2 Cor. ix. 6.
- Parco**, guppida, Rom. viii. 31, xi. 21, 2 Cor. i. 23.
- Parentes**, aite-amác, Matt. x. 21, Luke viii. 56 ; aitamác, John ix. 18, Luke xviii. 29 ; aitaméc (*as agent*), John ix. 2, 20, 22 ; burhassoak, 1 Tim. v. 4.
- ***Paro**, appainduren, Matt. xi. 10.
- Pars**, alde, Mark iv. 38, "unciaren guibeleco alde," "en la poupe."
- Parvus**, chipi, Matt. xviii. 6 ; chipito, James iii. 4.
- Pasco**, bazcatu, bazcatzen, Matt. xxv. 37, Luke xv. 15, John xxi. 15, 16, 17 (*imper.* bazca itzac).
- ***Pascor**, alha, Matt. viii. 30, Mark v. 11.
- Passer**, parra-chori, Matt. x. 29, 31.
- Pastor**, artzain, John x. 11, 12.
- Pastus**, *s.*, bazca, John x. 9.
- Pater**, aita, Matt. vi. 8, 9.
- Pauci**, *peu*, guti, Matt. vii. 14 ; bakoitz, Mark vi. 5, eri bakoitz, "un peu de malades."
- Pax**, baque, Matt. x. 13.
- Pecunia**, diru (= 'argent'), Matt. xxv. 18.
- Pellax**, *enticing, attrayant*, gogagarri, 1 Cor. ii. 4.
- ***Pellicio**, bazcatzen, James i. 14, 2 Pet. ii. 18 (A. gives the signification "gouverner") ; goga eraci, Col. ii. 14.
- ***Pellis**, larru, Mark i. 6, Heb. xi. 37.
- Pello**, *drive, chasser*, ken, Acts xviii. 16 : cf. Mark xvi. 18, (sugeac) "kenduren dituzte," "chasseront." v. E. says, "la version anglaise dit 'take up,' ramasser." "Take up" = ἀποῦσι, 'tollent.' A. has "enlever, ôter" (see John xx. 15).
- Pendens**, dilindoca, Acts xxviii. 4 (= "à crochet pendante"), "dilinda" = "crochet," v. E.

***Pendeo**, urkatu, Gal. iii. 13.

Penna, *pen*, hegats, 3 John 13.

Penso, **pensito**, ehaiten, Luke ii. 19, "ruminant": cf. v. E., who, *s.v.* eo, has *ehotzen* bn. *ehaitzen* ou *ehaiten* l. 'tisser,' adding that, in b. and bn., it means indifferently "tisser" and "moudre."

***Per**, *during*, -cotz, *suffixed*, Rev. ix. 15.

Perdo, *lose*, galduren, Matt. x. 39.

Perdo, *destroy*, galtzen, Luke vi. 9, ix. 56.

Peregrinus, campoco, Eph. ii. 19.

Pereo, gal, galtzen, Matt. v. 29, 2 Thess. ii. 10.

Permitto, utzen, Matt. iii. 15, xxiii. 13.

***Pervenio**, eldu, 2 Cor. x. 13 : cf. *evenio*.

Perversus, bihurri, Matt. xvii. 17.

Pes, oin, Matt. xviii. 8.

Peto, *ask*, *demand*, esca, Luke xxiii. 52, 1 John v. 15, Matt. vii. 7 ; galde eguin, 1 John v. 15.

Petra, arroca, Matt. vii. 24, 25.

Pinguedo, urin, Rom. xi. 17.

***Pinguis**, guicen, Luke xv. 23 ; guicendu, Matt. xiii. 15.

Piscis, arrain, Matt. vii. 10.

Pius, Iaincoaren beldur, Luke ii. 25, Acts viii. 2.

***Placatus**, amatigatu, Heb. viii. 12 ; amatiga, Acts xiv. 18.

Placens, gogaraco, John viii. 29, 1 Cor. vii. 33.

***Planta**, *sole of foot*, çola, Acts iii. 7.

Planta, *a plant*, landare, Matt. xv. 13.

Planto, landatu, Matt. xv. 13, xxi. 33.

Platea, karrica, Luke xiii. 10.

Plenus, bethe, Luke xi. 39.

Plico, biribilgaturen, Heb. i. 12.

Ploro, nigarrez egon, John xx. 15.

Pluvia, uri, Matt. v. 45, vii. 25, Rev. xi. 6.

- Poculum**, *beire, Matt. x. 42 ('cruche'); **copa**, Matt. xx. 22;
 ***gopor** (?) Mark vii. 4. According to v. E., 'gopor' means an earthen bowl with a handle. In l. c. the Basque words "goporén ikutzeac, eta cubenac" correspond to "les lavemens des coupes, des brocs." In John ii. 6 "cruche" (= hydria) is represented by "kuba," so that "coupe" here = "gopor" ('calicum,' Vulg.).
- Pondus**, piçu, 2 Cor iv. 17.
- Poné**, *behind*, guibeletic, Phil. iii. 14.
- Pono**, eçarten, Matt. v. 15; eçarri, Mark vi. 5.
- Porcus**, urde, Matt. vii. 6.
- ***Porcorum grex**, urdalde, Matt. viii. 30.
- Porto**, eramaiten, Acts xxi. 35, Mark ii. 3.
- ***Post**, ondoan, Matt xvi. 24.
- Possessor**, iabe, Luke xix. 33.
- ***Postea**, guero, John xiii. 36.
- ***Postquam**, ondoan, Matt. i. 12.
- ***Potestas**, ahal, Matt. iii. 9, John iii. 9; bothere, 1 Cor. ix. 6.
- Potius**, aitzitic, Rom. iii. 30.
- ***Praecludo**, boçaturen, 2 Cor. xi. 10 (étoupée). *See Obturo.*
- Praedium**, borda, Matt. xxii. 5; *landa, James v. 4.
- Praemium**, sari, Matt. v. 12.
- Praesertim**, *gainetic, Rom. iii. 2.
- ***Praeterea**, berce alde, Luke xvi. 26; "outre tout cela."
- Praetereo**, iragan, Matt. xxiv. 35, Luke xvi. 26.
- ***Praevaleo**, garaithuren, Matt. xvi. 18.
- Prandium**, barazcal, Luke xi. 37, 38; barazcari, Matt. xxii. 4, Luke xiv. 12.
- Prandeo**, barazcaldu, John xxi. 15.
- ***Precatio**, othoitz, Matt. ix. 38.
- ***Precor**, othoitz eguin. *See Obsecro.*
- Premo**, hertsen, Luke viii. 45.
- Primarius**, lehen, Matt. xx. 27.
- Primo**, lehen, Matt. v. 24; lehenic, Matt. vi. 33.
- Primus**, lehen, Luke ii. 2.

Principium, *initium*, hatse, Matt. xxiv. 8, "hauc guciac dolore hatseac dirade"; Luke i. 2, Heb. vi. 1.

***Pro**, gatic *suffixed*, Rom. v. 6, 7, 8.

Probatio, phorogança, 2 Cor. viii. 24.

Probo, phorogatzen, Luke xiv. 19; enseyatzen, John vi. 6.

Procella, buhumba, Mark iv. 37.

Procul, urrun, Matt. viii. 30, Luke xv. 20.

Prodest, probetchaturen, Gal. v. 2.

Profundum, s., hundar (*of the sea*), Acts xxvii. 28, Matt. xviii. 6; "hundarrean," "au profond": (*see* v. E., 'ondo'); barnetassun, Rev. ii. 24; "Satánen barnetas-sunac": cf. Mark iv. 5, "lur barnetassunic."

Profundus, barna, John iv. 11, "putzua duc barna."

***Progenies**, casta, Matt. iii. 7, xxiii. 33, "vipera castá."

Prope, hurbil, Matt. iii. 2, xxiv. 33.

Prosapia, arraça, Luke ii. 4; leinu, Acts xvii. 28, 29 ("lignage" Fr.).

Provectus (aetate), aitzinaratu, Luke i. 7.

Proximus, hurbilengo, Mark i. 38; *hurreneco, Acts xiii. 42; hurrenengo, *ib.* 44.

Prudens, çuhur, Tit. ii. 5.

Prudenter, çuhurqui, Mark xii. 34.

Pruriens, quillicor, 2 Tim. iv. 3. *See* v. E., s. v. kilikatu.

Pudor, ahalque, 2 Cor. iv. 2.

***Puella**, nescatcha, Matt. xiv. 11.

Puer, haour, Luke ix. 42, rather = child: *see* Infans. Written "aur" by v. E. and Azkue; muthilco, John vi. 9: v. Eys gives this (but as *mithilko*, "soul." (i.e. Souletin) on the authority of Salaberry). Azkue renders it "moutard, gamin."

***Pulcher**, eder, Acts iii. 2, 10.

***Pullulo**, ninicatzen, Matt. xxiv. 32, "est en seve" = Mark xiii. 28, where L. has "ustertzen."

Pullus, *chicken*, chito, Matt. xxiii. 37.

Pullus asininus, asto-ume, Mark xi. 5.

Pulso, bulka, Matt. vii. 7; bulkatzen, Acts xii. 16.

- Pulvis**, errhauts, Matt. x. 14.
- ***Purgamentum**, karraca, 1 Cor. iv. 13, scoba, *ibid.*
- Purgo**, garbituren, Matt. iii. 12.
- Purus**, chahu, Tit. ii. 5.
- Puteo**, kirestu, John xi. 39.
- Puteus**, *fosse, pit*, lece, Matt. xii. 11. v. E., for *leize, leze*, gives "abîme, antre, caverne."
- Puto**, uste. *See Opinio.*
- Quadraginta**, berroguey, Acts xxiii. 21.
- Quadrans**, *pelata, Matt. v. 26 ("quadrin").
- ***Quaero**, bilha ibilli, John xx. 15, "noren bilha abila?" "qui cherches-tu?" i. 38, xviii. 7; bilhatzen, Rom. xi. 7.
- ***Quaero**, *tâcher, go about to*, bilhatzen, John vii. 25; nahiz ibilli, John vii. 30; "hura hatzaman nahiz çabiltzan," "ils tâchoient de l'empoigner;" John vii. 1, "Iuduac baitzabiltzan hura hil nahiz," "les Juifs cherchoient de le mettre à mort": cf. John vii. 19, 20, Rom. x. 3.
- Quare**, cergatic, John i. 25, xx. 15.
- Quatio**, iharros, Matt. x. 14; higuitu, Heb. xii. 26.
- Quia**, ceren, John vii. 1.
- ***Quicumque**, norc-ere . . . baitu, Matt. v. 19, xviii. 5.
- ***Quidquam**, deus (*with neg.*), Matt. xvii. 20, John i. 3.
- Quisque**, batbedera, Matt. xxv. 15. *See Unusquisque.*
- Quomodo**, nola, Matt. vii. 4; nolatan, 1 Cor. xiv. 9.
- Quoque**, halaber, Luke xvi. 20.
- Quotidie**, egun oroz, Luke ix. 23, Matt. xxvi. 55.
- Quotidianus**, eguneco, Luke xi. 3. (So v. E., but perhaps = "of the day," as some interpret the Greek *ἐπιούσιον*.)
- ***Quousque**, noizdrano, Mark ix. 19.
- ***Quum**, n or an, suffixed to the subst. verb: cf. the Greek *ἐν τῷ εἶναι*. John i. 48, "incenean," "quand tu étois"; John ii. 3, "faltatu cenean," "étant failli"; 1 Cor. xiii. 11, "haour nincenean," "quand j'étois enfant"; John xviii. 1, "gauça hauc erran cituenean," "après [Jesus] ût dit ces choses."

Racemus, mulko, Rev. xiv. 18.

Radix, erro, Matt. iii. 10.

Ramus, adar, Matt. xxi. 8, xxiv. 32.

Rana, *iguel, Rev. xvi. 13.

Ratiocinor, iharduquiten, Matt. xvi. 7 : cf. baciharducaten, Mark viii. 16.

Rectus, aequus, chuchen, Gal. ii. 14.

Redintegro, arramberritzen, 2 Cor. iv. 16. v. E., s.v. 'berri,' has 'arraberitu,' observing, "P. cite encore *arramberitu* ; i. a. [inconnu aujourd'hui]."

***Refulgens**, chist-mista, Luke ix. 29.

Regio, comarca, Matt. iii. 5 ; comarque, Acts viii. 1 ; "guciác barreya citecen Judéaco eta Samáriaco comarquetarát," "tous fureni épars par les quartiers de Judée et de Samarie"; herri, Matt. ix. 31 = "quartier," Mark vi. 1, Luke *v. 13, Acts vii. 3, 4, all = 'païs.'

Rejicio, iraitzi, Mark vi. 26 ; iraizten, Mark vii. 9.

***Remigo**, abiroina tiratu, John vi. 19.

Reminiscor, orhoitu, Luke xxiv. 8. Luke xxiii. 42, "orhoit albeitendi niçaz," "souviens-toi de moi."

Remissio, barkamendu, Matt. xxvi. 28.

Removeo, iragan, Matt. xvii. 20, Luke xxii. 42 ; *aldaraturen, Mark xvi. 3.

***Renes**, guelçurrunac, Rev. ii. 23. See v. E., s.v. "gerri." He cites "gerruntzak," from M. Eguren (guip.).

Requiro, esquez egon, 1 Cor. i. 22.

Res, gauça, Matt. xviii. 19. *Passim.*

Respondeo, ihardets, John i. 21 ; ihardesten, Luke xi. 7 ; ihardetsiren, Luke xii. 11.

***Responsum**, reposta, John xix. 9.

Rete, sare, Matt. iv. 18.

Retineo, eduquiren, John xx. 23 ; eduquiten, Rom. i. 28 ; *atchequi, 1 Thess. v. 21 ; "on denari çatchetzate," "retenez ce qui est bon." For "atchequi" = 'saisir,' see *Comprehendo*.

Revereor, ondraturen, Matt. xxi. 37.

- Reverto**, itzul, Matt. x. 13.
- Reus**, çordun (of an oath, *debtor*), Matt. xxiii. 18; hoguendun, Rom. iii. 19.
- Risus**, irri, Mark v. 40.
- ***Rixa**, liscar, Gal. v. 20, 2 Cor. xii. 20.
- Rodo**, mastacatzen, Rev. xvi. 10.
- Rogo**. *See* Peto.
- Ruber**, gorri, Matt. xvi. 2.
- Rubiginosus**, herdoildu, James v. 3.
- Rubigo**, herdoil, Matt. vi. 19.
- Rubus**, sapar, Luke vi. 44.
- Ruga**, cimur, Eph. v. 27.
- Ruina**, deseguite, Luke vi. 49.
- Rumor**, hots, Matt. xxiv. 6.
- Ruo**, oldar, Acts xix. 29.
- Rutilans** (*of the sky*), orzgorri, Matt. xvi. 3.
- Saepe**, maiz, Mark vii. 3.
- Sal**, gatz, Matt. v. 13.
- Salio**, *leap*, iauz, Luke vi. 23, i. 41.
- Saliva**, thu, John ix. 6.
- Salus**, *safety*, emparatze, Acts xxvii. 34; *health*, *ossassun, Acts iv. 30.
- ***Salvus**, empara, Acts xxvii. 43, 44; ossoric, Luke xv. 27.
- Saluto**, beguitharte eguiten, Matt. v. 47 ("faites accueil").
- Sanguis**, odol, Matt. xxvi. 28.
- Sano**, sendatu, Matt. xiv. 14.
- Sapiens**, çuhur, Rom. xvi. 27.
- Sarcina**, hatu, Acts xxi. 15.
- Satis**, asco, Matt. x. 25, xxv. 9.
- ***Sator**, ereille, Matt. xiii. 3.
- Saturo**, assetzen, Luke xvi. 21.
- Saxum**, harri, Matt. vii. 9.
- Scabellum**, oinetaco alki, Matt. v. 35.
- Scando**, igan, Luke xix. 4; igaiten, John x. 1.

- Scientia**, eçagutze, 1 Cor. viii. 1, Luke i. 77.
Scio, eçaguturen, Matt. vii. 16; eçagutu, Acts xxi. 34;
 *iaquin, 1 Cor. xiv. 8, ix. 26, x. 1.
***Secundum**, arauez, Heb. viii. 4, ix. 19, 22; araura, Matt.
 xxv. 15.
Secundus, bigarren, John iv. 54.
Securis, aizcora, Matt. iii. 10.
Sedeo, iarriren, Matt. viii. 11; iarten, Matt. xxiii. 2.
Sedes, cadira, Matt. xxiii. 2.
***Seductor**, abusari, Matt. xxvii. 63, 2 John 7.
***Seges**, ereince, Mark ii. 23, Matt. xii. 1.
Semel, *behin, Heb. ix. 26; behingoáz, Heb. vii. 27. v. E.
 says, "pour toujours; selon M. Salaberry." This is
 doubtless the meaning here, the translator following
 the Greek ἐφάπαξ. So 'behingotz,' Rom. vi. 10, where
 the French has "pour une fois."
Semen, haci, Matt. xiii. 24.
***Semper**, bethiere, Rom. xi. 10; bethi, John vii. 6.
***Senesco**, çahartzen, Heb. viii. 13.
Senex, çahar, Tit. ii. 2; *anciano, Philem. 9.
Separo, bereciren, Matt. xxv. 32.
Separatus, bereci, Rom. i. 1.
Sepelio, ohortz, Matt. xiv. 12, Luke xvi. 22, Acts v. 6.
Sepes, *hessi, Matt. xxi. 33, Mark xii. 1.
Septimana, aste, Luke xviii. 12.
Sequor, iarreiquiren, Matt. viii. 19; iarraitu, *imper.* 2 s.
 arreit, Luke ix. 59; *pres.* 1 s. narrayó, Phil. iii. 14
 banarreió, Phil. iii. 12.
Sericum, ceta, Rev. xviii. 12. *See* Byssus.
***Sero**, v. sow, ereiten, Matt. xiii. 3.
Serpens, sugue, Matt. vii. 10.
***Serus**, berandu, Mark vi. 35.
Servio, cerbitzaturen, Matt. iv. 10.
Servo, *keep, observe*, beguira, beguiratzen, Mark vii. 9, John
 ix. 16.

- * **Servo**, *save, preserve*, emparatu, Acts xxvii. 43.
- Servus**, cerbitzari, Matt. x. 24.
- Si**, baldin, Phil. iv. 8 ; (*in clauses of question or doubt*) *eya, Mark iii. 2, Acts viii. 22.
- Siccus**, eyhar, Luke xxiii. 31 ; leihor, Matt. xii. 43.
- Signum**, *keinu, Luke i. 22.
- Sileo**, ichildu, Matt. xxii. 34.
- Siliqua**, maguinche, Luke xv. 16.
- Similis**, irudi, Luke xiii. 19.
- Simul**, elkarrequin, Luke xxiii. 18.
- * **Sine**, *prep.*, gabe, Heb. vii. 7.
- Sinistra**, ezquer, Matt. vi. 3.
- Sinus**, bulhar, Luke xvi. 22 ; golko, Luke vi. 38.
- Sisto**, *be staunched*, gueldi, Luke viii. 44.
- Sitis**, egarri, 2 Cor. xi. 27. (v. E., s. v. edan, suggests that this is derived from 'edan-garri,' "porté, enclin à boire = soif.")
- * **Sive—sive**, ala—ala, Eph. vi. 8 ; bada—bada, 1 Cor. xii. 13
nahiz—nahiz, Col. i. 16.
- * **Socius**, lagun, 2 Cor. viii. 23 ; Luke v. 7 : *see* Acts v. 6.
- * **Socrus**, ama-guinharreba, Matt. x. 35.
- Sol**, igazqui, Matt. v. 45.
- * **Sollicitudo**, ansi, 1 Cor. xii. 25.
- Somnium**, amets, Matt. i. 20.
- Somnus**, lo, Matt. xxv. 5.
- * **Somnulentia**, logale, Luke ix. 32. (v. E. gives "gale, g. l; envie. *Lo galea*, g.l. *lo alea*, l. envie de dormir.")
- Sonitus**, soinu, Matt. xxiv. 31.
- * **Sopor**, itho, Rom. xi. 8, "eman ukan draue Iaincoac spiritu ithobat." "Dieu leur a donné un esprit assoupi."
- Sordes**, satsutassun, 1 Pet. iii. 21. *See* Purgamentum.
- * **Soror** (*to a brother*), arreba, Matt. xiii. 56 ; (*to a sister*), ahizpa, Luke x. 39, 40 : cf. v. E. s. v. aizpa.
- * **Speculum**, mirail, 1 Cor. xiii. 12.

- Specus**, lece, Heb. xi. 38, Matt. xxi. 13.
- ***Spica**, buruca, Matt. xii. 1.
- Spina**, elhorri, Matt. vii. 16, xiii. 7, 22, xxvii. 29.
- Spuma**, hagun, Jude 13.
- ***Statim**, bertan, Mark i. 31. *Passim.*
- Statura**, handitassun, Matt. vi. 27.
- Stella**, içar, Luke xxi. 25.
- Sterno**, *étendre, strew*, heda, hedatzen, Matt. xxi. 8.
- Sterquilinium**, ongarri, Luke xiv. 35.
- Stimulus**, *aiguillon, sting*, ezten, 1 Cor. xv. 55, 56.
- Stimulus**, *aiguillon (éguillon), goad*, akulo, Acts ix. 5.
- Stipula**, lasto, 1 Cor. iii. 12.
- Stirps**, arraça, Acts xiii. 26; Phil. iii. 5.
- Strangulatus**, itho, Acts xv. 20, 29.
- ***Strepitus**, hots, Rev. xi. 19, xvi. 18.
- ***Stridor dentium**, garrascots, Matt. viii. 12; Acts vii. 54.
- Stultus**, erho, Luke xi. 20.
- Stultitia**, erhogo, 2 Cor. xi. 1.
- ***Stupesco**, spanta, Luke viii. 56.
- Suadeo**, sinhets eraciren, Matt. xxviii. 14; *gogatzen, Acts xxvi. 28.
- ***Submergo**, hundatu, Matt. xviii. 6, Heb. xi. 29.
- ***Subitus**, laster, 2 Pet. ii. 1.
- ***Subverto**, erautzen, 2 Tim. ii. 18, "renversent." *See v. E.*
- Sudarium**, crobitchet, John xi. 44; Acts xix. 12.
- Sudor**, icerdi, Luke xxii. 44.
- Suffoco**, ithotzen, Matt. xiii. 22.
- ***Sugo**, edosqui, Luke xi. 27.
- ***Supellex**, ostillamendu, Luke xvii. 31.
- Surdus**, *sourd, deaf*, gor, Mark vii. 32.
- ***Surgo**, altchaturen, Matt. xxiv. 7; iaiqui, Mark v. 41.
- ***Sursum**, garaira, Eph. iv. 10.
- Sutura**, iostura, John xix. 23.

- Tabulatum**, soilleru, Acts xx. 9: "hirurgarren soillerutic," "du troisième étage." *See* v. E.
- Taceo**, ichil, Mark i. 25: "ichil adi," "tai-toi." *See* Matt. xx. 31; Luke xix. 40.
- Talis**, halaco, 1 Cor. v. 11; hunelaco, Mark vii. 8.
- Tango**, hunqui, Matt. ix. 21.
- Tardus**, berant, James i. 19.
- Taurus**, cecen, Heb. ix. 13.
- Tego**, estaltzen, Matt. viii. 24: cf. estaliric, Matt. x. 26.
- Tempus**, dembora, Matt. ii. 7, Acts vii. 20, xxvii. 9; ordu, Matt. viii. 29.
- Tenebrae**, ilhumbe, Matt. vi. 23.
- Tenebrosus**, ilhun, Luke xi. 36.
- Tener fio**, ustertzen, Mark xiii. 28: "haren adarra ia ustertzen," "est en seve." *See* Pullulo.
- ***Teneo**, itcheki, Matt. xxvi. 48, 1 Thess. v. 21 (*imper. 2 pl.* 'çachetzate'): eduki, Heb. iii. 6, iv. 14, x. 23.
- Tepidus**, eppel, Rev. iii. 16.
- Tergum**, bizcar, Rom. xi. 10: *guibel, John xviii. 6.
- ***Tero**, *fouler, thresh*, bihitzen, 1 Cor. ix. 10.
- Terra**, lur, Matt. ix. 26.
- Terrae motus**, lur ikaratze, Matt. xxvii. 54.
- ***Terreo**, icitu, Heb. xii. 21.
- ***Terribilis**, icigarri, Rom. xiii. 3.
- ***Territus**, icitu, Heb. xii. 21.
- Terror**, iciapen, 2 Cor v. 11.
- Tibicen**, soinulari, Matt. ix. 23.
- Timor**, beldur, Rom. xiii. 7 (= *reverential fear*); icidura, Luke i. 12, 65.
- Tinea**, cerren, Matt. vi. 19.
- ***Tinnio**, dindatzen, 1 Cor. xiii. 1.
- Titubo**, behaztopatzen, John xi. 9, 10; trebucatzzen, 1 Pet. ii. 8.
- ***Titubantia**, behaztopamendu, 1 Pet. ii. 7; trebucamendu, 1 Pet. ii. 7.

- Tollo**, *lift*, altchaturen, Matt. xii. 11 : cf. altchaturic, Luke vi. 20.
- Tondeo***, *shear*, *motzen, Acts viii. 32 ; *shave*, arrada, Acts xxi. 24.
- Tonitru**, igorciri, Mark iii. 17, John xii. 29, *pl.* Rev. viii. 5.
- Tonsus**, moztu, 1 Cor. xi. 6 ; arradatu, *ibid.*
- Torreo**, erratzen, Rev. xvi. 8 ; erre, Luke xxiv. 42.
- ***Tortuosus**, bihurri, Phil. ii. 15.
- Totus**, gucia, 1 Cor. xii. 17.
- Trabs**, gapirio, Matt. vii. 3, 4, 5.
- Trado**, liuraturen, Matt. x. 21 ; liuratzen, Acts xxv. 16 ; liuratu, Rom. iv. 25.
- Tranquillitas**, *calm*, sossagu, Matt. viii. 26, Luke viii. 24.
- ***Transeo**, iragaiten, Mark ii. 23, Luke vi. 1.
- Transgredior**, iragaiten, Matt. xv. 2.
- Transgressor**, hautsle, Rom. ii. 27.
- ***Tremefactus**, spantatu, Acts xxiv. 25.
- ***Tremo**, ikaratu, Heb. xii. 21.
- ***Tremor**, ikara, James ii. 19, Mark xvi. 8.
- Tribus**, leinu, Acts xxvi. 7, James i. 1.
- Triticum**, ogui-bihi, Matt. iii. 12, John xii. 24, Acts xxvii. 38 ; (*growing wheat*) ogui, Matt. xiii. 25.
- Trucido**, hilen, Matt. xix. 18.
- ***Tu ipse**, eurre, John i. 22.
- Tumescio**, hant, Acts xxviii. 6.
- Tunc**, orduan, John v. 12.
- Tunica**, iacca, John xix. 23 ; iuppa, John xxi. 7.
- Turris**, dorre, Matt. xxi. 33.
- Vacuus**, huts, Matt. xii. 44.
- ***Vagina**, maguina, John xviii. 11.
- ***Valde**, haguitz, Matt. xviii. 31 : tinquetz, Mark vi. 51.
- Vale**, ungui aicela, Acts xxiii. 30.
- Valete**, ungui duçuela, Acts xv. 29.
- ***Valesco**, sendaturen, Mark xvi. 18.

- Vallis**, haran, Luke iii. 5.
Vas, unci, 2 Tim. ii. 20, 21.
***Ubera**, ugatzac, Luke xi. 27. *See* v. E., s.v. ur 3, who cites Humboldt as authority for the word.
Ubi, non, Luke xvii. 37, John vii. 34.
***Vel**, ala, Luke vi. 9.
Velum, *veil*, estalqui, 2 Cor. iii. 13.
***Velut**, anço, Phil. iv. 18, Eph. v. 1; beçala, Matt. xxviii. 3, 4.
Vendo, sal, Luke xxii. 36.
Veneficus, poçoaçale, Rev. xxi. 8.
Venio, ethorri, John i. 11, 39; ethorriren, Luke xii. 46.
Venite, *imper.*, çatozte, John iv. 29, Matt. xi. 28.
Venter, sabel, Matt. xv. 17, Luke i. 41.
Ventilabrum, bahe, Matt. iii. 12.
***Ventus**, haice, Acts xxvii. 14.
Verber, ukaldi, Luke xii. 47.
***Verbero**, cehaturen, Luke xii. 47.
Verbum, hitz, Matt. viii. 8, John i. 1.
***Veritas**, eguia, 1 John i. 6, 8.
Verro, escobatzen, Luke xv. 8.
Verto, itzul, Matt. v. 39.
Verus, eguiazco, John i. 9, 1 John v. 20, 3 John 12.
Verus, eguiati, 1 John v. 20, Rev. iii. 7: v. E. equates with "véridique."
Vesper, arrats, Matt. viii. 16, xiv. 23.
***Vestigium**, hatz, Rom. iv. 12, 1 Pet. ii. 21.
Vestis, *estalqui, Heb. i. 12.
Veto, debeta, debetatu, Mark ix. 38, 39.
***Vetustus**, çar, Matt. ix. 27.
Via, bide, John xiv. 6.
Vicinus, hurko, Luke x. 27, 29, 36.
Video, ikussiren, Matt. v. 8; beha, Mark xv. 47, Rev. v. 6.
Videor, irudi, 1 Cor. xii. 22.
Vidua, alhargun, Mark xii. 42.

- Vincio**, esteca, Matt. xii. 29.
- Vinco**, garaitzen, garaita, John xvi. 33, Luke xi. 22.
- Vinculum**, estecaillu, Acts viii. 23; etchequidura, Mark vii. 35, "haren mihico etchequidurá."
- ***Vindico**, mendekatzen, Rev. vi. 10.
- Vindicta**, mendequio, Acts xxviii. 4.
- Vinea**, mahasti, Matt. xx. 1.
- Vinum**, mahatsarno, Luke vii. 33, John ii. 3: cf. v. E.
- Violentia**, bortcha, Matt. xi. 12, Acts v. 26; boalda, Acts xxi. 35.
- ***Vir**, guïçon, Matt. iv. 4.
- Viridis**, pherde, Mark vi. 39.
- ***Virtus**, verthute, Phil. iv. 8.
- Vis**, indar, Rom. v. 6; bothere, Acts xxvii. 41.
- Viscera**, halsar, Acts i. 18; *pl.* 2 Cor. vi. 12.
- Visus**, s. ikuste, Matt. xi. 5.
- Vita**, arima, Matt. ii. 20; vicitze, John xiv. 6, Matt. vi. 25.
- Vitiose**, gaizqui, James iv. 3.
- Vitis**, aihen, Matt. xxvi. 29, John xv. 1, "aihen eguiazco." v. E. gives for ayen (= aihen) "viorne, vigne sauvage,"
- Vitulus**, aretze, Luke xv. 23. v. E. says, "veau d'un an." *See Aretze*, in *Notes* below.
- Vivens**, vivus, vici, Luke xxiv. 5, Matt. xxii. 32.
- Vivo**, vici, Gal. ii. 20; *fut.* vicico (*with aux.*), Matt. iv. 4, ix. 18, Luke x. 28, Rev. xx. 4. According to v. E. the Spanish-Basque dialects, and (rarely) the Labourdin, use *go* (= *co*) for the future, while the French-Basque use *en* or *ren*.
- ***Vix**, nequez, Acts xiv. 18, miraz, Rom. v. 7, *see Difficultas*.
- Ultimus**, azquen, Mark ix. 35; hatse, Matt. xii. 45.
- ***Ultra potestatem**, ahalaz garaitic, "contre leur pouvoir," 2 Cor. viii. 3. *See Invité*.
- Ululo**, urhubi, James v. 1.
- Umbra**, itzal, Mark iv. 32.
- Unda**, бага, Matt. viii. 24, Acts xxvii. 41, James i. 6.

***Unicus**, bakoitz, John i. 14, iii. 16, 18, 1 John iv. 9, "bere semea bakoitza," "son fils unique"; Luke viii. 42, Rom. xvi. 27. Iaincoari, *bada*, çuhur bakoitzari, "à Dieu seul sage." *See Bakoitz*, below.

Unus, bat (*post pos.*), John i. 6. *Passim*.

***Unusquisque**, bedera, Matt. xxv. 15; batbedera, Luke xiii. 15, John vi. 7.

Voco (= *name*), deithuren, deitzen, Matt. i. 21, ix. 13. Also = *summon*, John ix. 18 (*dei*).

Volo, *I will*, nahi diát, Matt. viii. 3, John xvii. 24; nahi badut, John xxi. 22.

Volo, *fly*, hegaldatzen, Rev. xiv. 6, xix. 17.

Volucris, chori, Matt. vi. 26.

Voluntas, vorondate, Matt. vii. 21; nahi, *see Volo*. Cf. 1 Pet. iii. 17, "baldin Iaincoaren vorondateac hala nahi badu."

Voluto, *wallow*, iraulzkatzen, 2 Pet. ii. 22.

Vomitus, s., issurtze, 2 Pet. ii. 22, "ora itzuli içan da bere issurtze proprira"; "le chien est retourné à son propre vomissement." v. E. has for "isuri, isurtzen," "verser, répandre."

***Vox**: voce magna, ocengui, Luke viii. 28; voces, hots, Rev. xi. 19, xvi. 18: cf. v. E., "ots g. *hots* bruit. O. (*i.e.* Oienhart) cite *hots*, bruit, renommée, sans dire à quel dialecte *hots* appartient." Azkue makes it (c), *i.e.* common to all.

Urbs, hiri, Matt. viii. 34.

***Urcens**, kuba, John ii. 6. *See Poculum*.

Urgeo, hertsen, Luke xi. 53.

Urna, pegar, Heb. ix. 4, "urrhezco pegarbat, non baitzén Mäna," "cruche d'or."

Usque, "rano" as suffix, Matt. xxviii. 20, John xiii. 1; "drano" as suffix, 1 Cor. iv. 13; Matt. xxiv. 21.

Usura, lucuru, Matt. xxv. 27.

Uter, *bottle*, *outré*, çahagui, Matt. ix. 17.

Uterus, *see* **Venter**.

Uva, mahats, Luke vi. 44.

***Vulgo**, ohi, 2 Pet. ii. 22.

Vulnus, çauri, Rev. xiii. 3, 12, 14.

***Vulpes**, aceri, Luke ix. 58, xiii. 32.

Vultus, ikartze, Matt. xxviii. 3.

Uxor, emazte, Luke xiv. 20.

Zona, guerrico, Matt. iii. 4.

III.—*Notes on M. van Eys' Dictionary.*

After these notes had been written, and, indeed, sent to press, I received the very copious Basque-Espagnol-Français Dictionary of Prof. l'Abbé Azkue. Bilbao, 1905, 1906. As Prof. Azkue has thoroughly examined the N. T. of Leizarraga, his work has rendered some of my notes superfluous, and these have been omitted. I have occasionally referred to him as A.

Abiroina, John vi. 19, "abiroina tiratu ondoan" = "après qu'ils ûrent ramé" (Fr. aviron, *steering oar*).

Ala = Lat. num, "ala Gobernadosétaric edo Phariseuétaric batec-ere siuhetsi du hura baithan?" "aucun des Gouverneurs ou des Pharisiens a-t'il crû en lui," John vii. 48; "ala gure Legueac condemnatzen du nehor," "nôtre Loi juge-t'elle un homme?" *ibid.* 51; ala artha du idiéz Iaincoac?" "Dieu a-t'il soin des bœufs?" 1 Cor. ix. 9.

Ao, "g.b. *aho* l.bn. bouche." So John xix. 29. But also = *edge* (of sword); *see* especially Rev. i. 16, "haren ahotic bi ahotaco ezpata çorrotz bat ilkiten cen," "out of his mouth went a sharp two-edged sword"; *ibid.* ii. 12, "bi ahotaco ezpata çorrotz duenac," "he which hath the sharp sword with two edges." Also

Heb. iv. 12, Azkue gives the meaning, "lame d'un outil tranchant"; adding "quelques-uns, sans doute par ignorance du mot veritable, qui est sorbatz, bizar, ahopil, prennent le mot **Ao** pour désigner 'le tranchant.'" No doubt, Leizarraga was influenced by the Greek *στόμα*.

Arauez = *arauz*, "selon," Heb. viii. 4, ix. 19, 22; "arauezco," 2 Tim. iv. 3, "beréc bere desirén arauezco."

Aretze, "veau d'un an." This should be simply 'veau' (as A.). See Acts vii. 41, "aretze bat eguin ceçaten egun hetan," "en ces jours-là il firent un veau." See also Heb. ix. 19, Rev. iv. 7, "bigarren animalac aretzen irudi çuen." (A. cites Luke xv. 23, but these are more conclusive.)

Arte, "espace." Also of time, *e.g.* "gure afflictione arin arte gutitacoac"; "nôtre legere affliction, qui ne fait que passer," 2 Cor. iv. 17. For the meaning "milieu" (given by A.) see above, *s.v.* **Medio**.

Barreu, "bn. dispersé; contraction de barreatu"; = "barreya," Acts viii. 1.

Bakoitz, "chacun." But also = "unicus," as: "alaba bakoitz bat" = "une fille unique," Luke viii. 42; "bere Semé bakoitz" = "son Fils unique," John iii. 16; also John i. 14. [A. gives "unique."] See **Unicus**, above.

We also have "eri bakoitz" = "un peu de malades," Mark vi. 5. [Compare in A. "bakotš batzueten" = "(de) rares fois."]

Baratzen. See Luke viii. 43, "odola baratzen etzayón" = "qui avoit une perte de sang": cp. barreatzen.

Bekaizteria, "l. P. le mauvais œil; le mal occhio des Italiens." See Mark vii. 22, "le mauvais regard," where, however, the meaning is 'envy,' = "bekaizkeria"; compare Gal. v. 20, where "bekaizteriac" = "dépits."

Bide, "chemin, voie, moyen." Note "bide," *adj.*, = "juste,"
 "bide datena emanen arauquat" = "je vous baillerai
 ce qui sera de raison," Matt. xx. 4; "bide dena" = "ce
 qui est juste," Luke xii. 57. [A. has "licite," or
 "permis," quoting Luke xx. 22.]

Bihi, "grain (blé)" (*of mustard*), Matt. xiii. 31.

Billusgorri, "nu." Add the subst. "billuzgorritassun" =
 "nudité," Rev. iii. 18.

Bixtu. v. Eys notes that Larramendi writes "viztu." It
 is so in Acts xxi. 38.

Busti, "mouiller." v. Eys cites Salaberry for the form
 "busta." It is so in Luke xvi. 24.

Chorta, "bn. goutte, petite quantité." But see Acts xx.
 19, "anhitz nigar chartarequin" = "avec beaucoup
 de larmes."

Creaçale, "créateur," 1 Pet. iv. 19, a hybrid of Latin and
 Basque.

Deseguin, *destroy*; **Deseguile**, *destroyer*, 1 Cor. x. 10. Compare
 v. Eys, p. 132, s.v. eta. The prefix is borrowed from
 the Latin.

Dupin, tupin; "pot en fer dans lequel les paysans font la
 soupe" ['marmite,' A.]. Compare, however, Matt.
 xxvii. 10, where the compound "tupinaguile" =
 "potier." In Rom. ix. 21 "potier de terre" is "lur-
 tupinaguile."

Egundaño (g.), egundaino (l. bn.), "jamais . . . Litt., jusque
 est jour." v. Eys formerly (*Essai*, p. 8) decomposed
 this word into "egun-rano, jusqu'à jour"; but subse-
 quently preferred the derivation from egun-da-ño =
 jusque est jour (cp. also his Introduction, p. xxxii).
 Now, it deserves notice that "egunerano" = "jusqu'à
 jour," occurs in Acts i. 2; "goiti recebitu cen egune-
 rano" = "jusques au jour qu'il fut receu en haut."

- Again, in Acts xxvi. 22, we have “egungo egunerano” = “jusqu’à ce jourd’hui”; and the same expression in Rom. xi. 8 = “jusques au jour présent.” The change from *r* to *d* is common, says v. Eys, to all the dialects.
- Ehortsi**, l., ihortzi, bn. “ensevelir.” In Matt. xiv. 12, Luke xvi. 22, Acts ii. 29, v. 6, 10, ohortz, ohortzi.
- El**, eldu, eltzen (in bn. hel, heldu, heltzen); v. Eys does not note the signification “help” (which, however, is given by A.). See above, under **Adjuvo**.
- Elkar**. Note “elkargatzen” in Mark ix. 25, “ecen populua lasterca elkargatzen cela,” “que le peuple y accouroit l’un sur l’autre.”
- Eraman**, g. l. bn., emporter, emmener; g. supporter, porter. Add the signification “mener (la vie).” See 1 Tim. ii. 2, “vicitze baquezcoá eta emeá eraman deçagunçat” = “afin que nous puissions mener une vie paisible et tranquille.”
- Emendio** (2° augmentation, supplément, A.: not in E.). See 1 Cor. xi. 17, “ceren ezpaitzarete emendiotan biltzen, baina desemendiotan”; “c’est que vous vous assemblez non point en mieux, mais en pis.”
- Eo**, eotzen . . . ehaiten, “tisser, moudre.” Also “ruminer.” “Mariac beguiratzen cituen gauça hauc guciac, bere bihotzean ehaiten cituela”; “les ruminant en son cœur,” Luke ii. 19.
- Erautsen** = renverser, 2 Tim. ii. 18.
- Erdiratu**, erdiratzen, “l. fendre; P. dit fendre par la moitié; on nous a dit que ce verbe n’est employé qu’au figuré.” But see Matt. xxvii. 51, “templeco velú erdira cedin bi çathitara . . . eta harriac erdira citecen”; “le voile du temple se fendit en deux . . . et les pierres se fendirent.” [A. cites also Mark xiv. 63.]
- Erri**. v. Eys judges that this word signifies ‘the inhabitants,’ rather than ‘the country.’ Compare, however, Matt. ix. 31, “barreya çecaten haren famá herri

hartan gucian," where the Fr. has 'quartier.' And in Mark vi. 1, "ethor cedin bere herrira," where the Fr. has 'en son pais.' [A. thinks it probable that the signification 'inhabitants' is an extension of 'country.'] *See Regio*, above.

Erazo . . . **erazi**, "contraindre, forcer." But also = faire, with no idea of force, "iar eraciren diát neurequin, neure thronoán"; "je le ferai seoir avec moi en mon trône," Rev. iii. 21.

Gaizquigule, malfaiteur, Luke xxiii. 33 = gaizqui-egule, John xviii. 30.

Garbitu, "nettoyer." In John ix. 7 = se laver.

Gelzurrunác, (guelçurrunác) = les reins, Rev. ii. 23 (not in v. Eys). A. has geltzurriñ and giltzurriñ.

Gerruntzak, "g. les reins, los lomos, selon M. Eguren." The word occurs in Acts ii. 30, "haren guerrunceco fructutic" = ἐκ καρποῦ ὀσφύος αὐτοῦ, where the French has 'reins'; but 'loins' is more appropriate. A. has "gerruntza, lomo, lombes."

Geroz, "l. depuis." Also = "puisque." *See* Acts xiii. 46, "baina hura arbuyatzen duçuenaz gueroz" = "mais puis que vous le rejettez." Also see Acts iv. 9.

Gogatzen, *persuade*, Acts xxvi. 28, "hurrensu gogatzen nauc Christino eguin nadin." A. has "gogatu . . . gagner par flatterie le cœur de quelqu'un."

Gogo, "pensée . . . gré . . ." v. Eys, here and *s.v.* garaztik, "d'en haut," quotes 1 Cor. ix. 17, where "gogoz garaitic" = "à contre-cœur," or, as he renders it, "contre mon gré," adding "Dit-on en bn. sur, au lieu de, contre mon gré?" The same expression occurs in Heb. xiii. 17 = "à regret," "alegueraqui . . . eta ez gogoz garaitic"; and in 1 Pet. v. 2, = "par contrainte," "ez gogoz garaitic, baina gogotic." Compare 2 Cor. viii. 3, where, "ahalaz garaitic" corresponds to the

French, "contre leur pouvoir," the meaning, however, being "beyond their power." In this case, the translator doubtless followed the Greek, ὑπέρ.

Gortasun, "surdité." See Acts xiv. 3, where "Iaunaren gorthassunez" represents "se portans hardiment au Seigneur"; παρρησιαζόμενοι.

Gurtu, gurtzen, "saluer, incliner la tête en saluant" (also vénérer, adorer, A.). Also = 'stoop' (simply), "Iesusec beheiti gurthuric erhiaz scribatzen çuen lurean," John viii. 6, = "Jesus étant encliné en bas écrivoit au doigt en terre." Compare Eph. iii. 14, "gurtzen ditut neure belhaunac," = "je plonge mes genoux."

Halsarrak, "Selon P. (Pouvreau) ce mot signifie 'entrailles,' et se trouve, 2 Cor. xii.; mais nous l'avons cherché vainement." The correct reference, as I pointed out in *Notes and Queries*, is 2 Cor. vi. 12. The words are "enserratuac çarete ceurón halsarretan" = "vous êtes (*sic*) à l'étroit en vos entrailles." Azkue has the correct reference, but, strange to say, while his Spanish translation is correct, the French which he gives does not agree either with the Basque or with the N. T. of La Rochelle. It is "vos entrailles se sont rétrécies." The singular form is found in Acts i. 18.

Itho, "noyer . . . 1. étouffer, étrangler." See Rom. xi. 8, "spiritu itho bat" = "un esprit assoupi" πνεῦμα κατα-νύξως.

Kampo, Heb. xi. 34 = armée.

Karminduren, *make bitter*, Rev. x. 8, "hire sabelá karmin-düren dic," "il mettra ton ventre en amertume." [A has "se rancir, s'aigrir" (*of food*).]

Lo, "sommeil." v. Eys remarks, "P. [Pouvreau] construit *lo* avec *etzan*," i.e. instead of *egin*. It is so construed in Mark xiv. 37, "Simón lo atza?" "Simon dors-tu?" Also John xi. 11, "Lazaro . . . lo datza." "Lazare . . . dort."

Maillegatu, "emprunter ; du prov. malevar." In Matt. v. 42, "maillabatu."

Mahatsi, "vigne." In Matt. xx. 1, Luke xiii. 6, 7 = 'vineyard.'

Mutkiko (*read* Muthiko), (*s.v.* mutil "garçon") "bn. mithilko soul. (i.e. souletin) selon Sal. (Salaberry) syn. de *Mutil*." Muthilco occurs in John vi. 9 = "petit garçon," "baduc hemen muthilco bat" "il y a ici un petit garçon."

Noizbait, "un jour ou l'autre" "whenever, igrënd wann" (v. Eys seems to mistake the meaning of the English words "whenever," "wherever." The latter he equates with "nombait, quelque part"). Also = "at one time," autrefois ; *see* Eph. ii. 13, "cuec noizpait baitcinen urrun" "vous qui étiez autrefois loin." Also Col. iii. 7 "cuec-ere ebili içan baitzarete noizpait," "vous avez cheminé autrefois." [A. gives "quelquefois, à une époque indéterminée."]

Nehor, nehork (and other forms), "Tous ces pronoms, accompagnés de *ez* ou d'un verbe avec un sens négatif, signifient 'personne.' . . . Le seul exemple que nous puissions citer où *nehor* est employé seul, et alors affirmativement, est le 241^{me} prov. d'O." (i.e. Oihenhart). They occur, however, in the N.T. in hypothetical clauses without a negative (= quelqu'un). For example : "noiz-ere nehorc ençuten baitu resuma hartaco hitza" = "Whenever anyone heareth the word of the kingdom" (the French turns somewhat differently), Matt. xiii. 19. Again "baldin nehore ene ondoan ethorri nahi bada" = "si quelqu'un veut venir après moi," Matt. xvi. 24. And "orduan baldin nehore badarraque" = "alors si quelqu'un vous dit," *ibid.* xxiv. 23. Also in a question "nehore ekarri othe drauca iatera" = "quelqu'un lui avait-il apporté à manger ?" John iv. 33.

Ongi, "bien." Note "unguiegule" = "homme de bien,"
 τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, Rom. v. 7 [A. has "ongiegile . . . *bien-facteur.*"]

On, "good." Note with suffix; Phil. iv. 8, "icen oneta-coac" = (choses) "de bonne renommée." And 2 Cor. v. 13, "adimendu onetaco" = "de sens rassis."

Parpara. v. Eys here cites Pouvreau as an authority for "parra choria" = "passereau." See Matt. x. 29; "bi parra-chori" = "deux passereaux." [A. has "parratšori," quoting Luke xii. 6 from the version of Haraneder.]

Satsutassun, 1 Pet. i. 19 = "tache." [A. has "satsutarzun (*S. Andere dona Maria.*)"]

Sossagu, a calm, Matt. viii. 26; Luke viii. 24 (Span. *sosiégo*); *sossega cedin* = "cessa" (of the wind), Mark vi. 51.

Spanta, astonished, Luke viii. 56 (cf. Span. *espantár*).

Sporça, of good courage, Mark vi. 50, x. 49 (cf. Span. *esparcirse*, to make oneself merry).

Truffatzen, to mock, "truffatzen ciraden harçaz," "ils se rioient de lui," Luke viii. 53. Also the same words = "se moquoient de lui," Matt. xxvii. 29. See also *ibid.*, ver. 41 (Span. *trufár*, to deceive). [A. has the word ('trufatu'), but quoting Duvoisin, Matt. xxvii. 41.]

Zetha, defined by v. Eys as a medium kind of linen "entre l'étope et le lin propre." But in Luke xvi. 19 it is = "fin lin," and in Rev. xviii. 12 = "soye." It is clearly the Span. *séda*, Ital. *seta*.

Zuzen, . . . "chuchen, bn. droit, equitable." Also in the literal sense, "straight, direct." *E.g.* "beguiac . . . chuchenduric" "ayant les yeux dressées," Acts xxiii. 1; "bertan chuchent cedin," "à l'instant elle fut redressée," Luke xiii. 13: cf. ver. 11.

T. K. ABBOTT.

THE REVENUE YEARS OF PHILADELPHUS, EUERGETES I, AND PHILOPATOR.

APPENDIX II of the Hibeh papyri contains an examination of the various theories which have been suggested as explanations of the double system employed by the early Ptolemies in counting the years of their reigns ; it ends with an admission of failure : “ We are reduced, therefore, to the conclusion that none of the suggested explanations of the distinction between revenue and regnal years can be regarded as satisfactory, and that the present evidence is inadequate to provide a solution of the problem.”

In the following paper I have collected several indications from papyri which tend to show that there was a year employed for revenue purposes which was counted from some date close to the vernal equinox.

In Par. pap. 62, iv. 4, we read—

*αι δ αναφοραι μερισθησονται της μεν ζυτηρας της χειμερινης εξαμηνου
λογιζομενου του μηνος εξ ημερων $\overline{\lambda\epsilon}$ της δε θερινης εξ ημερων $\overline{\kappa\epsilon}$ των δ
αλλων ωνων εκ του κατα λογον των υπαρχουσων μεχρι του αλ.*

It is evident that this papyrus deals with a revenue year ; and the passage just quoted implies that the year was divided into two parts of six months each—a winter six months, and a summer six months. The reference to winter and summer suggests that the year was not the Egyptian vague year, but one determined by the equinoxes ; and from the facts that the winter is mentioned before the summer, and that the *ωναι* were sold *απο μηνος Μεσορη*, it would be natural to infer that the beginning of

the year was determined by the autumn equinox, which took place at this time in Mesore. There are, however, several objections to this inference, for it removes none of the difficulties from the interpretation of the opening lines of the papyrus, and is inconsistent with the evidence of other papyri. The words *πωλουμεν τας ωνας εις το αΛ[. . απο μην]ος Μεσορη εις δωδεκαμηνον και τας επαγομενας ημερας ε* involve an unnecessary tautology, if the first year coincided with the period of twelve months and five days counted from the first of Mesore. The alternative reading, [*απο Θωυθ ε*]ως Μεσορη, presents many difficulties, and is based on the assumption that the revenue year began in Thouth, which is, I think, sufficiently disproved by the evidence produced below. It has been suggested by Grenfell and Wilcken that the lacuna at the beginning of l. 2 contained a reference to the second year; and it is possible that the proper restoration of the passage is [*πωλουμεν τας εν τ]ωι οξυρυγχιτηι ωνας εις το αΛ [και το βΛ απο μην]ος Μεσορη εις δωδεκαμηνον [και τας επαγομενας] ημερας ε*—that is, that the *ωναι* were sold for a period of twelve months and five days, beginning on the 1st of Mesore, and coinciding with the last half of the first year and the first half of the second year. Under these circumstances the revenue year would begin with Mecheir, in which month the vernal equinox took place.

The very strange statement that the winter months are to be counted as having thirty-five days, and the summer months twenty-five, has never been satisfactorily explained. According to Lumbroso and Revillout, the reason was that more beer was drunk in the summer, “la consommation étant plus grande l’été” (Lumbroso, *Recherches*, p. 306), than in the winter, “où l’on en boit moins” (Revillout, *Mélanges*, p. 248). This can hardly be the true explanation; and Wilcken rightly rejects it: “Ich kann an diese

Erklärung nicht glauben, weiss aber keine andere vorzuschlagen." Whatever the reason may have been, there is a curious parallel to the division in Hibeh pap. 116: with reference to βαλανειων γ we there find—

διαίρεσις Μεχίρ εως Επειφ Ϛ ραβ- ι-φν
Μεσορη εως Τυβι Ϛ ρκη= ι-ψο

Here, again, the year is divided into two parts of six months, practically coinciding with the periods between the two equinoxes, the only difference being that the summer period of six months comes first; the ratio between the monthly payments of each period is also the same as that in the Paris papyrus, for 91 dr. 4 ob.: 128 dr. 2 ob. = 550: 770 = 25:35. This exact correspondence of ratios can hardly be due to accident: Mecheir to Epeiph represents the summer six months, and Mesore to Tybi the winter six months of Paris pap. 62.

In addition to the evidence produced in Hibeh pap. app. ii, to prove that there was a year which did not begin on the 1st of Thouth, the following papyri seem to indicate not only that there was such a year, but that it began at or near the beginning of Mecheir:—

(1) P. P. III. 75 is a document dated in the twelfth year of Euergetes I. It contains an account of the land sown εις το ιγλ εως Αθυρ λ̄. Since the papyrus was written in the twelfth year, the words εως Αθυρ λ̄ must refer to that year; and the harvest, which must have been gathered in some months before the following Thouth, is assigned to the thirteenth year; hence the beginning of the thirteenth year took place between the 30th of Athyr and the end of the harvest: the conditions are satisfied by a year beginning in Mecheir, but not so well by one beginning in Thouth.

(2) P. P. III. 109 enumerates a number of taxes due in the thirty-sixth, thirty-seventh, and thirty-eighth years of

Philadelphus, and gives the dates on which they were paid; these dates are particularly instructive:—

- (a) ii, 21 f. Two successive payments were made on Athyr 16 of the thirty-seventh year and Mesore 1 of the thirty-eighth year. If the year began in Thouth, there would be a whole year and nine months between the payments; and since so long an interval is very improbable, the papyrus seems to indicate that the year began between the 16th of Athyr and the 1st of the following Mesore.
- (b) The dates of payments in col. iii are not inconsistent with either theory as to the beginning of the year; but in col. iv, 22f, the dates of four successive payments are—year thirty-six Phamenoth, Tybi 25, year thirty-seven Mecheir 30 and Thouth 12; hence (i) Phamenoth and the following Tybi are both in the thirty-sixth year; (ii) Tybi and the following Mecheir are in different years; (iii) Mecheir and the following Thouth are both in the thirty-seventh year. We may deduce from (i) and (iii) that the year did not begin in Thouth, and from (ii) that it did begin between the 25th of Tybi and the 30th of the next month, Mecheir.
- (c) A still closer approximation to the beginning of the year can be obtained from the fragment (b) of the same papyrus, according to which payments were made in Mesore, Athyr, Choiak, and Tybi of the thirty-seventh year, and then on Mecheir 5 of the thirty-eighth year.

Hence, this papyrus seems to indicate that the financial year began between Tybi 25 and Mecheir 5; the interval is only ten days; and we may for the present adopt the 1st of Mecheir as the beginning of the financial year.

(3) In an unpublished Tebtunis papyrus (Mummy 84), dealing with a variety of taxes, the entries pass from Mesore to Thouth without any indication of a change of year; but one of the sections is headed—

φορτιων υγρων
] . . ι [. . .] εκ του κθL εις τον Μεχιρ
του λL ελαιου σησαμ με πγ χ ι

The word lost at the beginning of l. 2 is uncertain, but the meaning is clear: "There remain over from the 29th year (of Philadelphus) for Mechir of the 30th year 83 metretæ 10 choes of oil of sesamum." It is hardly possible to avoid the conclusion that the revenue year in the reign of Philadelphus began in Mecheir. On the verso of the same papyrus the entry

Του ιβL αναφερε[ται
απο Μεχιρ εως Επειφ λελογευμ[

indicates that the revenue year of Euergetes I also began with Mecheir.

(4) Magdola pap. I, 6, ολον τον κληρον κατεσπειρεν εν τωι [κγL] ου οι καρποι εις το κδL (the restoration κγ in the lacuna is confirmed by l. 13, του δε κδL ου οι καρποι εις το κεL; and in fact any other number would be absurd). In order to appreciate the bearing of this quotation on the question under discussion, it is necessary to observe that the ordinary months for sowing were Phaophi, Athyr, and Choiak: *e.g.* P. P. III. 75, which has been discussed above, indicates that sowing was practically completed by the end of Athyr; Magd. pap. III, that some land could be sowed before the 10th of Choiak, and that some could not; the cultivator in Magd. pap. XII sowed his land in or after Choiak, and the harvest took place after Phamenoth; in Tebt. pap. 54 the κληρος was ωριμος σπαρηναι in Phaophi; and in Tebt. pap. 22 seed was applied for in Phaophi. Since, then, the tenant in Magd. pap. I sowed the whole

καληρος in the twenty-third year, and the resulting crop is assigned to the twenty-fourth year, the year must have begun after the sowing and before the end of the harvest—that is, between Choiak and Pachon.

(5) Magdola pap. XXIII is a complaint, dated Tybi 12 in the first year of Philopator, that a loan, made in the twenty-sixth year of Euergetes I, had not been repaid; if, as is generally supposed, both these years were counted from the same 1st of Thouth, the maximum time between the loan and the complaint was four months and twelve days: this period, though short, is not impossible, but the much more reasonable maximum of nearly twelve months is obtained on the supposition that the year began in Mecheir.

(6) The evidence of Magd. pap. XXV is much clearer: Seuthes owed Theonides 15 artabæ of barley, and promised to pay the debt out of the produce of the twenty-sixth year; though often applied to for payment, he still refused. It is obvious that the complaint must have been made some time after the harvest of the twenty-sixth year; but it is dated in Tybi of the first year of Philopator. If, however, as is generally supposed, the twenty-sixth year of Euergetes and the first year of Philopator began on the 1st of Thouth, then the harvest of the twenty-sixth year had not been gathered in before the date of the complaint, and the time for payment would not have elapsed; but if, on the other hand, the twenty-sixth year began on the 1st of Mecheir, the harvest would be gathered a few months later; and Theonides would have plenty of time for his frequent applications for payment before complaining to the king in Tybi, at the very end of the year.

(7) Hibeh pap. 90 is a contract for the lease of some land for one year—*i.e.*, for one sowing and one harvest, drawn up in the twenty-fifth year in the month Gorpiaëus: in the twenty-fifth year of Euergetes Gorpiaëus corre-

sponded to Choiak-Tybi; hence the contract was made just at the end of the sowing-time of this year. The tenancy, however, was not to begin till the sowing of the twenty-sixth year, *i.e.*, probably the following Phaophi: the rent was to be paid in the Xandicus of the twenty-seventh year, and it is natural to suppose that the rent was to be paid out of the crop resulting from the sowing; but if the years began with Thouth, there would be an interval of more than a year and a half between the sowing and the payment of the rent; if, on the other hand, the years were counted from Mecheir, Xandicus (Epeiph) of the twenty-seventh year, would be the ordinary time for paying rent out of the produce of crops sown in Phaophi of the preceding year.

(8) Hib. pap. 100, Pathates pays rent on Phaophi 11 of the nineteenth year for the nineteenth year; since Egyptian tenants did not pay their rent in advance, the year cannot have begun with the preceding month Thouth.

To these instances may be added the papyri discussed in Hibeh pap., p. 360, which seem to indicate a revenue year beginning in Mecheir; in that discussion, it is supposed that the revenue year began in Thouth; and the apparent exceptions are explained away, rather unsatisfactorily, by considering that in some departments of finance the accounts were kept without reference to the beginning or close of the revenue year.

According to different systems of division the year may have been regarded as consisting of:—

- (a) Two parts of six months each, beginning in Mecheir and Mesore:—cf. Hib. pap. 116 where the year is divided Mecheir to Epeiph and Mesore to Tybi; ib. 133, in which the contract for the beer-tax starts from Mesore; Rev. pap. col. 53, and Par. pap. 62, in which Mesore is the starting-point.

- (b) Three parts of four months each, beginning in Mecheir, Pauni, and Phaophi: cf. Hib. pap. 115. in which the accounts are made up for the four months Mecheir, Phamenoth, Pharmouthi, and Pachons, and P.P. III. 141 quoted below.
- (c) Four parts of three months each, beginning with Mecheir, Pachons, Mesore, and Athyr: cf. Hib. pap. 114, in which a return is made for a period of nine months beginning with Mecheir, and ending with Phaophi, and an unpublished Tebtunis pap. (Mummy 43) of unknown date which arranges the anaphoræ for a year as follows:—

Μεχειρ 'Ασ Φαμενωθ 'Ασ Φ[αρμουθι
 Παχωνς 'Ασπ Παννι 'Βπ Ε[πειφ
 Μεσορη 'Βωι Θωθ 'Βχι Φα[ωφι
 Αθυρ 'Βχι Χοιαχ 'Βψκ Τυ[βι

For convenience and simplicity of statement the subject has so far been considered here in reference to the Egyptian year only. It is, however, not only possible but probable that the beginning of the year was really determined by the Macedonian year during the earlier part of the Ptolemaic dynasty—that is, the year may have been counted from the first day of a Macedonian month, which preceded or followed the vernal equinox: in most years this would have been some day in Mecheir, but sometimes it may have been in Tybi or Phamenoth. In this way it would be possible to explain Hib. pap. 33, an apographe of sheep 'for the third year' dated 'year 2 Phamenoth.' It is hard to see why a man should state the number of his sheep for the third year in Phamenoth of the second year, whether the year began in Thouth or Mecheir; but the papyrus becomes intelligible if he made his return in Phamenoth, just before the beginning of the new year. If this be so, the year would have begun on the first of the Macedonian month which followed the equinox.

114 THE REVENUE YEARS OF PHILADELPHUS,

P.P. III. 72 *b*, which is dated $\Lambda\kappa\epsilon\ \tau\upsilon\beta\iota\ \bar{\lambda}$, and is an apographe $\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\ \kappa\epsilon\Lambda$, was probably drawn up at the end of the year, as a statement of the number of sheep the writer had possessed during the past year.

If then the revenue year was counted from the Mecheir which preceded the accession of the king, it is reasonable to suppose that the other year, which may be called the regnal year, was counted from the first of Thouth preceding his accession: we must now consider how these two years were related to each other.

If the king came to the throne between Thouth 1 and Mecheir 1, the two years would coincide in Thouth, Phaophi, Athyr, Choiak, and Tybi, and sometimes Mecheir according to the incidence of the Macedonian months, and the number of the revenue year would be one greater than that of the regnal year in Mecheir, Phamenoth, Pharmouthi, Pachon, Pauni, Epeiph, and Mesore: in the case of Euergetes, who probably came to the throne in Athyr–Tybi (see Hib. pap. p. 364), we know, from P.P. III. 58*c*, that the revenue year was one in advance in Phamenoth, and this is in accordance with our requirements. But if the king's accession took place between Mecheir 1 and the following first of Thouth, the relations are exactly reversed: the years will coincide in Mecheir, Phamenoth, Pharmouthi, Pachon, Pauni, Epeiph, and Mesore, and the regnal year will be one in advance of the revenue year in Thouth, Phaophi, Athyr, Choiak, and Tybi.

The date of the accession of Philadelphus is not known; and unfortunately nothing can be deduced from Hib. pap. 80, where the demotic docket to a Greek receipt written on Epeiph 4 of the thirty-fifth year is dated "year 34 which makes year 35," because it is not stated which of these numbers represents the revenue year. The date of the accession of Philopator is also unknown; and the inferences which have been drawn from the Magdola papyri and

from P.P. III. 141 are, from our present point of view, invalid. For if, as I have tried to show above, many of the Magdola papyri are dated by revenue years, the occurrence of Tybi in the first year teaches us nothing, since Tybi is by hypothesis the last month of a revenue year. P.P. III. 141 is an account dated, at the beginning, 'year 25 Choiak,' and ending with the entry *οψωνιον του αλ απο Παννι εως Θαντ μηνων δ*. The form of this entry implies, as has been pointed out elsewhere, that the years in question did not begin with Thouth; hence they must have been, according to the theory here put forward, revenue years. If this be so, the account began in the eleventh month of the twenty-fifth year of Euergetes, who would have begun his twenty-sixth revenue year in the following Mecheir. There is evidence that, in continuous accounts, the number of the revenue year was not changed till the beginning of a new revenue year, *e.g.* in P.P. III. 112, the twenty-sixth year is followed by the second year, but there is no reason to suppose that this rule was always followed: all that can be inferred from P.P. III. 141 is that the papyrus was written after Thouth, and after the accession of Philopator: the writer would naturally assign all transactions in and after Mecheir to the first year.

There are two papyri of the reign of Philopator which should probably be explained by the difference between regnal and revenue years—(1) a bilingual papyrus published by Revillout (*Proc. Soc. Bibl. Arch.*, 1891) and Griffith (*ib.* 1901): the demotic text is dated "Year 12 Tybi" of Philopator; the Greek docket is dated *Λγ Τυβι δ*, and refers to the demotic contract as having been written in Tybi of the thirteenth year: from this we might infer, since the numbers of the years differed in Tybi, that the twelfth year was a revenue year, and the thirteenth a regnal year, and that the king's accession had taken place between Mecheir and Thouth.

(2) A papyrus published by Jouguet and Lefebvre (Magd. pap. xxxv) and by T. Reinach (*Mélanges Nicole*, p. 451) contains the date $\tau\omicron\upsilon \epsilon\lambda \omega\varsigma \alpha\iota \pi\rho\omicron\sigma\omicron\delta\omicron\iota \Phi\alpha\mu\epsilon\nu\omega[\theta$; unfortunately, the number of the corresponding regnal year is not given, and that of the day of the month is not preserved. The occurrence of Phamenoth, however, seems to contradict the inferences drawn from the bilingual papyrus. It might be suggested that the Magdola pap. did not belong to Philopator, but to Euergetes I, or that the words $\tau\omicron\upsilon \epsilon\lambda \omega\varsigma \alpha\iota \pi\rho\omicron\sigma\omicron\delta\omicron\iota$ do not necessarily imply that the numbers of the revenue and regnal years were different, or that in the bilingual pap. $\Lambda\iota\gamma$ in l. 8 of the Greek text was a mistake for $\Lambda\iota\beta$; but none of these suggestions is in any way probable. Possibly the apparent contradiction may be removed by connecting, as suggested above, the revenue year with the Macedonian month containing or following the vernal equinox. In this year the equinox fell on the 9th of Mecheir, the 4th of Tybi is more than a month distant from this date, and so both of these days could not fall within one Macedonian month: cf. Unger (*I. Müller's Handbuch I*, p. 734), "Neujahr wurde entweder die dem idealen Jahresanfang, der Wende oder Gleiche, voraufgehende oder die ihm folgende Numenie: wegen der Wandelbarkeit ihrer Jahreszeit musste es genügen, wenn zwischen der Numenie des ersten Monats und jenem Jahrpunkt keine andere Numenie einfiel und demgemäss die Entfernung des wirklichen Neujahrs von dem idealen nicht den Betrag eines ganzen Monats erreichte": but, if the new year was counted from the 1st of the Macedonian month following the equinox, and if the Magdola pap. was written at the beginning of Phamenoth, its evidence will agree with that of the bilingual papyrus. No certain inference, however, can be drawn as to Philopator without further evidence.

J. GILBART SMYLY.

MEDIAL VOWEL-SYNCOPE IN LATIN.

I.

THE determination of the precise conditions under which the syncope of medial vowels took place in Latin has often been said to be a hard or even impossible task. Professor Sommer says¹: “Die Beurteilung, Sichtung und chronologische Anordnung der zahlreichen Fälle, bei denen in der verschiedensten Epochen der lateinischen Sprachentwicklung Vokalabsorption erscheint, ist sehr schwierig. Die Gesetze, nach denen sich ihr Auftreten regelt, liegen noch im Unklaren.” Still more pessimistically writes Professor Buck²: “The factors involved are so complex, and have been so obscured by subsequent levelling, that it is impossible to formulate the precise conditions.” He adds, however, that “much progress has been made in this direction.” More or less complete presentations and discussions of the facts may be found in Lindsay, *Latin Language*, p. 170 ff.; Brugmann, *Grundriss*, I². p. 215 ff.; Ciardi-Dupré, in Bezzenger’s *Beiträge zur Kunde der Indogerm. Sprachen*, 26. pp. 188-223; Sommer, *Handbuch*, p. 146 ff. Dr. Ciardi-Dupré treats the subject at length and in detail with the avowed object of “setting the laws of the phenomenon in the right light”; but his conclusions and suggestions have not been accepted, and, in my judgment, cannot be accepted

¹ *Handbuch der lateinischen Laut- u. Formenlehre*, p. 146.

² *A Grammar of Oscan and Umbrian*, § 87, note.

as a satisfactory solution of the problem. There does not seem to be any sufficient reason why the formulation of the law of syncope in Latin should be thought impossible or even very difficult. The material is so abundant that the failure of philologists to accomplish the task would seem to be the condemnation of the methods employed.

I define syncope as the suppression of a short unaccented vowel between consonants, which has for its direct effect the shortening of a word by a syllable. This definition excludes the phenomenon called *samprasāraṇa*. It also excludes some cases of word-shortening. For example, *nōmus* is not an instance of syncope, if, as is probable, it arose from **nouēnos* through the stages **nouonos*, **nōōnos*.

Not all instances of syncope occurring in Latin literature are natural instances. For example, Vergil uses *asprīs* for *asperīs* in *A.* 2. 379. That is not a natural instance, because it is obviously due to metrical necessity. No cretic word could be admitted unchanged to dactylic verse.

Again, not all natural instances of syncope show the direct result of the working of the law of syncope. Many of them may, or rather must, be due to analogy. They may show syncope where the physical conditions which determine syncope are not present. For example, *ardor* is undoubtedly derived from **ārid-ōs* by syncope. The syncope may be original in the nominative case, or it may conceivably have begun in the oblique cases, **āridōris* becoming *ardōris*, and from them may have spread to the solitary nominative by 'levelling.' As the physical conditions found in the oblique cases (length of word and position of accent) are often not identical with the physical conditions found in the nominative case, it is highly important that we should not lose sight of this possibility. And generally, before we draw any inference

as to the cause of syncope from the occurrence of the phenomenon in any given form, we must make certain that the form is free from possible analogical influences.

Further, while we are still trying to determine the law of syncope, only certain and undisputed instances of the phenomenon should be considered. We can proceed from the known to the unknown; but any doubtfulness or error associated with our instances will be communicated to the inferences we may found upon them. For example, *alter* may possibly be a syncopated form of **ali-teros*; but it is not certain that it is so. It may well be from an original **al-teros*, as some good authorities hold.¹ All such doubtful instances must be, during the inquiry, put aside. Afterwards, when the law has been determined, we may use it as a criterion to determine the question of the syncope or non-syncope of *alter*, and other doubtful instances. Dr. Ciardi-Dupré often offends in this way. He seeks to support his case by bringing forward such doubtful instances as *hallux*, *tinca*, **fulca*, *quernus*, *morbis*.

Then there is the important question of chronology. We find existing side by side syncopated forms which may, or in some cases must, have arisen at widely separated periods. For example, *quindecim* and *balneum* were both used in the Augustan age. Yet the former must have been syncopated from **quīnquedecem* at a period earlier than the establishment of the laws of Latin accentuation as we know them; while the latter was syncopated later than the time of Plautus, who invariably uses the longer form.² Instances of syncope manifestly originating at different periods should be kept apart, unless we hold as a postulate that the law of syncope was not only essentially the same at all periods of the

¹ See A. Walde, *Lat. Etymologisches Wörterbuch*, s. v.

² Cf. Lindsay, *L. L.* p. 173.

Latin language (as is possible), but is also capable of being formulated in the same way for all periods (as it certainly is not). Most writers on the subject offend in this way. For example, Ciardi-Dupré places side by side, as instances of syncope after the letter *r*, *lardum* from *lāridum*, and *morbus* from **morodhos* (*l.c.* p. 194). Now the syncopated form *lardum* came into existence apparently later than the time of Plautus, who invariably uses the fuller form;¹ while *morbus*, if it really is syncopated from **morodhos* (which is doubtful), must have lost its medial vowel at a very remote period, as is proved by the representation of original *dh* by *b*. This chronological discrepancy ruins Ciardi-Dupré's argument, which is that the letter *r* had the power of producing syncope of a following short unaccented vowel. The wide interval of time between the two syncopations indicates that the peculiar character of the letter *r* cannot have been the cause producing them.

Most writers on this subject assume a multiplicity of causes. Ciardi-Dupré assigns the chief part in producing syncope to the nature of the surrounding consonants. But in addition to that, he recognizes some six or seven other factors as occasionally co-operating with the chief one ("Hie und da wirken andere Faktoren mit")—such other factors as the quantity of the preceding syllable, the length of the word, the quality of the vowel to be syncopated, proclisis, even "*Sprechtempo*" (*l.c.*, pp. 189, 214 f.). There is, of course, no logical reason why the same effect may not have a variety of causes. But we must make sure that we have some better reason for suggesting a second cause or factor than that the one first selected fails to explain some portion of the facts; and we must make sure that the new cause or factor suggested does not interfere

¹ See Lindsay, *Captiui*, 1900, p. 20.

with some earlier suggestion. For example, Ciardi-Dupré selects as the chief cause of syncope the nature of the preceding (sometimes also of the following) consonant. In particular, he asserts that syncope regularly occurred after liquids and nasals, and he explains as due to that cause the syncopation of original **adolitos* (*adultus*), **surogelos* (*surculus*), **sēmicaput* (*sinciput*), and the like. But there are numerous instances of syncope to which that explanation does not apply; e.g. *nucleus* from *nuculeus*, where the syncopated vowel is preceded by *c*. For these, other explanations are offered; and it is suggested that the syncopation of *nuculeus* was due to the fact that it was a word of four syllables (*l.c.*, p. 214)! But so were original **adolitos*, **sēmicaput*, etc., words of four syllables; and no other explanation of their syncope need have been offered, or of the syncope of any four-syllabled word in the language. Further, all four-syllabled words would necessarily have been syncopated, which is not the case. As a matter of fact, neither *nūcūlēus*, nor any other word or word-ending of that measure (e.g. *balineum*, *pueritia*), occurs in a syncopated form in Plautus.¹

II.

In the following inquiry I propose to consider first the conditions under which syncope occurred in republican Latin. I exclude, therefore, from consideration, for the present, all such instances as can be shown to have originated either earlier or later than that period. In the text of Plautus we find a convenient standard of republican Latinity in its most characteristic form and quality. I hope to show that all certain instances of medial syncope in Latin are due to a single cause.

It is desirable to select what Bacon calls an *instantia crucis*,² or crucial instance. If we can find a syncopated

¹ Cf. Lindsay, *Capt.*, pp. 20, 357.

² *Novum Organum*, II. 36.

and an unsyncopated form having every other circumstance in common except one, that one occurring in the former only, it will be a legitimate inference, by what logicians call the Method of Difference, that the other circumstance in which alone they differ is the cause of the syncope. It will be a crucial instance. Or, failing such an ideal instance, it is desirable to select one in which the syncopated and the unsyncopated forms differ in as few circumstances as possible. Such an instance we certainly have in *suprā* beside *superus*, *extrā* beside *exterus*, etc.

First, it is not disputed that *suprā* is syncopated from *superā*. Nor can there be any doubt that in *suprā* the syncope is the direct effect of a sound law,—that is, that it is not due to analogy. The analogy of *superus*, etc., must have acted against syncope. Therefore, at a certain time, two forms existed side by side, *superā* : *superus*. The one became syncopated, the other did not. At first sight, it looks as if they differed in only one other circumstance—the quantity of the final syllable. At first sight, therefore, it seems to be a legitimate inference that the syncope depended in this case on the quantity of the syllable that followed the vowel to be syncopated—occurring when that syllable was long, not occurring when it was short. That is actually the view of Professors Stolz,¹ Sommer,² and Brugmann,³ who accept a suggestion of von Planta's.⁴ Von Planta seeks to explain in this way the absence of syncope in the passive participle of the Second Conjugation in Umbrian; e.g. *tasetur* for **tacetōs*, nom. pl. = Lat. *tacīti*. He assumes, like most other authorities (though unnecessarily), that the *e* of *tasetur* was

¹ *Hist. Gram.*, p. 203.

² *Handb.*, p. 149.

³ *Kurze vergleichende Gram.*, § 346
(3).

⁴ *Gram. der Oskisch - Umbrischen Dialekte*, I. 214.

originally short; and suggests, as the reason why it was not syncopated (cf. U. *deitu* from **deikētōd*, Lat. *dicĭto*), that originally syncope occurred in Umbrian only when the following syllable was long. Consequently, in passive participles of the type of *tasetur*, there would originally have been syncope only in those inflexions which had long endings, while the nom. sing. in *-tōs* and the acc. sing. in *-tōm* would have remained unsyncopated. The two unsyncopated forms are then supposed to have influenced all the other cases by analogy!

Following von Planta's suggestion, Stolz, Sommer, and Brugmann would explain *suprā*: *superus* by supposing that a similar law operated in Latin. *Suprā* is supposed to have been syncopated because the short unaccented vowel was followed by a long syllable (or, as Sommer prefers to state the rule, by more than one mora): *superus* is supposed not to have been syncopated because the same vowel was followed by a short syllable.

There is a fatal objection to this theory. *Ex hypothesi*, all those inflexions of *superus* which had heavy endings should have been syncopated—**suprī*, **suprō*, etc. But such forms do not occur, so we must suppose the *e* to have been restored by the analogy of those inflexions that had light endings. There were originally only two inflexions with light endings—**superōs* and **superōm*—against at least twelve with heavy endings. Further, there were the inflexions of the verb *superō*, all of which were originally heavy—*superās*, *superāt* (in Plautus), etc.; and these also, more than a hundred in number, should, *ex hypothesi*, have been syncopated; and in these also we must suppose the *e* to have been restored by the analogy of the same two forms, *superūs* and *superūm*! That these two solitary forms should have prevailed against such overwhelming numbers is not perhaps absolutely impossible, but certainly it is incredible. And

they must have prevailed so utterly that not a trace of **suprī*, **suprant*, and the rest of them, remained! We cannot, therefore, attribute the syncope of *suprā* to the quantity of the syllable which followed the syncopated vowel.¹

We must look for some other circumstance in which original *superā* and *superus* differed. There remains only one, and our instance thus becomes crucial: when *superā* was used as a preposition, it was enclitic on its noun or pronoun, or, as it is sometimes called, proclitic. In the enclisis of original *superā*, therefore, in its prepositional use, we are justified, by the Method of Difference, in finding the cause of its syncope.²

But what exactly was this enclisis? As it is a phonetic phenomenon which we are investigating, we must express enclisis in terms of phonetics. There is good and sufficient evidence that, in republican and early imperial Latin, a preposition and its noun or pronoun were joined together in pronunciation to form a single word, and that they were accented as a single word. Thus the Romans said *prop-tēreos*, not *prōpter eos*; *ergānōs*, not *érga nōs*; *proptērpātrēm*, not *prōpter pātrēm*; *èrgamātrēm*, not *érga mātrem*; *antēpedes*, not *dnte pēdes*. The evidence may be briefly summarised as follows:—(1) the explicit testimony of Quintilian (I. 5. 27), who says that the two words were joined into one, and accented as one; (2) the evidence of early inscriptions, where such words are often joined into one, e.g. *extaboleis*, i. 198. 27; *amatre*, 1306; *adeum*, 206. 8; *inagro*, 1185; (3) the evidence of such collocations as

¹ The same objection applies to von Planta's suggested explanation of U. *tasetur*, etc., which indeed suffers shipwreck on such forms as U. *todcom* (for **toutikōm*, acc. sing.). I have argued that the *e* was originally long (*tasetur* = **tacētōs*, cf. Lat. *monēta*) in HERMATHENA, xxvii., p. 397 ff.

² In strict logic, we are not yet justified in inferring that enclisis is the *only* cause operating here. It may be not more than a part of the cause. But it is easily proved, by comparing this with other instances, that enclisis is the only cause operating here.

became fixed in special senses, and so escaped recomposition, e.g. *intéreā*, *admodum*, *denuo*, *sédulo*, *óbuiam*; (4) the evidence of metre in the dramatists.¹

Yet, in spite of this sufficient evidence, the pronunciation indicated by it is not generally recognized. The reason is, that the pronunciation of us moderns has been determined not by ancient evidence, but by tradition. As regards quantity and accent, our pronunciation of Latin has come to us by unbroken tradition from the last years of the Empire through the Latin Church. Now, in the imperial period, the pronunciation of Latin underwent a change of far-reaching consequences: all accented vowels became long. Republican *pēdem*, *uēnit*, and so forth, became *pēdem*, *uēnit* (both with open *e*). A necessary consequence of this change was wholesale 'recomposition' of compounds and word-groups. When *uēnit* had become *uēnit*, it was no longer possible to pronounce *dēuēnit*, and *dēuēnit* became *deuēnit* (with open *e*), after the analogy of *uēnit*—whence come the Italian *diviene*, French *devient*. Cf. It. *assai*, Fr. *assez*, from *assātis*; It. *riceve*, Fr. *reçoit* from *recīpit* (with open *i*), etc. Similarly, when, e.g., republican *pēdes* became *pēdes*, it was no longer possible to pronounce *antépēdes*, which became *ante pēdes*.² And this last is the accentuation which has come down to us by tradition, through the Latin Church; and from the influence of that tradition it is not easy for us to escape. As regards the date at which the lengthening of accented vowels began to be felt, I shall have something to say later, in connexion with another part of the inquiry. Recomposition had certainly begun

¹ In the February number of the *Classical Review* (vol. xx., p. 31 ff.), I have, I hope, shown the existence of a law of metrical resolution in Plautus, and that it postulates such pronunciations as *antépēdes*, etc. Other in-

dications of this pronunciation, derived chiefly from the metrical practice of the early dramatists, are collected by Prof. Radford in the *Am. J. Ph.* xxv. 4, p. 414 ff.

² Cf Radford, *l. c.* 2, p. 151.

to take place earlier than the time of Gellius (second century): see *Noct. Att.* vii. 7.

To return to original *superā*, it is indisputable that it was enclitic in its prepositional use. That is to say, it would form part of a word-group, necessarily of more than three syllables in length—*sūperāuīam*, *sūperamūrum*, *sūperdnōs*. It has been shown, too, to be a legitimate inference that enclisis was the cause of its subsequent syncope—*suprāuīam*, etc. That is the same thing as saying that the three syllables were not syncopated when standing alone as a single word accented on the first syllable, but were syncopated when forming the first part of a longer word, and with a different accentuation. Therefore the cause of syncope in this case was either (*a*) the length of the word, or (*b*) the position of the accent, or (*c*) both combined. These questions will need to be decided by the examination of other instances.¹

But the inference that enclisis was a cause of syncope rests at present on a single instance. We must proceed to test it. In the pair of forms *ualdē* : *ualidē* we have, perhaps, a more perfect crucial instance than in *supra* : *superus*. Besides the fact that one only of the forms is syncopated, they differ in one other circumstance only—their use. *Ualidē* is normally a modal adverb meaning ‘mightily’: *ualdē* is normally an intensive adverb meaning ‘very.’ It is in accordance with the analogy of other languages that the earlier modal sense should have passed into the intensive,

¹ It may be observed in passing that, if this inference as to the cause of syncope in *supra* is correct, original *superā* must at first have been syncopated only when it was a preposition. As an adverb, it would remain unsyncopated, because it would not be enclitic. (Cf. Lindsay, *L.L.* ch. iii. § 12a. (6)). We must suppose therefore that the classical adverb *supra* followed the

analogy of the preposition. It would be possible, however, and natural for the phonetically correct form of the adverb to continue in use for a time beside the form modified by analogy. That is what we find. *Superā* occurs several times as an adverb in republican Latin, e. g. *Lucr.* i. 429; iv. 672; v. 1407; *Cic. Arat.* (*N.D.* ii. 106); *C.I.L.* i. 1166, 1011.

and that the word should have lost its accent in the process — that is, should have become enclitic. For example, ‘very’ in English (from Lat. *uerax*) is accented in its original use as an adjective, as in Wordsworth’s

‘A very hunter did I rush
Upon the prey’:

as a mere intensive it is not accented, except occasionally for the sake of special emphasis—that is, it is enclitic. We have seen what enclisis means in Latin. Originally, *ualidē* in its intensive sense must have been joined with the following word to form, phonetically, a single word under a single principal accent; e.g. *uàlidē-bélla*: contrast *uálidē contórsit*. It is only as an intensive that *ualidē* suffers syncope—a fact which, like many other facts in this inquiry, has been overlooked by philologists of the Indogermanist school.¹

Again, in *postrídie* beside *pósterō díe* (both used by Cicero and Caesar) we have a very clear instance of syncope associated with enclisis. It may fairly be claimed therefore that the inference drawn from a comparison of *supra* and *superus* is fully confirmed. In three crucial instances syncope is seen to be associated with enclisis, and is legitimately inferred to be caused by enclisis.

It has already been pointed out that, the effect of enclisis being word-grouping under a single principal accent, the actual cause of syncope in such cases as *supra* and *ualde* is the length of the word of which they come to form a part in enclisis, or, possibly, the changed incidence of the accent, or, possibly, both factors together. But inasmuch as the incidence of the accent depends directly on the length and measure of the word, it need

¹ In Plautus, the use of *ualide* as a mere intensive seems to be only incipient, and syncope does not seem to have yet taken place; e.g. Pseud. 145:

fáciam ut uálide uária sint. In Cicero’s time, its use as an intensive in the form *ualdē* is very frequent.

not be separately considered as a possible factor in causing syncope. We have therefore to consider word-length only, and to determine exactly how long it was necessary for a word to be, in order that syncope might be caused. It would be wearisome to set out in detail every step in the reasoning by which, unless I err, a successful answer to the question may be reached. There is left in the final result, when many instances have been examined and compared, the following law:—

In all words or word-groups of four or more syllables bearing the chief accent on a long syllable, a short unaccented medial vowel was necessarily syncopeated, but might be restored by analogy.

I should like to point out that this is not yet put forward as the only law under which it was possible for syncope to occur in Latin. It is put forward as the law under which, in certain crucial instances—*supra*, *extra*, *ualde*, *postridie*—syncope demonstrably did take place. In order to prove it, it is only necessary to show that wherever the conditions required by the law were present, there the same effect, namely syncope, followed. It is not necessary to show that there are no instances which cannot be explained by it; and if it should appear that there is such a residuum, the law would not necessarily be invalidated. However, I hope to show that it does in fact explain all but a very few doubtful instances, consisting chiefly of words which, on etymological grounds, are thought to have suffered syncope at a very early period; e.g. *tinca* beside Skr. *timis*, ‘fish.’ There is, of course, the chronological question. We are concerned at present only with the republican period; but it will appear that the law was operative at all periods, except perhaps the earliest prehistoric period, and certainly the

latest imperial period. Before I proceed to apply the law to the explanation of the facts, there are one or two points in the statement which call for comment.

First, as to the minimum number of syllables necessary in order to produce syncope. This is determined to be four by comparing such instances as *supremus* (from **superēmus*) with *superus* and *supra*: cf. *aprilis* < **aperīlis*, and many others.

That not all four-syllabled words were syncopated is shown by words of the type of *bālŋnēm*, which never appear in a syncopated form in Plautus; e.g. *bālŋnēae* not *balneae* (*As.* 357, et saep.); *cōlūmŋne* not *culmine* (*Trin.* 85); *nūcūlēus* not *nucleus* (*Capt.* 655; *Curc.* 55).¹ Such syncopations as *balneae*, *culmine* are characteristic of the early imperial period. This is a very significant and material fact, and will be discussed later. Again, words like *discipulus* were not syncopated: contrast *disciplīna*. Evidently another factor is needed besides mere *Viersilbigkeit*—one has often to regret the inferiority of English to German in the power of forming compounds—and the examination of a large number of instances shows that the case is met by requiring the word to be accented on a long syllable. Nevertheless, this is a point on which I have felt some doubts, chiefly on the score of *officium* from **ōpifaciom*. But in this case syncope must have occurred in the prehistoric period, with which we are not yet concerned, when the accent of all compounds lay on the first syllable; and it is possible that the statement of the law for a period when the accentual conditions were so different, may need a slight modification. Or possibly—though not, I think, probably—the derivatives *officiōsus*, *officīna* may have exercised some influence. I find a conclusive proof that the quantity of the accent-bearing

¹ See Ritschl., *Prolog. Trin.* p. 65; Lindsay, *L. L.*, p. 173; *Capt.* (1900), p. 357.

syllable was a factor in causing syncope in *ministĕrium* beside *sestertius* < **semistĕrtius*. *Ministerium* was never syncopated in republican, or indeed in classical Latin. Ciardi-Dupré speaks of "das Plautinische *misterium*" (*l.c.* p. 202), but that is an inaccuracy. No such form occurs in Plautus; but it has been conjectured by Prof. Lindsay to underlie the reading of the MSS. (*miseriis*) in *Pseud.* 772. But the reading of the MSS. is not necessarily corrupt in that place (it is retained by Prof. Lindsay himself in his edition); and, if it were, *ministeriis*, the conjecture of Acidalius, would be perfectly metrical. But *ministerium* was certainly syncopated in the late imperial period, as is shown by Fr. *métier*, O. Fr. *mestier*, from **mi(n)stĕriu*. The only known change in the phonetic conditions of the word which had taken place in the late imperial period was that its accented syllables had become long—*mīnistĕrium*. Thus, it was syncopated in precisely the same circumstances in which *sēmistĕrtius* had been syncopated at an earlier period; and we may infer that the original shortness of its chief accented syllable had prevented its syncope earlier. (There is no evidence that the lengthening of the first syllable under the secondary accent was a factor in causing syncope in this word.)

III.

In applying the law to the explanation of the facts, I have endeavoured to include all typical instances of syncope.

alter is not necessarily syncopated from **aliteros*, as Sommer (*I.F.* xi. 3) and Ciardi-Dupré (*l.c.* p. 191) assume: see Walde, *Etym. Wörterb.*, s. v. No inflexion of *alter* is syncopated in Plautus, except possibly *altrius* in *Capt.* 306, for *alterius* (so Ritschl, *Opusc.* I., p. 436). Contrast *altrinsecus*, *altrouorsum* (*alterinsecus*, read by Lindsay in *Merc.* 977, makes the line unmetrical).

ardor, ardeo : aridus, arduus. Undoubtedly *ardor* is from **āridōs*. Under the proposed law, no word originally trisyllabic could be syncopated, except indirectly, as the result of analogy. Such an explanation is obvious here. All the oblique cases of original **āridōs* would fall under the law—*āridōris* > *ardoris*, and so forth. The isolated nominative would be assimilated to the oblique cases by ‘levelling.’ The true phonetic form is preserved by the adjective *aridus, aridī*, etc. *ardeo* < **ārideō*, on the analogy of **āridēre, *āridēmus*, etc. The isolated and rare form *ardus* (e.g. Lucil. 27, 40 M., and restored by Seyffert in Plaut. *Aul.* 297, *Pers.* 266) must be explained as due to the analogy of *ardorem, ardere*.

If this group of kindred words stood alone, the charge of arbitrariness might perhaps justly be brought against the judgment that the syncope in *ardus* was due to analogy. But these instances must be compared with others—with such instances as *extra : exterus, ualde : ualide*, and the like ; and it has been shown that the latter are crucial instances. Other explanations of *aridus : arduus* have, of course, been suggested. According to Ciardi-Dupré, *ardus* is the phonetic form, *aridus* the form due to analogy. That involves Ciardi-Dupré’s theory that the chief cause of syncope was the nature of the preceding consonant—a theory that is untenable. For example, he holds that *r* and *l* had the power of causing syncope, and adduces such instances as *hallux, *fulca*, in support of his view, but passes over such exceptions as Plautine *balineum, columen, laridum*. Even in imperial Latin, syncope is far commoner in the oblique cases of *columen* than in the nominative—*culminis*, etc., beside *columen*—indicating that the cause of syncope lay not in the nature of the liquid *l*, but in the length of the word.

Again, Professor Skutsch (*Forsch.* I. 47) follows Osthoff (*Wölfl. Arch.* iv. 464 f.) in attributing the coexistence of

aridus, *ardus* to what is called *Sprechtempo* or *Redetempo*, *aridus* being a ‘*Lentoform*,’ *ardus* an ‘*Allegroform*.’ But what is *Redetempo*? It has been accepted widely in the philological world, though its credentials have been neither produced nor demanded, and its powers remain undefined and unlimited. For example, did the rate of utterance affect all words, or only some? Had each word its double, or only some? If all, why have so few left any trace? If only some, what cause determined the birth of a double form? Again, could *Redetempo* affect all the sounds of a word, or only some? If only some, which? If all, why do we never find all the sounds of a word affected? Briefly, what are the laws of *Redetempo*? At present, any shortening of a word can be attributed to *Redetempo*: it is impossible to test it. *Redetempo* is “Sporadic Change” under a new name.

With this explanation Skutsch associates another. He declares (*l.c.*) that syncope is characteristic of colloquial Latin (“das familiäre Latein”), as distinguished from the more elevated style (“Hochlatein”). But that is a too hasty generalisation, and is contradicted by Plautine *balineum*, *laridum*, *columine*, invariably unsyncopated. These attempted explanations are not in harmony with the facts when they are viewed in their entirety. Unsyncopated *āridus* cannot be separated from (e.g.) *exterus*, *asperum*, *dextera*: syncopated *ardōrem* cannot be separated from (e.g.) *extrēmus*, *asprētum*, *dextrouōrsu*, *extrādomu*, *extrapōrtam*. It is evident that all these forms are “lautgesetzlich”; and *ardor* and *ardus* must be set down as due to analogy—the former to schematism or ‘levelling,’ the latter to logical analogy. I have dealt with this instance at some length, because the question raised by it is vital to the whole inquiry—the question, in which instances we are to see the direct working of the law of syncope, and in which we are to see the effect of analogy.

artaena (Lucil. i. 35 M.) < *arytaéna* (Gk. ἀρύταινα)
asper, *asperī*, etc. : *asprētum*, *asprītūdo*, *asprātilis*.

These need no comment. Vergil's *asprīs* (*A.* ii. 379) has been already referred to as artificial.

avidus : *audeo* < **auideō*. This is a very instructive instance, to be compared with *aridus* : *ardeo*. Just as *ardeo* was due to the analogy of *ardēre*, *ardēmus*, etc., so too *audeo* could not have been syncopated as the direct result of the law, but must be due to levelling. If the law had taken its course undisturbed by analogy, we should have found **āuīdēō* beside *audēmus*, *audēbat*, etc. The fact that it is necessary thus constantly to invoke the aid of levelling in order to explain forms, is a strong indication that the determining factor in syncope was word-length and accentuation, which went with word-length. The length and accentuation of Latin words varied so continually in inflexion and derivation (*dmo*, *amdmus*, *amdtio*, *amatiōnis*) that we might confidently have predicted that any phenomenon which depended upon those two factors would be powerfully modified in the end by levelling.

auspex < *duispex*, on the analogy of *auspicari*, a verb in very frequent use in all its parts. Cf. *augur* on the analogy of *augurari*, *auguratus*, etc.¹

calidus : *caldarium*, *caldor*, *caldus*. The influence of analogy, of both logical analogy and levelling, is very conspicuous in this group. *Calidus* and *caldarium* are "lautgesetzlich": *caldor* arose by levelling from *caldōris*, etc.: *caldus* arose by logical analogy from *caldārium* and *caldōrem*. *Calidus* and *caldus* are related exactly as *aridus* and *ardus*: the *caldus* of Cato corresponds to the *ardus*

¹ It is possible that what seems to be syncope after consonantal *u* differs from ordinary syncope. Consonantal *u* had a peculiar influence on certain vowels, the laws of which are not

definitely determined. See Solmsen, *Studien sur lat. Lautgeschichte*. It does not affect the argument if these examples are struck out.

of Lucilius. That this is the true explanation is indicated by the absence of syncope in *gelidus*. There was no word **gel(i)dārius*. Cf. *frigdaria* (Lucil. viii. 12 M.) beside *frigidus* and (in late Latin) *frigdus* (whence Ital. *freddo*). With the syncope of *calidus* to *caldus*, that of *lāridum* to *lardum* may be compared. In both cases syncope was due to the same cause. As *caldus* was due to the analogy of *caldaria*, so *lardum* was due to the analogy of *lardārius*, 'a pork-butcher.' *Laridum* and *lardum* cannot have been related to one another as a literary to a popular form, seeing that Plautus invariably uses the former (e.g. *Capt.* 847, 903; *Men.* 210).¹

calefacio: calfacio. The latter form was usual in the first century p. Ch. n. (Quint. i. 6. 21), and was due to the analogy of *calfactus*, etc.

cette < cé-date. Syncope was due to enclisis, as in *supra*, *ualde*, etc. The syncope of the root-vowel proves that the sense of 'give' was lost: *cettedéxtram* meant no more than "Your hand!" means in English. There are interesting indications in Plautus and Terence of the enclisis of *cette*. The noun *dextera* is normally not syncopated in comedy, just as, e.g., *exterī* was not syncopated; but it appears as *dextra* when it immediately follows *cedo* or *cette*.² For example, it is not syncopated in:—

Curc. 307: te áduenire. cédo tuam mihi || *déxteram*. ubi sunt spēs meae?

Curc. 339: préndit *dexterám*, seducit, etc.

¹ I am happy to find myself in agreement with Prof. Lindsay in suggesting that *caldus* and *ardus* were influenced by *caldarius* and *ardorem* respectively. Prof. Lindsay also suggests that the syncope in *aetas* may have arisen first in the oblique cases (*L. L.*, p. 173).

² Trisyllabic inflexions of *dexter* occur twenty-three times in Plautus: see

Lodge, *Lex. Plaut.* s. v. In twenty-one of these places the unsyncopated form must be read. The syncopated form must be read twice—in *Mer.* 965, after *cette*, and in *Frag.* i. 108, in an ambic verse-close, *dextrā uia*, where word-grouping is obvious. In *Am.* 333 the conjecture *dextrā* (adv.) is, for more than one reason, unsatisfactory.

Poen. 315: immo etiam in medio óculo paullum || sórdet, cedo sis *déxteram*.

Contrast—

Merc. 965: úxor tibi placida ét placatast. || *cétte dextrás* núnciam.

Heaut. 493: cedo *déxtram*: pórro, etc.

This syncope of *dextera* after *cedo*, *cette* in Plautus and Terence, appearing there, as it does, only in these or similar circumstances (e. g. *dextrāuiā*, *Frg.* i. 108), indicates that the two words were grouped together under a single principal accent: *cedodéxtram*, *cettedéxtras*; just as, e.g., *exterā* was syncopated in similar circumstances: *extra-pórtam*. (Whether the enclitic word follows or precedes the word with which it is grouped makes no real difference. The distinction between enclisis and proclisis is therefore unimportant.) And this grouping of *cette* with a following noun explains its syncope also. In *cettedéxtras*, therefore, we have a double syncopation from an original **cèdatedéxteras*. Sommer and Ciardi-Dupré dismiss the syncope of *cette* as due to "Sprechtempo"!

cunctor < **concitōr* (cf. Sk. *ṣankitas* 'anxious') on the analogy of *cunctāri*, etc. Cf. *hortari* < **horilārī*, *mantare* < **manitāre*, *portare* < **poritare*—all frequentatives. The important point is, that the syncope is not necessarily original in the first person singular of the present indicative.

dexter < **dexiteros* (Gk. *δεξιτερός*) obviously cannot have been syncopated under the historical accent. It has been shown under *cette* that the noun *dextera* is normally unsyncopated in Plautus, but is syncopated only in enclisis, e.g. when immediately preceded by *cedo* or *cette*. *Dextera* would also fall under the law of syncope when preceded by prepositions, *ādéxlērā*, etc., unless the analogy of *dextera* unaccompanied by a preposition made itself felt. When preceded by a preposition, *dextera* is unsyncopated in

Plautus and Terence, but is always placed in the last foot of the line—an indication that the pronunciation varied. In fact, *addexteram*, etc., was treated by Plautus exactly as the form *periculum*. Plautus uses *periculum* only in the last foot: elsewhere he uses *periculum*.¹ Examples of *addexteram*, etc.: *As.* 260, *Mil.* 607, *Poen.* 417, 711, *Rud.* 156, *Ter. And.* 734, 751. We invariably find *dextrouorsum* (e.g. *Curc.* 70, *Rud.* 176).

erga < **ē-regā* or **ē-rogā*, properly 'over against': cf. use of *e regione*. The syncope originated in enclisis: cf. *supra*, etc. In the same way explain *ergo*, *corgo*.

ferme may be syncopated from **ferimē*, superlative of *ferē*. If so, the syncope is to be explained in exactly the same way as that of *ualdē* above. *Ferime* was possibly the Plautine spelling (cf. *fert me* for *ferme* in MSS. at *Trin.* 319; and see Lindsay, *L. L.*, p. 185), just as *ualide* was the Plautine spelling of *ualde*.

fulmen is given by Ciardi-Dupré (p. 203) as syncopated from **fulgumen*. It is doubtful: see Walde s. v.

**fulca* has been unnecessarily conjectured in *Furius Antias* ap. *Gell.* xviii. 11. 4. (see Skutsch, *Forsch.* I. 113). There are many instances of resolved arsis in early hexameters.

gaudeo < **gāuideō* on the analogy of *gaudēre*, *gaudēmus*, etc.

Hercules < **Hēraculēs* < **Hēraclēs* (Gk. Ἡρακλῆς): cf. *Pollucēs* (Plaut. *Bacch.* 894) < **Polydeúcēs* (Gk. Πολυδεύκης).

magistri < **maglsterī*: cf. *ministri*, *sinistri*. *sinisteram* in *Ter. Eun.* 835 is due to the analogy of *dexteram*.

orno may be from **ōrdinō*. If so, the syncope began in *ōrnāre*, *ōrnāmus*, etc.

pauper < **pauo-paros* (cf. *opi-parus*) is given by Ciardi-Dupré as a case of syncope (p. 206). It is rather an

¹ See Lindsay, *L. L.*, p. 175.

instance of disappearance of *u* before *o*: cf. *aunculus*, the colloquial (and Plautine) form of *auonculus*, whence Fr. *oncle*. So also *rursum* < **reuorsum*.

postus < *positus* (e.g. Lucr. I. 1059; vi. 965) was an artificial form in classical Latin. It may be remarked, however, that a passive participle is never a good instance of syncope, seeing that the phenomenon may be secondary, and due to the analogy of the future participle, in which it would be 'lautgesetzlich.'

propter < **propiter* in enclisis: *proptéruium* (so accented in Plaut. *Mil.* 9).

prudens < *prōuidēns* on the analogy of *prudentem*, etc.

If *repperi* shows syncope (from **repeperi*), it is easily explained as beginning in *repperisti*, *repperissem*, etc. But cf. Ciardi-Dupré, *l.c.*, p. 211, n. 4.

If *sumo* is from **subs-emō*, syncope may have spread from *sūmimus* < **sūbs-ēmimus*, *sumēbat*, etc., perhaps helped by the analogy of *demo* < **dē-emō*.

utrum < **quoterom* (cf. Gk. πότερον) undoubtedly owes its syncope to enclisis. It was not of course an enclitic in all its uses; but enclisis would distinguish its relative and indefinite use from its interrogative use.¹ Even as an interrogative it would be enclitic when introducing alternative questions in their older form: e.g. *utrum praedicemne an taceam*? (pron. *utrumpràedicémne*, etc.), Ter. *Eun.* 721.

There remain a small number of words in which syncope is more or less probable, but cannot be explained under the proposed law: e.g. *ornus* < *ōsinos*.² Beside *ornus* I place *iuncus* < **joinicos* (O. Ir. **oin*, M. Ir. *aoin*), *quernus* < **quercinos* (?), *tinca* < **timica* (Skr. *tīmis*, 'big fish'). These four words may be classed together as rustic words, and

¹ For the testimony of the grammarians on this point, see Lindsay, *L. L.*, p. 167 (5).

² For the etymology of this and other words here quoted, see Walde, *op. cit.* s. v.

as such would be likely to show dialectal influence. Compare *bos* and *lupus*, which are not Latin words, but are borrowed from some Umbrian-Samnite dialect. We know that syncope was a very marked feature of Oscan-Umbrian, and that it is found there under conditions which differ from those under which it occurred in Latin. What more likely, then, than that the syncope in these rustic words is due to dialectal influence? Therefore we can base no sure inference on these instances. *Verna* also, if from **uesinā*, may show similar influence. As to *ulna* < *ōlenā* (Gk. ὠλένη) I can make no useful suggestion; but that it cannot be a normal case of syncope is indicated by the persistence of *columen*. *Uillum* < **ueinolom* and *ullus* < **oinolos* also need explanation.

IV.

It remains to consider briefly those instances of syncope which demonstrably originated either earlier or later than the republican period. In the former category we scarcely find any other than compound words—*anculus* < **ambicolos* (cf. Gr. ἀμφίπολος), *nuncupo* < **nōmocaḡō*, *naufragus* < **nāuifragos*, etc. The very fact that these words were syncopated is a part of the evidence that in their original form they were accented on the first syllable. If we except certain words whose second syllable was originally either *-uo-* or *-ue-* or *-ui-* (e.g. *nūper* < **nouoparos*, *cūria* < **co-uiriā*, etc.), which may not be cases of ordinary syncope, the first or accented syllable seems to have been always long. Also the original word seems always to have contained at least four syllables. Consequently, the conditions required by the law of syncope in the historical republican period seem to have been equally required in that earlier period when compound words were still accented on the first syllable.

There is, however, as I have noticed above, at least one instance in which those conditions are not fulfilled—*officium* < **ópifaciom*: contrast *opifex*, *opificis*. It is possible, therefore, that at that period any compound word of five or more syllables was syncopated without respect to the quantity of its first syllable, provided that its second, *i.e.* posttonic, syllable was capable of syncope. The law would remain substantially the same even if modified to that extent.

It is obviously impossible to fix an exact date at which republican Latin ceased and imperial Latin began. Many of the characteristic features of imperial Latin are found in later republican, and vice versa. But the distinction between them is a real one: either period of the language has a well-marked character of its own. With a view, therefore, to secure the greatest possible definiteness, I have selected the text of Plautus as exhibiting republican Latin in its most characteristic form. In the same way, and with the same object, I propose to select a particular age out of the whole imperial period as exhibiting imperial Latin in its most characteristic form—the age of Quintilian. I thus exclude from the inquiry such instances of syncope as manifestly belong to a later age. For example, the Appendix Probi censures the pronunciation *baplo* for *uapulo* (K. iv. 199. 14); and the appearance of *b* (which there had the sound of a purely labial spirant) for *u* is in itself evidence that the form belongs to a comparatively late age.

There is only one type of syncopation which is found in imperial Latin, but not in republican Latin—in the sense in which I am using the words—namely, the type of *balneum* < *bálineum*. As has been pointed out above, words ending in four short syllables—or rather, words whose final syllable is preceded by three short ones, for the quantity of the final syllable is immaterial—are never

found syncopated in Plautus.¹ They were accented on the fourth syllable from the end—*puérítia*, *cólumine*, *bálineum*—as can be conclusively proved by the evidence of metre,² though their syncopation in later times is in itself a sufficient proof of the fact: *balneum* could not come from *balíneum*. Here, then, we find a definite type of word not syncopated in the time of Plautus, syncopated in the time of Quintilian; and it is the only type of syncopation which is found in classical Latin, but is entirely absent in the Latin of Plautus. We cannot attribute the change to analogy: to the analogy of what? Still less can we speak of a ‘tendency’ to syncope which was gaining strength: to do so, in connexion with a sound-law, is to abandon the principle of the Uniformity of Nature. The conditions in the language must have changed in some way between the ages of Plautus and Quintilian.

We have here, I believe, another piece of evidence that in imperial Latin all accented syllables were becoming, or had even become long. It was the lengthening, by imperceptible degrees, of the originally short accented syllable which, at a certain stage in the process, made that which had been possible in the Plautine age impossible in the imperial period. Before Plautine *núcŭlĕus* and *cólŭmĭne* became *nucleus* and *culmine*, they must have moved towards **núculeus* and **cólumine*, and have thus fallen under the same law of syncope which operated in the republican period. The initial syllables need not have been of full length when syncope occurred: a stage would arrive in the imperceptible process at which the word would become by a fraction too heavy to be carried by a principal accent four syllables from the end; and, wherever analogy failed to reverse the change, syncope would result.

¹ See above, p. 129, note 1.

² Cf. Lindsay, *L. L.*, p. 158; and the author in *Class. Rev.* xx., p. 33.

That syncope in words of this type was connected with word-length, is indicated by the fact that, where the number of syllables varied in different parts of the paradigm, it was in those forms that had four syllables that syncope first arose. For instance, we find *culmine* beside *columen*, *tegmine* beside *tegimen*, etc.

That all accented vowels became long in imperial Latin is undisputed; but the fact that cultured poets continued to write verse according to the ancient rules obscures the chronology of the change. That it was already making its influence felt in the Augustan age is possibly indicated by the changes introduced by the Augustan poets in the rules of versification.¹

It was the lengthening of short vowels under the accent which caused the rules of accentuation in Latin to take the form in which they have been handed down to us. Had they come to us from republican times, they would probably have been differently expressed. It is often asserted that in the republican accentuation of words whose final syllable was preceded by three short ones, we have a surviving trace of an earlier system of accentuation, according to which every Latin word was accented on the first syllable.² The assertion is plausible, perhaps, if we think only of words, like *múlierem*, *bálineum*; but it is hard to see how the republican accentuation of words of the measure of *puérítia* (whence *puertia*, Hor. C. i. 36. 8), *latériculus* (Caes. B. C. ii. 9. 2: whence *laterculus*) can properly be regarded as a survival of a system of accentuation according to which every word took the accent on its first syllable. Rather it indicates that in words of the measure of *mũltĩere* it is a mere accident that the accent lies on the first syllable—that what the

¹ Cf. HERMATHENA, xxix., p. 503 (1903).

Lindsay, *L. L.*, p. 158; *Capt.*, p. 357; Sommer, *Handb.*, p. 97 f.; Brugmann, *Kurze vergl. Gram.*, § 58.

² This is the view, for example, of

law of accentuation at that period required was that, in words of a certain type, the accent should lie on the fourth syllable from the end. I suggest that the rules for the accentuation of republican Latin should be formulated as follows :—

1. The accent lay on the first mora of a long syllable.
2. The quantity of the final syllable had no effect on the accentuation, or, in other words, the final syllable might always be regarded as short.
3. If the pænultima was long, it was always accented.
4. If the pænultima was short, the accent was thrown back to the fourth mora from the end of the word wherever it was possible ; or, if that was impossible, to the third.

Hence *puérítia*, but *amīctia*, since the accent in *amīctia* would have lain on the fifth mora from the end of the word. If this was the real meaning of the rules for the accentuation of Latin, it is clear why a slight change became necessary in imperial times. When, e.g., *bálineum* approached the pronunciation *bālineum*, it could no longer be accented on the first syllable without offending against the law. Therefore it was syncopated. If words of the same measure were incapable of syncope, they suffered other changes. For instance, *Púteoli* > *Pùteōli*, whence the modern *Poszuóli*; *párietem* > *pàriēte* (later *parēte*), whence Ital. *parete*, Fr. *paroi*. No word could be accented on the fourth syllable from the end in the imperial period. Hence the form in which the rules of accentuation have come down to us.

It appears therefore that the post-Plautine syncope of words of the measure of *bālīnĕum* occurred under precisely the same conditions under which the syncope of words like *anculus* (< **dm̃bicolos*) had occurred at that early time when

the accent of at least all compound words lay on the first syllable; and under the same conditions as were required for syncope in the intervening period. That is to say, from the time of the First Syllable Accent till the age of Quintilian all certain instances of medial syncope fall under one law.

CHARLES EXON.

THE HYPOTHETIC VARIABLE.

WHEN a variable (standing for any real finite number) is used in an algebraic demonstration, stated powers or functions of the variable may be replaced under certain conditions by stated numbers, positive or negative, the other powers being left in the variable form ; or, they may sometimes be replaced by other functions of the variable. Under these circumstances the variable may be called *hypothetical*, to indicate that the symbol used stands, in some case for the variable, in others for constants connected with the indices of the symbol by a determinate relation which should, if possible, give a commutative rule of substitution.

The so-called 'imaginary' $\sqrt{-1}$ is really a hypothetic variable. The letter i represents in the first place a variable standing for any *real* number. But it represents a hypothetic variable because i^m is to be replaced by $+1$, -1 , or i according to a commutative (and hence unambiguous) rule. The impossibility of assigning a number to $\sqrt{-1}$ has had the curious effect of preserving the variable nature, and of suggesting the rule according to which constants are to be substituted for the higher powers of the variable. This simple explanation of the well-known paradox that the use of the 'imaginary' leads to correct results (provable otherwise) has been obscured by the very form of the symbol $\sqrt{-1}$, and by the confusion with each other of three logically distinct processes

all represented by the same sign =. Subalternation (or logical substitution) is confounded with numerical equation, and with another kind of substitution used in Algebra. Substitution may be a case of logical subalternation (I from A), as when we replace a variable by a definite real number; or it may be legitimate on other grounds in special Algebras, as when the square of a real variable is replaced by a negative quantity. I shall distinguish these two modes of inference as *logical* and *algebraic* substitution respectively.

In the symbol ω we have an example of a hypothetic variable in which a *function* of the variable is replaced by a stated number, the rule of substitution stating that $1 + \omega + \omega^2$ is to be replaced by 0; and in general if ω_n is a so-called imaginary n^{th} root of unity (where n is odd), we replace $1 + \omega_n + \omega_n^2 + \dots + \omega_n^{n-1}$ by 0. The validity of the substitution does not depend on the assumption that there are numbers which satisfy such equations, nor does it depend on the existence of geometrical entities obeying analogous laws of symbolism, but only on the laws of algebraic identities.

The genuine mathematician is not content with the empirical fact that the use of 'imaginary' symbols has never been known to lead to results that have been proved false by less doubtful methods. Their employment must be justified by some more universal and more fundamental principle. It was long ago pointed out that the symbol i has a geometrical meaning. Reflection, however, showed that algebraic laws cannot be explained by reference to the properties of Space; accordingly algebraic or logical explanations have most justly been attempted. Dr. Whitehead¹—if I understand him—holds that the Algebra of Arithmetic is a particular case of a more generalized Algebra; and that if results obtainable

¹ *Universal Algebra*, p. 10.

in the latter can be interpreted in the former, they must be valid. I venture to think that this depends on circumstances and upon the way in which the principle is interpreted. For example, if the symbol $=$ denotes merely a transitive symmetrical reflexive relation (and this appears to exhaust its purely symbolic meaning), and if the other signs used in Arithmetic ($+$, $-$, &c.) are described in an analogous manner by their laws of composition, there is no symbolic contradiction between $i^2 = 1$ and $i^3 = 3$, or in its consequence $1 = 9$. But in Arithmetic, where $=$ signifies numerical equality, a real contradiction arises. To take another example: $a\beta = -\beta a$ is, in quaternions, consistent with the falsity of " $a = 0$, or $\beta = 0$," but not in Arithmetical Algebra. The converse argument is of course true—if a particular Algebra is self-consistent, the laws of combinations of its symbols regarded as merely formal can involve no contradiction. The more universal an Algebra is, the fewer its negations, and therefore the fewer formal contradictions are possible. But particular Algebras are confined and symbolically defined by negations, e.g. in the above case Arithmetical Algebra excludes the coexistence of $i^2 = 1$, and $i^3 = 3$.¹ And because $(-1)^{\frac{1}{2}}$ has no existence as a number, it has to be shown why no contradiction arises from its use; and this proof must be deduced, not from universal Algebra, but from the Algebra of Arithmetic.²

The theory of Complex Numbers has also been used to explain the use of 'imaginaries' and other analogous symbols. This idea is different from—though it was suggested by—the geometrical interpretation referred to. The objections to this explanation are the same

¹ Unless we regard i as a hypothetic variable. But in this case the results will be ambiguous; owing to the non-commutative nature of the rules of

substitution $(i^2)^3$ is not $= (i^3)^3$.

² By the 'Algebra of Arithmetic' I mean the Algebra whose terms are finite numbers.

as those I have urged against regarding Arithmetical Algebra as logically dependent on other kinds of Algebra. If complex numbers are used to draw arithmetical conclusions, the symbolism used must be shown to be justified by the principles of Arithmetical Algebra.

Some explain the difficulty by saying that we may put a for $\sqrt{-1}$, and finally put $a^2 = -1$. They approach the conception of the hypothetical variable; but unfortunately the logical difficulty is slurred over, viz., why is the proof valid when $a^2 = -1$, seeing that a then becomes a self-contradictory number about which nothing or everything can be said?

II.

In using the hypothetical variable, the following principles are involved:—

A. All algebraic¹ demonstrations, and geometrical ones based on them by the Cartesian method, reduce to stating algebraic identities, which can be interpreted by using real numbers only; e.g., ' a is a root of $f(x) = 0$,' means $f(a) = 0$; ' x', y' is a focus of the conic $S = 0$,' means $\lambda S = (x - x')^2 + (y - y')^2 - \mu L^2$, and so on. To give concrete meaning to these identities, real numbers must be substituted for the different variables. This substitution is logical subalternation.

B. A principle of which the following is a particular case. Let $\theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3, \&c.$, be functions of u expansible by means of powers of u , such that if u' is a term of θ_m , it is not a term of θ_n ; then if $A\theta_1 + B\theta_2 + C\theta_3 + \&c. = 0$ for all real values of u that make $\theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3$ real, it follows that the identity still holds if we replace $\theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3, \&c.$, by any real numbers or by any functions of u , for the simple reason that the original identity is impossible unless $A = 0, B = 0, C = 0$. Now the illusion about the imaginary has crept in

¹ From this to the end 'Algebra' means the 'Algebra of Arithmetic.'

as follows : $A\theta_1(u) + B\theta_2(u) + C\theta_3(u) + \&c. = 0$, for all values of u (real and 'imaginary') ; and therefore (it is said) it holds good—by logical subalternation—if $\phi(u) = 0$, where the roots of this equation are imaginary. Suppose a is one of these, then $A\theta_1(a) + B\theta_2(a) + C\theta_3(a) = 0$. By equating to zero real and 'imaginary' parts we finally get equations that express no more, and usually less, than $A = 0$, $B = 0$, $C = 0$, &c.

Similarly the equation $\theta(u^2) + u\phi(u^2) = \psi(u^2) + u\chi(u^2)$, for all, or for an assignable number of, real values of u (or for an infinite continuous set of such values), implies $\theta(u^2) = \psi(u^2)$ and $\phi(u^2) = \chi(u^2)$. But as these identities are simply the results of separate identities of coefficients $\theta(-1) = \psi(-1)$ and $\phi(-1) = \chi(-1)$. The process is algebraic substitution ; and the result follows, not from the universal proposition expressed by the variable form, but from what the possibility of this universality implies, viz., that separate coefficients are equal—in fact, that the two functions can be reduced to the *same* form. Hence $\theta(-1) + u\phi(-1) = \psi(-1) + u\chi(-1)$. In using i for u , we make this inference at once, and then infer $\theta(-1) = \psi(-1)$, &c. It will be found that all proofs involving imaginaries end in this way, and depend throughout on nothing but the general principles of real functions. The symbolism is abbreviated by saying that $u^2 = -1$.

C. $\phi(i)$ signifies the result of expressing $\phi(u^2)$ in terms of the real variable i , and replacing u^2 by -1 . It is important to observe that the reason why no ambiguity is introduced is that, in multiplication of several factors, the place at which the substitution is made is indifferent ; in other words, the rule of substitution is commutative, and i^m is ambiguous. This condition must be fulfilled by a useful hypothetic variable. Otherwise complicated precautions must be taken to prevent contradictory or ambiguous conclusions.

III.

The stock examples illustrate the principle for the hypothetical variable that is mostly used ($i^2 = -1$).

(1) $(\cos \theta + i \sin \theta)^n = \cos n\theta + i \sin n\theta$ signifies that if $(\cos \theta + u \sin \theta)^n$ be expanded, and u^2 replaced by -1 , the result is $\cos n\theta + u \sin n\theta$; and, further, that, in expanding the left-hand side, u^2 may be replaced by -1 at any stage of the process; i^m is unambiguous.

(2) Conjugate functions

$$f(x + uy) = \phi(u^2, x, y) + u\psi(u^2, x, y),$$

implies

$$u^2 \frac{d\psi}{dx} + u \frac{d\phi}{dx} = \frac{d\phi}{dy} + u \frac{d\psi}{dy};$$

$$\therefore -\frac{d\psi_{-1}}{dx} + u \frac{d\phi_{-1}}{dx} = \frac{d\phi_{-1}}{dy} + u \frac{d\psi_{-1}}{dy},$$

where

$$\phi_{-1} = \phi(-1, x, y).$$

Equating coefficients of u , we get the usual result proved by i .

(3) *Imaginary roots.* " $a + \beta\sqrt{-1}$ is a root of $f(x) = 0$ " means only that if $f(a + \beta u)$ be expanded in powers of u , and if u^2 be replaced by -1 , the transformed expression is identically zero. The independence of the results on the sign of u is expressed by saying that $a - \beta\sqrt{-1}$ is also a root. The statement that every equation of the n^{th} degree has n roots is to be interpreted by this principle.

(4) *Transcendental functions.* To interpret

$$f(x + y\sqrt{-1})$$

we must be able to separate u^{4m} , u^{4m+1} , u^{4m+2} , and u^{4m+3} from each other (where m is a negative or positive integer) in the function $f(x + yu)$. The exponential values for

$\sin \theta$ and $\cos \theta$ are to be interpreted thus. This also applies to statements of the form

$$\operatorname{sn} (x + 2K \sqrt{-1}) = \operatorname{sn} x.$$

This becomes intelligible only if $\operatorname{sn} (x + 2Ku)$ can be treated in the way mentioned.

We may here ask why the hypothetic variables are always symbolized as 'imaginary' roots of equations. The answer seems to be that the supposed impossibility of replacing certain powers of the variable by a definite number has had the accidental and originally unconscious effect of preserving the variable nature in those powers. Further, the symbol i is perhaps more useful in the application of Algebra to Physics than any other hypothetic variable is likely to become, as it suggests many solutions of the equation

$$\frac{d^2 u}{dx^2} + \frac{d^2 u}{dy^2} = 0.$$

And in the theory of the complex variable it points to a one-one relation between algebraic substitution and geometrical translation and rotation. But there is no algebraic reason for the restriction to i or to any one hypothetic variable. For example, if $+1$ is substituted for j^2 ,

$$(\cosh \theta + j \sinh \theta)^n = \cosh n\theta + j \sinh n\theta,$$

from which we get the expansions for $\cosh n\theta$, $\sinh n\theta$, in terms of $\cosh \theta$ and $\sinh \theta$. Also if

$$f(x + jy) = \phi + j\psi,$$

then

$$\frac{d\phi}{dx} = \frac{d\psi}{dy}, \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{d\psi}{dx} = \frac{d\phi}{dy},$$

and extending the method from circular to hyperbolic functions

$$\cosh \theta = \frac{e^{j\theta} + e^{-j\theta}}{2}, \quad j \sinh \theta = \frac{e^{j\theta} - e^{-j\theta}}{2}.$$

The right-hand sides have a meaning only when the expansion in powers of j is performed, and j^2 replaced by $+1$. The factor j divides across in the second equation.¹

(4) A more complicated example is the method sometimes used for finding the foci of a curve $U = 0$ by means of its tangential equation. This problem consists in finding an identity of the form

$$\lambda U = \{(x - x')^2 + (y - y')^2\} V + L^2 W \dots (1).$$

The condition that the *real* lines $x - x' \pm a(y - y') = 0$ may touch the curve being $\phi(a^2) \pm a\psi(a^2) = 0$, both of these conditions will be fulfilled if $\phi(a^2) = 0$, and $\psi(a^2) = 0$.

Under these circumstances, since the chord of contact is common to both tangents, as they both pass through x', y' , we have

$$\rho U = \{(x - x')^2 - a^2(y - y')^2\} V_a + L_a^2 W_a \dots (2),$$

where V_a, L_a, W_a contain no odd powers of a (for otherwise there would be a different chord of contact for each of the lines). It follows that there must be, for all real values of a , an identity of the form

$$\rho U = \{(x - x')^2 - a^2(y - y')^2\} V_a + L_a^2 W_a + P\phi(a^2) + Q\psi(a^2).$$

The algebraic conditions of this identity imply that it holds good when a^2 is replaced by -1 . The condition for the focal form is therefore $\phi(-1) = 0, \psi(-1) = 0$. This result is got more shortly by using $\sqrt{-1}$, and equating real and imaginary parts; but all the above steps are essential to the argument.

¹ It should be noticed that, since j be *any* number. The fact that no is a *hypothetic* variable, the inference similar convention is required for i is $j = \pm 1$ is arbitrarily excluded; j may what brought it into use.

IV. GEOMETRICAL INTERPRETATION.

The last example illustrates the geometrical meaning of the imaginary. I am not concerned with the geometrical interpretation of i as a symbol of rotation through a right angle. The discussion given above shows that whatever *objective* meaning may be given to the complex variable, its *symbolic* use leads to correct numerical results. But i has been used (by Salmon and Cayley) to extend the results of numerical Algebra to actual Space by Cartesian methods, and that is what I am dealing with here. A mystical belief in the geometrical reality of 'imaginaries' has acted as a great stimulus to inquiry. But *the reality is that of a highly comprehensive logical inference*, not of actual points. The I and J points are real in the following sense only:—"There is a definite rule of algebraic substitution by which the equation of any circle can be obtained from the equation of some conic passing through two fixed points chosen arbitrarily; to each circle corresponds a conic and *vice versa*." The ' I and J ' points may thus be defined as the class of point-pairs considered as having the property mentioned. As *every* pair of points has this property, it follows that, in one sense, the 'circular points at infinity' are more real, more concrete, more mathematically living than any actual intuitible points. They are real as the Platonic Ideas are real, as the *Begriff* is real, because they express universal truth entering into the particular things of sense. To return to the *lumen siccum*: different classes of curves may be brought under one class by means of the hypothetic variable; and they have common those geometrical properties which use only those powers of the hypothetic variable for which substitution is made. For example, if a is a hypothetic variable, $x^2 - a^2z^2 = r^2$ represents

ellipses, circles, or hyperbolæ; and those geometrical properties which can be expressed in terms of a^2 are common to all three. Every mathematician knows all about this: it is unnecessary to give further illustrations.

One of the interesting features about some of Cayley's geometry was his mystical Platonism. He speaks, for example, of the *locus in quo* of imaginary points and figures.¹ This celestial region is just a corner of the $\tau\acute{o}\pi\omicron\varsigma \epsilon\iota\delta\omega\acute{\nu}$. Here exists the 'Absolute Conic.' All conics are emblems of the Absolute Conic whose meaning—as must be now fairly obvious—consists just in the universality of geometrical inferences by means of the hypothetic variable. Of course, Cayley must have been aware of this, though from his language one might infer that he believed that the Absolute Conic existed somewhere in individual form; just as the followers of Plato, and Plato himself, spoke of the Ideas as having an individual existence. And so they have, because they enter into particular things.

In short, the meaning and value of the hypothetic variable consists in its comprehensiveness united with rapid application to special cases. We use it to prove—as we fancy—properties of 'circular' curves and surfaces only, but the argument proves *en passant* general theorems of a much wider system of curves and surfaces of the same order. And to those who do not recognise this the proof is actually unsound.

THE ELLIPTIC VARIABLE.

Another way of looking at $\sqrt{-1}$ is to regard it as an ellipsis for $\sqrt{u-1}$, where $u > 1$. This is justified by the fact that the ultimate terms of Arithmetic are real signless numbers. A negative quantity in every case

¹ British Association Address, 1883. ² Collected Works, VIII., 31.

indicates that the number is supposed to be subtracted from some greater number. The pioneers of Arithmetic recognised this, as children do still; and their view is, I think, correct. In this sense

$$(\cos \theta + \sqrt{-1} \sin \theta)^n = \cos n\theta + \sqrt{-1} \sin n\theta,$$

signifies

$$(\cos \theta + \sqrt{u-1} \sin \theta)^n = \cos n\theta + \sqrt{u-1} \sin n\theta + u\phi(u).$$

But the full explanation is virtually the same as in the case of the hypothetic variable.

REGINALD A. P. ROGERS.

MR. ARCHER-HIND'S TRANSLATIONS INTO GREEK VERSE AND PROSE.¹

MR. ARCHER-HIND'S book will be welcomed no less by those who are personally and professionally interested in the classical writers and the fruitful study of them than by those who, though perhaps rusty in their Greek, love to have a book beside them teeming with beautiful pieces, and to watch, so far as their Greek will avail them, the charming process whereby triumphs of expression in English are moulded into a shape as exquisite, sometimes even more exquisite, in Greek. Mr. Archer-Hind's command over Greek idiom, with its fascinating elasticity and power to convey delicate shades of feeling, is wonderfully perfect, and is exercised with delightful ease. Readers will find places where the thought emerges far more easily and gracefully in the Greek than in the English. If this were a review in the strict sense of the word—I mean, were it my object to show that Mr. Archer-Hind is a master of his craft and to recommend him to our readers—I should content myself with quoting a verse here and there illustrating his command over the various metres which he has employed. But in Trinity College, Dublin, no one questions his mastery. He has already published in *Sabrinæ Corolla* enough to show that he is among the very best composers; be it observed, however, that all the compositions in the

¹ By R. D. Archer-Hind, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. University Press, Cambridge, 1905.

volume before us appear now for the first time. My object here will rather be to delight the readers of HERMATHENA. Since an article in HERMATHENA has wider limits than elsewhere, except in the Quarterlies, I will avail myself of this greater latitude to quote far more than would be permissible in a weekly or monthly magazine. My first extract is long, but it is a nearly perfect gem—for a questionable point see below—and its effect would be marred if it were not presented as a whole. It is in a metre little used by English composers, the exquisite hexameters of Theocritus. I hope the readers of the specimens which I propose to give will not rest content until they have acquired the volume. The piece is an extract from Harriet W. Preston's translation of a very graceful Provençal song from F. Mistral's *Mirèio* :—

ΔΑΦΝΙΣ. ΑΜΑΡΥΛΛΙΣ.

“ Magali, queen of my soul,
The dawn is near !
Hark to my tambourine,
Hide not thy bower within,
Open and hear !

“ The sky is full of stars,
And the wind soft ;
But, when thine eyes they see,
The stars, O Magali,
Will pale aloft ! ”

“ Idle as summer breeze
The tune thou playest !
I 'll vanish in the sea,
A silver eel will be,
Ere thou me stayest.”

“ If thou become an eel,
And so forsake me,
I will turn fisher too,
And fish the water blue
Until I take thee ! ”

Δ. Ηνιδ', ἐμᾶς Ἀμαρυλλί φᾶος
φρενός, ἔρχεται ἁώς,
τὴν δ' ἄμμες τι φίλον συρίσδομες·
ἀλλὰ κατ' οἶκον
μή με λάθῃς, θυρίδας δὲ δίοιγέ μοι,
ὄφρ' ἐπακούῃς.

ἄστρων μὲν πλήρης μέγας ὠρανός,
ἀδὸ δ' ἤητι
πᾶσα πνοά· τεὰ δ' ὄμμαθ' ὄκ' ἂν
ποθοῶντ', Ἀμαρυλλί,
ὠχρότεροι πολὺ πάντες ἂν ὠρανὸν
ἀστέρες ἐντί.

Α. ὥς μὲν ἄεντι μάταν θέρεος πνοαί,
ὥς δὲ καὶ αὐτως,
ὥπότε, μωσίσδες· τάχα δ' ἐγχείλυσ
ἀργυροειδῆς
εἰς ἅλα δῦσ' ἐσσεῦμαι, ἀθήρευττός
θ' ὑπαλυξῶ.

Δ. αἶ κα μὰν ἄλῖα γένη ἐγχείλυσ, ὥς
μ' ἀλεείνης,
κῆγών πασάμενος μέγα δίκτυον
ἐλλοπιευσῶ
κυανέας σκοπέων πόντῳ πλάκας, ἵς
κε λάβω τυ.

“ In vain with net or line
Thou me implorest :
I'll be a bird that day,
And wing my trackless way
Into the forest ! ”

“ If thou become a bird,
And so dost dare me,
I will a fowler be,
And follow cunningly
Until I snare thee ! ”

“ When thou thy cruel snare
Settest full surely,
I will a flower become
And in my prairie home
Hide me securely ! ”

“ If thou become a flower,
Before thou thinkest
I'll be a streamlet clear
And all the water bear
That thou, love, drinkest ! ”

“ When thou, a stream, dost feed
The flower yonder,
I will turn cloud straightway,
And to America
Away I'll wander. ”

“ Though thou to India
Fly from thy lover,
Still I will follow thee :
I the sea-breeze will be
To waft thee over ! ”

“ I can outstrip the breeze,
Fast as it flieth :
I'll be the swift sun-ray
That melts the ice away
And the grass drieth ! ”

“ Sunlight if thou become,
Are my wiles ended ?
I'll be a lizard green
And quaff the golden sheen
To make me splendid ! ”

Α. οὐκ ὄφελος καλὰ μω γ', οὐ δικτύω,
ὥς με κιχάνης·
ἀλλὰ μεταλλάξασα φίλον δέμας
ἔματι τήνῃ
οἰωνῶ μεθέποις' ἔβατον πάτον εἶμι
ποθ' ὕλαν.

Δ. αἱ τὸ γένοι' οἰωνός, ἐμὸν μέρος
οὐκ ἀλέγοισα,
ἧ σοφὸς ἱξευτὰς μετανισσόμενός τυ
δόλοισιν
ἔς τε λάβω ῥάβδοισιν ὑπαὶ λόχμασι
δοκευσῶ.

Α. ἀλλ' ὅκα δὴ παγίδας θέσθαι τὰς
ἀναρσίους οἶη
δύσσοος, εἴτα πάλιν μεταφύομαι
ἡρινὸν ἄνθος
οἰκείαις ἀμέριμνον ἐν εἰαμεναῖσι
κεκευθός.

Δ. καὶ τὸ δὴ ἀγροῖσιν πέλη ἄνθεμον·
ἀλλ' ἔτι κήγῶν
κρουνὸς ἄφαρ βευσεῦμαι ἀγαλλόμενος
ποτῷ ἄδει,
ὥς ὅσα λῆς πίνην, κώρα φίλα,
εἰσοχετεύσω.

Α. καὶ δὴ κρουνὸς ἐὼν τῇν' ἄνθεμον,
αἰπόλ', ἐέρσαις
φέρβες· ἀειρομένα κ' ἐλαφρὸν νέφος
ἰθὺ γανοίμαν
ἐκ σταλᾶν ζέφυρόνδε πλανωμένα
Ἑρακλειᾶν.

Δ. αἱ δ' ὑπὲρ ὠκεανῶ πτησεῖ ῥέυς,
ὥς τὸν ἐρῶντα
παρφεύγης, πτερύγεσσιν ὕμῳς ἀλίαις
ἀνέμοιο
κουφισθεὶς ἐψεῦμαι ὑπὲρ πόντῳ τυ
κομίζων.

Α. ἀλλ' ἔτι μὰν ἄνεμον φθαξῶ,
ταχινόν περ ῥόντα,
ἀελίῳ κραιπναῖσιν ἀλιγκία ἀκτίνεσ-
σιν,
αἱ τὸ κρύος τάκοντι καταναίοντι δὲ
ποίαν.

Δ. ἄρ' ἀκτὶς περ ἐοῖσα τὸν ἐκ
γραμμᾶς με ποιησεῖς
κινῆσαι; σαυράν χ' ὑποδὺς τάχα
χρυσεδόνωτον
μαρμαρυγαῖσι τεαῖς λιπαρὸν δέμας
ἀγλαΐσαιμι.

Another metre rarely essayed by composers is the Iambic tetrameter catalectic, which in modern Greek has superseded all the measures of antiquity : here is a happy example of it :—

MARESNEST. WINDBAG.

M. Why do you grow pale and
mutter? One thing, one, in
this event

Will console me : you will pay
for 't.

W. I? I've nothing to repent.

M. Nothing?

W. No, I never harmed them
in a single feather.

M. What?

How of all those odes you wrote
with—goose-quills?

W. Mercy! I forgot!

M. Hapless goose!

W. More hapless poet!

M. And what multiplies
the offence

Thousandfold, you're always scrib-
bling, but you never mend your
pens.

W. Still the goose—

M. Speak not too lightly—you
have many a charge to
dread.

Have you ever—

W. No, I never—

M. Slept upon a feather-
bed?

W. Out, alas!

M. Or ever relished, with a
grating of nutmegs,
August wheat-ears?

W. Oh!

M. Or partridge *purées*—

W. Ah!

M. With plovers'
eggs?

W. Guilty, guilty! All ye birds
impeach me! But why mock
me, you,

For my innocent ill-doing? You
have crimes far worse to rue.

ΟΝΟΠΟΚΙΔΗΣ. ΠΟΜΦΟΛΥΓΩΝ.

Ο. τί δ' ὠχρίσας σκορδινᾷ; τούτων
γὰρ ἐν μόνον μοι
ἀρεστόν, ὥς κλαύσει σύ.

Π. πῶς γ'; ὅς οὐδὲν ἠδίκηκα.

Ο. οὐδὲν σύ γ';

Π. οὐ πτερὸν γὰρ οὐδ' ἐν
οὐδαμῶς ἔτρωσα.

Ο. τί δῆτ' ἐκείνων μελυδρίων πτεροῖσι
χηνός—

Π. ὦ Ζεῦ,

ἔλαθέ μέ πως.

Ο. τάλας γε χήν.

Π. τάλας μὲν οὖν ποιητής.

Ο. θάμαρτιά δέ γ' οἶσθ' ὅσῃν προσβολὴν
προσῆψας;
γράφων γὰρ ἀπέραντ' οὐδ' ἀκεῖ τοῦθ'
ὃ τοσαῦτ' ἔγραψας.

Π. ὦ χήν δ' ἄρ'—

Ο. εὐφήμει, τοσαῖσδ' ἔτ' ἔνοχος
αἰτίαισιν.

ἤδη γάρ, εἴπ'—

Π. οὐδέ ποτ' ἔγωγ'—

Ο. ἐπὶ πτεροῖς ἔδαρθες;

Π. Ἄπολλον.

Ο. οὐδὲ Σικελικοῦ ποτ' ἐπιπά-
σας τι τυροῦ

κιχλῶν βέβρωκας;

Π. Ἡράκλεις.

Ο. οὐδ' ὀρτύγων ποθ'
ἐφθῶν;

Π. ἀπόλωλα.

Ο. πρὸς δὲ χλωρίωνος ῥ';

Π. ὅλωλα δῆτα

πᾶσιν καταγνωσθεὶς παρ' ὀρνέοις·
ἀτὰρ τί δὴ σὺ

μαθὼν με κερτομεῖς ἐφ' οἷσιν ἐσφάλην
μάλ' ἄκων,

αὐτός γε πολλῷ δεινότερα καὶ πλείον'
ἠδίκηκός;

The very next piece, from the *Erechtheus* of Swinburne, has some excellent dochmiacs—a metre which, so far as I know, has never been used by modern composers; and, save Mr. Gilbert Murray, hardly any English scholar has tried the Greek choral ode, of which the following is a beautiful specimen:—

The sun and the serenest moon sprang
forth;
The burning stars of the abyss
were hurled
Into the depths of heaven; the daedal
earth,
That island in the ocean of the
world,
Hung in its cloud of all-sustaining air.
But this divinest universe
Was yet a chaos and a curse,
For Thou wert not: but, power from
worst producing worse,
The spirits of the beasts were
kindled there,
And of the birds, and of the
watery forms,—
And there was war among them and
despair
Within them, raging without truce
or terms.
The bosom of their violated nurse
Groaned, for beasts warred on
beasts and worms on worms,
And men on men; each heart was
as a hell of storms.

Εκθορ' ἀέλιος σελάνας τε μειλίχιον φάος,
πανοὶ δ' ἐξ ἀφανοῦς ἔφαρ
ἐδίνηθεν αἰθέριοι
βένθε' ἀμφὶ πόλου· νῆσος δ' ὡς ἐνὶ βοθίῳ
θαλάσσης
αἰωρητὸν οὐρανόθεν γῆς κύκλωμα δαιδά-
λεον
βάθρον ἐπ' ἀχλύος ἀερίας ἐξιδρυθὲν
ἐφάνθη.
ἀτὰρ οὖν θείας τόδ' ἄγαλμα τέχνης
κόσμος ἄκοσμος κατήρδς ἔκειτ'·
οὐκ ἔφυς, πότνια· χεῖρ ὃς
ἀεὶ 'πὶ κακοῖς Κήρ τις ἀνιεῖσ'
ἐξέφλεξεν θηρσί τ' ὀρείοις
πτηνῶν τ' ἐγέλαις
ὄργας ἐνύδροισί τε μορφαῖς.
τοῖς δ' ἄρ' ἔμπεσ' ἔρις θ' ὑπὸ στήθεσιν τ'
ἔπορον κρύος,
λύσσ' ἔσπονδος, ἀμάχανος·
βιασθεῖσα δὲ φρενόθεν
πάντροφος στένε γὰρ θηρείων τ' ἰδοῦσα
φυτλῶν ἀπασῶν
ἀλλαλοκτήνους μανίας ἐρπετῶν τε καὶ
μερόπων·
φρεσὶ γὰρ ἐρεβόθεν προσέπνει πᾶμφθαρ-
τός τις Ἴρις.

The choral ode is a favourite measure with Mr. Archer-Hind, and is an appropriate garb for many fine lyrics from Shelley, Swinburne, and Milton. A curious feature in the collection is that, though it includes above fifty authors, English, Spanish, German, and Italian, there is only one piece from Shakespeare, and that a sonnet, and only

one from Browning, of which I give the last four lines :—

I have addressed a frock of heavy mail,	ἀτὰρ φέρων νάρθηκα δυσπλάνοισ ὁδοῖς
Yet may not join the troop of sacred knights ;	οὐ ξυντελεῖν Βάκχοισιν ἢ κατάξιος·
And now the forest creatures fly from me,	φεύγει μ' ἀν' ὄλην θηρί', οὐδαμῇ δ' ἔτι
The grass-banks cool, the sunbeams warm no more.	ψύχει με λειμῶν οὐδὲ θερμαίνει φάος.

There are only two short pieces from Tennyson ; both are so beautiful, both in the English and the Greek, that I must present them to the readers of HERMATHENA :—

I.

Come not, when I am dead,
To drop thy foolish tears upon my
grave,
To trample round my fallen head,
And vex the unhappy dust thou
wouldst not save.
There let the wind sweep and the
plover cry ;
But thou, go by.
Child, if it were thine error or thy
crime
I care no longer, being all unblest :
Wed whom thou wilt, but I am sick
of Time,
And I desire to rest.
Pass on, weak heart, and leave me
where I lie :
Go by, go by.

Μὴ δῆτ' ἐπεμβαίνουσα κατθανόντι μοι
τάφον ματαίοις δάκρυσιν καθυβρίσης
κάρᾳ μ' ἄιστον λάξ πατοῦσα, δυσπότημου
αἰκισμα τέφρας· οὐ γὰρ οὐδὲν σῶσαί γ'
ἔτλης.
ἀρκεῖ ξυναλγεῖν ἢ θ' ὑπαιθρία πρὸς
πτηνῶν τ' ἰυγαί· μὴ σύ γ' ἐμβάλης
πόδα.
ἄκουσα δ' εἶθ' ἡμαρτες ἢ λώβης χάριν
ἤδη λέγω παρ' οὐδὲν ᾧδ' ἄνολβος ὢν·
γάμους γαμοί' ἂν οὖς θέλοις, ζωῆς δ'
ἐγὼ
ἄσῃ κεκμηκὼς κἀναπαύεσθαι ποθῶ.
ἔρρ' ᾧ κέαρ μάταιον, ὥς κοίτας ποτὲ
σέθεν γ' ἀμόχθους ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ κοιμώμεθα.

II.

There has fallen a splendid tear
From the passion-flower at the
gate.
She is coming, my dove, my dear,
She is coming, my life, my fate ;
· · · · ·

Εκκεχυται παμφεγγὲς ἀπαι κάλυκος
δροσοέσσας
δάκρυον ἀγχιθύρου λειβόμενον ῥοδέας·
έρχεται ἃ χαρίεσσα, πελειάδι παρθένος
ἴσα,
έρχεται ἃ ζωῆς δεσπότης ἀμετέρας,

She is coming, my own, my sweet ;
 Were it ever so airy a tread,
 My heart would hear her and beat,
 Were it earth in an earthy bed ;
 My dust would hear her and beat,
 Had I lain for a century dead ;
 Would start and tremble under her
 feet,
 And blossom in purple and red.

ἔρχεται ἃ μούνα μοι ἐμᾶς φρενὸς ἀδέα
 τέρψις·
 κεῖ ζεφύρου βαῖνοι ποσσὶν ἐλαφρο-
 τέροις,
 ἢ νιν ἐπαισθόμενον ποθ' ὑπορχήσαιτ' ἂν
 ἐμὸν κῆρ,
 κεῖ βαθὺν δὴ κείθοιτ' ἐν κονίαις κονία·
 αἰσθόμενον νιν δῆτα μάλ' ἐν στέρνοις
 δονέοιτο,
 εἴ με νεκρὸν κατέχοι γαῖ' ἑκατονταετῇ,
 παδῆ τε τρομοῖ τε φίλοις ὑπὸ ποσσὶ
 πατεύσας,
 ἄνθεσί τ' ἐκβλάστοι πορφυρέοισι
 τέφρα.

His only rendering from Scott is a gem :—

Sound, sound the clarion, fill the
 file !
 To all the sensual world proclaim,
 One crowded hour of glorious life
 Is worth an age without a name.

Φθογγὸς ἴτω σάλπιγγος, Ἐνυαλίου
 κελάδημα,
 τοιάδε τοῖς σπατάλη φῆσον ἄβρυνο-
 μένοισ'·
 Κρεῖσσον ἄρ' ἦν ὅσον ἡμᾶρ ἐπιστεφές
 ἡγορέων
 ζώμεν, ἢ τὰ τυχόντ' ἄφθιτ' ἔγειν
 ἔτεα.

Shelley, Heine, and Swinburne seem to be his favourite poets ; and Sir Thomas Browne, Sir John Maundeville, and George Mac Donald supply the most copious materials for his prose translations.

I would fain give the dialogue between the *Messenger* and the *Chorus* from Swinburne's *Atalanta* (p. 26), and the splendid version from the same play on p. 68, the Sapphics (p. 113) into which *Annie Laurie* goes beautifully, and the Alcaic rendering of Shelley's "I arise from dreams of thee" on p. 107 ; but we must not rifle too many of the sweets which the translator has set before us. Never have I felt so helpless under an *embarras de richesse*. One thing seems to me certain that, as long as England produces scholars who can turn out work like Mr. Archer-Hind's, so long

will her school hold that commanding position which she took up shortly after the revival of learning, and has triumphantly maintained in her dealing with the literary treasures with which Africa has recently endowed us. The prose translations do not, of course, afford the same variety; but the style is perfect whether the model be Herodotus, Demosthenes, Plato, or Aristotle.

As examples of his power to deal with subjects quite alien from Greek thought, I must give a couple of his prose renderings. The first is a Trade Circular :—

The Cambridge Scientific Instrument Company has moved from Panton Street to St. Tibb's Row. The reason for this change is that the place formerly occupied was found to be too small for the work that has lately had to be done. Increased space will do more than make it possible merely to increase the amount of work done; it will make it possible for the Company to do that work more completely in accordance with their desire to make it as practical and accurate as possible. The Company is, as it always has been, anxious rather to strike out or adopt and improve new forms of instruments than to direct its energies to the reproduction in a dealer's spirit of familiar and more or less stereotyped models. The nature of the machines which the Company is now prepared, and hopes in future, to supply is indicated by the catalogue appended. This catalogue, however, is necessarily not altogether complete as regards the present, and is of course still less complete as regards the future. Fuller information may be given in answer to special requests, and in the case of less known and more complex machines, it will be possible to convey a better notion of them by means of photographs to those who have a special interest in obtaining them.

Ἡ μὲν ἐταιρεία ἥ ἐν Κανταβριγίᾳ ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν τεχνικῶν μηχανῶν παρασκευῇ συνεστῶσα μετέκρηκεν ἐκ τῆς Παντωνίας ὁδοῦ εἰς τὸ Θεοβαλδεῖον. αἴτιον δὲ τῆς μεταστάσεως τὸ ὑπάρχον οἶκημα στενότερον ὢν ἢ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀρτίως ἐπεσταλμένα. εὐρυχωρίας δὲ προσγενομένης οὐχ ὅπως πλείω τῇ ἐταιρείᾳ ἐγχωρήσει τὰ ἔργα διαπράττεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὥς ἂν τις μάλιστα βούλοιτο χρήσιμά τε καὶ ἀκριβῆ ἀποτελεῖν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐταιρεία ἀεί τε μάλιν νῦν πρόθυμός ἐστι καιμουργίας τῶν μηχανῶν αὐτὴ τε ἐξευρίσκειν ἄλλων τε παραλαβοῦσα ἐξακριβῶσαι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ γνώριμα καὶ δεδημευμένα εἶδη κατασκευάζουσα καπηλικῶς διαπονεῖσθαι. ἵποίᾳ δὲ τινὰς ἤδη τε ἐτοιμός ἐστι πορίσαι τὰς μηχανὰς εἰσαυθὺς τ' ἐλπίζει, δηλοῖ δ' ἐπόμενος κατάλογος, καίπερ οὐδὲ τὰ νῦν παρεσκευασμένα, μή τί γε τὰ ἔτι μέλλοντα δημιουργηθήσεσθαι, ἅπαντα ἐνδεικνύς. τοῖς μέντοι ἰδίᾳ τι ἐπερωτῶσι πάρεσται πλείω πυνθάνεσθαι· ὅσαι δὲ τῶν μηχανῶν ἀηθέστεραί τ' εἰσὶ καὶ μᾶλλον κεκομψευμένοι τοῖς κτήσασθαι αὐτὰς ἐπιθυμοῦσι πεφωτογραφημένοι γ' ἂν σαφέστερον ἀποδηλωθεῖεν.

The second deals with a meeting of Argentine bond-holders :—

The only weak point is the still unsettled question of the railway guarantees ; and as regards this we can only note Dr. Avellaneda's assurance that his Government takes an "anxious interest in arriving at a satisfactory arrangement." The scheme of debt settlement ratified by the meeting is very simple. The Argentine government will remit to an agent to be named by the Committee of the Bank of England the annual sum of £1,565,000 for five years, and in the sixth year the amount of interest on these loans in full. The money will be apportioned in the following manner :—the interest on the 1886—7 loan to be temporarily reduced from 5 per cent. to 4 per cent., the interest on the funded loan to be reduced from 6 per cent. to 5 per cent., the interest on the waterworks loan to be reduced from 5 per cent. to 4 per cent., and other loans to receive 60 per cent. of the face value of the coupons.

ἐν γε μὴν ἔτι ὑποδεέστερον, ὅτι τὰ τῶν ὁδῶν τῶν σεσιδηρωμένων οὐπω τῆς ἐγγύης ἀσφαλῶς ἔχει. τοσοῦτον μέντοι μόνον ἔχομεν λέγειν, ὅτι διισχυρίζεται Καρυάτης, ὡς ἄρα περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖται ἢ Ἀργυραίων πόλις τὸ καλῶς συνομολογήσαι. ἀ δ' οὖν τοῖς τότε συλλεγεῖς κεκύρωται περὶ τῶν χρεῶν τάξεως οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν διασαφῆσαι. προξενήτη γάρ ὃν ἂν οἱ δημόσιοι ἡμῖν τραπέζιται διὰ τῶν προβούλων καταστήσωσιν, ἀποστελε ἐπὶ πέντε μὲν ἔτη ἢ Ἀργυραίων πόλις ἑπτακισχίλια τάλαντα κατ' ἐνιαυτόν, ἕκτῃ δ' ἤδη ἔτει ἐντελεῖς ἀποτίσει τοὺς τόκους· τὰ δὲ χρέματα ταῦτα διατακτέον ὦδε· ἀντὶ γὰρ τοῦ ἐπὶ πέντε ἡμιωβολίοις γενήσεται ἐπὶ ῥητὸν χρόνον ὁ τοῦ τε πρώτου δανείσματος καὶ τοῦ πρὸς τὴν ὑδραγωγίαν τόκος ἐπὶ δυοῖν ἤδη ὀβολοῖν· τῶν δὲ δημοσίᾳ ἡγγυημένων ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ τρίσιν ὀβόλοις ὁ ἐπὶ πέντε ἡμιωβολίοις· τοῖς δὲ δὴ ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἔσται δραχμὰς ἐξήκοντα λαβεῖν παρὰ μὲν ἀκάστην τῶν ἐν τῷ συμβόλῳ ἐγγεγραμμένων.

A few slight errors are to be noticed, probably due in most cases to the printers. The most curious is κῖονας on p. 21. Mr. Archer-Hind knows quite well that the ι is long, but probably in the proof he transposed μακάρων ἔδρας, overlooking the effect of the transposition on the preceding word. On p. 71 exact antistrophic correspondence would imply νεοθαῖλεις, but few are now prepared to go so far. One might ask whether περιέπτυσσες (p. 21) could be used in verse, and whether ἐδαιτᾶτο for διητᾶτο (p. 187) is an admissible form ; and one might doubt the possibility of ἦνῖσι on p. 85. The passages in Homer where the word occurs would seem to go for ἦνῖσι. There are a few misprints in accents ; and we have on p. 13 μελιχίοισι . . . ἀκτίνεσσι—clearly a misprint, as on p. 11 we find κραιπναῖσιν . . . ἀκτίνεσιν.

In the same fine piece (quoted above) *παγίδας τὰς ἀναρσίους* is somewhat daring; could *ἀναρσίους* be a dialectic variety of any form of the accusative plural except *ἀναρσίους*? Why not *ἀναρσίας*? Theocritus would have given the adjective three terminations, not two.

The use of the particles is excellent, as might be expected in so deft a composer; but there are instances of *γε* introduced *metri gratia*—what one may call the ephelcystic *γε*. The following are instances in which I cannot see the force of the particle, perhaps through lack of a sufficiently deep and clear insight on my part:—

Page	95,	line	4.	ἔβατόν γε τιν.
„	121,	„	2.	κάλυμμά γ' ἐκπέπτωκε.
„	35,	„	4.	οὐ γὰρ οὖν σῶσαί γ' ἔτλης.
„	„	„	12.	σέθεν γ' ἀμόχθους.
„	45,	„	3.	θεός γ'.
„	„	„	8.	μηδὲν δ' ἀθύμει γ'.
„	49,	penult.		τοίᾳ γ' ἀνάγκη.
„	75,	line	1.	εἴ γ' ἦ τύραννος.

I have not noticed any violation of the rule which forbids the trochaic caesura in the fourth foot of a hexameter. This is remarkable, for the rule has hardly yet established itself, and is often infringed by modern composers. It must be remembered that the licence is permissible when the line ends with a polysyllable, as in *Λῆμνον ἀμιχθαλόεσσαν*.

I think *Εὐφροσύνα θεόμορφε* hardly conveys the atmosphere of 'Spirit of Delight.' Would not *Πότνια Τέρψι* go nearer to it? Nothing could be better than *οἰοφρόνων* for 'lonely' applied to the stars in Matthew Arnold's

'But now ye kindle
Your lonely, cold-shining lights.'

But to enumerate all Mr. Archer-Hind's felicities of expression, 'often flowering in a lonely word,' would be almost to copy the book into the pages of HERMATHENA.

R. Y. TYRRELL.

IRISHTOWN, NEAR DUBLIN.

IT occurred to me recently to consider at what age, and under what circumstances, a suburb of Dublin, situated on the sea-coast, fully two miles from the old city, should have been so named. We know of an Irishtown beside Kilkenny, and beside Limerick, obviously to keep the native population outside the walled city held by the Anglo-Irish. But here the settlement is far away from the old walls, and no apparent adjunct to the city. I tried in vain to excite the interest of some antiquarian and historical friends on this point; nor do the extant Histories of Dublin tell us one word about it. So I was obliged to make an attempt for myself, and now set down for future topographical historians of County Dublin what I have been able to discover.

In the first place, I have not been able to find any very old mention of this Irishtown. As Gilbert's Calendar of Ancient Records of Dublin has no index, I cannot be positive without reading the first four volumes page for page over again; but I hazard the following statement as probably true. There is no mention of or allusion to the existence of Irishtown in the first three volumes. This brings us down to 1650.

In the appendix to vol. iv. (p. 562), under the head of Ringsend and the liberties thereof, we have 'Irishtowne, number of people 98; English 23; Irish 75.' This is from the census of 1659. In the Preface to the same volume

(p. vi), Gilbert tells us: 'By an edict of the lord deputy and council [*note*, dated at Dublin, 21 May, 1655], Irish people were prohibited to reside or dwell within two miles of the city of Dublin'—an edict which he shows, by quoting a petition in 1657, to have been impossible to enforce. He might have shown it better by the very facts of the census, which gives us Irish people living in every parish of Dublin, though for the most part in a small minority, not as in Irishtown; and even the neighbouring Ringsend, certainly an old settlement, has 59 English, and 21 Irish. Gilbert, as usual, gives us no reference to the place where he found this edict, and as yet my search for the document has been fruitless. But as he can hardly have invented the fact and the date, I assume that an attempt was made to turn the Irish out of Dublin, which was only feebly enforced; and to this attempt we owe the first settlement of Irishtown. In seeking for further evidence to sustain this hypothesis, I thought some help might be obtained from old leases or maps of the Fitzwilliam (now Pembroke) estate, which included the site. Mr. Vernon, agent of the estate, was most kind in giving me what help he could. But he states that there are no old leases of that part of the estate in his office. He found for me, however, two old descriptions (dated 1639 and 1666) in which Ringsend is mentioned, and no Irishtown, though in later documents they always appear together. He found me a map dated 1667 in which there are only three houses set down as Irishtown, and a later map (1692) when there were about twenty houses, another in 1706 with about thirty houses, and a churchyard, but as yet no church. St. Matthew's Church, Irishtown, with its massive tower, was not built till about 1712.

All these facts agree with my hypothesis, in favour of which I will add, that if any turbulent Irish were excluded from the town, and relegated to a separate

Irishtown, they would on no account have been allowed to settle inland towards the mountains, where their presence would only have caused additional danger to the city. Hence Irishtown was established on the seashore, as far as possible from their kinsfolk in the wild country.

These considerations I submit, with all deference, to our local antiquaries, and trust they will find further evidence either to establish or to overthrow the conclusions at which I have arrived.

J. P. MAHAFFY.

[NOTE BY THE EDITOR.]

There are four townlands bearing the name of 'Irishtown' in County Dublin:—

- 1st. In the parish of Lusk (sheet 7 of 6-inch Ordnance Survey map).
- 2nd. In the parish of Palmerston (sheet 17 of 6-inch Ordnance Survey map).
- 3rd. In the parish of Ward (Finglas) (sheets 10 and 13 of 6-inch Ordnance Survey map).
- 4th. In the parish of Donnybrook (sheet 18 of 6-inch Ordnance Survey map)—the one above referred to.

These are marked on p. 549 of the topographical index to the Census of 1901. There are in all twenty-six townlands named Irishtown given in the Index.

The Ordnance map shows that, of the three other Irishtowns in County Dublin, each has in its vicinity—not, indeed, a large correlative English town like Dublin, but—a number of townlands with English names, implying English inhabitants, in contrast to which the name 'Irishtown' seems given to it as a district left, or 'reserved,' wholly or chiefly to the Irish. 'Town,' in the compound, probably bears the older sense of a mere 'enclosure,' still found in certain provincial usages.]

THE CREEDS OF SS. IRENAEUS AND PATRICK.

THE Creed of S. Patrick given in the fourth chapter of the *Confessio*, the Latinity of which compares very favourably with that of the other chapters, and suggests that it was a form he had committed to memory, is an interesting study on account of its remarkable resemblance to certain passages in the Treatise of S. Irenaeus against the Gnostics. This resemblance proves (1) that the direct origin of S. Patrick's Creed and theology was Gallican, and (2) that the indirect origin was Greek and Eastern as distinguished from the Latin and Roman. The resemblances between the Creed of S. Patrick and the theological statements in the Treatise *Contra Haereses* will be first considered; and then an attempt will be made to trace from the reconstruction of a possible creed or *regula fidei*, more akin to the creed afterwards formulated at Nicaea (325), and completed at Constantinople (381), the eastern origin of the *regula veritatis*, which Irenaeus ascribes to John, the disciple of our Lord, and which was the outcome, direct or indirect, of the controversy with the Gnostics, who were, perhaps, the first Christians to formulate rules of faith (Irenaeus, III. xi. 3), and were considerably influenced by Greek thought and speculation (Irenaeus, II. xiv.).

(A.) The Creed of S. Patrick may be divided, for

convenience, into three clauses, each of which will be treated separately : —

I. Quia non est alius Deus nec unquam fuit nec ante nec erit post haec [v. l. hunc] praeter Deum Patrem ingenitum, sine principio, a quo est omne principium, omnia tenentem.

In the first statement, the oneness of God the Father is emphasized in the manner of the First Commandment, and of Irenaeus, I. xxii. 1, *super quem alius Deus non est*. That oneness is asserted in positive terms in the Treatise, e.g., Unus et Idem Pater (v. xvi. 1), Unus Deus omnipotens (I. xxii. 1). The main thesis of Irenaeus was to prove the Unity, Omnipotence, and Eternity of the Father, without Predecessor or beginning, and without Successor or end, against the Gnostics, who believed in a rival to the Father in the Demiurge or Creator (IV. xix. 1), and distinguished Jesus the Son of the Demiurge from Christ the Son of the Father (III. xi. 1). This Creator is declared by Irenaeus (IV. xx. 4) to be “the one God who made and fashioned all things by His Word and Wisdom,” and is described thus : *super omne initium et potestatem* (IV. xix. 2); *neque super eum nec post eum est aliquid* (I. ii. 1); *sine initio et sine fine* (III. viii. 3); *super quem alius Deus non est, neque Initium neque Virtus neque Pleroma* (I. xxii. 1); *Ipse Factor, ipse Dominus omnium, neque praeter ipsum neque super ipsum . . . nec Deus alter quem Marcion affinxit* (II. xxx. 9); *πρῶτος πάντων* (IV. xxxviii. 3). Irenaeus denies the existence of any God before Him, and refutes the Gnostics, who believed in *Ἀιῶνα πρόοντα. τοῦτον δὲ καὶ . . . Προπάτορα καὶ βυθὸν καλοῦσι* (I. i. 1). It is quite possible to see traces of this controversy in S. Patrick’s description of God the Father.

Ingenitum = ἀγέννητον recalls a passage of Irenaeus preserved in the Greek (IV. xxxviii. 3), *ὁ καὶ μόνος ἀγέννητος καὶ πρῶτος πάντων . . . τέλειος γὰρ ὁ ἀγέννητος. οὗτος δὲ ἐστὶ θεός*.

The word *ingenitus* is found in II. xxxiv. 2, Et per hoc inferiora sunt ab eo qui ea fecit quoniam non sunt ingenita; and in a Fragment, εἰ ἀγέννητος ἢ ὕλη, *si materia est ingenita*. This word also shows traces of the controversy with the Gnostics, who styled their original principle ἀίδιός τε καὶ ἀγέννητος (Iren. I. i. 1): cf. Ignatius, *Eph.* 7 (a description of the Incarnate Christ):

εἰς ἰατρός ἐστιν, σαρκικός τε καὶ πνευματικός, γεννητὸς καὶ ἀγέννητος, ἐν σαρκὶ γενόμενος Θεός.

Sine principio a quo est omne principium: cf. Iren. III. viii. 3: Ipse enim infectus est et sine initio et sine fine, et nullius indigens, ipse sibi sufficiens et adhuc reliquis omnibus ut sint hoc ipsum praestans: quae vero ab eo sunt facta initium sumpserunt. [For He Himself is not generated, but is without beginning or end, and lacks nothing, being self-sufficient and conferring on all else the very existence they enjoy; but the things which have been made by Him have a beginning.] Clement of Alexandria (Str. VII. 829) calls the Son ἀναρχος ἀρχή, of which *principium sine principio* would be a literal rendering. The Gnostics called their original Aeon Προαρχή, and described Νοῦς as ἀρχὴ τῶν πάντων (Iren. I. i. 1).

Omnia tenentem. It is very questionable if this word is used here in the sense of παντοκράτωρ, 'Almighty,' as Dr. Newport White suggests (*Latin Writings of S. Patrick*, p. 283). There are many parallel expressions to be found in Irenaeus, e.g. II. xxx. 9: Solus hic Deus invenitur qui omnia fecit, solus omnipotens, . . . et *omnia capiens*, solus autem a nemini capi potest. It would seem that S. Patrick's expression *omnia tenentem* might be paraphrased by the latter part of this clause, which had quite a different significance from παντοκράτωρ in the Gnostic controversy. Cf. Quomodo autem ea quae extra Pleroma est conditio cepit eum qui continet universum Pleroma? (V. xviii. 1), where

‘continent’ is used in sense of χωρεῖ: cf. description of Gnostic Νοῦς I. i. 1, καὶ μόνον χωροῦντα τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ Πατρός. The Patrician phrase would therefore mean ‘all-embracing’: cf. Iren. IV. xix. 1: qui comprehendit terram pugillo, and his definition of *tenet* (III. vii. 2), tenet enim qui alligat tenetur qui alligatus est. ‘Alligatus spiritu’ is twice used by S. Patrick, *Confessio* 43, *Ep.* 10, but may, of course, be explained as due to influence of Vulgate reading of Acts xx. 22, rather than to a knowledge of this Treatise:

II. Et eius Filium Iesum Christum qui cum Patre scilicet semper fuisse testamur ante originem saeculi spiritaliter apud Patrem inenarrabiliter genitum ante omne principium. Et per ipsum facta sunt visibilia et invisibilia, hominem factum, morte devicta in caelis ad Patrem receptum. Et dedit illi omnem potestatem super omne nomen caelestium et terrestrium et infernorum. Et exspectamus adventum ipsius, mox futurus iudex vivorum atque mortuorum.

For the notable omission of the Virgin-Birth, compare the Nicene Creed as it was recited at the Council of Chalcedon (Proctor’s *Book of Common Prayer*, p. 233, 1864). For the ascription of the Creation to the Word, see the same Nicene Creed: δι’ οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο, τὰ τε ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ, and Irenaeus’ treatise *passim*, especially I. xxii. 1 and III. xi. 1: Unus Deus omnipotens qui per Verbum suum omnia fecit et visibilia et invisibilia. Irenaeus refutes the idea that the world was made through angelic agency by the first chapter of S. John’s Gospel. For the coexistence of the Son with the Father, see Iren. III. xviii. 1: exsistens semper apud Patrem, and II. xxx. 9, semper autem coexistens Filius Patri. For the expression *ante originem saeculi*, compare the Nicene Creed in its Constantinopolitan form: πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων; and, Irenaeus, v. i. 1, where the Son is described as *ante omnem condi-*

tionem, and IV. xx. 3, where he wrote of the Holy Spirit, *erat apud eum ante omnem constitutionem*.

Spiritualiter (πνευματικῶς). For a commentary on this word, we may not look so much to I Cor. II. 14, πνευματικῶς ἀνακρίνεται, which refers to spiritual insight, not to spiritual existence, as to the Treatise of Irenaeus, where the Gnostic distinction of πνευματικός and ψυχικός was fundamental to the argument. See II. xxx., *passim*, where Irenaeus insists on the spiritual nature of the Demiurge, whom the Gnostics treated as psychic. In II. x. 3 there is a reference to *spiritalis et divina substantia*, in II. xxx. 7 to *in caelis spiritales conditiones*, and in II. xxx. 6 to *spiritalis enixio*.

For *inenarrabiliter genitum ante omne principium*: cf. Irenaeus IV. xxxiii. 11, *inenarrabile habet genus*. ‘*Inenarrabilis*’ was a favourite word of the Latin translator of Irenaeus, generally as a rendering of ἄρρητος (IV. xix. 1, IV. *Præf.* 4, I. xv. 5, V. vii. 2, I. i. 1). For ‘*gemitibus inenarrabilibus*,’ see S. Patrick, *Confessio*, § 25.

Et per ipsum facta sunt visibilia et invisibilia: cf. Col. i. 16 τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ ἀόρατα, the Nicene Creed πάντων ὁρατῶν τε καὶ ἀορατῶν ποιητήν, and Irenaeus *visibilia et invisibilia* (II. xxx. 9, and frequently elsewhere).

For *hominem factum*, cf. ‘*homo factus*’ Irenaeus (V. i. 1), and ἐνανθρωπήσαντα (Nicene).

For *morte devicta*, cf. Iren. V. xiii. 3: Tunc enim vere erit victa mors quando ea quae continetur ab ea caro exierit de dominio eius; and III. xix. 3: καὶ ἀποθνήσκειν συγγινομένου (i. e. τοῦ Λόγου) δὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐν τῷ νικᾶν (the Word assisting His manhood in the victory over death).

“*In caelis ad Patrem receptum*” = εἰς τοὺς οὐρανοὺς ἀνάληψιν (Iren. I. x. 1). The Roman Creed has ἀναβάντα, the Jerusalem and Nicene ἀνελθόντα; but Irenaeus, after Mark xvi. 19, ἀνελήφθη, which is rendered in the Latin version of his Treatise (III. x. 6) *receptus est in caelos*,

speaks of an Assumption rather than of an Ascension. Cf. III. 16, 9 qui etiam surrexit et assumptus est in caelos and III. 4, 2 Et resurgens et in claritate receptus, and III. xix. 3 ἀναλαμβάνεσθαι. Cf. Clement of Alexandria in Str. vi. 128 καὶ τὴν εἰς οὐρανούς ἀνάληψιν (quotation from the *Preaching of Peter*).

Et dedit illi omnem potestatem super omne nomen caelestium et terrestrium et infernorum ut omnis lingua confiteatur ei quia Dominus et Deus est Iesus Christus quem credimus. This passage, which can hardly be considered as an integral article of the Creed of S. Patrick, being an obvious scriptural proof, offers, however, a striking parallel to the Creed of Irenaeus given in I. x. 1, where the same passage from the Epistle to the Philippians (II. 9-11) is cited both in Greek and Latin, and in the latter with the same reading *confiteatur*. For *potestatem super omne nomen*, cf. Iren. IV. xix. 2: super omne initium et potestatem et dominationem et omne nomen—an obvious rendering of the passage Eph. i. 21, which is found in different forms throughout the treatise (see II. xxx. 9), as it was peculiarly suited to the arguments with the Gnostics. In fact, we might say that the theology of Irenaeus was inspired by Colossians i. 15-24, and Ephesians i. 3-23, the 10th verse of the latter passage giving Irenaeus the key-word for his Christology in ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι τὰ πάντα, an expression of which Justin Martyr may have taught him the full significance, the words “suum plasma in semetipsum recapitulans” occurring in a quotation from Justin (IV. vi. 3). The use of *credimus*, the plural, is another interesting link with the Eastern Creed, which was always plural, πιστεύομεν or ὁμολογοῦμεν, as distinguished from the Western forms, which began with πιστεύω or *credo*.

Et exspectamus adventum ipsius, cf. Creed of Irenaeus (I. x. 1) καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν ἐν τῇ δόξῃ τοῦ Πατρὸς παρουσίαν αὐτοῦ, *et de coelis in gloria Patris adventum*.

III. *Et effudit in nobis abunde Spiritum Sanctum, donum et pignus immortalitatis qui facit credentes et obedientes ut sint filii Dei et coheredes Christi quem confitemur et adoramus unum Deum in Trinitate sacri nominis.*

For *effudit in nobis abunde Spiritum Sanctum*, cf. Tit. iii. 5, 6 Πνεύματος Ἁγίου οὗ ἐξέχεεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς πλουσίως (Spiritum Sanctum quem effudit in nos honeste, Old Latin) and ἐξέχεε Acts ii. 34. But it is possible that S. Patrick became familiar with this expression from reading the Treatise of Irenaeus during his stay in the South of Gaul. *Effudit* was a favourite expression with Irenaeus: e.g. v. iii. 1, propterea benigne *effudit* semetipsum; III. x. 2, Hic idem Deus secundum magnam bonitatem suam *effudit* misericordiam in nos; and IV. xxxiii. 15, Semper eundem Spiritum Dei cognoscens etiamsi in novissimis temporibus nove *effusus est* in nobis.

Donum et pignus immortalitatis. Irenaeus speaks of the gift of the Spirit in III. xi. 8, τὴν δωρεὰν τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος εἰς πᾶσαν ἐξέπεμψε τὴν γῆν (cf. Acts II. 38). Irenaeus describes the Spirit as the pledge of our immortality in III. xxiv. 1, Communicatio Christi, id est, Spiritus Sanctus, arrha incorruptelae et confirmatio fidei nostrae et scala ascensionis ad Deum; and in v. viii. 1, where he discusses Eph. i. 13, signati estis Spiritu promissionis Sancto qui est pignus hereditatis nostrae (ἀρραβὼν τῆς κληρονομίας ἡμῶν) and writes: Pignus hoc habitans in nobis iam spirituales efficit et absorbetur mortale ab immortalitate, which might be summed up in S. Patrick's phrase, Pignus immortalitatis. In IV. xxxviii. 1, Irenaeus calls the Spirit "panis immortalitatis" (ἀθανασίας ἄρτος), cf. uti per Spiritum semper permanentem habeant vitam (v. vii. 2). The life-giving power of the Spirit was a favourite subject with Irenaeus. See v. ix. 1: Propter hoc autem et mortales tales dicti sunt Domino. Sinite enim, inquit mortuos sepelire mortuos suos quoniam non habent

Spiritum qui vivificet hominem. Irenaeus, like Patrick, also regarded the Spirit as the Author of man's *faith* (confirmatio fidei nostrae, IV. xxiv. 1) and *obedience* (sic nunc accipientes Spiritum in novitate vitae ambulemus obedientes Deo, V. ix. 1). For the phrase "donum immortalitatis," cf. Iren. IV. xiii. 4 "Amicitia Dei immortalitatis est condonatrix." For the connexion of the Holy Spirit with man's *inheritance* of the kingdom of God, cf. V. ix. 3 ἵνα μὴ ἄμοιροι τοῦ Θεοῦ Πνεύματος γιγνόμενοι ἀποτύχωμεν τῆς βασιλείας τῶν οὐρανῶν, and V. ix. 4 κληρονομηθῆναι δὲ εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν (ὑπὸ τοῦ Πνεύματος) *hereditate autem possideri in Regno a Spiritu potest*, i.e. inheritance in the kingdom may be acquired through the Spirit. He also represented the Spirit as worshipped by the Angelic host : cf. IV. vii. 4 Filius et Spiritus Sanctus quibus serviunt et subiecti sunt omnes Angeli. The concluding phrase *in Trinitate sacri nominis* is very expressive and reminds one of the passage in Irenaeus, III. xviii. 3 : *In Christi enim nomine subauditur qui unxit, et ipse qui unctus est, et ipsa unctio in quâ unctus est. Et unxit quidem Pater, unctus est vero Filius, in Spiritu, qui est unctio.*

These resemblances between the Creed of S. Patrick and the teaching of Irenaeus are so many and varied that they cannot be regarded as altogether casual. At the conclusion of his summary of the faith, Irenaeus significantly remarked : Et neque hae quae in Germaniâ sunt fundatae, Ecclesiae aliter credunt, neque hae quae in Hiberis sunt, neque hae quae in Celtis, neque hae quae in Oriente, neque hae quae in Egypto (I. x. 2) ; so that it is possible to regard Irenaeus as the chief authority on the faith among the Teuton and Celtic nations, and therefore all the more likely to be the master whose books S. Patrick studied at Lerinus and Autissiodorum (Auxerre), where one would naturally expect to find traces of the great Bishop of Lugdunum's work and doctrine.

There are other points in S. Patrick's writings which remind one of Irenaeus. Irenaeus was a more reserved and more dignified personality, a man of the highest culture and scholarship of his age; but he, like S. Patrick, regretted the *rusticitas* of his style, which arose in each case from the same cause, having to speak in the language of the Celts. In his preface the Bishop of Lugdunum wrote: "You will not expect from me who am domiciled among the Keltae, and am accustomed, on most occasions, to the use of their dialect, any display of rhetoric which I have not studied"; while Patrick bewails his literary defects in a more passionate outburst.

A comparison of the two passages set side by side may show some traces of the Latin version of Irenaeus in the wail of Patrick.

Irenaeus.

Praef. of Book I, §. 3.—Non autem exquires a nobis qui apud Celtas commoramur et in barbarum sermonem plerumque vacamus, orationis artem, quam non didicimus, neque vim conscriptoris, quem non affectavimus, neque ornamentum verborum, neque suadelam, quam nescimus, sed simpliciter et vere et idiotice (*ἰδιωτικῶς*) ea quae tibi cum dilectione scripta sunt cum dilectione percipies.

Patrick.

Conf. § 9.—Quapropter olim cogitavi scribere sed et usque nunc hesitavi; timui enim ne inciderem in linguam hominum quia non dedici, sicut et caeteri qui optime iura et sacras litteras utraque pari modo combiberunt, et sermones illorum ex infantia nunquam motarunt sed magis ad perfectum semper addiderunt. Nam sermo et loquela nostra translata est in linguam alienam. . . .

S. Patrick proceeds to deplore his *rusticitas*, and to invoke the clever and cultured rhetoricians "et vos dominicati (domini cati, 'clever sirs,' Bury) rhetorici audite." There was, however, a great difference underlying this superficial resemblance. For Irenaeus had been once a well-read and highly-finished scholar, but had been compelled to lay aside his studies for his pastoral and episcopal duties among the Celts; whereas it is very doubtful if S. Patrick ever acquired more than a smattering of Latinity and culture.

Another point of resemblance is the stress laid by both bishops on the Unity of the Church, if we may accept Tírechán's story of the conversion of Loigaire's daughters as embodying a true tradition. In that story the Saint put the question: 'Do ye believe in the Unity of the Church?' With this question compare the statement of Irenaeus in his denunciation of schismatics, IV. xxxiii. 7: Qui sunt inanes, non habentes Dei dilectionem, suamque utilitatem potius *considerantes quam unitatem ecclesiae* et propter modicas et quaslibet causas magnum et gloriosum corpus Christi conscindunt et dividunt. *ἐνότης* and *ἑνωσις*, or union and unity in the Church, are also the keynotes of the Ignatian Epistles (see Mag. 1, Phil. 8; Mag. 7, *Mag.* 13, *Polyc.* 8, Eph. 13, Smyr. 3), of which we find many echoes in the Treatise of Irenaeus; e.g. compare the passage on the Incarnation, III. xvi. 6, with the letters to the Ephesians, c. viii., and to Polycarp, c. iii.

Again, in V. ix. 3, the translator of Irenaeus used the word *qualitas*, Qualitatem autem Spiritus assumens conformis facta Verbo Dei,—which is also found in the *Confession* of S. Patrick in exactly the same sense of *character*: Opto fratribus et cognatis meis scire qualitatem; and the expression "pandamus Deum," 'explain God' (II. xxviii. 7), may throw a light on *Dei nomen expandere*, Conf. 14, which seems to mean 'explain' (cf. Lucr. I. 127: "rerum naturam expandere dictis,") rather than 'spread abroad.'

¹ With the substance and rhythmic form of S. Patrick's utterances in the scene with Loigaire's daughter in Tírechán compare the many stately passages of Irenaeus on the subject of God the Father and the Trinity throughout the Treatise. The Father is described as *δημιουργός, ποιητής*, and *τροφεύς* (I. x. 3). Of His hand we read in IV. xix. 2: in se continet

latitudinem et longitudinem et profundum deorsum, et altitudinem supernam universae conditionis. . . . Ipse est qui caelos implet et perspicit abyssos. . . . Manus enim eius apprehendit omnia et ipsa est quae caelos quidem illuminat, illuminat etiam quae sub caelo sunt . . . et in manifesto alit et conservat nos. The most poetical passage, perhaps, on the Creator is

(B.) The second part of this thesis is to prove that a creed can be constructed from that Treatise of S. Irenaeus, of which we have seen undoubted trace in the writings of S. Patrick, which will bear a remarkably close resemblance to the Constantinopolitan Creed, and therefore must point to an eastern rather than to a western source, and which shows that the formulation of the statement of the faith was the outcome of the Church's controversy with the Gnostics, to whose *regulae* Irenaeus refers (III. xi. 3 and xvi. 5).

Many statements of creed-like form are found in the Treatise, notably in I. x. 1, II. xxx. 9, III. iv. 12, II. xxxv. 4, iv. xxxiii. 7, which are, perhaps, the earliest recorded summaries of the rule of faith, and which Irenaeus is careful to state are based upon Scripture and Apostolic tradition: *Quoniam autem dictis nostris consonat praedicatio Apostolorum et Domini magisterium et Prophetarum annuntiatio et Apostolorum dictatio et Legislationis ministratio* (IV. xxxv. 4). Reading such statements with the additional light of the various passages in the treatise that explain and interpret them, we find that they can be arranged in the form of a creed that is of a distinctly Greek and Oriental cast, as distinguished from the Roman

II. xxx. 3, where Irenaeus demands of his opponents: *Quos caelos firmaverunt? quam terram solidaverunt? quas emiservunt stellas? vel quae luminaria elucidaverunt?* etc. Compare also III. v. 3: *Deum qui constituisset et fecisset omne humanum genus et per conditionem aleret et auget et constabiliret*, etc., and IV. i. 1: *qui dominatur omnium*. With these passages compare Patrick's description of Gob to the Irish princesses. An example of Irenaeus' views of the Trinity may be seen in IV. xxxviii. 3: "God is over all, the only Uncreated, Before all, and

the Cause of all. . . . The Father approving, the Son ministering and moulding, and the Spirit nourishing and enhancing, man advances gradually and ascends to the perfect, that is the Uncreated One." The coexistence of the Father and the Son (II. xxx. 9, II. xxv. 3), the Unity of the Godhead in Three Divine Persons are favourite themes of Irenaeus, and on these Patrick insists; while the former's discourse on light (IV. xiv. 1) may well have been the inspiration of the similar passage in Tírechán's notes.

and Western. This does not surprise us. For, although Irenaeus may have spent many years in Rome, his mind and thought, originally developed in a Greek circle, had been further trained by Justin Martyr and by studies in the Epistles of Ignatius, which helped him to grapple with heresies connected with the Person of our Lord, and to make the Incarnation the starting-point of his speculation (Harnack, *History of Dogma*, II. 262, Eng. Trans.).

The following is an attempt to reconstruct a creed from the scattered statements of faith found in this treatise:—

We believe in one God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible.

[Solus hic Deus invenitur qui omnia fecit, solus omnipotens et solus Pater condens et faciens omnia et visibilia et invisibilia et coelestia et terrena (II. xxx. 9). Unus et idem Pater (V. xvi. 1), fabricator coeli et terrae (IV. vi. 4).]

And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Only-Begotten Word, the Son of God, the Only-Begotten and First-Begotten of the Father, the Offspring of the Father, the Visible of the Father, Begotten before all worlds, the Son who is always coexistent with the Father, Who with the Father is the only Lord and God, Who with the Father is the God of the Living. The Light of men and Very God, By whom all things were made, Who descended for the salvation of men, Who became incarnate for our salvation, by the Holy Ghost, of the Virgin Mary, of the seed of David, and was made man, and was crucified under Pontius Pilate. He suffered for us; descended into the lower regions of the earth, rose again from the dead and ascended for the salvation of man; was taken up into heaven, and is at the right hand of God, and shall come again in the glory of the Father to raise all flesh and to judge all men; Whose kingdom is eternal.

[Verbum Unigenitus ipse est Iesus Christus Dominus noster (III. xvi. 6); *Μονογευής* (I. ix. 3); Filius Dei

(III. x. 1) ; Progenies eius, Primogenitus Verbum (V. xxxvi. 3) ; Ipse Unigenitus a Patre (III. xvi. 9) ; Pater qui generaverit Filium (IV. vi. 6) ; Visibile autem Patris Filius (IV. vi. 6) ; qui est ante omnem conditionem (V. I. 1) ; Semper autem coexistens Filius Patri (II. xxx. 9 and II. xxv. 3) ; cum Verbo suo iuste dicatur Deus et Dominus solus (III. viii. 3) ; Christus cum Patre vivorum est Deus (IV. v. 2) ; Lumen hominum (III. xvi. 4) ; vere Deus (IV. vi. 7) ; per quem facta sunt omnia (III. viii. 2) ; et hunc incarnatum esse pro salute nostra (III. xvi. 2) ; Ipse est qui descendit . . . propter salutem hominum (III. vi. 2) ; ex Virgine natum Filium Dei . . . ex Mariâ sit natus (III. xvi. 2) ; Spiritus Sanctus advenit in Mariam . . . quod generatum est, sanctum est, et Filius Altissimi Dei Patris omnium qui operatus est incarnationem eius (V. i. 3) ; Hominis filius factus (III. xvi. 3) ; homo verus (V. i. 1) ; De semine David (III. xvi. 3) : cf. Ignatius, *ad Trall.* ix., ἐκ γένους Δαβὶδ) ; crucifixi sub Pontio Pilato (II. xxxii. 4) ; passus sub Pontio Pilato (III. iv. 2) ; qui passus est pro nobis et surrexit propter nos et rursus venturus in gloria Patris ad resuscitandam universam carnem et ad ostensionem salutis et regulam iusti iudicii ostendere omnibus qui sub ipso facti sunt (III. xvi. 6) : cf. I. x. 1, et de coelis in gloria Patris adventum ; descendit ad inferiora terrae (IV. xxii. 1) ; et ascendit propter salutem hominum (III. vi. 1) ; assumptus est in coelos (III. xvi. 9) ; resurrexit a mortuis, qui est in dexterâ Patris (III. xvi. 9) ; Qui destruet temporalia regna et aeternum induet (V. xxvi. 2).]

And in one Holy Spirit, the Spirit of Life, the Spirit of the Father given by the Son, Who with the Son assisted in the Father's Creation, Who with the Father and the Son assists in the salvation of man, through whom men receive the image of the Father and the Son, Who with the Son is worshipped by the angels ; Who spake by the prophets.

[Spiritus unus (IV. vi. 7) ; Spiritus Sanctus (V. Praef.) ;

Spiritus vitae (III. ii. 8) ; Domino effundente Spiritum Patris (V. i. 1) ; Adest enim ei semper Verbum et Sapientia, Filius et Spiritus, per quos et in quibus omnia libere et sponte fecit (IV. xx. 1) ; Spiritu quidem operante, Filio vero ministrante, Patre vero comprobante, homine vero consummato ad salutem (IV. xx. 6) ; per omnia unus Deus Pater et unum Verbum, Filius et Unus Spiritus (IV. vi. 7) ; Per Spiritum imaginem et inscriptionem Patris accipiente (III. xvii. 3) ; Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, quibus serviunt et subiecti sunt omnes Angeli (IV. vii. 4) ; Propheticus Spiritus. Qui in prophetis quidem praeconavit (III. xxi. 4).]

And in one holy, Catholic, ancient, and apostolic Church, the baptism of regeneration for the remission of sins, the communion with the holy angels, the resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting. Amen.

[Unitas Ecclesiae (IV. xxxiii. 7) ; hanc fidem ecclesia et quidem in universum mundum disseminata deligenter custodit quasi *unam* domum inhabitans (I. x. 2) ; *antiquus* ecclesiae status in universo mundo et character corporis Christi secundum successiones Episcoporum (IV. xxxviii. 8) ; quibus apostoli tradiderunt ecclesias (V. xx. 1) ; sancta (IV. xxvi. 5) ; Catholica (see III. xi. 8, where the Church's relation to the four catholic spirits and covenants is discussed) ; per lavacrum regenerationem restituens (V. xv. 3) βάπτισμα ἀφέσεως ἁμαρτιῶν ; βαπτίσματος τῆς εἰς θεὸν ἀναγεννήσεως (I. xxi. 2 and 1) ; Filius hominis factus a Patre potestatem remissionis peccatorum accipiens (V. xvii. 3) ; cum sanctis Angelis conversationem et communionem (V. xxxv. 1) ; resurrectio carnis (II. xxxiii. 5 and *passim*), vitam, incorruptibilitatem, . . . gloriam sempiternam (I. x. 1).]

There are many expressions in this creed so constructed which were afterwards embodied in the Nicene, and of which we may note a few. The *oneness* of the Father and the *oneness* of the Son are emphasized in both. The Father is also in both the Maker of all things *visible and invisible* by

His Word the Only-Begotten. Again, Jesus is *Verus Deus* (Irenaeus), cf. θεὸν ἀληθινόν (Nicene); He is the *Lumen hominum*, cf. φῶς ἐκ φωτός (Nicene), and also Iren. II. xvii. 4; Si autem, velut a lumine lumina accensa, sunt Aeones a Logo. He is begotten of the Father in an ineffable manner. He became incarnate *for our salvation* (pro salute nostrâ (Irenaeus) = διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν (Nicene). He will return *with glory* (venturus in gloriâ Patris (Irenaeus) ἐρχόμενον μετὰ δόξης (Nicene)). The Holy Spirit is the Giver of Life (qui vivificet hominem (Irenaeus) = τὸ ζωοποιόν (Nicene)); Who spake by the prophets (qui in prophetis praeconavit (Irenaeus) = τὸ λαλῆσαν διὰ τῶν προφητῶν (Nicene)). And Baptism is connected with the Remission of Sins.

It is also a remarkable fact that the word *Homoousion*, which afterwards made its startling appearance in the Nicene Creed, is to be found in the description of the emanation theory of the Gnostics in the Treatise II. xvii. 2: Et utrum *eiusdem substantiae* existebant his qui se emiserunt an ex altera quadam substantia substantiam habentes. The expressions to which attention has been drawn in this paper are sufficient to prove that S. Irenaeus was, as Jerome described him, a Greek writer, *i.e.*, a writer who belonged to the Greek school of thought as distinct from the writers of the Latin school, and that if S. Patrick, whose literary remains and theology show many traces of the teaching of him who is so admiringly described by Theodoret as "lumen occidentalium Gallorum," and as he "qui Celticas gentes excoluit et illuminavit," and "qui Occidentem illustravit," could be said to be in any sense "the bearer of the *Roman idea*" (Prof. Bury, *Life of St. Patrick*, p. 221), he was certainly not so in the domain of the Roman theology of his own times, and still less so in the domain of the Roman superstition of a later age.

F. R. MONTGOMERY HITCHCOCK.

ISAEUS AND ATTIC LAW.¹

IN the preface to his great work, *L'Histoire du droit privé de la République Athénienne*, M. Beauchet enumerates the scholars who have made material contributions to the world's knowledge of Greek Law. His list contains representatives of France, Italy, Germany, Holland, and Austria—but none from the United Kingdom. Whether, indeed, the implied reproach is merited, is a question which I do not intend to discuss and answer here; in any case, it has been finally removed from the nations that speak English by Mr. Wyse's recent edition of the *Orations of Isaeus*. Unflagging industry, profound learning, piercing acuteness, independence of thought, are the characteristics of this work. It marks an era in the study, not merely of Isaeus, but of the whole subject of Athenian law; and by good fortune its one fault—the editor's personal animus against his author—detracts in no way from its merits or its usefulness. On the contrary, it enhances them. It has caused Mr. Wyse to make strikingly prominent the folly of accepting any statement of Isaeus without most careful scrutiny. What is true of Isaeus is true of all the other orators, and constitutes the peculiar difficulty and at the same time the peculiar attractiveness of the study of Athenian law.

¹ The *Speeches of Isaeus*, with Critical and Explanatory Notes by WILLIAM WYSE, M.A., late Fellow and Lecturer of Trinity College,

Cambridge; sometime Professor of Greek in University College, London. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1904.

In what follows I propose to consider certain legal questions raised by the speeches of Isaeus, and to consider them in connexion with Mr. Wyse's discussions. I regret that it will not be possible to do justice to the textual and grammatical merit of the editor, and must content myself with a mere expression of profound admiration for his work in these respects.

ORATION I.

In the speech *On the Estate of Cleonymus* we learn that the plaintiffs, who were the nephews and next-of-kin of Cleonymus, and had lived with him since the death of their former guardian Dinias, had nevertheless been disinherited by a will made in favour of the defendants, who were also related to the testator, but more distantly. Witnesses were called to prove that this will had been made when the plaintiffs were still under the care of Dinias, and as a result of a quarrel between their guardian and Cleonymus; and they now prayed to have it upset on the ground that Cleonymus had made an attempt, rendered futile partly by the interference of the defendants, partly by his sudden death, to withdraw it from the magistrate in whose charge it was deposited, with the object of destroying it. The defendants, on the other hand, maintained that he desired merely to make certain corrections in the will; and Mr. Wyse declares that 'various circumstances make this explanation more plausible than that put forward by' the plaintiffs (p. 177). Be that as it may—and, after all, the question is really of no particular interest—the discussion of the incident gives rise to the one important problem in Attic law which the speech contains. According to the rules of English law, a later will *ipso facto* revokes an earlier, and a will may be revoked by a codicil, which indeed differs

from a will in no essential respect (1 Vict. c. 26, s. 1). Did these rules hold good in Athens? The material for an answer to this question is very scanty, being practically confined to the statement of Isaeus here (§ 25) :

ἔτι δὲ καὶ εἴ τι προσγράψαι τούτοις ἐβούλετο, διὰ τί οὐκ ἐν ἐτέρῳ γράψας αὐτὰ γραμματεῖα κατέλιπεν, ἐπειδὴ τὰ γράμματα παρὰ τῶν ἀρχόντων οὐκ ἐδυνήθη λαβεῖν ; ἀνελεῖν μὲν γάρ, ὧ ἄνδρες, οὐχ οἷος τ' ἦν ἄλλο γραμματεῖον ἢ τὸ παρὰ τῇ ἀρχῇ κείμενον· γράψαι δ' ἐξῆν εἰς ἕτερον εἴ τι ἐβούλετο, καὶ μηδὲ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν ἀμφισβητήσιμον εἶναι.

On the strength of this statement it has been generally laid down that in Attic law a later will did not invalidate an earlier, but that the earlier will could be legally modified in a separate document. Mr. Wyse rejects both inferences. He draws attention to the curious wording of the sentence, and in criticising Lipsius' emendation (*ἄλλῳ γραμματεῖα τὸ παρὰ τῇ ἀρχῇ κείμενον*), he says :

My own belief is that the plain unmistakable statement which Lipsius introduces, is exactly what Isaeus was obliged to avoid, and that the sentence, so far from showing that the Athenians did not recognise the commonsense rule of Roman and modern law, is indirect evidence of the contrary.

Mr. Wyse's whole argument is most acute, and I follow him in condemning the absurd but prevalent practice of quoting the speeches of the orators as if they were the considered judgments of law lords. On the other hand, the fact that the speeches were preserved and published after delivery proves that deliberate falsification of the law must have been avoided, and that a careful comparison of the statements made with the facts of the case will yield us, as a general rule, trustworthy information. Furthermore, the Athenian dicast cannot have been so easily imposed upon as is usually assumed: he had plenty of practice in hearing cases, and his distrust of professional

speech-writers would tend materially to sharpen his care in listening to and weighing arguments. Nor is there any ground, I think, for believing that the dicasts habitually disregarded the law, as they are always accused of doing. No doubt they did so in political cases, like juries of every nation in the world's history; and I do not deny that they treated with scant courtesy the law which permitted a man to dispose by will of his own property as he liked. But it should be remembered that even the law allowed a by no means unlimited power of disposition, and that such a power has been very variously regarded by all legal systems. Hypereides states (6. 17) that according to the practice of the Athenian courts, οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ ἰδίῳν αἱ μὴ δίκαιαι διαθῆκαι κύριαί εἰσιν, and the view has a good deal to recommend it. Wills, then, being regarded with suspicion at Athens, it is reasonable to believe that their validity was hedged round with dangers unknown to us; and I am convinced by the facts of the present case that the destruction of a previous will was necessary for the validity of a later. Both sides acknowledged that Cleonymus desired to withdraw his will from the custody of the magistrate, though of course they interpreted his desire differently. At any rate, he meant to change his dispositions in some way; and I cannot resist the conclusion that he was aware of the rule that the original testament must first be destroyed. Isaeus states this definitely in the words ἀνελεῖν μὲν γάρ, κ.τ.λ.; and a falsehood here would have been a gross blunder. It has not been observed, I think, that the plaintiffs' whole case rests on the point of law. They maintain that Cleonymus sent for the magistrate *animo revocandi*: now, if he could have revoked the will in any other way, they would not have had a leg to stand on. In that case they would have attacked the will as procured by compulsion, or made in a fit of madness (see the significant words in § 11);

as it is, they nowhere deny that the will had really been made in a perfectly valid manner. In § 42 (τὰς δὲ διαθήκας, αἷς οὗτοι πιστεύοντες ἡμᾶς συκοφαντοῦσιν, οὐδεὶς ὑμῶν οἶδε κυρίας γενομένης) I cannot agree with Mr. Wyse, who would read κυρίως (also suggested by Katabaines) and translate with Caccialanza, 'nessuno può dire che sia stato fatto secondo le regole.' The context and the whole line of argument show that κύριος is here used as the contrary of ψευδεῖς in § 41. Again, there is certainly frequent reference to the fact that Cleonymus made the disputed will in anger, so that it was in a sense οὐκ ὀρθῶς βεβουλευμένη; but I think that this is done solely to make it probable that the plaintiffs' interpretation of their uncle's action in sending for his will is the right one. As regards the other inference—that the will could be legally modified in a separate document—I agree with Mr. Wyse in rejecting it. The two inferences seem to me to be mutually contradictory, for it is the merest quibbling to assert that the separate document is anything more or less than a new will. Besides, as Mr. Wyse points out, the second inference cannot be drawn from the orator's words; or rather, I should say, those words are a clear proof that the separate document would have been legally worthless. Otherwise Isaeus would have most carefully avoided any reference to it, because of the obvious *tu quoque* retort. But of two contradictories one must be true—a rule of logic that Mr. Wyse seems to me to violate; and in the present case the probabilities are in favour of the view that a later will did not invalidate a will which had been made in solemn form and deposited with the officials of the State.

ORATION III.

In his Introduction Mr. Wyse refers to one controversy in which this speech figures—whether, namely, the children

of Athenian parents born out of wedlock were or were not citizens. Most scholars answer this question in the affirmative, on the strength principally of the 'Αθ. Πολ. C. 42 :

μετέχουσιν μὲν τῆς πολιτείας οἱ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γεγονότες ἀστῶν. ἐγγράφονται δ' εἰς τοὺς δημότας ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἔτη γεγονότες. ὅταν δ' ἐγγράφονται, διαψηφίζονται περὶ αὐτῶν ὁμόσαντες οἱ δημόται, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ δοκοῦσι γεγονέναι τὴν ἡλικίαν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου, κἂν μὴ δόξωσιν, ἀπέρχονται πάλιν εἰς παῖδας, δεύτερον δ' εἰ ἐλεύθερός ἐστι καὶ γέγονε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. ἔπειτ' ἂν [μὲν] ἀποψηφίσωνται μὴ εἶναι ἐλεύθερον, ὃ μὲν ἐφίησιν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, οἱ δὲ δημόται κατηγοροὺς αἰροῦνται πέντε ἄνδρας ἐξ αὐτῶν, κἂν μὲν μὴ δόξη δικαίως ἐγγράφεσθαι, πωλεῖ τοῦτον ἡ πόλις, ἐὰν δὲ νικήσῃ, τοῖς δημόταις ἐπάναγκες ἐγγράφειν.

The inference usually drawn from this passage is well expressed by Beauchet (*op. cit.* I. p. 508) :—

Pour Aristote, comme pour Plutarque, il suffit donc à être né de deux citoyens. Si cette condition n'avait pas été suffisante et s'il avait fallu en outre le mariage des parents, Aristote, qui n'oublie rien, n'aurait pas manqué d'employer une autre formule, celle qui, par exemple, est citée si souvent par les orateurs, ἐξ ἀστῆς καὶ ἐγγυητῆς.

Mr. Wyse is right, in my opinion, in characterising this as 'a very insecure foundation'; and I would add the following considerations to his very acute argument. It seems to me that the wording of the passage just quoted from the 'Αθ. Πολ. cannot be reconciled with the current theory. Putting aside the question of the candidate's age, we find that what the demesmen had to decide was, εἰ ἐλεύθερός ἐστι καὶ γέγονε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, and Mr. Wyse argues that ἐλεύθερος here, as in several other passages, means not merely 'of free birth,' but of 'citizen birth.' His contention is proved beyond dispute by the fact that in case the rejected candidate's appeal was dismissed by the δικαστήριον, he was sold, according to Photius,

ὥς ξένος and not ὥς δοῦλος. That being so, it is obvious that γέγονε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους must imply the presence of some additional qualification besides Athenian parentage ; and we cannot resist the conclusion that this was birth in wedlock, especially when we meet such a phrase as occurs in Dem. 57. 69 κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ὁ πατήρ ἔγημε. The usual explanation of the phrase is that it merely refers to the clause μετέχουσιν μὲν τῆς πολιτείας οἱ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γεγονότες ἀστῶν. But in that case ἐλεύθερος means simply 'of free birth,' with absurd results, for which I refer the reader to Mr. Wyse ; or else the phrase is mere surplusage with κατὰ τοὺς νόμους as an unmeaning variant for ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἀστῶν, in which case the current theory falls to the ground, depending as it does on the presumption that the passage is written with complete accuracy of detail.

Furthermore, let us consider what consequences flow from the doctrine here disputed. It asserts that when M, an Athenian, had fruitful intercourse with W, an Athenian woman to whom he was not married, their son N was admitted by law to the jealously guarded honour of Athenian citizenship. If the intercourse took place without the consent of W's κύριος, M was guilty of seduction—a crime which in Athenian law was treated with the same severity as adultery (Thonissen, *Droit pénal de la République Athénienne*, p. 336). On the other hand, if the κύριος consented, we may assume that he was influenced by bribery—in other words, that he was a pander : and the infamy which this involved is painted by Aeschines in the speech against Timarchus. Consider, too, the facts mentioned by Dinarchus (1. 23) :

ὕμεῖς Μένωνα μὲν τὸν μυλωθρὸν ἀπεκτείνετε, διότι παῖδα ἐλεύθερον ἐκ Πελλήνης ἔσχεν ἐν τῷ μυλῶνι· Θεμίστιον δὲ τὸν Ἀφιδναῖον διότι τὴν Ῥοδίαν καθαριστρίαν ὕβρισεν Ἐλευσινίοις, θανάτῳ ἐζημιώσατε, Εὐθύμαχον δέ, διότι τὴν Ὀλυνθίαν παιδίσκην ἔστησεν ἐπ' οἰκήματος.

While this was the attitude of the Athenians towards the intercourse to which N owed his existence, we are asked to believe that they were so enlightened as to admit the innocent child to full political rights—and that, too, though they cut him off from family and phratry. The astounding reason given by Beauchet (*op. cit.* I. p. 523) for this rule is that the other course ‘eût même été une mesure impolitique, car la république devait se préoccuper de ne pas trop réduire le nombre assez restreint de ses citoyens.’ In other words, Athens winked in this respect at the seduction and prostitution of her daughters, in order that the population might be kept up!

In truth, the sole foundation for the prevailing doctrine stands confessed in Hruza's foot-note on p. 63 of *Die Ehebegründung nach attischem Rechte*: ‘Wäre eheliche Abstammung Voraussetzung des Bürgerrechtes, Aristoteles hätte dies an dieser Stelle hervorheben müssen.’ It is not necessary at this time of day to prove the folly of an *argumentum ex silentio*; and in any case it would be far more in accordance with probability to say that, if birth in wedlock had been unnecessary, Aristotle could not have failed to emphasize such an anomaly.

In his notes on § 3 Mr. Wyse deals briefly with the very difficult question, whether an Athenian husband was, as such, the *κύριος* of his wife. Hruza (*op. cit.*, p. 71) and Beauchet (*op. cit.*, I., p. 216 ff.) answer the question in the negative; and their arguments have been adopted by Mr. Beasley (*Classical Review*, xix., p. 231) and the late Dr. A. H. J. Greenidge (*Law Quarterly Review*, 1905, p. 360), whose statement of the new view I quote, but without his references:—

At Athens we find a system which it is difficult to regard as a descendant of a type of marriage which asserted any kind of proprietorship over the wife. In this system the original family bonds are never dissolved, and may at any moment be asserted. The

wife is little more than a loan to her husband by her proper *κύριος*. On the advent of a new *κύριος* an existing marriage might be dissolved. There is only one case (probably not a common one) where the husband himself becomes the *κύριος*. This is the case where he has been adopted by the wife's father. His power in this case is based solely on the fact that he has become a member of *her* family; and, once he has become *κύριος*, he may cease to be a husband, for he may assign his wife in marriage to someone else. . . . The clan system here was more rigorous than at Rome, for it did not permit any woman to escape its grasp.

The process of reasoning by which this result is reached may best be given in the words of Hruza (*op. cit.*, p. 69):—

Würde die Ehe dem Manne die Gewalt über die Frau in die Hand geben, so müssten wir überall in seiner Hand die Attribute dieser Gewalt finden. Er müsste ausschliesslich das Recht haben, seine Frau an einen anderen zu verheirathen und es dürfte niemand das Recht haben, sie ihm wegzunehmen. Wir finden aber vielfach das Gegentheil bezeugt.

I propose to consider the cases by which Hruza, Beauchet, and Greenidge support their view—there are not many of them.

(1) Dem. 57. 41: the speaker's mother was first married to one Protomachus:—

ὁ Πρωτόμαχος πένης ἦν· ἐπικλήρου δὲ κληρονομήσας εὐπόρου, τὴν μητέρα βουλευθεὶς ἐκδοῦναι πείθει λαβεῖν αὐτὴν Θούκριτον τὸν πατέρα τὸν ἐμόν, ὃνθ' ἐαυτοῦ γινώριμον, καὶ ἐγγυᾶται ὁ πατήρ τὴν μητέρα τὴν ἐμὴν παρὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτῆς.

(2) Isaeus 2. 6–9; Menecles was married to the speaker's sister, but their union was unfruitful.

ἔδειτο οὖν ἡμῶν δοῦναι χάριν ταύτην αὐτῷ, ἐκδοῦναι ἄλλῃ αὐτὴν μετὰ τῆς γνώμης τῆς ἐαυτοῦ. καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐκελεύομεν αὐτὸν πείθειν αὐτὴν περὶ τούτων· ὃ τι γὰρ ἂν ἐκείνη πεισθῇ, τοῦτ' ἔφαμεν ποιήσιν. καὶ ἐκείνη το μὲν πρῶτον οὐδ' ἠνέσχετ' αὐτοῦ λέγοντος, προϊόντος δὲ τοῦ χρόνου μόλις

ἐπείσθη· καὶ οὕτως ἐκδίδωμεν αὐτὴν Ἑλiew Σφηττίω, καὶ ὁ Μενεκλῆς τὴν τε προῖκα ἀποδίδωσιν αὐτῆς, . . . καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια, ἃ ἦλθεν ἔχουσα παρ' ἐκείνου, καὶ τὰ χρυσίδα, ἃ ἦν, δίδωσιν αὐτῇ.

(3) Dem. 30. 7: Timocrates was married to the sister of Onetor, who

ἐβουληθη μὲν Ἀφόβω δοῦναι τὴν ἀδελφὴν, ὁρῶν τῆς θ' αὐτοῦ πατρῶας οὐσίας καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς οὐκ ὀλίγης αὐτὸν κύριον γεγενημένον, προέσθαι δὲ τὴν προῖκ' οὐκ ἐπίστευσεν, . . . ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ἀδελφὴν ἔδωκε, τὴν δὲ προῖκ' αὐτῷ Τιμοκράτης ἐπὶ πέντ' ὀβολοῖς ὀφειλήσειν ὡμολόγησεν.

(4) Plut. *Per.* c. 24:

ἦν μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ γυνὴ . . . Εἶτα τῆς συμβιώσεως οὐκ οὔσης αὐτοῖς ἀρεστῆς, ἐκείνην ἐτέρῳ βουλομένην συνεξέδωκεν.

(5) Dem. 41. 3:

οὗτος ὁ Πολύευκτος, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἦσαν αὐτῷ παῖδες ἄρρενες, ποιεῖται Λεωκράτη . . . οὐσῶν δ' αὐτῷ δύο θυγατέρων ἐκ τῆς τοῦ Λεωκράτους ἀδελφῆς, τὴν μὲν πρεσβυτέραν ἐμοὶ δίδωσι, καὶ τετταράκοντα μνᾶς προῖκα, τὴν δὲ νεωτέραν Λεωκράτει. τούτων δ' οὕτως ἐχόντων, διαφορᾶς γενομένης τῷ Πολυεύκτῳ πρὸς τὸν Λεωκράτη, ἀφελόμενος ὁ Πολύευκτος τὴν θυγατέρα δίδωσι Σπουδία τουτῷ.

(6) Isae. 3. 64:

τὰς μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πατέρων ἐκδοθείσας καὶ συνοικούσας ἀνδράσι γυναῖκας, ἂν ὁ πατήρ αὐτῶν τελευτήσῃ μὴ καταλιπὼν αὐταῖς γνησίους ἀδελφούς, τοῖς ἐγγύτατα γένους ἐπιδίκους ὁ νόμος εἶναι κελεύει, καὶ πολλοὶ συνοικοῦντες ἤδη ἀφῆρηνται τὰς ἑαυτῶν γυναῖκας.

These, I think, make up the complete list of passages that have been quoted in favour of the doctrine under discussion; I add to them a parallel from Amorgos.

(7) Dittenberger S. I. G. II.² No. 828, p. 685:

ὁρος χωρίων [ἐν . . .] ρει καὶ οἰκίας καὶ κ[ήπων] τῶν Ξενοκλέους τω[ν κει]μένων ἐμ Φυλινχεῖαι καὶ τῶν ἐπικυρβίων ἐνεχύρων ὑποκειμένων, συνεπιχωρούσης τῆς γυναικὸς Ἑρατοκράτης καὶ τοῦ κυρίου Βρουκίωνος.

Of these passages (1), (2), (3), and (4) are regarded as proving that the husband was not his wife's κύριος, because he could not give her away in marriage to another husband. It is impossible, however, to draw this conclusion from them. The husband could not marry his wife to another man, because one constituent part of every valid marriage was the ἐγγύησις of the bride by her κύριος. This ἐγγύησις, which will be fully discussed below, was far more important than our betrothal, from a legal point of view. Hruza, in fact, even goes the length of saying that ἐγγύησις constituted marriage (*op. cit.*, § 4). Consequently, unless we are prepared to admit and prove the existence of polyandry in Athens, it is evident that the prior union must be terminated before the new marriage was formed; and as the husband was *ex hypothesi* κύριος *quâ* husband, he ceased to hold that position the moment the marriage was dissolved. The words ἐκδοῦναι in (1) and συνεξέδωκεν in (4) present no difficulty. This verb was regularly used in reference to the provision of a dowry, and bore no legal significance. When marriages, as in these cases, were dissolved by mutual consent, the ex-husband would naturally be willing to assist the lady in obtaining a new spouse by behaving generously in the return of her dowry.

So far, then, we find no ground for the doctrine that the husband was not, as such, his wife's κύριος. The fifth passage, however, is the *pièce de résistance* of those who hold this view. It is taken to imply that the wife's father could, at his own good will and pleasure, take her away from her husband. This would be a portentous privilege; and although it belongs, I believe, even at the present day to the wife's father in Japan, we should not attribute it to Athens without distinct proof, or at any rate strong probabilities in its favour. The probabilities, however, are all against it. In the first place, it implies a paternal power to interfere *de iure* in the affairs of adult male

citizens, which is against the whole trend of Athenian legislation. From the time of Solon this trend was in the direction of a steady denial of the principle that the paternal relationship permitted one Athenian citizen to dominate another. Individualism was the note of Athenian democracy; and it asserted itself in the matter of the *patria potestas* as strongly as elsewhere. Again, if the wife's father possessed the power attributed to him, it would be natural to find it designated by some technical term. Every other legal act in connexion with marriage is so designated: what unexplained mercy has excepted one of such importance as this? It would have given the wife's father, in countless cases, an absolute power over his son-in-law, by threatening him both with the loss of his wife and with the necessity of returning her dowry: and yet the act had no name, and there was no suit for the abuse of the power. As to the latter point, it is true that the passage quoted above from Dem. 41. 4 continues as follows:—

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτ' ἡγανάκει θ' ὁ Λεωκράτης, καὶ δίκας ἐλάγχανε Πολυεύκτῳ καὶ τουτῷ Σπουδία, καὶ περὶ πάντων ἡναγκάζοντ' εἰς λόγον καθίστασθαι, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον διελύθησαν, ἐφ' ᾧτε κομισάμενον τὸν Λεωκράτην ἅπερ ἦν εἰς τὴν οὐσίαν εἰσενηνεγμένος, μήτε κακόνουν εἶναι Πολυεύκτῳ, τῶν τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐγκλημάτων ἀπηλλάχθαι πάντων.

Here is Hruza's comment (*op. cit.*, p. 70, n. 48):

Leokrates war über die Sache sehr erzürnt, und erhob eine Klage, die durch einen Vergleich beendet wurde. Der Vergleich ging dahin, dass Leokrates alles erhalten solle, was er in das Haus (er war auch adoptiert worden) eingebracht hatte; er bekam also nur, was ihm ohnehin gebührte; hätte er die Wegnahme der Frau anfechten können, wäre der Vergleich, sollte man meinen, für ihn günstiger ausgefallen.

It seems to me that this reasoning is entirely groundless. If Polyseuctus possessed the power to take his daughter

from Leocrates, the words of Demosthenes can only mean that Leocrates brought an action against him for abuse of this power—in which case, by the way, it is impossible to see why Spudias was joined as a defendant. Now, if the right of Polyeuctus was indefeasible, as Hruza says it was, why, in the first place, did Leocrates do so foolish a thing as bring an action unknown to Athenian law? And, in the second place, why does Demosthenes say *ἡναγκάζοντο*? On Hruza's principle there was obviously no room for compulsion in the case of Polyeuctus. One thing at least is evident from *ἡναγκάζοντο*, namely, that Leocrates had some good ground of action against his former father-in-law and his supplanter; and, as I have just said, this could only have been the abuse of his power by Polyeuctus, if such power really belonged to him. But we are left in no doubt on the question. A comparison of § 4 with §§ 27, 28 will show that Leocrates was making no attempt to recover his wife, but that his sole object was to recover his property, and that he succeeded in doing so. Before the dissolution of the marriage Leocrates had presented his wife with clothes and personal ornaments amounting in value to over a thousand drachmæ; and it was to recover this amount that he threatened Polyeuctus and Spudias with legal proceedings. Whether an adopted son who had married his adoptive father's daughter could reclaim, on the rupture of the marriage and adoption, moneys expended in this way, is a nice and much-disputed point in Attic law; Leocrates at any rate succeeded in compelling their restitution. It is very curious that Hruza and those who think like him should find support for their theory in this fact, as if it proved that Leocrates had come out second best in the whole affair.

The truth is that, so far as this passage is concerned, the whole theory now under discussion rests upon the assumption that the word *ἀφελόμενος* is a technical term

of Attic law used here with rigid accuracy. For such an assumption there is not, and could not be, any proof whatever. The word is nowhere else used as a legal term ; and even if it were, this would not prove that it is here employed with technical purport. We might as well assume that Spudias broke off the marriage on the strength of the words in § 27 : ὁ μὲν γὰρ Σπουδίας, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί, παρὰ τοῦ Λεωκράτους ἔχουσιν τὰ χρυσία καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια τὴν γυναῖκα ἔλαβεν. What really happened was, no doubt, that the daughter of Polyeuctus dissolved the marriage by way of ἀπόλειψις at her father's instigation and with his support before the archon, his activity on the occasion giving the speaker ample justification for the use of the word ἀφελόμενος. Furthermore, if this suggestion is correct, it shows that Hruza is wrong in saying that Leocrates had no action for the loss of his wife. A remedy was provided by Athenian law in the δίκη ἀπολείψεως, which in the present case could well be described, with practical though not with legal accuracy, as a suit against Polyeuctus. The existence of this suit is indeed denied by some scholars, but rightly maintained by Beauchet, Caillemer, Ciccotti, Van den Es, Meier, Schömann, and Lipsius.

With regard to the sixth passage quoted above, the discussion by Mr. Wyse shows clearly that no certain inference can be drawn from it. The seventh passage does undoubtedly introduce us to a lady whose husband was not her κύριος : but Amorgos was not Athens, and besides we have an inscription from the same place which contains the words ὑπὸ Νικησαρέτης τῆς γυναικὸς τῆς Ναυκράτους καὶ κυρίου Ναυκράτους (Michel, no. 1370).

So much for the evidence adduced in favour of the theory that at Athens the husband was not, as such, his wife's κύριος ; we have now to consider what may be argued on the other side. First of all, we find that in this speech

Xenocles is the *κύριος* of his wife Phile. Hruza tries to explain this case away, but his elaborate argument is totally demolished by Mr. Wyse in two lines (p. 285). Again, as Mr. Wyse points out, Aphobus would have become *κύριος* of Demosthenes' mother if he had married her (Dem. 27. 55, 56; 29. 47, 48); and husbands appear as *κύριοι* at Tenos (*Inscr. Jurid. Gr.*, I., p. 92) and Thespiae (*ib.*, p. 280, 80). The scholiast on Aristoph. *Eq.* 969 says definitely: οὕτω γὰρ προκαλείσθαι εἰώθασιν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἡ δεῖνα καὶ ὁ κύριος, τουτέστιν ὁ ἀνὴρ. Beauchet's comment on this is so astounding that to obtain credibility I must quote his very words (I., p. 220): "Quant à la scholie d'Aristophane, on ne peut non plus la prendre en considération quand on voit le scholiaste donner pour exemple d'une personne pourvue d'un *kyrios* Smykithès, qui était un homme."

The peculiar procedure employed when a wife divorced her husband supports strongly the view that the latter was her *κύριος*. In all other cases a woman could deal with the archon only through her representative; in this case, so far as our meagre information goes, she appeared in person. Beauchet indeed argues that this was true only in the cases (according to him very few) in which her husband was her *κύριος*; but in order to maintain this theory, which of course is needed to support his assumption with regard to the whole *κύριος* question, he is forced to throw the ancient authorities overboard. The sole positive evidence that he can adduce is the thirtieth speech of Demosthenes:

"Si l'on se reporte maintenant au premier plaidoyer de Démosthène contre Onétor, où il est souvent question d' *ἀπόλειψις*, on n'y voit jamais que la femme doive agir elle-même en divorce contre son mari. On y rencontre, au contraire, une phrase qui paraît bien significative et dans laquelle l'orateur parle de 'ces hommes qui

ont fait inscrire le divorce par devant l'archonte'" (§ 17 τὴν ἀπόλειψιν οὗτοι πρὸς τὸν ἄρχοντ' ἀπεγράψαντο).

He also refers to §§ 31 and 26; but it is obvious that these passages are all compatible with the view that the woman herself appeared. They show merely what we might have assumed without them—that she was supported by her relatives. Furthermore, if we construe the phrase in § 17 strictly, it proves the point for which I am here arguing, since οὗτοι is plural. There is no reason to think that the lady had more than one κύριος; and if he could have acted at all, he would have acted by himself. Another consideration also makes it probable that a wife, divorcing her husband, appeared in person. The seclusion of Athenian women, the extreme disfavour with which their taking a personal part in litigation was regarded, and the otherwise universal custom of representation, were so well known in antiquity, that the notion of a personal appearance in divorce cases could hardly have arisen unless it were founded on fact; while, on the other hand, it never would have been the fact had it not been the case that the husband was the κύριος of his wife.

In his note on § 4, l. 5 (p. 289), Mr. Wyse discusses and rejects "the novel theory propounded by Hruza in the first volume of his *Beiträge zur Geschichte des griechischen und römischen Familienrechtes*; approved by Gilbert (*Staatsaltert.*, I², p. 209) and Beauchet (I., p. 120 *sqq.*); rejected by Müller (*Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des attischen Bürger- und Eherechts*, p. 746 *sqq.*)" with regard to the true meaning of ἐγγυᾶν and ἐγγύησις when used in connexion with an Athenian marriage. I propose here to reproduce Mr. Wyse's statement of the case, and to discuss it.

Mr. Wyse says :—

“ According to Athenian law an ἐγγύησις was a necessary condition of a valid marriage, except in the case of an ἐπίκληρος (see VI., 14. 9, 10 n.). The most important effect of marriage, i. e. the legitimacy of the issue, depended on the propriety of the ἐγγύησις. . . . This ἐγγύησις was a contract concluded between the suitor and the person who, as κύριος, had authority over the woman. . . . The aim of Hruza's book is to refute the old-established view, that this contract was a betrothal or affiancing. . . . He refuses to believe that Athenian law made the legitimacy of children depend on a betrothal, which is, and must be, *ex vi termini*, merely an act preparatory of marriage. 'Εγγύησις, he says, since it produced the consequences of marriage, constituted marriage, and should be compared with the *consensus nuptalicius* of Roman law, not with the *consensus sponsalicius*. This criticism involves more than a definition of words. Hruza proceeds to argue that the ἐγγύησις was the beginning of the married state, and that it was the first and most important ceremony of the wedding-day, as a rule preceding immediately the marriage festivities and the home-bringing of the bride. He even doubts whether betrothals existed in Attica. Further, with regard to the etymology, ἐγγυᾶν is said to be identical with δίδοναι and ἐκδίδοναι, ἐγγυῶμαι corresponding to ἐγγυῶ as δανείζομαι to δανείζω, and ἐγγύησις is rendered by 'giving away' (*Vergebung*). ”

In other words, Hruza maintains that ἐγγυᾶσθαι means 'to accept as one's wife' (cf. *Beiträge* II., p. 178, “ So ist auch ἐγγυᾶν eine Frau zur Ehe geben, ἐγγυᾶσθαι eine Frau sich zur Ehe geben lassen ”), and that γαμεῖν is simply 'to consummate a marriage' already contracted. As one might expect, these translations produce a dire result in many passages. In Dem. 28. 15 f. the orator speaks of his father as on his deathbed: τούτῳ τὴν ἐμὴν μητέρα ἐγγυῶν, and thereby, if Hruza be right, making the lady a bigamist. Hruza maintains, indeed, that polygamy was permitted at Athens—but this was polyandry.

It is obvious, however, from Dem. 27, 17 that Cleobule was *not* married to Aphobus, for Demosthenes says there: τὴν μὲν τοίνυν προῖκα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἔχει λαβών. μὴ γήμαντος δ' αὐτοῦ τὴν μητέρα τὴν ἐμήν, ὁ μὲν νόμος κελεύει τὴν προῖκ' ὀφείλγειν ἐπ' ἐννέ' ὀβολοῖς, ἐγὼ δ' ἐπὶ δραχμῇ μόνον τίθημι. There could be no more complete disproof of Hruza's statement (*Beiträge* I., p. 40): "Wäre die ἐγγύησις nur ein Verlöbniß, so müsste später noch die Ehe durch einen besonderen Akt begründet werden. Davon ist aber nichts überliefert. Der γάμος (γάμοι) spielt keine andere Rolle als ... unsere Heimführung." If this were so, Demosthenes must have written ἀποπέμψαντος, instead of μὴ γήμαντος. The phrase he does use shows that Attic law regarded the γάμος as absolutely essential, and as absolutely distinct from the ἐγγύησις.

When Hruza wrote his essay, he overlooked Plato Legg. 923 D, where, among the rules laid down for testators, we find the following: ὅτῳ δ' ἂν τῶν υἱέων ὑπάρχων οἶκος ᾗ, μὴ νέμειν τούτῳ τῶν χρημάτων, θυγατρὶ τε ὡσαύτως ἢ μὲν ἂν ἐγγεγυημένος ὥς ἀνὴρ ἐσόμενος ᾗ, μὴ νέμειν· ἢ δ' ἂν μὴ, νέμειν. His attention was afterwards drawn to this fatal passage; and, in the second volume of his *Beiträge*, he says (p. 181): "Das Futurum ἐσόμενος ist ganz wohl auch dabei am Platze: εἶναι ἀνὴρ ist ein Zustand, etwas der Ehestiftung als Rechtsakt Nachfolgendes, daher der Gebrauch des Futurums in Bezug auf den Zeitpunkt der Vergebung gerechtfertigt." Beauchet is less courageous, but more ingenious. He explains the rule as follows (I. p. 125); "Si, outre les fils, il y a des filles, le père doit faire à celles-ci une part dans le surplus de sa succession, à moins qu'elles n'aient été déjà données en mariage, car alors elles sont pourvues, quoique n'ayant pas reçu de dot; or, pour désigner la fille ainsi donnée en mariage, Platon parle uniquement de l'engyésis." But even if

ἐγγυᾶσθαι had the meaning attributed to it by Hruza and Beauchet, this would have been an astounding method of saying, 'to a daughter already married.' Besides, the phrase undeniably contemplates the lapse of a certain period of time between the *ἐγγύησις* and the consummation of the marriage; and how is this to be reconciled with the view held by Hruza, that the two events took place on the same day—a view that he cannot help holding? Plato is really carrying out the principle laid down in 743 A: *ἀγαθὸν δὲ ὄντα διαφερόντως καὶ πλούσιον εἶναι διαφερόντως ἀδύνατον*. Hence he ordains that a testator shall, as far as possible, leave no wealth to children already provided for, and excludes not only sons who already possess an *οἶκος*, and sons and daughters who have another lot of land in the country, but even daughters who are unmarried, provided they are betrothed. That daughters already married should be excluded, he would have called self-evident: their marriage, indeed, had severed them from their father's family (776 B). If it be objected to this that the betrothed girl might be jilted, and would then be without any provision, I refer to what Plato himself says in connexion with the laws regulating intestacies (925 D, E).

The origin of Hruza's whole theory is probably the celebrated formula, *ἐξ ἀστῆς καὶ ἐγγυητῆς γυναικός*: "c'est donc," says Beauchet (I. p. 125), "que l'engyésis suffit pour la formation du mariage, sinon on n'aurait pas manqué d'indiquer les autres conditions requises pour la légitimité des enfants." This is a complete misunderstanding of the case. The formula indicates the conditions of legitimacy with the utmost fullness. When an Athenian swore that his child was born *ἐξ ἀστῆς καὶ ἐγγυητῆς γυναικός*, he implied that the child's mother was his wife, that she was an Athenian citizen, and that he had married her with the consent of her *κύριος*. The use of *ἐγγυητῆς* does not

mean that the ἐγγύησις was the marriage—it means that, unless the κύριος formally approved of the union, the children would not be legitimate. It used to be the law of England that the marriage of a minor without the consent of his or her κύριος was void; but this did not mean that the consent of the κύριος *ipso facto* enabled the parties to cohabit as man and wife. In the formula just quoted, we find sometimes γαμετῆς instead of ἐγγυητῆς (*e.g.* Isae. 12. 9). This is regarded (Beauchet, I., p. 125) as proving “que la femme ἐγγυητή est considérée comme mariée aussi bien que celle qui est γαμετή.” But in that case we should meet with γαμετή much oftener than we do. The law required children to be born in lawful wedlock, which would indeed usually be the case where the woman was γαμετή; but as a γάμος might take place without the consent of the κύριος (a γάμος ἀνέγγυος), and, as his consent was essential for the legitimacy of the children, it was safer to say ἐγγυητή. It is for this very reason that we meet ἐγγυᾶσθαι, instead of γαμεῖν, as frequently as we do: litigants were concerned solely with the legal validity of the marriage. The misleading effect of this finds an excellent illustration in Beauchet’s reference (I., p. 125, n. 5) to [Dem.] 59. 52–4, and the use of ἐγγυᾶν all through that passage, which refers to a law forbidding anyone to give in marriage to an Athenian an alien woman under a false pretence that she is his daughter. But of course that use is due to the fact that the ἐγγύησις was the part transacted by the κύριος, and so the part at which the law aimed and for which alone Phrastor had, or could have, an action.

In Herodotus 6. 57 we read: δικάζειν δὲ μούνους τοὺς βασιλέας τοσάδε μοῦνα, πατρωιούχου τε παρθένου πέρι ἐς τὸν ἰκνέεται ἔχειν, ἣν μή περ ὁ πατήρ αὐτὴν ἐγγυήσῃ. Stein’s note on ἐγγυήσῃ is, “im Testamente über ihre Hand verfügt hat”;

but I think the phrase will also cover a disposal *inter vivos*. In neither case can ἐγγυᾶν mean more than 'betroth.' If the act took place during the father's lifetime, it would be doubly absurd to say that the kings decide who shall marry a *virgin* heiress, *unless she is already married*. If the phrase means, 'unless her father should ἐγγυᾶν her to some man in his will,' no argument is required to show that the verb can mean no more than 'offer in marriage.' I take this opportunity of remarking that everyone regards 'betroth' as merely a loose translation of ἐγγυᾶν, for which, I think, 'offer in marriage' would in most cases be more strictly correct. 'Betroth,' however, possesses the great advantages of being convenient for purposes of translation, and of marking clearly that ἐγγύησις was *not* marriage; and so may very well be retained, as there is no real danger of misleading students by its use.

Other arguments against Hruza's theory will be found in Mr. Wyse's note, and therefore need not be repeated here; but I should like to say a few words, in conclusion, on the comparison which Hruza institutes between ἐγγύησις and the *consensus nuptalicius* of Roman Law. Ulpian says, no doubt, "nuptias non concubitus sed consensus facit" (Dig. 35, 1, 15); but though the consensus of the various parties concerned was necessary for the validity of the marriage, it did not constitute the marriage. In order to be operative, it must be followed at once by the delivery of the woman into the possession of the man (see Poste, *Gaius*, ed. 4, p. 46; Sohm, *Institutes of Roman Law*, p. 475; Girard, *Droit romain*, ed. 4, p. 151), usually solemnised by a formal *deductio in domum mariti*. Just so in Athens: the ἐγγύησις between the κύριος and the intending husband did not *per se* constitute marriage: it was necessary that it should be followed by a beginning of cohabitation, usually solemnised by a γάμος. If Hruza's theory were

correct, Aphobus would have become the stepfather of Demosthenes as soon as he had seized Cleobule's dowry (a very practical ἐγγυῶμαι); but he did not enter into this relationship to the orator, because there was no γάμος and no cohabitation.

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(To be continued.)

ON A THEORY OF GEOMETRICAL PROPORTION.

AN interesting view of geometrical proportion may be obtained by taking 'rectangle,'¹ and the relation of equality between rectangles, as the indefinables, the results of the first three books of Euclid being assumed. The definition is not so fundamental or so comprehensive as Euclid's, which is not confined to so-called Euclidean geometry, but is applicable to any manifold that can be generated by logical series. Even in Geometry the theory here considered is unable to escape from incommensurables and limits as soon as we leave rectilineal figures. At the same time the rectangle theory is very elegant and simple as far as it goes; and it is of some interest to follow it out, and to show that all purely rectilineal propositions in Bk. VI. may be accurately interpreted by means of it.

All the propositions in Bk. V. may be proved from geometrical properties of rectangles.² I shall only mention the more striking ones. From the nature of the case the order of proof is different from Euclid's. The statement of VI. 16 becomes our definition of proportion³; VI. 4, 5,

¹ This was suggested by a remark of Mr. Robert Russell.

² I.e., so far as they refer to straight lines. Some of these are noticed by Prof. Purser (*Elementary Geometry*, p. 91). He refers to Nixon. The present paper adds proofs by this method of the Transitive Law, and of the fundamental propositions in Book VI.

³ The statement of Euclid VI. 15 might be taken as the definition of proportion; but the geometry would be less simple, as the angle of the triangle is variable. We should have to prove that $a : b$ is one-valued. It is therefore better to take a definite angle, and a right angle is the most convenient.

and 15 are then proved by using III. 35, 36. No doubt everything could be based on I. 43 (which is the fundamental theorem for proving equality between rectangles), and the circle need not be introduced; but the argument would be clumsy.

I.

Symbolism. (ab) means the rectangle under the straight lines a and b . The bracket is used to avoid hasty algebraic inference. The symbol is commutative, i.e., (ba) stands for the same thing.

Definition. $a : b :: c : d$ means $(ad) = (bc)$.

Alternando is merely an expression of the Commutative Law $(ad) = (bc) = (cb)$, $\therefore a : c :: b : d$.

Invertendo. $(ad) = (bc)$ implies $(bc) = (ad)$, i.e., the symbol = stands for a symmetrical relation.

Componendo. $(ad) = (bc)$ implies $(a+b)d = b(c+d)$. (II. 1).

It is unnecessary to go through all the propositions in Bk. V, as most of them are obvious. The *Transitivity* of proportion (V. 11) is, however, important and not self-evident. If $a : b :: c : d$ and $c : d :: e : f$, then $a : b :: e : f$. This amounts to proving that if $(ad) = (bc)$ and $(cf) = (de)$, then $(af) = (be)$. It depends on this simple rider:—ABCD is a rectangle, X_1 a point in AB, Y_1 in BC such that AX_1OX_2 , CY_1OY_2 are complements about the diameter BD. Then if P, Q are points on X_1Y_2 , X_2Y_1 such that PQY_2X_2 are concyclic, PQY_1X_1 are also concyclic. Let $AX_2 = a$, $AX_1 = d$, $BX_1 = b$, $CY_1 = c$, $OP = f$, $OQ = e$, and the result follows. (See note on p. 208.)

Ex aequali is a particular case of the Transitive Law combined with *alternando*. For given $a : b :: x : y$, $b : c :: y : z$, then $a : x :: b : y :: c : z$; therefore, by the Transitive Law $a : x :: c : z$; therefore $a : c :: x : z$. Euclid apparently did not notice this. *Ex aequali* may also be proved directly. If $(ay) = (bx)$, and $(bz) = (cy)$, then $(az) = (cx)$. This follows

by using the converse of I. 43. (ay) and (bx) may be placed so as to be complements with reference to one rectangle, and (bz) and (cy) with reference to another in such a way that (az) and (cx) are immediately seen to be equal.

We have next to consider what is meant by ratio between areas. This really requires a new definition—a fact which shows the superiority of Euclid's treatment. If A, B, C, D are four areas, then $A : B :: C : D$ when $A = (ax)$, $B = (bx)$, $C = (cx)$, $D = (dx)$, and $a : b :: c : d$. *Alternando, Invertendo, Componendo*, and the Transitive Law are obviously true; and all the propositions follow without difficulty. Ratios between solids can be defined in like manner.

II.

In order to apply these principles, four fundamental propositions are required. They are easily proved by the first three books of Euclid:—

(α) If two triangles are equiangular, the sides opposite the equal angles are proportional. For by III. 35 or 36, if a, a' are opposite equal angles, and likewise b, b' ($a b' = a' b$): i.e., $a : a' :: b : b'$.

(β) The converse of (α) proved similarly.

(γ) If two triangles containing equal angles have the sides about the equal angles reciprocally proportional, they are equal in area. In other words, if $\angle C = \angle C'$, and $(ab) = (a'b')$, then the triangles $ABC, A'B'C'$ are equal in area. Place the triangles so that the angles C and C' coincide: let A' fall on AC and B' on BC . Produce AC to B_1 and BC to A_1 , so that $B_1C = BC$, $A_1C = A'C$. Then $AC \cdot CB_1 = B'C \cdot CA_1$: therefore A_1B_1AB' are concyclic; therefore the angle $CAB' = B'A_1B_1 = CA'B$ (I. 4); therefore $A'B$ and AB' are parallel and the triangle $CA'B' = CAB$.

(δ) The converse of (γ) proved similarly.

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The proof and interpretation of all the propositions in Bk. VI. (except 33) are now obvious. No incommensurables or limits are used, as everything has been reduced to a question of equality of rectangles. One advantage in this method is that it preserves the organic connexion between the doctrine of proportion and the rest of geometry. But when we go deeper, we find that Euclid's theory of proportion (when properly modified) is more satisfactory and preserves even better the continuity of the science. In fact, it may be shown that the *whole* of Euclido-Cartesian geometry can be based on a definition of a one-dimensional series by means of Euclid's theory of proportion, with the help of some simple axioms.

REGINALD A. P. ROGERS.

NOTE.—The proof I have given of the Transitive Law is unnecessarily complicated, as it follows at once by using I. 43 and its converse.

REVIEWS.

M. Tulli Ciceronis Orationes pro Sex. Roscio, de Imperio Cn. Pompei, pro Cluentio, in Catilinam, pro Murena, pro Caelio, recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit ALBERTUS CURTIS CLARK, Collegii Reginae Socius. Oxonii e typographeo Clarendoniano. 1905.

THIS work is the full fruition of the Anecdote, "The Vetus Cluniacensis of Poggio," which was noticed in HERMATHENA last year (xiii. 589-593). It marks a very important advance in the criticism of all the Orationes with which it deals. In the *Pro Sex. Roscio* and the *Pro Murena*, the St. Victor codex (Σ), being, as it is, a faithful copy of the eighth-century Cluni manuscript (No. 496 in the Cluni Catalogue), is henceforth to be regarded as the chief authority; and the Wolfenbüttel (W) and Munich (s) codices are relegated to an inferior position, the former as being a copy of a copy of Σ , and the latter as being a highly worked-up manuscript which has incorporated all kinds of various readings into its text. Even the process of incorporation,¹ Mr. Clark, with his usual thoroughness, has succeeded in tracing; and we conceive that it was with no little legitimate pride that he has been able to say, "Annis abhinc decem in maiore mea Miloniana editione codicem (s) hoc modo conflatum esse docui: illud numquam speraveram ut mihi aliquando concederetur huius rei primos medios postremos gradus manifesto deprehendere." Subsidiary assistance can be derived (1) from a Laurentian MS. (A), usually known as Lagomarsini 10, written by Johannes Arretinus in 1415, for which he used the Cluniacensis or a rough copy of it, but corrected in many cases what he found written, as he was a good scholar; and (2) from a MS. of Perugia (Π) written in 1416.

For the *Pro Cluentio*, *st* (*t* = Lag. 12) have to resign their primacy; and their place is taken by the marginal notes of Σ , which

¹ Principally through cod. Laur. (Gadd.) xc. sup. 69 (Ψ).

were derived from the Cluniacensis, and by M (Lag. 64), the parent of all the "codices mutili."¹ Among many subsidiary helps may be mentioned the fifteenth-century codex S. Marci 255 (b), also known as Lag. 6.

For the *Pro Caelio*, the marginalia of Σ come to our assistance where the great Paris manuscript 7794 seems defective. See the remarkable example in § 24 referred to in our notice (p. 591) of Mr. Clark's Anecdoton. These marginalia are more in accordance with the palimpsests and the quotations from the grammarians than P is. The striking way in which Σ has confirmed the conjectures of so many scholars, notably Madvig's, leads Mr. Clark to the very just exclamation, "Habes, lector, unde artis criticae obtretractores vanitatis convincas." In this speech we can get some further assistance from certain copies of P,² also from b and Ψ.

The introduction of the *Pro Caelio* into this volume shows that the order observed by Mr. Clark is not chronological; 'in orationibus Tullianis' (he says) 'alia ratio temporum est, alia codicum, et hanc sequi editori expeditissimum est.' But with the exception of the *Pro Caelio*, none of the speeches here edited is later than 63 B.C. It is, however, rather from the fact that the codices of the *De Imperio Cn. Pompei* are much the same as those of the *Pro Milone* that Mr. Clark treats of that speech here. The celebrated Harleian 2682 is here again facile princeps,³ supported by the Erfurtensis (E), and the Tegernseensis (T) in the latter part (which is all it now contains). In the former part, the Hildisheimensis (t)—see Müller, Introd. p. xx.—which was copied from T when intact, supplies its place. E and T come from the same original; and every reader of Mr. Clark's writings knows how satisfactorily he has shown that the copyist of E used either H or a copy of H.⁴ The Parcensis, as being full of glaring interpolations, may be disregarded.

The *Catilinarian Orations* bring forward the other Cluni MS. 498, which happily is still extant. Following a hint of Dr. Reid's that there was an important MS. of the Verrines in Lord Leicester's library at Holkham, Dr. Peterson, Principal of M'Gill University, Montreal, studied the MS.; and in a very interesting Anecdoton, published in 1901, proved that this MS. was that noted in the Cluni Catalogue.⁵ In addition to portions of the Verrines, this MS. also contains portions of the Catilinarian orations and of those for Ligarius and Deiotarus. This being a ninth-century MS., and closely connected with the tenth-century Ambrosian (A) and the thirteenth-century Laurentian (a), to both of which it is slightly superior (e.g.,

¹ See notes to §§ 102-107: 127-132: 149-154: 176-182. These lacunae have been filled up in Σ from the Cluniacensis: see Mr. Clark's Anecdoton, p. xiii.

² Cod. Gemblacensis (g), Erfurtensis

(e), Harleianus 4927 (h).

³ E.g., see the notes to §§ 13, 14.

⁴ See his edition of the *Pro Milone*, pp. xxxviii-xlii.

⁵ Anecdota Oxoniensia, Classical Series, part ix.

§ 22, it alone gives the right reading *duint*), becomes the 'signifer' of α , the best family.¹ Mr. Clark also uses Harleian 2716, saec. x-xi (*l*), and Cod. Coll. Corp. Christi, saec. xii (*o*). The former belongs, in all but Or. iv, to the β class; in iv to the γ class: while *o* belongs to the γ class, but has corrections from α . On the whole, Mr. Clark seems to estimate γ higher than β .

Another instrument of criticism besides the mss. is used for the first time, to a considerable extent, in this edition. It is the celebrated law of the clause-endings in Cicero's orations, which has recently been set forth with such vigour and success by Prof. Th. Zielinski of St. Petersburg.² There can be no doubt whatever that the law holds generally for Cicero's speeches—and for the more formal of his Letters, we think, also. Accordingly, Mr. Clark adopts Ernesti's *vellet* for *voluerit* of the mss. in *Sex. Rosc.* 99, and himself reads *laevos se* in § 124 for *laesos se esse* of the mss. (V 2 for P 2). In *Imp. Pomp.*, § 14, *tardavit* of E is preferred on these grounds to *relardavit* of the other mss., including H; while, again, for a similar reason, *cognostis* of H, in § 42, is preferred to *cognovistis* of E: and in § 68 *nemo esse* of HE gives place to *esse nemo* of T. Yet Mr. Clark is slow to abandon the mss. to get correct clause-endings, e.g., he retains *non videatur* in *Sex. Rosc.* 56, not even mentioning Kayser's *non videtur*; cp. also § 142, where he rightly does not accept Richter's *splendor* for *splendore*: and in *Cat.* iv. 23 resists the temptation to read *esse filium* for *filium esse*. Strong manuscript authority must, in general, rank of more importance than considerations of rhythm.

Mr. Clark has introduced many emendations of his own into the text, which are all characterized by the same careful wisdom which appears in his discrimination of the different manuscripts. It is, of course, only possible to mention a few of these emendations. In *Sex. Rosc.* 107, for *iudiciuae* (Σ , *indiciue* A) he reads *indici causa*. It may, perhaps, be questioned whether we should not read *indicinae* (or *indiciuae*),³ a form found in Apuleius, *Met.* vi. 8 and vii. 25. In *Sex. Rosc.* 141 for *bona fortunas vestrasque nostras*, Mr. Clark reads, with considerable probability, *bona fortunas arasque nostras*, comparing Dom. 109, Sest. 145; *aras* might readily have looked like *ūras* (*vestras*). *Pomp.* 6, for *nunc quid agendum sit illi* (so H: om. *cett.*) considerate, Mr. Clark reads *ipsi*. The confusion is not uncommon. Perhaps, however, *illico*. In 54 he

¹ Nohl's division of the mss. of the Catilinarian Orations into three classes α , β , γ is universally accepted. To α , in addition to the mss. named above, are to be added Cod. Vossianus (saec. xi) and the celebrated Harleianus 2682 (*h*).

² *Das Clauselgesetz in Ciceros Reden.* 1904.

³ So Haupt in the passages of Apu-

leius. Vliet compares Corp. Gloss. Lat. ii. 80. 43 *indicium* $\mu\eta\nu\tau\rho\acute{o}\nu$. If *indici* is retained, it might be preferable to read *indici nomine* rather than *causa*. From the second passage of Apuleius (*ob indicinae praemium*), it would appear that something might be said for Müller's conjecture *praemium* for *partem*.

is right in ejecting *insula*, retaining *parvula* (aut tam parvula insula H: tam parva insula *cett.*); *insula* arose from the unusual diminutive. The notoriously difficult passage in *Clu.* 39 Ac tum Oppianici causa crimen hoc Asuvianum cum testibus multis tum vero *illius* (Σ: indicio *cett.*) *Avillii* comprobabatur; in quo *adlegatos* (so Σ: the other mss. have something similar) Oppianici nomen primum esse constabat, &c., is treated with great boldness and success by Mr. Clark. For *Avillii* he supplies *testamento*; and he supposes *adlegatos* to have arisen from a gloss *a legato*, i.e., a *testamento*: so that the passage would run, *tum vero illius testamento comprobabatur: in quo Oppianici nomen primum esse constabat*. The phrase *nomen primum* certainly points to a will. In 192 mulierem quandam Larino atque illam usque a mari supero Romam proficisci, &c., for the difficult *atque illam*, Mr. Clark reads *advolare*, comparing §§ 18, 25.¹ The mysterious *K* (found in *a* in *Cat.* i. 26) Mr. Clark interprets as *Kaput*. One would fain believe that Dr. Peterson (see his *Anecdoton*, p. xii, note) is right in supposing it to stand for *Kalumnia*: cp. also ii. 4, where a gloss *calumnia* appears to have intruded itself into the text. In *Cat.* ii. 19 Mr. Clark excellently adds *ordinum* after *concordiam*. In *Muren.* 8, si tibi tum cum peteres *consulatum adfui*, *nunc cum*, &c., the words *cons. adfui nunc* have very slender ms. authority. Lag. 9 conjectures *favi* for *adfui*, ingeniously indeed. Mr. Clark reads *studui*, comparing Quintilian xi. 1. 68 se *studuisse* petitioni Sulpicii contra honorem Murenæ. In *Mur.* 67 for *remove in* (so Σ: remove ac s: om. *cett.*) Mr. Clark reads *remove vim*, comparing §§ 58 and 59. In *Cael.* 60, quonam modo ille furenti fratri suo consularis restitisset qui consul incipientem furere atque *conantem* sua se manu interfecturum audiente senatu dixerit, Mr. Clark reads *tonantem*—a most excellent suggestion.

It is interesting to watch with admiration the various stages of the stately building which Mr. Clark is erecting in his edition of Cicero's Orations; and we feel sure that, when it is completed, it will be found to be so firmly grounded, so well compacted, and so strong in its structure, that it will without difficulty resist all the attacks of increasing learning.

¹ Possibly *ab Apulia*. Larinum was on the borders of Samnium and Apulia. There is a slight misprint in the statement of Müller's reading. It

should be *Larinatem illum*, not *Larinatim illum*. It was Gulielmus, we think, who first suggested *illum*.

Origin and Influence of the Thoroughbred Horse. By W. RIDGEWAY, Disney Professor of Archæology in the University of Cambridge. Cambridge Biological Series. 12s. 6d. net.

WHEN we take up a book by Professor Ridgeway, we expect to find him maintaining a thesis, paradoxical perhaps, but at any rate supported by immense learning and research, by an accumulation of facts from the most diverse and unlikely sources, and presented with such persuasive power that we are for the time completely carried away by the enthusiasm and obvious conviction of the author. It is true that reflection may suggest now and then that the strength of Professor Ridgeway's position depends largely on special pleading: we have an uneasy feeling in the present case that possibly a scientist with a tithe of Professor Ridgeway's historical and archæological equipment could make out a decided case against his theory.

The subject chosen by Professor Ridgeway is one that affords ample scope for speculation. The story of the Arab is wrapped in an apparently impenetrable mystery.¹ We do not know at the present time where the best breed is to be found. Explorer after explorer has made the attempt to solve the mystery, but without success, though there is still a possibility of its partial solution at least, as there remains a large tract of pasture-land lying in the south towards the Great Desert to be explored. But even then, further knotty problems would still remain. How did the Arab get into such a closed district as Arabia at all? And if he was developed from some wild species within its borders, there remains the further question of support, in a land so poorly supplied with water and pasture. If he is, as Tweedie and Darwin hold, a composite breed, how are we to conceive the Arabs of that primitive time capable of bringing it to such a state of improvement?

Professor Ridgeway has not here, as in his book dealing with the origin of the Achæans, kept the reader in the dark as to the solution he adopts, almost up to the last moment. Early in the work he informs us that his purpose is to prove, by a concatenation of negative and positive arguments, that the original home of the Arab was not, as is generally supposed, Arabia, but Libya.

The problem is thus ultimately the origin of the so-called Arab and animals of the same characteristic type—not the special question of the origin of the English thoroughbred. The source of the latter, is of course, well known. All the horses now on the turf trace their pedigree directly to one of the three famous steeds—Byerly Turk, the Darley Arabian, and the Godolphin Barb—

¹ The 'double mystery' is concisely dealt with in the Times Lit. Supplement, September 9, 1905.

introduced into England in the reigns of William III, Anne, and George II, respectively. It is not generally known exoterically that the word 'thoroughbred' has a strict technical signification. "By thoroughbred [as Mr. Brickwell informs us] is meant a horse or mare whose pedigree is registered in the Stud-book kept by Messrs. Weatherby, the official agents of the Jockey Club. The first attempt to evolve order out of the chaos which reigned supreme was made in 1791, with the publication of an Introduction to a General Stud-book."

Such, then, are the conditions of the problem to which Prof. Ridgeway directs his immense erudition and skill. The author's originality is obvious on every page: he dissents, and gives cogent reasons for dissenting, from the most important authorities on the question, including Gilbey, Tweedie, Darwin, Palgrave, and Blunt. Stated generally, his argument may be divided into the negative attempt to prove that Arabia was not the original home of the so-called Arab, and the positive theory that this Arab, as well as all modern horses possessing the characteristic Arab qualities of docility, speed, and endurance, are to be traced to Libyan progenitors.

The negative side of Professor Ridgeway's argument was adumbrated as long ago as 1877 by Hehn, whom apparently Professor Ridgeway overlooks. Hehn points out the absence of the horse from Egyptian monuments prior to the beginning of the eighteenth century B.C., and the fact that the earliest references to this animal in Hebrew literature do not carry us further back, and concludes thence that the Semitic peoples, as a whole, were indebted for the horse to the lands of Iran. In this latter remark he is in direct opposition to Professor Ridgeway; and it would probably be from this standpoint that a criticism of the new theory would proceed. Hehn, in agreement with Professor Ridgeway, also points to the fact that literature shows no trace of the horse as indigenous to Arabia prior to about the beginning of the fifth century A.D. Professor Ridgeway supports his negative argument with quotations from Strabo and Eratosthenes; but these quotations, we venture to think, will not bear the weight required of them. Strabo informs us that the horse is not to be found in Nabat, which lies well to the north; while Eratosthenes merely says that horses, mules, and swine are not found "in the extreme parts to the south facing Ethiopia." Thus nothing is said of the large tract known as Arabia Felix. If horses existed here—and we have no proof of the opposite—it is obvious that the Egyptians could have obtained them from here; and it is just as probable that Lybia derived them from Egypt as vice versa.

The argument on the positive side is of a more cumulative nature; it extends, in fact, over 230 pages, and has its sources practically throughout the length and breadth of the planet. As

the result of his elaborate researches—the magnitude of which one can scarcely realize—Professor Ridgeway has reached the conviction that all the horses of the modern world are to be traced back to two distinct types—the Libyan, and a race of slow, thickset animals which had spread across northern Europe and Asia. We have a modern wild representative of the latter in Prejvalsky's horse still existing in the Altai tablelands. The North-European-Asiatic horse was of a white or dun colour; while the original colour of the best Libyan type was the bay. It is interesting to note that by far the greater part of the winners in modern races are of this colour—a fact which goes to prove that development under modern conditions tends more and more to restore the original hue. We may see from the Homeric poems that the Greek horses were of the heavy northern type: their colours are almost invariably dun or white; while we have the significant fact that one of the coveted steeds of Æneas was a bay. "He was," the poet says, "bay as to all the rest of him, but in the forehead marked with a white star round like the moon." It is worthy of note that these are just the characteristics of the very best so-called Arab breed.

Thus we have in the Troad, prior to 1000 B.C., a superior type of horse, which for its speed and general excellence was regarded as divine; and we know that it possessed the colour and 'blaze' of the best Arab type.

It is proved by the Egyptian monuments that horses possessing these characteristics made their appearance in Egypt not long prior to 1500 B.C.; and the crucial question is, where did they come from? Professor Ridgeway is convinced that they came from Libya; but the evidence is, we think, of the slenderest nature. It consists mainly of the account given by Odysseus (14, 267) of the part he took in a piratical expedition to the mouth of the 'River of Egypt.' We are told that the natives came out against the pirates in great force:—

*πλῆτο δὲ πᾶν πεδίον πεζῶν τε καὶ ἵππων,
χαλκοῦ τε στεροπῆς.*

Professor Ridgeway concludes that the district here described is Libya, and supports his conclusion by a chariot found at Thebes, which is not of Egyptian manufacture, but probably of Libyan. "It is, therefore, probable," he concludes, "that the Egyptians obtained their light, four-spoked chariot from the Libyans, and along with it the horse." Though the argument is frail, we think, at this crucial point, yet Professor Ridgeway is by no means dependent upon it alone. He makes some further points, and very telling ones, in favour of the Libyan origin. He shows the undoubted significance of the fact that the fabled winged steed,

the Pegasus, was said to have come from Libya. In the fourth Pythian, too, the Libyans are expressly stated to be a race of horsemen. An inscription, moreover, of the first half of the first century A.D., set up in honour of a famous jockey, proves that no less than thirty-eight out of forty-two victors were North African horses.

Professor Ridgeway, at the end of his notable third chapter, in which he passes in review the breeds of historic and prehistoric times, advances the sweeping generalization that Libyan blood has influenced the horses of Asia as far as China, and those of Europe as far as Ireland: the Connemara pony, he says, exhibits the characteristic marks of the Libyan strain; and, on the ground of this royal origin, he holds that the recent introduction of hackney blood into this country is a fatal mistake due to historical ignorance. Again, it is to the blending of the bay horses of North Africa with the dun or white of Asia and Europe that are due all the improved breeds of the world: it is to the Libyan strain that the bracelets and blaze so constantly found in domestic horses are due: it was the Libyans who first began to ride on horseback, and it was from them that the Greeks first learned the art.

Not the least interesting part of the book is that devoted to the influence of the horse on history. Here at least we are on certain ground. He points out that all the races which have, in turn, held the mastery in Asia, Africa, and Europe have owed the preservation of their liberty or the extension of their power to the possession of horses, whether they were Egyptians, Syrians, Medes, Libyans, Persians, Scythians, or Macedonians; that the lack of horses till after the conquest of Gaul was the weakness of the Romans; that the acquisition of the horse by the Arabs was a main factor in the spread of Islam; that the possession of horses enabled the Normans to conquer at Hastings; that the possession of the great war-horse (of which, by the way, King William's horse in College Green is a fair sample) was the sure means of defending one's country or conquering that of others in the Middle Ages; that even when armour was discarded, light cavalry became a most formidable engine of war. Marlborough's victories were due largely to his cavalry. Nor has the introduction of the automobile endangered the position of the horse. Recent wars have proved that never was there greater need of horses to draw artillery or to carry infantry. "It is, therefore, imperative," he adds, "that this country should not shut its eyes to the need of breeding horses suitable for war; and that special steps should be taken to preserve our good breeds, and not permit them to be contaminated and destroyed by rash experiments in breeding."

HUGH CANNING.

Elementary Geometry based on Euclid's Elements. By PROFESSOR FREDERICK PURSER. Dublin: Hodges, Figgis, & Co. 1905.

It is not often that so proficient a master of both scientific method and philosophy as Professor Frederick Purser condescends to write a text-book on elementary mathematics; and when we are thus favoured, we naturally expect that teachers as well as students will receive valuable hints. In the present case we are not disappointed. The *Elementary Geometry* before us was written, as the author states, "not to furnish a new edition of Euclid as such, but rather to present his subject-matter as a coherent system of geometrical truth, in which the student may recognise, not only the cogency, but the natural sequence of the propositions, and thus learn the true spirit of geometrical method, alike in its naturalness and its rigour." The work contains, in four books, most of the substance of the first six books of Euclid. The author takes the intuitional or Kantian point of view; and consistently with this, in describing the simpler geometrical entities, he omits for the most part the pretentious word 'definition.' The objects of intuition, just because they are *individua*, cannot be logically defined—they can only be exemplified; whereas the more modern doctrine (Peano, Whitehead, and others), which accurately defines geometrical objects by means of series, classes, and relations, is of course out of place in an elementary text-book, and is not essential to a scientific knowledge of the properties of space. Mr. Purser, however, aims as far as possible at strict demonstration, without entering into a detailed analysis of those elementary spatial properties that are intuitively obvious. The intuitional view, indeed, treats geometry as a branch of applied mathematics, in which experience may be used up to a certain point to supplement the want of logical precision. This method is, we believe, desirable in general education, and is to the ordinary sense more elegant than the stricter one. At the same time advanced students should never lose sight of the fact that a non-intuitional logical foundation for geometry has been made possible by the theory of relations.

In these degenerate days some people are quite unnecessarily abandoning Euclid's elegant, simple, and profound treatment of ratio. We would ask them to ponder on Leibniz's remark—which is very likely true—that the unprogressive state of Chinese civilization was due to their never passing from mensuration to rational geometry. The Celestials are in the majority nowadays; but the friends of Professor Purser could have prophesied that no book written by him would favour such a retrograde movement. He follows almost entirely Euclid's doctrine of ratio, which he discusses in a clear and simple manner, intelligible to anyone who knows what is meant by saying that one bottle of wine is greater

than, equal to, or less than another. We think that he might have gone further, and proved *alternando*, *invertendo*, &c., for the general case, instead of proving them only for straight lines and rectilineal areas. It seems a pity not to explain why the term 'equality of ratios' is used, as it means something very different from geometrical equality, which he defines by the possibility of superposition. The connexion between them is entirely symbolic; the term 'equality' may be used whenever we have a symmetrical ($a = b$ implies $b = a$), transitive ($a = b$, $b = c$, implies $a = c$), and reflexive ($a = a$) relation. The relation of ratio satisfies these conditions.

The work as a class text-book would be improved by the addition of a number of simple riders. The discussion on equality (pp. 3-5) might have been relegated to an appendix, as in its present position it would surely discourage a beginner. There are also some Kantian phrases which are out of place in the body of such a work. The typographical structure of the book is by no means perfect; and several of the figures are inaccurately drawn. We hope that a second edition will soon be required in which these defects may be corrected.

At the end of the book Professor Purser adds a lucid explanation of the fact that the same symbolism is used for geometrical ratios as for fractions and numbers. This forms what he calls the transition to trigonometry, and is of much interest and importance.

To teachers we strongly recommend the book, owing to its excellent logical arrangement, and the clear view which it gives of the unity of geometrical method.

R. A. R.

Index Verborum Propertianus, by J. S. PHILLIMORE. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

PROFESSOR PHILLIMORE'S text of Propertius was reviewed in No. xxviii. of HERMATHENA, by the late Mr. L. H. Gwynn, *vir multis multum deflendus*. The present volume is an index to that text, which is based chiefly on N. It is to be regretted that the Oxford editors have not seen fit to append an index, however summary, to the different volumes of this series. Prof. Phillimore's text of Propertius will derive no small value from this companion volume. The principle observed in the compilation is to catalogue the chief MSS. readings, and to avoid recording the infinite number of conjectures, unless they are such as have strong claims to validity. It is an index *verborum*; the context is ignored. This procedure

makes the volume a handy compendium, but throws some extra trouble on the student.

I have not noticed many divergences from the readings of Professor Phillimore's text.

In iv. 4. 47, he now favours *purgabitur*, the reading of Huleatt adopted in the Corpus. The reading *pigrabitur* suggested in HERMATHENA (1902) seems closer to the MSS., and, as a rarer word, was more likely to be corrupted than *purgabitur*. In Apuleius, *Met.* 9, ϕ V read *repugnato*, F *repignato* for the correct *repigrato*. In the same poem, l. 50, *semper* is hardly right; *cespes* or *vepris* is preferable. In l. 55, Mr. Housman's *spatierne* deserves mention, though the editor's *sin hospes patria metuar* is excellent. *Addita* iii. 9. 13 hardly deserves to be indexed as correct. The same remark holds of *fama*, Beroaeldus' reading (though it is catalogued without comment); *palma* G is strongly supported by iv. 10. 4, *non juvat e facili lecta corona iugo*. *Gladios* iv. 3. 34 does not seem sound; *radios* G is perhaps better. *Sit* iii. 12. 8; A. Palmer's *sis* deserved mention. *Animo* ii. 12. 18, the editor's conjecture, is extremely harsh, and cannot commend itself in the face of *alio* N. In iii. 13. 39, Professor Phillimore adheres to the MSS. reading. Dr. Postgate's *crinigerique dei* is good, if there is a reference to Apollo here. A. Palmer read *corniger atque deus vaccam*, seeing here a mention of Pan. To me there does not seem to be any reference to a deity. We want a picture of the bull and the ram leading home the herd and flock. I have thought of *bos piger Arcadii vaccam* pastoris in aulam, dux aries saturas ipse reducit oves. This suggestion is, of course, far from the MSS., but the sense required is something like that. In iv. 5. 20, the editor adheres to his conjecture, given in the foot-note *exorabat opus verbasco blanda peruncta, saxosamque forat (sedula culpa!) viam*. I am certain that Palmer's *exorabat opus verbis ceu blatta terebrat, saxosamque forat sedula talpa viam*, will seem more attractive, if not more probable, to most readers of Propertius. In iv. 4. 68, *se furiis* (J. Lievens) is catalogued without comment: O has *nefariis*. The editor reads *non* with O in 2. 29. 42, a reading which surely is not to be preferred to *nox* G. iii. 16. 9, *postus* is hardly an improvement on *pulsus*, FLDV; *portus* N. Palmer's *tortus* is better. In the same ode, Palmer's emendation *et cuius sit*, read in the Corpus for *exclusis fit*, does not deserve to be ignored. The same remark holds of Palmer's *Cassiopes litus* iii. 17. 3. In iii. 21. 23, the conjecture in G *mea lintea* seems to deserve more attention than it has received. In iii. 22. 3, the labours of Palmer and Haupt have established *Dindymis et sacra fabricata e vite Cybellæ*; it is futile to abide any longer by the corrupt reading. In i. 13. 18, I would suggest *externo* for *extremo*, comparing ii. 32. 31. i. 16. 29 does not seem to be much improved by the punctuation *multa prius; vasto labentur flumina ponto Annus et inversas duxerit ante vices*.

Perhaps *aucta* for *multa* might be a help; i.e., 'the sea shall feed the rivers, and the year go backward.' I would also suggest *lento* for *longo* in iv. 9. 19, comparing iv. 4. 10, and *culta* for *cauta* in iv. 11. 86: the step-mother does not show her malice on her wedding-day, when the lectus genialis is exhibited.

This index, as was said above, will be most useful, but I wish that Professor Phillimore had been less chary about quoting the context. For example, *Pretium* is hardly a correct index for the phrase *pretium facere aliquem* in iv. 1. 81, and 5. 29. We owe, however, the editor too much to cavil at trifles. He has vindicated the supremacy of N as an *instrumentum criticum*, and has made a much-needed protest against the fashion of regarding the text of Propertius as a species of Chinese puzzle, which had been shuffled up in the dark ages, and which could be arranged into the original picture by the sagacity of his editors. The craze originated by Scaliger for making inversions and transpositions has run riot too long in the text of the Roman Callimachus.

A.

(1) *Libellus de Sublimitate Dionysio Longino fere adscriptus*; ed. A. O. PRICKARD; Oxford, Clarendon Press.

(2) *Longinus on the Sublime*, translated by A. O. PRICKARD; Oxford, Clarendon Press.

FOR students of Dublin University the treatise 'on the Sublime' has a special interest, for it was one of the special books which Senior Sophisters had to study in the eighteenth century. Edmund Burke, a Scholar of the House, must have read it diligently in his undergraduate days, with profit, as his own *Philosophical Inquiry* shows. George Miller, a Fellow of the College, noted for his advanced liberalism, produced an edition of the treatise in 1820.

Of Mr. Prickard's two volumes, the second is that which is destined to have the greater vogue: excellent as the translation is, no small additional value lies in the scholarly Introduction and Appendices. They suffer from one fault—they are too few. The author's modesty has defrauded the reader of many interesting supplements which, it is to be hoped, will be appended to future editions: for it is not rash vaticination which promises a long life to the English version.

There is no writer in Greek literature whose history so baffling a mist of ignorance envelops as the author of this 'golden book.' Mr. Prickard's Introduction states the arguments urged by different scholars; and the case against the romantic view which identified this mysterious Hellenist with Zenobia's vizier, is expressed with

pitiless force. Our admiration, affection almost, for the author will not suffer us to believe that this man, conversant with the great writings of the East and West, was a prophet unhonoured in his own time. To us, familiar with the teachings of the Semite and the Greek, he seems more akin than others whose nationality limited to some extent their genius. His mind has an ampler sweep—it is to a greater degree co-extensive with the modern ideal of Poetry and Religion. In the very title of his work, in the term *Sublime*, he exhibits his difference from other Greek writers. The recognition of the subjective, ecstatic aspect of the works of genius overcasts his Hellenic intellectualism with the religious emotion of the Semite. Professor Butcher remarks that we might sum up the spirit of Israel in the verse, ‘He hath set eternity in their heart.’ Our author insists that the great poet or speaker is more than a mere creature of Time. He is ἐπάνω τοῦ θνητοῦ. Τὸ ὕψος ἐγγὺς αἶρει μεγαλοφροσύνης θεοῦ. The treatise frankly admits that sublimity is an inspiration; it can point to the faults which sometimes adhere to greatness: but, like Pindar, he recognises that greatness cannot be thrust upon one in the schoolroom; σοφὸς ὁ πολλὰ εἰδὼς φύᾱ. The treatise is a glowing appreciation of all that is great in literature. Its practical value, if it is to be estimated by that standard, is cathartic and critical; and this critical power is the fruit of long study (πολλῆς ἐστὶ πείρας τελευταῖον ἐπιγένημα). Genius, like all force, is ultimately inexplicable and increate; but it can be controlled by art. ἡ τέχνη τὴν τῆς εὐβουλίας τάξιν ἐπέχει. The *vis consili experts* is in danger of the snares of turgidity, frigidity, affectation, and the like. Such are the premises of the writer *on the Sublime*.

To the English version, Mr. Prickard has attached an Introduction which gives a lucid history of the manuscripts and of the speculations regarding the identity of the author. The analysis which follows will be very useful; but of far greater value and interest are the Appendices. The first consists of select passages translated from Greek critical works, including those of Dionysius, Plutarch, Dion Chrysostom, Lucian, Cassius, Longinus. The second Appendix deals with the non-Greek character of the treatise, and coincidences with the dicta of Latin writers, especially Quintilian. The third Appendix contains excerpts from the works of Bishop Lowth. Probably Mr. Prickard desired to avoid making his volume too cumbrous or pretentious. Still, so excellent are these additional pages, that the reader becomes very greedy. A few paragraphs of selections with comments from the critical works of Dante, Ben Jonson, Burke, and Wordsworth (especially the last) would be extremely welcome. The English of the translation is excellent and appropriate, and rivals Mr. Havell’s version in lucidity. Paraphrase is occasionally employed where the state of the text prevents a literal version, for example, § 10 *ad fin.*

The Greek text, though it does not pretend to any remarkable originality in the *loci vexati*, exhibits a careful study of the latest works on the subject. It is based, of course, on 2036 P. The editor has himself consulted the four Parisian mss. For the Vat. 194 and 1417, Weiske has been used. The Marcian codex, employed by Manutius, has been referred to in over one hundred places. The editor has also examined the Laurentian and Ambrosian codices, and states that the reading ἀνάστημα (§ 7) attributed to that ms. arises from a mistake of Weiske. All mss., therefore, agree in ἀνάστημα. Professor Rhys Roberts's collation of the Cambridge manuscript has also been employed. On the whole, Mr. Prickard follows the line of Professor R. Roberts: his critical notes are fuller, and contain the suggestions of Wilamowitz, R. Ellis, Richards, J. B. Bury, etc. A few examples of the readings of the text will best show Mr. Prickard's views.

In 4. 4, Mr. Prickard refuses to accept Professor Roberts's attractive suggestion that ἱταμόν is a gloss (*v. Class. R.*, vol. xiii. 1). In the same section Rohde's ὡς φῶρ ἰοῦ is consigned to the foot-note: it seems too unacceptable for mention at all. 7. 2, ἀνάθημα is given up in despair: Manutius, παράστημα (cf. 9. 1) gives fair sense, but is too far from the *ductus litterarum*. 7. 3, ἀπαύξησιν is read; Professor R. Roberts's ἀπαξίωσιν deserves mention at least in the foot-note. 9. 9, ἐχώρησε has been suspected, but the word is not unsuitable on the lips of one who was acquainted with Semitic thought. Professor Roberts translates it too loosely 'formed'; Mr. Prickard's 'conceived' is better. There is no need for Manutius' ἐγνώρισε or Ellis's ἐθεώρησα. 9. 13, Manutius' τέρματα always seemed to the writer to have strong claims. 9, 14, Richards's εἰς λῆρον ἐνίστε τεράστιον is very attractive compared with the text ἐνίστε ῥῆστον. 10. 2, Ahrens' conjecture καὶ δέ μ' ἰδρῶς, read by Roberts, seems better than ἀ δέ μ' ἰδρῶς. In the same stanza φαίνομαι ἄλλα might have been accepted without any great qualms. 10. 3, for ἥ γὰρ φοβεῖται ἥ παρ' ὀλίγον τέθνηκεν, the editor suggests φοβεῖται, παρολιγωρεῖ. 10. 7 *ad fin.* is marked with an asterisk: Rhys Roberts's ἐμποιοῦντα ἐς is so far the best attempt to clear up this *locus vexatissimus*. 12. 2, πράγμασι μορίων (Portus's conjecture) is read in the text without comment; P has πράγμασιν ὀρίων. 12. 3, Bentley's ἀπαστράπτει still remains in the foot-note, rightly, in spite of its ingenuity (*v. R. Roberts, Cl. R.*, xix., p. 459). 13. 4, Mr. Prickard might have admitted εἰδῶν (Toll) without scruple for the awkward ἡθῶν; Bury's ἡ θεῶν is close to the text, but θέα hardly gives a satisfactory meaning; we have θ for δ again in 44. 10 (καθέκαστον P. for καδέκαστον). 14. 2, πεπαῖχθαι is marked with an asterisk, which seems a little dangerous; the text can give excellent sense (*v. R. Roberts*). 17. 2, παραληφθεῖσα is accepted, and translated 'being associated with'; this view renders otiose the conjectures παρακαλυφθεῖσα, παραλαμφθεῖσα.

22. 2, Finckh's ἀπολλύει, accepted by Roberts, is replaced by the MSS. reading ἀπολύει, though Mr. Prickard in his translation trenches dangerously on the conjecture—'the freedom of running is destroyed.' 23. 4, αὖξουσιν is adopted, though there is much to be said for the reading of P (v. R. Roberts *ad loc.*). αὖξουσιν now has been found as a correction in the *Eliensis*. 34. 1, εἰ δ' ἀριθμῶ μὴ τῷ ἀληθεῖ κρίνοιτο τὰ κατορθώματα; so P. Mr. Prickard himself suggests μὴ ὅτι πλήθει, following Richards's τῷ πλήθει. Dr. Postgate's ὁρῶ μὴ τῷ ἀληθεῖ is read by Professor Roberts, and certainly solves the crux. ὁρῶ could easily have been confounded with the abbreviation of ἀριθμῶ.

In the appended fragments of Longinus' *τέχνη ῥητορική*, the texts of Ruhnken and Bake have been employed, and there is little of conspicuous note. The same may be said about the *Epitome*. It will add much to the value of Mr. Prickard's volume that he has deemed it fit to append these works.

On the whole, Mr. Prickard is to be congratulated warmly; he has given us two volumes which for their size contain a marvellous amount of illustration, comment, and suggestion. The English version especially is one of the most useful handbooks which a student either of English or classical literature can possess.

A.

A History of Rome during the Later Republic and Early Principate.

By A. H. J. GREENIDGE, M.A., D.LITT. Methuen & Co.

Studies of Roman Imperialism. By W. T. ARNOLD, M.A. Manchester University Press.

THE younger Pliny, referring to the sudden death of C. Fannius, who was writing a history of the *dura tempora* of Nero, remarked: "Videtur acerba semper et immatura mors eorum, qui immortale aliquid parant." Untimely decease seems the peculiar fate of many scholars who have endeavoured to make a *κτῆμα ἑσπερίον* of the history of Rome. The great Thomas Arnold, in his first volume, lamented the premature death of Niebuhr; and Dr. Hare, in the third volume of the same work, had to deplore the same fate for his master. To-day we mourn the death of another Arnold, who had hoped to follow the example of his famous grandfather, but met death at the threshold of his task. Close upon the death of W. T. Arnold came that of Dr. A. H. J. Greenidge, an irreparable loss to the scholarship of the world. It is the tragedy and the coincidence of the ends of Greenidge and Arnold which make us link together these brief references to their last and unfinished works; for the exigencies of space will not permit an exhaustive

review. In other respects their careers differed. Dr. Greenidge had already won a sufficiency of fame—a world-wide reputation as a scholar and historian of the very first rank. W. T. Arnold was, except for an elaborate edition of a portion of his grandfather's work, and a brilliant treatise on *Roman Provincial Administration*, with which he won in 1879 the Arnold Prize, better known as a journalist than as a historian.

Dr. Greenidge's volume is the first of a series of six, in which he purposed to write a history of Rome from the days of Ti. Gracchus to the accession of Vespasian. The first hundred pages of the present work are devoted to an exhaustive review of the social and economical conditions which led up to the great crisis at which the history proper commences. The exactitude and precision, the polished diction, the mellow judgment of Greenidge are conspicuous in every sentence; the lines of political development are drawn clearly, with the boldness of a master-hand. For the history proper we have unqualified admiration: it affords a wealth of detail, but there are no superfluous excrescences to divert from the central theme; the references at the bottom of the pages are a model of what references should be. The letterpress is of the best; and a good index and map are appended. The book is one that every scholar must welcome with joy—a joy mixed with bitterness at the thought that there are few, if any, who can take the torch from the dead historian's hand, and complete the task which he has so magnificently designed.

The second work before us consists of an Introduction, with a memoir of W. T. Arnold, written by his sister, Mrs. Humphrey Ward, and C. E. Montague, and seven chapters on Roman Imperialism. These originally were intended to form part of a *Student's History of the Early Roman Empire*; but illness compelled the author to resign the task to the able hands of Professor J. B. Bury. The memoir is of great interest, containing as it does the *obiter dicta* of Arnold on a wide range of subjects. The historical chapters are illuminative and brilliant; we recognise that in W. T. Arnold we have lost one whose powers were first-class, whose judgment and insight were acute and just.

Arnold's estimation of contemporary historians and his conception of what history should be are shown in a letter quoted in the preface: "The history of the Empire," he says in 1881, "has to be largely reconstructed from epigraphic sources. You know my opinion of Merivale, and will therefore understand the satisfaction with which I read the other day in a first-rate German book: 'Die Bücher von Duruy und Merivale sind Compilationen mittelmässiger Güte.'" His own few chapters on Roman Imperialism are masterly; in them we find the originality and the penetrating certitude of a great mind, which was familiar with the world of politics and with humanity. Especially fine are the last

two chapters, which emphasize the essential dualism and inevitable schism of East and West—a dualism, as it is shown, which was asserted by Mithridates and again by Antony, and was never really overcome.

Everywhere we see a painstaking investigation of original authorities, epigraphical and historical, and a thorough acquaintance with all the literature of his subject. The marginal references are full and suggestive; and there are two excellent indices.

We can cordially recommend the book, and congratulate its editors, while sympathizing with them for the melancholy occasion of their task.

A.

Petronius: Cena Trimalchionis; translated and edited with Introduction, Notes, &c., by MICHAEL J. RYAN. Walter Scott Publishing Co.

MR. RYAN in his Preface disclaims any originality for the present volume, and frankly admits the possibility of errors, for the correction of which he states that he will be grateful. The ingenuous character of such a Preface is calculated to blunt the arms of a critic; yet it would be unjust both to the author and his editor to be altogether blind to faults of carelessness or lack of scholarship, however much one desires to be kind to a writer whose attitude is so correctly modest.

The Introduction gives an interesting summary of the history of the MSS., and of the speculations regarding the author of the *Satyricon*, with some remarks on the *Sermo Plebeius*. Even here there are signs of slovenliness which might be attributed to the printer, were they not repeated with unpleasant frequency throughout the whole book. A scholar should not suffer such monstrosities as *Menippae*, *Ctesibus*, etc., to appear in his work. Mr. Ryan, like some of his predecessors, is inclined to regard all rare forms as post-classical or colloquial. *Argutat* (46) is found in Propertius, as the note shows, and may well be included in the *sermo urbanus*. *Fruniscor* is classified with verbs which in literary Latin require a dative, but in colloquial speech take an accusative. As far as we know, *fruniscor* governs the accusative as a rule, rarely the ablative, never the dative. Sharp distinctions between colloquial and literary language are dangerous. It would have added much to the interest and value of Mr. Ryan's Introduction to have given in a brief conspectus a comparison of the epistolary style of Cicero and the more plebeian style of Petronius. These two literary media would

be found to agree in far more ways than Mr. Ryan evidently thinks.

As regards the translation and notes, we regret that our verdict cannot be one of complete approval. The notes are almost altogether a *contaminatio* of those of earlier editors—especially de Guerle, Friedländer, and W. K. Kelly. Such a method, if employed with discretion and skill, is commendable and useful. But Mr. Ryan often, we fear, fails to understand his predecessors. The first note exemplifies this unhappy fault. Mr. Ryan remarks: "Henry Valois says that it was usual to give a *libera cena* to gladiators who had been condemned to fight in the arena, on the day before the combat took place. Cf. Hor., *A. P.* 85: et invenum curas et libera vina referre." The reader must assume that Horace's *libera vina* refers to the gladiatorial carouse. Mr. Ryan was deceived by a careless perusal of de Guerle's note, wherein Horace's line is quoted as suggesting an alternative interpretation in place of the usual one that *libera cena* meant a gladiators' feast, a *Henkermahlzeit*. De Guerle's words are: "On peut encore prendre ici le mot *libera cena* dans le même sens que le *libera vina* d'Horace (*A. P.* vers. 85)."

Mr. Ryan's English version is spirited, but is marred by two grave blots: want of exactitude in detail, and a habit of inserting indigestible particles of Latin in the middle of the English. *Tegebant asellum duae lances* (32) is not correctly rendered by 'over the ass were two platters.' Prof. Peck's version renders *tegebant* properly by 'flanked.' 'Puto me hercules illum reliquisse solida centum' is translated, 'By Hercules! I think he left a hundred *solidi* behind him!' 'Hermogenis filicem' (45) is rendered 'daughter of H.' Can *porcum poculo coronatum* (66) have the meaning Mr. Ryan assigns to it—'washed down with wine'? In the same section, *bene me admonet domina mea* is translated, 'that reminds me of something about the wife.' We think that Mr. Ryan's views about *Pax Palamedes* (which he translates 'be quiet, Palamedes,'—Palamedes being one of Habinna's slaves) will hardly be accepted by scholars. He regards *vide modo* (51) as a similar interjectional remark; but there he has failed to observe the force of *utique postquam*. In 68, *circulatores* does not mean 'strolling players,' but 'hawkers.' In 73, *praefiscini* is ignored in both translation and notes. These are but samples of what can be found on every page. Latin terms, as was remarked above, are unpleasantly frequent. *Incubo*, *novendial*, *cordax*, *chorales*, *amphora*, *decuria*, *dispensator*, *denarii*, *lanista*, *triclinium*, *pilleus*, *structor*, *oclopeta*, etc., etc., affront the reader in all the glaring ostentation of italics. This is characteristic of the schoolboy, who shirks the difficulties of his task, not of the scholar, whose translation should be above such subterfuges.

The errors which result from careless proof-reading are exceedingly numerous. *Apophoreti* (40) is read in the text; in the notes

apophoreta is given without comment; similarly *oricularios*, p. 44, *oracularios*, p. 190; *effluant*, p. 134; *effuant*, p. 250; on p. 188, Cicero is quoted *duo parietes de una ficedula (fidelia) dealbare*; p. 213, Ovid's line is given as *virginis est verae facies ut credere vivas (vivere credas)*. Greek quotations suffer especially from this form of disaster. Accents and breathings seem to be regarded as indifferent: e.g., Lucian is quoted: p. 216, ταὐτ' ὀδύρομαι, καὶ ὅτι ἔμπεδον οὐδὲν ἀλλάκως εἰς κυκλεῶνα πάντα συνειλέονται; p. 185, Ἐῆ χύτρα, Ἐῆ φιλία; similarly βορρόν, ὕδωρ, λαικάζειν (for λειχάζειν or λαικάζειν) ἀποστημά τις τοῦ ὄνυχος, μὴ πίστει (πίστευε), etc., etc.

It is regrettable that this little volume is not one which can be recommended for a place on the shelves of a student, the more so, since in one respect—namely, external appearance—it is excellent. In that point it compares favourably with most editions of Petronius, excepting perhaps Friedländer's work. It is the hope that the author may, in future editions, correct these blunders (which damage a work that was well conceived) that has made us somewhat cruelly prolix in our criticism.

A.

Xenophon Hellenica. Text by E. C. MARCHANT, Fellow of Lincoln College. Notes by G. E. UNDERHILL, Fellow of Magdalen College.

WHATEVER Xenophon's countrymen may have thought of his powers as a strategist and tactician—and recent critics are of opinion that the leader of the Ten Thousand has immensely overrated himself in his account of that immortal retreat—the later Greek historians speak of him in no uncertain tone. Polybius by implication compares him favourably with Ephorus in his description of Leuctra and Mantinea. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Diodorus Siculus, Lucian—all put him on a footing of equality with Herodotus and Thucydides. In ancient times there was not a single dissentient voice in the applause of critics (except in reference to his style); he was considered a model of honesty, truth, and justice.

Modern historians of Greece have changed all that. Grote says: "To pass from Thucydides to Xenophon is truly mournful. His partiality to Sparta, visible from the beginning, is intensified by spite against the Thebans and Epaminondas." Niebuhr says bluntly: "His History is worth nothing." Freeman has nothing for him but unqualified condemnation; he accuses him of "sheer want of common honesty." Mure writes in the same strain: "He is notorious for the most unscrupulous partiality; he suppresses, colours, or otherwise misrepresents truth."

It is to this antinomy that Mr. Underhill directs his critical

abilities in the excellent volume before us; for it is one of the great merits of the book that, without neglecting the textual and grammatical side, he devotes special attention to the many historical problems involved in Xenophon's work. This he is all the more able to do, as he adopts, with but few exceptions, the text already constructed by Mr. Marchant for the Clarendon Press: he prints in the text but two or three conjectures of his own. He displays, however, greater boldness in attacking the problem of Xenophon's capacity and honesty. Space would fail us to even outline the arguments, arrived at by a careful analysis of the subject-matter of the work, in which Mr. Underhill attempts—successfully we think—to show that the ancient testimony to Xenophon's honesty is well grounded, though of course in the wide and comprehensive view required of an historian, in the capacity of assimilating a complex material, and eliminating the non-essential elements, in the ability of following a guiding line and tracing the development of an idea or of a policy—in short, in the artistic requirements of an historian—he falls incomparably short of Herodotus and Thucydides.

Mr. Underhill points out that no key has hitherto been found to unlock all the difficulties of the problem. All scholars have felt the lack of unity in the *Hellenica*, and have advanced in many cases various more or less fantastic theories to account for it. Mr. Underhill's view is that this lack of unity is due "partly to the nature of the subject-matter, partly to the length of time over which its composition was spread (over thirty years perhaps), partly to the shifting motives which animated the historian at different periods of his life."

But how are we to account for the numerous omissions and inequalities? Are we to say that the work is merely an epitome? Mr. Underhill, in refutation of this theory of Campe, points out that an epitome leaves out unimportant details, and lays most emphasis on matters of the most importance, while in the *Hellenica* it is just the reverse that generally happens. Nor does the theory of corrupt text and large interpolations help us much in face of the fact that a papyrus of the third century A.D. exhibits practically the same text as we have, and contains passages which are now universally regarded as interpolations.

It has become a commonplace of historical criticism to ascribe these omissions and inequalities to Xenophon's partiality for Sparta and her aristocratic constitution. Mr. Underhill disposes of this theory by ten closely printed pages of fact taken from the *History* itself. Xenophon omits, no doubt, many facts damaging to Sparta, but an almost equal number of omissions may be collected of instances favourable to Sparta, and of insertions of things damaging to her reputation. Here Mr. Underhill gives chapter and verse for his conclusions. Neither does Hertzberg's

theory of personal prejudice against individuals carry us very far. If he omits much that is to the credit of Alcibiades, he also passes briefly over many of his failures: he omits altogether the scandalous tales which Plutarch retails against him. Mr. Underhill's general conclusion on this head is that "though his partiality for Sparta and hatred of Thebes may sometimes explain his inclusion of some and omission of other occurrences, these subjective feelings seldom if ever lead him to distortion of actual matters of fact"; and further that "Xenophon's primary object was to write history on the grand scale, like his predecessors Herodotus and Thucydides; but that *from lack of capacity rather than of honesty*, he was unable adequately to carry out his purpose."

The above will give some idea of the theses maintained by Mr. Underhill in the first section of his Introduction: it cannot give any of the careful collection and able marshalling of the facts by which these theses are clinched. There is also a brief account of the MSS., with an exhaustive chronological summary; and several matters of importance are discussed in special appendices. There are copious analyses of the subject-matter; and explanatory notes are added where necessary. We think it would be advisable to publish the Introduction and notes in a separate volume, as the majority of students are now equipped with the New Oxford texts.

Bucolici Graeci: recensuit et emendavit VDALRICUS DE WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORFF. Oxonii e Typographeo Clarendoniano.

THIS edition, together with the *Textgeschichte der griechischen Bukoliker* soon afterwards published by the editor, forms an indispensable aid to the student of the Greek Bucolic poets, and especially of Theocritus. The vast learning of Professor von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff renders all that he writes valuable. He is never commonplace or dull. He never takes up a subject without introducing his reader to facts which place it in a new light, and imparting to it a new interest and importance. It was therefore with no little eagerness that this edition was expected by scholars; for all felt that, in entrusting him with the production of it, the Delegates had committed it to one as fit as anyone living to do justice to the work. The preface is brief; for (as the editor tells us) the facts and arguments which would have run into many pages have been gathered into the other work (above referred to) on the history of the texts of the Greek Bucolic writers. Yet, brief as it is, it is very instructive; a model at once of clearness and comprehensiveness. The most obviously striking feature, at first sight, in this edition is the departure made by the editor from the

ordinary arrangement and numbering of the poems of Theocritus. The reasons for this are explained in the preface. Professor von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff pays a glowing tribute to his predecessor H. L. Ahrens; and, when referring to his compliance with the invitation of the Delegates that he should undertake this work, he gives utterance in a noble paragraph to sentiments of which not only English scholarship, but the whole community of those engaged in *litterae humaniores*, may be justly proud. No higher claim can be put forward on behalf of the study of classics—especially of Greek—than that it helps to implant and foster the spirit in which this great German scholar writes as follows: “Imprimis autem viro bono et patriae et humanitatis amanti nihil sanctius est colendum communione illa bonarum artium, per quam quicunque inter omnes gentes vero investigando vitam impendimus, vel, ut breviter dicam, quicunque γνησίως φιλοσοφοῦμεν, regibus populisque viam praeimus quae sola ad mundi salutem et concordiam ducit.” We regret the impossibility of doing justice to his work in a short notice like the present.

Opus Epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami denuo recognitum et auctum, per P. S. ALLEN, M.A., e Coll. Corporis Christi. Tom. I, 1484–1514. Oxonii in Typographeo Clarendoniano. MCMVI.

THIS work is one the value of which it would be difficult to overrate. Great as is the literary importance of the letters of Erasmus, their historical importance is still greater; and here we have them arranged in the manner most convenient for the purposes of the historian or student of history. There is a commentary “intended to explain the dates assigned to the letters, and incidentally to trace the course of Erasmus’ life”; whilst biographical notes are added dealing also with the persons mentioned in the letters. Mr. Allen has had the advantage of having the “great framework” of the edition of Erasmus projected by Dr. Knaake (editor of Luther’s Works) placed at his service by the courtesy of his executors; while Madame Reich has enabled him to acquire the collections of notes formed by her husband. He is profuse in acknowledgment of assistance derived from books, public bodies, and individuals. His work appears to be to him a genuine labour of love. He appeals for aid in collecting all letters to and from Erasmus; and he gives a list of manuscript letters “known to have been in existence recently, but of which he is unable to trace the originals.” We sincerely hope that Mr. Allen may succeed in completing his edition (so splendidly begun) of the writings of the

man to whom persons of intelligence turn with most confidence for information respecting the state of things which justified, or at least precipitated, the violent reform of the Christian Church in Western Europe.

A Grammar of Classical Latin for use in Schools and Colleges. By ARTHUR SLOMAN, M.A. Cambridge: at the University Press. 1906.

THIS appears to us to be a most excellent book for its purpose. Its treatment of Latin syntax is based on the usage of Cicero and Caesar in prose, and of Virgil, Ovid, and Horace in poetry; while as regards accidence the author refers to Sallust, Livy, and other prose writers (including Tacitus), and to the poets Catullus, Tibullus, Propertius, Lucan, Persius, and Juvenal. Mr. Sloman, while using the works of predecessors, to some extent, for guidance as to what he should include in the matter of his Grammar, has not relied absolutely on any of them, but has tested every doctrine and statement for himself; and he has succeeded in producing a Grammar which, in arrangement, comprehensiveness, and accuracy, will be of the greatest use in schools. He deserves the respect of masters as well as scholars for attacking and routing the old notion that *natus major* is the comparative of *senex*. His explanation (given in *The Spectator* of September 8th) of the difference between *senior* and *natus major* is perfectly sound, as well as new, though it is strange that it should have been necessary. His work, while unencumbered with etymological matter, implies the requisite knowledge of what comparative etymology has to teach as to the structure and inflection of Latin words. He fully acknowledges in his modest preface the work of others, e.g., Professor E. A. Sonnenschein and Dr. J. P. Postgate, as pioneers in what he regards as the right direction. Yet his own Grammar conveys the pleasing impression, not only of trustworthiness, but also of freshness and thoroughness, as the work of one who is no mere follower, but an author of independent judgment and research.

P. Papini Stati Thebais et Achilleis recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit H. W. GARROD, Collegii Mertonensis Socius. Oxonii e Typographeo Clarendoniano.

THE editor divides the codices of the *Thebais* into two genera, the one represented by the Codex Puteanus (P), the other by six codices which he designates by the letters BDKNQS. These two

genera are both derived, he thinks, from an archetype of the eighth century, written in minuscule, which he names π . He gives a conjectural description of this archetype, and tries to determine its relationship to P and S, and to the other five codices of the above group, whose consensus he denotes by ω . His reasoning for the affiliation of them all to π , notwithstanding the diversity of readings between the two genera, is clear and ingenious. This diversity he endeavours to explain or reduce to its lowest terms. He suspects that in the recension which P presents we possess *δευτέραι φροντίδες* of Statius, which the latter did not publish in his lifetime, but left in MS.; and Mr. Garrod, following a conjecture of Prof. Phillimore, is confident that the discrepancy between the two genera can be completely explained on the hypothesis of a second edition of the *Thebais* begun by Statius himself. The emendation of the text must, he thinks, rest chiefly on the Codex Puteanus, and all the more if the suspicion of its containing such *δευτέραι φροντίδες* be well founded. He regards the codices which are later than the eleventh century as untrustworthy. They all derive their text from a 'conflation' of that found in P and ω S. Of the codices older than the twelfth century the best are BDKNQS (the group constituting the second genus). Our editor is (he says) the first who used DNQ for constituting the text of the *Thebais*. He gives a detailed account of these MSS., which is of considerable interest. In a short separate preface to the *Achilleis*, he, in the same way, describes the critical resources at the command of editors. These prefatory introductions to the history of the text of the *Thebais* and *Achilleis* are valuable and scholarly pieces of work. The critical foot-notes to each page are sufficient for the purposes of the ordinary student. The book is beautifully printed, and forms a valuable addition to the new series of Oxford texts.

The Works of Lucian of Samosata. Translated by H. W. FOWLER and F. G. FOWLER. In four volumes. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1905.

THIS is a translation which deserves a hearty welcome. The genius of Lucian renders his writings in many ways attractive. He has treated of a host of follies and weaknesses, moral and intellectual, which beset humanity in every phase of its development, and has with peculiar force exposed those extravagances which characterize pretended *illuminati* of the various professions and sects. Much of what he has bequeathed to us, however, stands in need of expurgation, in order to suit the tastes and feelings of the majority of such modern readers as are not philosophers. The translators have

accordingly omitted certain passages which can well be spared, and which none will miss except those who can, if they choose, supply them by reference to the original Greek. An admirable Introduction sums up the facts known of Lucian's life., the order of his writings, the circumstances of the times in which he wrote, and also presents us with an appreciation of his merits as an author. He dealt with types and tendencies of thought and character which are almost as interesting and important to us as they were to his contemporaries.

Satire was his forte, and this, notwithstanding Horace's dictum, is incapable of dealing satisfactorily with topics and questions of transcendent interest. It can only challenge and excite to further inquiry; but as a form of criticism it is more perfect in him than in any other writer with whom we are acquainted. If it is too much to expect now that people should learn Greek in order to read Lucian, those who have to rely on the services of an interpreter may accept the present version, not, indeed, as an equivalent, but as an excellent substitute for the original.

A Realist of the Ægean, being a verse-translation of the Mimes of Herodas. By HUGO SHARPLEY, M.A. London: David Nutt, 1906.

THIS translation aims at enabling English readers to appreciate the literary and other merits of "Herodas." It must be judged therefore not only by its correctness as a version, but also by its style. Mr. Sharpley is a good scholar, as his "Peace" of Aristophanes (reviewed in HERMATHENA, 1905) proves; and it may be readily assumed that his translation is free from vulgar errors. He has used all the assistance to be derived from criticisms of the text, particularly in the excellent edition of Mr. Nairn. He has, however, purposely, he tells us, left foreign versions of the Mimes unread. This seems to have been a needless attempt to shun the risk of even unconscious imitation. The modesty and candour with which Mr. Sharpley acknowledges indebtedness are sufficient to render him safe against the imputation of plagiarism from any source. But it was dangerous, we should have thought, for a translator to leave unread the versions written by Crusius, Mekler, and others; for no man can be sure that his own work would not derive benefit from the work of predecessors; nor should anyone present the reading public whose esteem he desires with a publication which ordinary precaution might have rendered better than it is. The reader cares far more about the excellence of the translation than about the αὐτάρκεια of the writer, or how far he was able to produce

it without assistance. If he had read Crusius' translation of 1. 56 ('bei Mises Niederfahrt'), would he have rendered καθόδω by 'at the *Returning* of Mises'? κάθοδος used, e.g., of Orestes might naturally enough mean *return* (from exile); but used of a goddess who dwells with Demeter (cf. Call. *H.* to *D.* i. τῷ καλᾷθω κατιόντος) it seems to mean 'descent,' while the word for 'return' in this case would be ἄνοδος. This translation, however, though suggested by Mr. Nairn's note, is not adopted by Mr. Sharpley. We may well doubt 'right from the shoulder,' as a rendering of κατ' ὤμου in iii. 3, where the version of Crusius, 'leg aber diesen ueber,' probably gives the true meaning, which Mr. Nairn also suggests. The phrase 'right from the shoulder' would be appropriate of a boxer making a drive, but not of a schoolmaster administering chastisement to a little boy. In iii. 36—ἦν δὲ δὴ τι καὶ μείζον γρύξαι θέλωμεν—on the other hand, Mr. Sharpley's rendering, 'if we speak a word,' is perfectly correct, though others have taken the clause as if the subject of γρύξαι were the boy—'if we wish *him* to speak.' We cannot examine and appraise this little book here as fully as we should wish; but we may say that in style as well as in grammatical scholarship it is very creditable to its author, and a worthy presentment of the "Realist of the Ægean."

Translations into Greek and Latin Verse. By H. A. J. MUNRO.
With a Prefatory Note by J. D. DUFF, Fellow of Trinity
College, Cambridge. London: Edward Arnold. 1906.

A VOLUME of Greek and Latin translations by H. A. J. Munro needs little introduction to those of the reading public who really understand and care for classics. His scholarship, learning, and skill as a composer were household words when we were young; and though since he died nearly a generation has passed, and in the small world of classical studies it is peculiarly true that

οἷη περ φύλλων γενεή, τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν,

his reputation is still undimmed, and his writings are as much valued as ever. There seems to be a peculiar fitness in the fact that their issue to a wider public has been entrusted to Mr. Duff. No editor could have been more competent or sympathetic. Most of the pieces contained in the book are already well known to University classical men of standing; but it is to be hoped that they will now become equally familiar to a much greater number

among the younger scholars and students of to-day, serving them as a model in their efforts to acquire the gentle and delightful art in which Munro excelled, and moreover keeping alive in them a wholesome respect for the powers and attainments of the generation of great scholars which is fast passing away.

We have received also the following works:—

A late eighth-century Latin-Anglo-Saxon Glossary, preserved in the Library of the Leiden University. Edited by JOHN HENRY HESSELS, M.A., St. John's College, Cambridge. Cambridge: at the University Press. 1906.

A Primer of Classical and English Philology. By the REV. WALTER W. SKEAT, LITT.D., LL.D., D.C.L., PH.D., F.B.A. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1905.

Selections from Plutarch's Life of Caesar. Edited by R. L. A. DU PONTET, M.A. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1906.

A Catalogue of the Sparta Museum. By M. N. TODD, M.A., and A. J. B. WACE, M.A. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1906.

Greek Reader, voll. I and II, adapted with English Notes from von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff's Griechisches Lesebuch. By E. C. MARCHANT. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1905 and 1906.

The Iliad of Homer, Book XXIV and Books III and IV. Translated by E. H. BLAKENEY, M.A. George Bell & Sons. 1905 and 1906.

Euripides' Alcestis. Translated by H. KYNASTON, D.D. With Introduction and Notes by J. CHURTON COLLINS, LITT.D. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1906.

Matthew Arnold's 'Merope.' To which is appended the Electra of Sophocles, translated by ROBERT WHITELAW. Edited by J. CHURTON COLLINS. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1906.

Plutarch's Life of Coriolanus. Edited with Introduction and Notes. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1906.

The Resultant Greek Testament. By the late RICHARD FRANCIS WEYMOUTH, D.LITT. With an Introduction by the late RIGHT REV. JOHN JAMES STEWART PEROWNE, D.D., Bishop of Worcester. London: James Clarke & Co. 1905.

Le Prophète Aggée. Introduction Critique et Commentaire par TONY ANDRÉ, licencié en Théologie, privat-docent à l'Université de Genève. Paris: Librairie Fischbacher. 1895.

Harvard Studies in Classical Philology. Published by Harvard University. Vol. XVI. 1905. London: Longmans, Green, & Co. Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz.

Annals of Mathematics. Published under the auspices of Harvard University. Second Series, vol. 7, vol. 8, No. 1. London: Longmans, Green, & Co. Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz.

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
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By exchange

HERMATHENA.

A SYNOPSIS, ANALYTICAL AND QUOTATIONAL,
OF THE VERBAL FORMS IN THE BASKISH
NEW TESTAMENT PRINTED AT LA ROCHELLE
IN 1571.

I HAVE much pleasure in being permitted to introduce to the readers of HERMATHENA the following paper by an eminent Bascologist. No greater boon can be conferred on the student of Baskish than a complete analysis of the verbal forms in Leizarraga's translation of the New Testament published in 1571, which is, indeed, the most important of all Baskish books. To this task Mr. Dodgson has devoted himself with unremitting zeal for eighteen years, taking the several books of the New Testament separately. The results of his labours, so far as they have been hitherto published, are as follows:—

1. The Epistles of St. Peter, 1890, 1891; 2. The Epistle of St. Jude, 1893; 3. The Epistles of St. John, 1893; 4. The Epistle to Philemon, 1894; 5. to Timothy, 1895; 6. to Titus, 1898; 7. The Epistle of St. James, 1899; 8. Philip-
pians and Colossians, 1902; 9. St. Mark, 1898–1903;
10. Ephesians and Thessalonians, 1904. Of these, 1 and 9 appeared in the *Revue de Linguistique* (Paris); 2 and 4 in the *Bulletin de la Société Ramond* (Bagnères de Bigorre); 3 and 5 in the *Actes de la Soc. Philologique et Œuvre de St. Jérôme* (Paris); 6 in the *Bulletin de la Soc. des Sciences et*

Arts (Bayonne); 7 and 8 were published by the author, the former at Chalon-sur-Saône, the latter at Villanueva y Geltru; 10 was published by the Royal Academy of Sciences at Amsterdam. The analysis of the forms in Hebrews has been published in part this year, in the *Revue de Linguistique*, and that of St. Matthew, with a second edition of 2 and 4, was issued on the 8th of July, 1907, at Oxford, by Mr. H. Frowde.

I learn that Mr. Dodgson has in MS. the Gospels of St. Luke and St. John, the Acts, and also a Synopsis to the Epistles to the Romans and Corinthians, and to the Apocalypse, cast this year into a single work. This is, of course, the longest part, and embraces 924 forms of the verb.

These works form the foundation on which will be constructed a complete Grammatical Dictionary of the Baskish New Testament.

T. K. ABBOTT.

Some use to praise before they doe peruse,
And make a *Common-Hackney* of their Muse.
I love my *Friend*, yet doe I love to looke,
Before I passe my *verdict* on his Booke.

R. BRATHWAIT, *Hymen's Præludia*. London, 1652.

CE Rosaire de mots sténographiques a été dressé dans l'ordre alphabétique que voici :

A, B, C & Qu = K, D, E, G, I, L, N, T, Ç, Ce & Ci, TZ & Z.

Le son primitif de Ç, Z, et C suivi de *e* ou *i*, semble avoir été TZ. Le Z Heuskarien exprime le son de l'S Castillan.

The reader is requested not "to mutter over a road of words only,"¹ as he looks into this work, but to test the

¹ *A Practical Exposition on the Lord's Prayer* (p. 4). By Ezekiel Hopkins, late Lord Bishop of London-derry. London, 1692.

logic of the parsing by a minute perusal of the quotations, and to verify the latter in one of the thirty copies of Leïçarraga's *Testamentu Berria*, which exist in Europe and America. There is one in the British Museum, another in the Library of the British and Foreign Bible Society, and another, incomplete, in the Bodleian Library.¹ There is a reprint of this, published at Strasburg im Elsass in 1900, not quite in *facsimile*. The French quotations will be found in the translation of Jean Calvin, published at Lion, in 1566, by S. Honorati, and printed by Jaques Favre. There are copies of this to be seen in the British Museum, and the Bodleian Library, Oxford. It is certain that Leïçarraga and his assistants followed the Greek text in many places more closely than the French of Calvin. The use of italic, and other details, prove, beyond doubt, that they studied both the Greek text and the said edition of that version, which is a beautiful specimen of the French language, and not at all Calvinistic. A reprint of the Leïçarragan version, in a column between the Greek text, as known between 1565 and 1571, and the French of Calvin, would be a great boon to scholars.

The verb in *Heuscara* is a system of short-thought, as spoken; of short-hand, as written. The Baskish mind divides its verb into *being* and *having*, and the two ideas are in some cases mingled. The irregular verbs are compounded with one or the other. *To walk is to be in walking*. *To know is to have it in knowing*.

“ Verbum directum habemus.”

Here follow the 202 forms contained in the

EPISTRÆ DE S. PAVL APOSTRE AVX GALATES.

ADI. 2. Impératif singulier 2^e personne, auxiliare. *Be thou!*

¹ In this copy one finds the following note in the handwriting of Prince L. L.

Bonaparte: “ London, 10 Jan., 1883. Sir, In answer to your question, I beg

4. 27...., ALEGUER*adi* steril . . . : DEND*adi*¹ eta heyagora EGUIN' . . . , Resiouy-toy sterile, . . . : efforce toy & crie, (Avec *eguin*, qui exige un verbe transitif, on sous-entend *eçan* : cf. St. Jean 4. 6).

ezADIN. 1. Subjonctif présent sing. 2^e, auxil. *That thou mayest (not) be.*

6. 1. . . . , hi-ere TENTA ezadin. . . . , que tu ne sois aussi tenté.

AILITEZ. 1. Optatif pluriel 3^e aux. *Would that they were!*

5. 12. *Ailitez* TRENCA . . . A la mienne volonté que ceux . . . , fussent retranchez.

ezAIZ, baHAIZ. 3. Indicatif prés. 2. verbe substantif & auxiliaire. *Art.* (εἶς in Greek, *es* in Latin.)

4. 7. Bada guehiagoric eZAIZ sclabo, baina semé : eta baldin seme baHAIZ, (H. mit *bahaiz*). Parquoy maintenant tu n'es plus serf, mais fils : que si tu es fils, (L. omet 'maintenant'. *Ezaiz* est 'tu n'es point'.)

2. 14. . . . , Baldin hi . . . Gentil anço VICI ba*haiz*, . . . , Si toy . . . vis comme les Gentils,

AICELARIC. 1. Id quod *aiz*, avec *e* euphonique et *la* participial décliné au partitif, avec le suffixe *ric*, qui n'y ajoute rien de traduisible. *While thou art.*

2. 14. . . . hi Iudu AICELARIC . . . toy qui es Iuif (L. traduit 'estant Iuif.')

ezAICENÁ. 2. I. q. *aiz*, avec *e* euph. & *n* pronom relatif vocatif, décliné au vocatif intransitif (*ná* = *o toi qui*). *O thou who art (not).*

4. 27. . . . steril ERTZEN ezaicená : . . . ERTZECO penan eZAICENÁ : . . . sterile, qui n'enfantes point : . . . , toy qui ne trauailles point : (L. traduit 'qui n'es point en peine d'enfantement').

to inform you that the Basque N. T. printed at La Rochelle in 1571 is one of the rarest books in existence, and almost impossible to replace in case of

loss. Believe me, yours truly, L. L. Bonaparte."

¹ *Denda* vient du latin *tenta*. Le grec est *πῆξεν*, et le latin *erumpes*.

AVÇVE. 2. Impér. plur. 2, régime sing. auxil. actif.
Have ye it!

5. 13. . . . : solament BEGUIRauçue, . . . : seulement
gardez (L. fit imprimer *beguiraucue*, pour respecter l'italique
de Calvin.)

5. 15. . . . : BEGUIRauçue . . . : gardez

BEÇA. 1. Imp. s. 3. r. s. aux. act. *Let him have it!*

6. 4. Bada bere obrá EXPERIMENTA beça batbederac :
Que chacun donc esprouue son œuure :

BIEÇÓ. 1. Imp. s. 3. r. s., r. i. s., aux. act. (Cf. Luc 3.
11). *Let him have it to him!*

6. 6. Bada COMMUNICA bieçó . . . , bere iracasleari, on
gucietaric. Que celuy . . . , face participant de tous ses
biens celuy qui l'enseigne. (L. omet, comme en maint
endroit, le mot que Calvin avait fait imprimer en italique.)

BIZ. 2. Imp. s. 3 aux. (variante de *bedi*). *Let him be!*
(Welsh *bydded*.)

1. 8. . . . , MARADICATU¹ biz. . . . , qu'il soit maudit.

1. 9. . . . , MARADICATU biz. . . . , qu'il soit maudit.

baiCÁRA & GÁRA. 6. *Cara* est la forme ancienne de
gara. Ind. prés. pl. 1 verbe subst. *We are*.

2. 15. Gu baiCÁRA naturaz Iudu, Nous *qui sommes* Juifs
de nature, (L. traduit *Juif*, et rend *qui* par *bai*. Hautin,
son imprimeur, mit *baicara*, pour reproduire l'italique
calvinien, qui indique qu'on avait lu 'Ημεῖς φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι,
sans verbe.)

2. 17. Eta baldin . . . , ERIDEITEN bagara gueuror-ere²
bekatore, Or si . . . , nous sommes aussi trouuez pecheurs,

3. 25. Baina fedea ETHORRIZ gueroztic, ezGÁRA gue-
hiagoric pedagogoren azpian. Mais la foy estant venue,
nous ne sommes plus sous pedagogue.

4. 28. Gu bada, anayeác, Isaac beçala promessezco

¹ Du latin *maledicto*.

mesmes. On lit pourtant *gueuroc*,

² Cf. 2 Thess. 1. 4, *gueuror* = nous-

2 Cor. 1. 4, and 1 Thess. 3. 1.

haour GARA. Or quand [sic] à nous, mes freres, nous sommes enfans de promesse, ainsi qu'Isaac.

4. 31. Bada, anayeác, ezGARA nescatoaren haour baina librearen. Or freres, nous ne sommes point enfans de la seruante, mais de la franche.

5. 25. Baldin VICI bagara Spirituz, Si nous viuons d'Esprit,

egotzQVIC. 1. Imp. s. 2. r. pl. adressé au masculin, aux. act. *Have thou them, O man!*¹

4. 30. . . . ? EGOTZquic campora nescatoa eta haren semea: . . . ? Iette hors la seruante & son fils :

ezQVITZAIZTE. 1. Ind. prés. pl. 1. r. i. pl. aux. C'est l'ancienne forme de *guitçaizte* = *gaitzaizte*. (1 Thess. 4. 15.) *We are (not) to them.*

2. 5. Eta suiectionez ezquitzaizte SUSMETTITU moment-bat-ere, Ausquels ne nous sommes soumis par suiection, non pas mesme vn moment :

DA (& Dere). 35. Ind. prés. s. 3. v. s. & aux. *Is.*

2. 17. . . . , Christ halacotz bekatuaren ministre² DA ? . . . , Christ est-il pourtant ministre de peché ?

2. 20. . . . , baina VICI *da* nitan Christ : [H, omit cette ponctuation.] . . . , mais Christ vit en moy :

2. 21. . . . : ecen baldin iustitiá Legueaz baDA, beraz Christ mengoa gabe HIL *içan da*. . . . : car si la iustice est par la Loy, Christ donc est mort en vain.

3. 4. . . . ? baldin alfer-ere baDA. (H. mit *bada*, parce que L. avait lu *εἰ γε καὶ εἰκῆ*, sans verbe.) . . . ? voire si c'est mesme en vain.

3. 10. . . . : ecen SCRIBATUA DA, MARADICATUA DA norere . . . ; car il est escrit, Maudit est quiconque

¹ Cf. Acts 7. 33, *eraunzquic* ; 1 Tim. 4. 7, 2 Tim. 2. 23, *iraisquic* ; Matt. 8. 22, *uzquic*. In these words the *s* final of the radicals is united with the *s* initial of the verbal form *zkic*, which implies an accusative case in the plural number. *Kic*, otherwise, means

properly *Have thou it!* See p. 311 of *La Revue de Linguistique*, 1902.

² In Baskish there is no equivalent of French *e* mute. The Basks would pronounce this word *ministré*. L. ought to have used *ministro*. In c. 3. v. 25 he uses *pedagogo*.

3. 11. . . . , gauça clara DA : ecen iustoa fedez VICICO *da*. (H. mit clara *da*, parce que L. avait lu δῆλον, sans verbe.) . . . , il appert, car Le iuste viura de foy.

3. 12. . . . , VICICO *da* hetan. . . . , viura en icelles.

3. 13. . . . : (ecen SCRIBATUA DA, MARADICATUA DA . . . gucia) . . . : (car il est escrit, Maudit est quiconque (*da* in *italic* because L. saw Ἐπικατάρατος πᾶς, without the equivalent of 'est')).

3. 15. . . . , Appointamendubat guiçon-batena baDERE, autoritatea CONFIRMATUA baDA, (badere = ba-*da*-ere = *even if it is*) . . . , Combien qu'un accord soit d'un homme, s'il est confirmé,

3. 18. Ecen baldin heretagea Leguetic baDA, Car si l'heritage est de la Loy,

3. 19. Certaco DA beraz Leguea? Transgressionén causaz ERATCHEQUI *içan da*, . . . , *eta* Leguea ORDENATU *içan da* Aingueruéz, A quoy donc sert la Loy? Elle a esté adioustee à cause des transgressions, . . . : & a esté ordonnee par les Anges,

3. 20. . . . : baina Iaincoa bat DA. . . . , mais Dieu est vn.

3. 21. Leguea . . . ERATCHEQUI *içan da*? (H. mit *eratchequi içan da*?) La Loy donc *a-elle esté adioustee* (A l'imprimerie de Jaques Faure, à Lyon, on mit 'don').

3. 24. Bada, Leguea gure pedagogo IÇAN *da* Christgana, Par ainsi la Loy a esté nostre pedagogue *pour venir* à Christ,

4. 1. . . . , gauça gucien iabe baDERE: (= baDA-ere) . . . , combien qu'il soit seigneur de tout:

4. 2. Baina tutorén eta curatorén azpico DA . . . Ains il est sous tuteurs & curateurs

4. 18. Baina on DA anhitz ONHESTEA gauça onean bethiere, Mais il est bon de tousiours fort aimer en bien,

4. 22. Ecen SCRIBATUA DA (H. mit 21) Car il est escrit

4. 24. . . . , bata DA Sinaco menditic Agar, . . . , l'vne, di-ie, du mont de Sina . . . , qui est Agar. (H. mit men à

244 A SYNOPSIS OF THE VERBAL FORMS

la fin de la ligne. L. omet 'di-ie,' parce que l'équivalent manque au grec. Mais il omet aussi ἡτις = *qui.*)

4. 25. (Ecen Sina mendibat DA Arabian (Car Sina est vne montagne en Arabie

4. 26. Baina Ierusalem gorá, libre DA, Mais la haute Ierusalem est franche,

4. 27. Ecen SCRIBATUA DA, Car il est écrit,

5. 11. . . .? beraz ABOLITU *da* crutzeazco scandaloa. . . .? le scandale de la croix donc est aboli.

5. 14. Ecen Legue gucia hitz batetan COMPLITZEN *da*, Car toute la Loy est accomplie en vne parole

5. 22. Baina Spirituaren fructua DA charitatea, Mais le fruit de l'Esprit est charité,

6. 1. Anayeác, baldineta ERORI ičan bada guicon-bat cembeit faltatan, Freres, encores qu'un homme soit surprins en quelque faute,

6. 16. . . ., baquea IÇANEN *da* hayén gainean eta misericordia, . . ., paix soit sur eux & misericorde, (*eta* est disjonctif, et ainsi *da* vaut *dire*. H. mit *içanen da* = *sera*. Il n'y a d'équivalent dans le texte grec.)

DACAZQVET. 1. Ind. prés. s. 1. r. pl. v. irr. act. *ekar*. *I bear them.*

6. 17. . . . : ecen nic Iesus Iaunaren mercác DACAZQUET neure gorputzean. . . . : car ie porte en mon corps les flestrissures du Seigneur Iesus.

DAQVIGVLARIC. 1. Ind. prés. pl. 1. r. s., avec *laric* participial v. irr. act *iaquin*. *We knowing it.*

2. 16. DAQUIGULARIC ecen . . . Sçachans que

baDAQVIÇVE. 2. Ind. prés. pl. 2. r. s. v. irr. act. *iaquin*. *Ye know it.*

3. 7. *Hala* baDAQUIÇVE ecen . . . Sçachez donc que

4. 13. Eta baDAQUIÇVE nola . . . Et vous sçaez comment

baDACVSSAÇVE. 1. Ind. prés. pl. 2. r. s. v. irr. act. *ikus*. *Ye see it.*

6. 11. BaDACUSSAÇUE . . . Vous voyez

DAGVIEGVN. 1. Imp. pl. 1. r. s., r. i. pl. v. irr. act. *eguin. Let us do it to them!*

6. 10. . . . , DAGUIEGUN vngui guciey, . . . faisons bien à tous,

DAGOELA. 1. Ind. prés. s. 3. *e* euph. *la* participial, v. irr. neutre *egon. While he stays.*

4. 6. . . . , oihuz DAGOELA, . . . , criant, (On a mit 'crians' dans l'édition de 1566.)

DAITE. 1. Potentiel prés. s. 3. aux. *He can be.*

6. 7. . . . : Iaincoa ECIN ESCARNIA *daite*: . . . , Dieu ne peut estre mocqué:

DAITENO. 1. I. q. préc. avec *n* rel. locatif de temps, décl. au duratif. (*no = jusqu'à tant que.*) *Till He may be.*

4. 19. . . . , Christ FORMA *daiteno* çuetan. . . . , iusqu'à tant que Christ soit formé en vous:

erraDAÇVE. 1. Imp. pl. 2. r. s., r. i. s. 1^e pers. v. irr. act. *erran. Say ye it to me!*

4. 21. ERRAdaçue . . . Dites-moy,

DELA. 5. I. q. *da*, v. s., avec *e* pour *a* devant *la* conjonctif (5. 3), et optatif = *que. That he is; may it be!*

1. 3. Gratia DELA¹ çuequin eta baquea . . . Grace vous soit & paix.

1. 5. Hari DELA¹ gloria . . . Auquel soit gloire

5. 3. . . . , ecen hura Legue guciaren BEGUIRATZERA çordun DELA. . . . , qu'il est obligé de garder toute la Loy.

6. 3. . . . cerbait DELA . . . estre quelque chose,

6. 18. Anayeác, Iesus Christ gure Iaunaren gratiá DELA¹ çuen spirituarequin. Freres, la grace de nostre Seigneur Iesus Christ soit auec vostre esprit.

DEN. 7. I. q. *da*, avec *n* rel. nom. = *qui. (On dit dan en Basque Espagnol.) Which is.*

¹ H. mit *dela* parce que *soit* manque au grec. En 1. 5, et ailleurs où *gloria* l'accompagne, L. évite la forme dativale, probablement parce qu'on pourrait

prendre *gloria* pour l'adjectif verbal signifiant *vanté, glorifié*, qui se trouve ci-dessous avec *ditecençát*.

1. 11. . . . , niçaz PREDICATU *içan den* Euangelioa, . . .
l'Euangile qui a esté annoncé par moy,

3. 13. . . . çurean URKATUA DEN gucia) . . . quiconque
pend au bois.)

3. 17. . . . CONFIRMATU *içan den* aliançá, . . . ETHORRI
içan den Legueac . . . , quant à l'alliance qui auparaavant
a esté confermee . . . , que la Loy qui est venue (Voyez
ez Tuela).

5. 3. . . . CIRCONCIDITZEN *den* guiçon guciari, . . . à tout
homme qui se circoncit,

5. 5. . . . fedetic DEN Spirituaz . . . par foy en Esprit.
(H. mit *den*. Le grec dit πνεύματι ἐκ πίστεως.)

5. 11. Bada niçaz DEN becembatean, Et quant à moy,
DENA. 1. I. q. préc. décl. nom. intr. (*na* = *celle qui*).
She who is.

4. 25. . . . eta bere haourrequin cerbitzutan DENA : . . .
& sert avec ses enfans :

DENAC. 1. I. q. *dena*, mais actif, nominatif de *bieço*.
(*nac* = *celui qui*.) *He who is*.

6. 6. . . . hitzean IRACASTEN *denac*, Que celuy qui est
enseigné en la parole,

DENEAN. 2. I. q. *den* aux., *n* rel. temporel décl. locatif
de temps. (*nean* = *quand, in the (time) at which*.) *When it*
is. 1. 15. Baina Iaincoaren placera IÇAN *denean* . . . Mais
quant [sic] il a pleu à Dieu

4. 4. Baina ETHORRI *içan denean* demboraren compli-
mendua, (H. mit com à la fin de la ligne). Mais quand
l'accomplissement du temps est venu,

DENO. 1. I. q. *den*, *n* rel. temp. décl. duratif (*no* = *durant*
le temps que). *While he is*.

4. 1. . . . , Herederoa haour DENO, . . . durant tout le
temps que l'heritier est enfant,

DEÇAGVNÇÁT. 1. Subj. prés. pl. 1 r. s. decl. desti-
natif, aux. act. *To the end that we may have it*.

3. 14. . . . , eta Spirituaren promessa fedez RECEBI

deçagunçât. . . . : afin que nous receuions la promesse de l'Esprit par foy.

DEÇANÇÁT. 1. Subj. prés. s. 3. r. s. décl. dest. aux. act. *To the end that he may have it.*

3. 17. . . . , promessa ABOLI *deçançât*.

. . . , pour abolir la promesse.

DEÇAÇVEN. 1. Subj. prés. pl. 2. r. s. aux. act. *That ye may have it.*

3. 3. : . . . , orain haraguiaz ACABA *deçaçuen*? . . . , que . . . , maintenant vous acheuiez par la chair?

DIO. 1. Ind. prés. s. 3. r. s. v. irr. act. *erran*.¹ *Says it.*

4. 30. Baina cer DIO Scripturac? Mais que dit l'Ecriture?

DIOT. 2. Ind. prés. s. 1. r. s. v. irr. act. *erran*.¹ *I say it.*

1. 9. . . . , orain-ere berriz DIOT, . . . , maintenant aussi ie di derechef,

3. 17. Haur bada DIOT, Voila que ie di,

baDIOTSVET. 1. Ind. prés. s. 1. r. s., r. i. pl. 2^e pers. v. irr. act. *erran*.¹ *I say it to you.*

1. 20. . . . , huná, baDIOTSUET Iaunaren aitzinean,

. . . , voici *ie vous di* deuant Dieu (H. mit *badiotsuet*. Le grec n'exprime pas "*ie vous di*").

DIRADE. 7. Ind. prés. pl. 3. v. s. & aux. *They are.*

3. 9. Bada, fedezcoac BENEDICATZEN *dirade* . . . Ceux donc qui sont de la foy, sont benits

3. 10. . . . , maledictionearen azpian DIRADE : . . . , sont sous malediction.

4. 17. Cueçaz IELOSSI *dirade*, ez onetacotz, (H. omit la virgule). Ils sont ialoux de vous, non point pour bien :

4. 24. Gauça hauc comparationez ERRAITEN *dirade*. Ecen hauc DIRADE bi aliançác, Lesquelles choses sont dites par allegorie : car ce sont les deux alliances,

¹ Il est nécessaire de dire que ces mots en expriment l'idée ; comme *tuli* avec ne dérivent pas de cette racine, mais *ferre*, ou *fui* avec *esse*.

5. 17. . . . : eta gauça hauc elkarren contra DIRADE :
 . . . : & ces choses sont contraires l'une à l'autre,

5. 19. Bada, çogueriac¹ DIRADE haraguiaren obrác, Les
 œuvres de la chair sont manifestes :

DIRADELA. 3. I. q. *dirade* avec la conj. = *que*. *That they are.*

2. 6. . . . cerbait DIRADELA . . . estre quelque chose

2. 9. . . . (habe DIRADELA ESTIMATUÉC) . . . (qui sont
 estimez estre les colonnes)

3. 7. . . . ecen fedezcoac DIRADELA Abrahamen haour.
 . . . que ceux qui sont de la foy, sont enfans d'Abraham.
 (L. dit 'enfant.')

DIRADEN. 3. I. q. *dirade*, avec *n* rel. nom. pl. & conj.
That they are, (they) which are.

1. 2. Eta enequin DIRADEN anaye guciéc, Et tous les
 freres qui sont avec moy,

2. 6. . . . (nolaco noizpait IÇAN *diraden*, . . . quels ils
 ayent esté quelque fois :

3. 10. . . . Legueco liburuän SCRIBATUAC DIRADEN
 gauça gucietan, (H. mit liburän) . . . en toutes les choses
 qui sont escrites an liure de la Loy

DIRADENAC. 1. I. q. *diraden*, *n* rel. nom. décl.
 accusatif pluriel. (*nac* = *ceux qui*). *Those who are.*

6. Sommaire I *Faltatan ERORTEN diradenac nola*
REPREHENDITZECO. I *De reprendre ceux qui faillent.*

DIRADENÉC. 3. I. q. *diraden*, *n* rel. nom. décl. nom.
 act. pl. (*néc* = *ceux qui*). *Those who are.*

2. 6. . . .) ecen estimatan DIRADENÉC (sujet de *eztrau-*
date) . . .) car ceux qui sont en estime

5. 24. Ecen Christen DIRADENÉC (sujet de *dute*) Or
 ceux qui *sont* de Christ,

6. 13. Ecen CIRCONCIDITZEN *diradenéc* berec-ere (sujet
 de *eztute*). Car ceux-mesmes qui sont circoncis,

¹ De *so* = *regard* et *aguerri* = *découvert, open to view*.

DIRADENEY. 1. I. q. *diraden*, *n* rel. nom. décl. datif plur. déterminé. (*ney* = à ceux qui.) *To those who are.*

2. 2. . . . , baina particularqui estimatan DIRADENEY, . . . en particulier avec ceux qui sont en estime :

DITECENÇÁT. 1. Subj. prés. pl. 3. aux., avec la terminaison destinative *çdt.* *To the end that they be.*

6. 13. . . . , çuen haraguian GLORIA *ditecençdt.*

. . . , afin qu'ils se glorifient en vostre chair.

DITVC. 1. Ind. prés. s. 2. r. pl. adressé au masculin, aux. act. *Thou, O man ! hast them.*

2. 14. . . . , cergatic Gentilac BORTCHATZEN¹ *dituc* IUDAIZATZERA ? . . . , pourquoy contrains-tu les Gentils à Judaïzer ?

DITVC. 1. Ind. prés. pl. 3. adr. masc. aux. *They are, O man !*

3. 8. . . . , BENEDICATUAC *içanen dituc* hitan Gendeguciac. . . . , Toutes gens seront benites en toy.

DITVDAN. 1. I. q. *ditut*, avec *da* euph. pour *t* devant *n* rel. acc. pl. = *que.* (*Things*) *which I have.*

2. 18. . . . DESEGUIN *ditudan* gauçác . . . les choses que i'ay destruites,

DITVELA. 1. I. q. *ditu*. Ind. prés. s. 3. r. pl. avec *e* euph. & *la* conj = *que.* aux. act. *That He has them.*

3. 8. . . . ecen fedeaz Iaincoac IUSTIFICATZEN *dituela* Gentilac, . . . que Dieu iustifie les Gentils par la foy,

DITVEN. 1. I. q. *ditu*, avec *e* euph. devant *n* rel. nom. act. = *qui.* *Who has them.*

3. 12. . . . : baina gauça hec EGUINEN *dituen* guiçona, . . . : mais l'homme qui fera ces choses,

DITVENAC. 1. I. q. *dituen*, décl. nom. act. sujet de *du.* (*nac* = celui qui.) *He who has them.*

3. 5. . . . , eta verthuteac çuetan OBRA TZEN *dituenac*, Celuy donc qui . . . , & produit les vertus en vous,

¹ Castillan *forzar* : cf. *altcha* de *alsar*.

DITVN. 1. Ind. prés. pl. 3. adr. féminin, v. s. *They are, O woman!* (Cf. Apoc. 18. 14. L'autre *ditun* se trouve St. Jean 4. 18.)

4. 27. . . . : ecen guehiago DITUN UTZIaren haourrac ecen ez senhardunarenac. . . . : car il y a beaucoup plus d'enfans de la delaissee que de celle qui a mari.

baDITVT. 1. Ind. prés. s. 1. r. pl. aux. act. *I have them.*

2. 18. . . . gauçác harçara EDIFICATZEN baditut, . . . si ie redifie les choses

DITVZTENÉC. 1. Ind. prés. pl. 3. r. pl. *n* rel. nom. pl. act. décl. nom. pl. act. aux. act. sujet de *eztutela*. (*néc* = *ceux qui*.) *Those who have them.*

5. 21. . . . : ecen halaco gauçác EGUITEN *dituztenéc* . . . , que ceux qui font telles choses

DITVÇVE. 1. Ind. prés. pl. 2. r. pl. aux. act. *Ye have them.*

4. 10. Egunac BEGUIRATZEN *dituçue*, eta hilebetheac, (H. omit la 1^e. virgule, comme l'imprimeur du texte français.)

Vous observez les iours, & les mois,

DITVÇVEN. 1. I. q. *dituçue*, avec *n* rel. acc. pl. (*Things*) *which ye have.*

5. 17. . . . NAHI *dituçuen* gauça guciac . . . tout ce que vous voulez.

DITZANÇÁT. 1. Subj. prés. s. 3. r. pl. avec la termⁿ. destinative *çát*, aux. act. *To the end that he may have them.*

3. 10. . . . , hec EGUIN *ditzançdt*. . . . pour les faire.

DITZAÇVENÇÁT. 1. Subj. prés. pl. 2. r. pl. décl. dest. aux. act. *To the end that ye may have them.*

4. 17. . . . , berac DESIRA *ditzaçuençdt*. (H. omit la virgule.) . . . , afin que vous les conuoitiez.

DRAVCA. 2. Ind. pres. s. 3. r. s., r. i. s. aux. act. *Has it to him.*

3. 8. . . . , aitzinetic EVANGELIZATU *ukan drauca* Abrahami, . . . , a deuant euangelizé à Abraham,

3. 18. . . . : baina Abrahami promessetic EMAN *ukan drauca* Iaincoac. . . . : mais Dieu l'a donné à Abraham par promesse.

DRAVCANIC. 1. I. q. *drauca*, avec *n* rel. nom. act. décl. à l'indéterminé participial nominatif (*nic* = *quelque chose qui*.) *Something which has it to it.*

4. 25. . . . , Ierusalem oraingoari IHARDESTEN *draucanic* (H. omit la virgule.) . . . correspondante à la Ierusalem de maintenant)

DRAVCAT. 1. Ind. prés. s. 1. r. s., r. i. s. aux. act. *I have it to him.*

5. 3. Eta TESTIFICATZEN *draucat* berriz . . . guiçon guciari, Et de rechef, ie proteste à tout homme

DRAVZQVIGVTE. 1. Ind. prés. pl. 3. r. pl., r. i. pl. 1^e. pers. aux. act. *They have them to us.*

2. 9. . . . lagunçazco escuinac EMAN *drauzquigute* niri eta Barnabasi : . . . : ils m'ont baillé à moy & à Barnabas la main d'association : (L. dit 'les mains droites', δεξιὰς.)

DRAVZQVIÇVEDAN. 1. I. q. *drauzquiçuet*, avec *da* euph. pour *t* devant *n* rel. acc. pl. = *que*, aux. act. (*Things which I have to you.*

1. 20. Baina çuey SCRIBATZEN *drauzquiçuedan* gaucetan, Or des choses que ie vous escri,

DRAVZQVIÇVET. 1. Ind. prés. s. 1. r. pl., r. i. pl. 2^e. pers. aux. act. *I have them to you.*

5. 21. . . . , guiça-ERHAITEÁC, . . . , eta hauc IRUDIAC, gauça hauc aitzinetic ERRAITEN *drauzquiçuet*, (H. mit erhaitecác,) . . . meurtres, . . . , & choses semblables à icelles : desquelles ie vous predi,

baDRAVÇVE. 2. Ind. prés. s. 3. r. s., r. i. pl. 2^e. pers. aux. act. *Has it to you.*

1. 8. Baina baldin . . . , edo Aingueru batec cerutic EVANGELIZATZEN *badrauçe*, Or si . . . , ou vn Ange du ciel vous euangelize

1. 9. . . . , Baldin norbeitec EVANGELIZATZEN badrauque
. . . , Si aucun vous euangelize

DRAVÇVEDAN. 2. I. q. *drauquet*, Ind. prés. s. 1. r. s.,
r. i. pl. 2°. pers., avec *da* euph. pour *t* devant *n* conj. régi
par *nola*, ou *cein*; aux. act. *That I have it to you.*

4. 13. . . . nola haraguiaren infirmitaterequin EVANGE-
LIZATU *ukan drauqedan* lehen. . . . comment ie vous ay
par ci deuant euangelizé avec infirmité de la chair :

6. 11. . . . cein letra lucez SCRIBATU *drauqedan* neure
escuz. . . . quelles grandes lettres ie vous ay escrites de
ma main. (L. dit 'par quelle lettre longue.')

DRAVÇVEDANEAN. 1. I. q. *drauqedan*, *n* rel. temp.
décl. temp. (*nean* = *quand*.) *When I have it to you.*

4. 16, . . . eguia ERRAITEN *drauqedanean*?
. . . vous disant la verité?

DRAVÇVEGVNAZ. 1. Ind. prés. pl. 1. r. s., r. i. pl.
2°. pers. *n* rel. acc. s. décl. médiatif déterm. s. régi par
berceric. (*naz* = *que ce que*. Cf. *duçuenaz*.) *From, or than
that which we have to you.*

1. 8. . . . , EVANGELIZATU *drauquegunaz* berceric, . . .
autrement que nous ne vous auons euangelizé,

DRAVÇVENAC. 1. I. q. *drauque*, *n* rel. nom. act. s.
décl. nom. act. s. (sujet de *du*.) aux. act. (*nac* = *celui qui*.)
He who has it to you.

3. 5. Bada, Spiritua çuey FORNITZEN *drauquenac*, Celuy
donc qui vous fournit l'Esprit,

DRAVÇVET, 5. Ind. prés. s. 1. r. s., r. i. pl. 2°. pers.
aux. act. *I have it to you.*

1. 11. IAQUIN ERACITEN *drauquet* bada, Or, freres, ie
vous fay sçauoir

4. 12. . . . , othoitz EGUITEN *drauquet*: . . . , ie vous
en prie,

4. 15. . . . ? ecen TESTIFICATZEN *drauquet*, . . . ? car ie
vous porte tesmoignage,

5. 2. Huná, nic Paulec ERRAITEN *drauquet* ecen, (H. omit cette virgule.) . . . Voici, moy Paul vous di que

5. 16. Eta *haur* ERRAITEN *drauquet*, Or ie vous di,

DV. 19. Ind. prés. s. 3. r. s. verbe poss. & aux. act
Has it.

1. 23. . . . , orain PREDICATZEN *du* . . . fedea.
. . . , annonce maintenant la foy

2. 8. . . . , OBRATU *ukan du* ni baithan-ere Gentiletara.)
. . . , a aussi besongné par moy enuers les Gentils.)

3. 5. . . . , Legueco obréz EGUITEN *du*, . . . ? (H. mit *eguiten du*.) . . . , *le fait-il* par les œuvres de la Loy, . . . ?

3. 22. Baina ERTSI *ukan du* Scripturác gucia bekatuaren
azpian, Mais l'Escriture a tout enclos sous peché,

4. 4. . . . , IGORRI *ukan du* Iaincoac Semea emaztetic
EGUINA, *eta* Leguearen azpico EGUINA : . . . , Dieu a enuoyé
son Fils, fait de femme, & fait sous la Loy :

4. 6. . . . , IGORRI *ukan du* Iaincoac çuen bihotzetara
bere Semearen Spiritua, . . . , Dieu a enuoyé l'Esprit
de son Fils, en vos cœurs,

5. 6. Ecen Iesus Christean ez circoncisioneac *du* deus
BALIO, ezeta preputioac: Car ne Circoncision ne prepuce
ne vaut aucune chose en Iesus Christ,

5. 9. Altchagarri appurbatec orhe gucia MINCEN *du*.
(H. omit ce point.) Vn peu de leuain enaigrit toute la
paste.

5. 10. . . . , EKARRIREN *du* condemnationea, . . . en
portera la condemnation,

5. 17. Ecen haraguiac GUTHICIATZEN¹ *du* Spirituaren
contrá, Car la chair conuoite contre l'Esprit,

6. 3. Ecen baldin norbeitec USTE badu . . . , harc bere
fantasiaz bere buruä ENGANATZEN *du*. Car si aucun
s'estime . . . , il se deçoit soy-mesme par sa fantasie.
(Voyez dela).

¹ Comme *codicia* en Castillan, ce mot dérive de *cupiditia*. Voyez Ducange.

6. 4. . . . : eta orduan bere baithan gloria UKANEN *du*,
 . . . : & alors il aura dequoy se glorifier en soy-mesme
 seulement, (L. ne traduit pas 'seulement,' *μόνον*.)

6. 5. Ecen batbederac bere cargá EKARRIREN *du*.¹
 Car chacun portera son fardeau.

6. 7. . . . , hura BILDUREN-ere *du*.¹ . . . , il le moisso-
 nera aussi.

6. 8. . . . , haraguitic BILDUREN *du* corruptione: . . . ,
 Spiritutic BILDUREN *du* VICITZE eternala. . . . , il moi-
 sonnera aussi de la chair corruption: . . . , il moissonnera
 de l'Esprit vie eternelle.

6. 15. Ecen Iesus Christean ez circoncisioneac *du* deus
 BALIO, ez preputioac, . . . Car en Iesus Christ, ne circon-
 cision ne prepuce ne vaut aucune chose,

DVALARIC. 1. I. q. *duc*, avec *a* euph. au lieu de *c*
 devant *laric* participial (formé de *la*, et servant à le
 distinguer de la conjonction *la* = *que*.) *While thou hast it,*
O man!

6. 1. . . . : CONSIDERATZEN *dualaric* eure buruä, (L. ne
 traduit pas littéralement ici). . . . : & te considere toy-
 mesme,

DVC. 1. Ind. prés. s. 2. r. s. adr. masc. aux. act. *Thou,*
O man, hast him.

5. 14. . . . , ONHETSIREN *duc* eure hurcoa eure buruä
 beçala. . . . , Tu aimeras ton prochain comme toy-mesme.

DVDAN. 3. I. q. *dut*, avec *da* euph. pour *t* devant *n*
 conj. = *que* régi par *nola* & beçala, et *n* rel. acc. = *que*.
That I have it, (that) which I have.

1. 13. . . . , nola CONVERSATU *ukan* *dudan* Iudaismoan,
 (L. ne traduit pas littéralement ici.) . . . quelle a esté
 autrefois ma conuersation en la Loy Judaïque:

2. 2. . . . PREDICATZEN *dudan* Euangelioa, . . . l'Euangile
 que ie presche

¹ Cf. B. Dechepare (Bourdeaulx,
 1545), p. 11, l. 8, Bat vederac egarrico
 orduyan vere haxia; and p. 5, l. 15,

Norc cer haci ereyn (baitu) vilcen dici
 comunqui. (*Haxi* = *fasci* latin.) See
daiTu Gal. 6. 7.

5. 21. . . . , lehen-ere ERRAN *dudan* beçala : . . . , comme aussi i'ay predict,

DVEN. 1. I. q. *du* aux. act., avec *e* euph. devant *n* rel. nom. s. act. = *qui*. *Which has it.*

5. 6. . . . : baina charitatez OBRATZEN *duen* fedeac. . . . , ains la foy ouurante par charité.

DVENA. 1. I. q. *duen*, décline au nom. intransitif, sujet de *da*. (*na* = *celle qui*.) *She who has it.*

4. 24. . . . , suiectionetara ENGENDRATZEN *duena* : . . . engendrant à seruitude,

DVENAC 3. I. q. *duena*, mais nom. act. (*na* = *celui qui*). *He who has it.*

2. 8. (Ecen Pierris baithan OBRATU *ukan duenac* Circoncisione Apostolutassunera, (Car celuy qui a besongné par Pierre à l'office d'Apostre enuers la Circoncision,

6. 8. Ecen bere haraguiaren¹ EREITEN *duenac*, . . . : baina Spirituaren¹ EREITEN *duenac*, Car qui seme à sa chair, . . . : mais qui seme à l'Esprit,

DVENAREN. 1. I. q. *duen*, décl. possessif déterminé (*naren* = *de celui qui*). *Of Him who has him.*

1. 1. . . . eta Iainco Aita hura hiletaric RESUSCITATU *duenaren* partez.) & par Dieu le Pere, qui l'a ressuscité des morts.) [The suffix *aren*, which belongs to *Aita* = *père*, is separated from this word by a whole intervening and qualifying clause. Cf. *dugunaren*.]

DVGV. 2. Ind. prés. pl. 1. r. s. aux. act. *We have it.*

2. 16. . . . : guc-ere Iesus Christ baithan SINHETSI *ukan dugu*, . . . , aussi auons creu en Iesus Christ :

6. 9. . . . : ecen bere sasoinean BILDUREN *dugu*, . . . : car nous moissonnerons en la saison,

DVGVN. 1. I. q. *dugu*, avec *n* conj. = *que*, régi par *beçala* = *ainsi*. (*As*) *we have it.*

¹ These possessives are here used dativally, for the receptive case, as if they bore the suffix *tdt*. Other instances may be found in this translation, and in other old Baskish books.

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1. 9. Lehen ERRAN *dugun* beçala, Ainsi que nous auons desia dit,

DVGVNAREN. 1. I. q. *dugu*, v. p. avec *n* rel. s. acc. décl. poss. dét. (*naren* = *de celle qui*). *Of that which we have.*

2. 4. . . . gure libertate Iesus Christean DUGUNAREN espia IÇATERA, . . . pour espier nostre liberté que nous auons en Iesus Christ,

DVGVNO. 1. I. q. *dugu*, v. p. avec *n* rel. temp. décl. duratif. (*no* = *pendant que*). *While we have it.*

6. 10. Bada dembora DUGUNO, Parquoy pendant que nous auons le temps,

DVT. 6. Ind. prés. s. 1. r. s., v. poss. & aux. act. *I have it.*

1. 10. Ecen orain guiçonéz PREDICATZEN *dut* ala Iaincoaz? Car maintenant presche-ie des hommes, ou de Dieu? (Voyez *nabila*.)

2. 18. . . . , transgressor neure buruă EGUITEN *dut*. . . . , ie me constitue moy-mesme transgresseur.

3. 2. Haur solament IAQUIN NAHI *dut* çuetaric, Je vueil seulement sçauoir ceci de vous,

4. 1. Eta *haur* ERRAITEN *dut*, Or ie di

4. 11. Beldurra DUT çueçaz, Je crain

5. 11. . . . , baldin are circoncisionea PREDICATZEN *badut*, . . . , si ie presche encore la Circoncision,

DVTÉ. 3. Ind. prés. pl. 3. r. s. aux. act. *They have it.*

1. 7. . . . , eta NAHI *duté* ERAUCI Christen Euangelioa : . . . , & veulent renuerser l'Euangile de Christ.

5. 24. Ecen . . . haragua CRUCIFICATU *duté*

Or ceux . . . , ont crucifié la chair

6. 13. . . . : baina NAHI *duté* . . . : mais veulent

DVTENEY. 1. I. q. *duté*, avec *n* rel. nom. pl. act. décl. dat. dét. (*ney* = *à ceux qui*). *To those who have it.*

3. 22. . . . SINHESTEN *duteney*. . . . à ceux qui croyent.

DVTENETARIC. 1. I. q. *duté*, avec *n* rel. nom. pl. act. décl. partitif dét. aux. act. (*netaric* = *de ceux qui*). *From those who have it.*

2. 6. . . . IRUDI *dutenetaric* . . . de ceux qui semblent

DVÇVE. 5. Ind. prés. pl. 2. r. s. aux. act. *Ye have it.*

1. 13. Ecen ENÇUN *duçue* . . . Car vous avez ouy

3. 2. . . . , Legueco obréz Spiritu *saindua* RECEBITU *ukan duçue*, ala fedearen predicationeaz ?

. . . , Auez-vous receu l'Esprit par les œuvres de la Loy, ou par la predication de la foy ?

3. 4. Alfer hambat SUFFRITU *ukan duçue* ?

Auez-vous tant souffert en vain ?

3. 27. . . . Christ IAUNCI *ukan duçue*.

. . . , auez vestu Christ.

5. 15. Baldineta elkar AUSSIQUITEN eta IRESTEN *ba-duçue* : Que si vous mordez & rongez l'un l'autre : (L. traduit κατεσθίετε.)

DVÇVENAZ. 2. I. q. *duçue*, avec *n* rel. acc. & temp. décl. médiatif déterminé, régi par *berceric* = *other than* & *gueroz* = *since*. (*naz* = *de ce que*.) *Than that which ye have ; since the time when ye have Him.*

1. 9. . . . RECEBITU *duçuenaz* *berceric*, . . . autrement que ce que vous avez receu,

4. 9. Baina orain Iaincoa EÇAGUTZEN *duçuenaz* *gueroz*, Mais maintenant puis que vous avez cognu Dieu, (L. traduit 'cognoissez'. Cf. *Biz* 3. 25, for the rule of *gueroz*.)

EÇAÇVE. 3. Imp. pl. 2 r. s. aux. act. *Have ye it !*

5. 13. . . . : baina elkar¹ charitatez CERBITZA *eçaçue*.

. . . , mais seruez l'un à l'autre par charité.

6. 1.... GOITI *eçaçue* haina emetassunetaco spiriturequin :

. . . , restaurez vn tel homme avec esprit de douceur :

6. 2. . . . : eta halaz COMPLI *eçaçue* Christen Leguea.

. . . : & ainsi accomplissez la Loy de Christ.

¹ *Elkar* = *l'autre* is here, as under *duçue*, in the singular : but under *itzaçue*, in 6, 2, *elkarren* is the possessive plural = *des autres*. See p. 258.

GABILTZALARIC. 1. Ind. prés. pl. 1. v. irr. intr. *ebil*, avec *laric* participial. *While we walk*.

2. 17. . . . Christez IUSTIFICATU NAHIZ GABILTZALARIC, . . . en cherchant d'estre iustifiez par Christ,

ezpaGAITEZ. 1. Hypothétique pl. 1. aux.¹ *If we be (not)*. Cf. 2 Cor. 5. 3 ; Héb. 12. 25.

6. 9. . . . , baldin lacho BILHA *ezpagaitez*.

. . . , si nous ne deuenons point lasches.

ezGAITECELA. 2. Imp. pl. 1. aux. *Let us (not) be !*

5. 26. *Ezgaitecela* vana-gloria guthicioso EGUIN, *elkar*² THARRITATUZ, *elkargana*² inuidia UKANEZ. Ne soyons point conuoiteux de vaine gloire, prouoquans l'un l'autre, ayans enuie l'un contre l'autre.

6. 9. Bada UNGUIGUITEZ *ezgaitecela* ENOYA : Or ne nous laissons point en faisant bien :

GAITECEN. 1. Subj. prés. pl. 1. aux. (sens de l'optatif). *Let us be !*

5. 25. . . . , Spirituz EBIL-ere *gaitecen*. . . . , cheminons aussi d'Esprit.

GAITV. 1. Ind. prés. s. 3. r. pl. 1^e. pers. aux. act. *Has us*.

3. 13. *Baina* Christec REDEMITU *ukan* gaitu Leguearen maledictionetic, *bera* guregatic maledictione EGUIN IÇANIC : . . . Christ nous a rachetez de la malediction de la Loy, quand il a esté fait pour nous malediction :

GAITVEN. 1. I. q. *gaitu*, avec *e* euph. & *n* rel. locatif. = *en laquelle*. *In which He has us*.

5. 1. Beraz Christec libre EGUIN *gaituen* libertatean, . . . donc . . . en la liberté en laquelle Christ nous a affranchis,

GAITVZTE. 1. Ind. prés. pl. 3. r. pl. 1^e. pers. aux. act. *They have us*.

¹ On voit que *bagara* 2. 17. & 5. 25. est le conditionnel du *fait*, tandis que *ezpagaitez* exprime une simple possi-

bilité imaginaire.

² See the note on p. 257.

2. 10. Solament AUISATU *gaituxte* (H. mis *avisatu gaituxte* parce que l'équivalent ne se trouve pas dans la traduction de Calvin, qui dit seulement "Seulement." On sous-entend comme sujets Iaques, Cephas & Iean, nommés en v. 9.)

GAVDE. 1. Ind. prés. pl. 1. v. irr. neutre *egon*, comme auxiliaire. *We stay, await.*

5. 5. . . . iustitiazco sperançaren BEGUIRA GAUDE: Car nous attendons l'esperance de iustice

GVENDOACENÇÂT. 1. Subj. passé pl. 1. décl. dest. v. irr. intr. *ioan.* *To the end that we should go.*

2. 9. . . . : gu Gentiletarát GUENDOACENÇÂT eta hec Circoncisioneçoëtarat: . . . : afin que nous allissions aux Gentils, & eux à ceux de la Circoncision: (H. mit *guendoacençdt*, par ce que L. avait lu le grec, où le verbe manque).

GVENEÇANÇÂT. 1. Subj. passé pl. 1. r. s. décl. dest. aux. act. *To the end that we should have it.*

4. 5. . . . , haourrén adoptionea RECEBI *gueneçançdt*. . . . : à celle fin que nous receussions l'adoption des enfans.

GVENTECEN. 1. Subj. passé pl. 1. aux. *That we should be.*

2. 10. . . . paubréz ORHOIT *guentecen*: . . . qu'eussions souenance des pouures:

GVENTECENÇÂT. 2. I. q. *guentecen* décl. dest. *To the end that we should be.*

2. 16. . . . , IUSTIFICA *guentecençdt* Christen¹ fedeaz, . . . : afin que nous fussions iustifiez par la foy de Christ,

3. 24. . . . , fedez IUSTIFICA *guentecençdt*. . . . , afin que nous soyons iustifiez par foy.

¹ C'est le possessif objectif, équivalent à 'en Christ'; bien que la Théologie dise que la foi que tient le Chrétien est celle que le Christ a enseignée. Dans le Basque de Leïçar-

raga *Christean* signifie *en le Christ*, et *Christen* est *de Christ*. Mais "la foi en Christ" ne peut pas être traduit 'Christen fedeaz.' Ces mots seraient 'Christ baithango fedeaz,' Actes 24. 24.

GVENTVENAC. 1. Ind. imp. s. 3. r. pl. 1^e. pers. le *n* servant de rel. nom. act. décl. nom. act. sujet de *du*. (*nac* = celui qui.) *He who has us.*

1. 23. . . . , Gu berce orduz PERSECUTATZEN *guentuenac*,
. . . , Celuy qui autrefois nous persecutoit,

GVENÇANÇÁT. 1. Subj. passé s. 3. r. pl. 1^e. pers. décl. dest. aux. act. *To the end that he might have us.*

1. 4. . . . , IDOQUI *guençançát* secula gaichto hunetaric,
. . . , afin de nous retirer du present siecle mauuais

GVENÇATENÇÁT. 1. Subj. passé pl. 3. r. pl. 1^e. pers. décl. dest. aux. act. *To the end that they might have us.*

2. 4. . . . , gu suiectionetara EREKAR *guençatençát*.
. . . , à celle fin de nous reduire en seruitude.

. EDWARD SPENCER DODGSON.

(*To be concluded in 1908.*)

NOTES ON THEON OF SMYRNA.

TWO separate portions of the work of the Platonic philosopher, Theon of Smyrna, are still extant; the text of each part depends upon a single manuscript, that containing the first part belonging to the eleventh or twelfth century (A), that containing the second to the fourteenth or fifteenth (B). “Ex codicibus A et B ducti sunt omnes quorum ego notitiam habeo libri manu scripti in quibus tota extat aut prior pars aut posterior,” says Hiller in the preface to his edition. The text of both these manuscripts is in a very bad condition; but the nature of the errors in each is different. Both were written by ignorant men; but the writer of A thought that he was learned, and has vitiated his text by numerous inept and often ridiculous interpolations: many of these have been removed by Hiller in his edition published in the *Bibliotheca Teubneriana*, but much still remains to be done. The writer of B did his best to copy what he saw; but his best was far from good; he was, for instance, incapable of reading Greek numerals—a fatal fault in the copyist of the work of a Greek mathematician—and sometimes omitted them altogether or replaced them by the despairing word ἀριθμοί.

In the following notes the references are to the pages and lines of Hiller's edition; the only other edition of the complete work with which I am acquainted is that of M. J. Dupuis (Paris, 1892), which will be occasionally noticed.

p. 53. 13. Theon, having pointed out that the word 'semitone' (ἡμιτόνιον) was not used, as Aristoxenus supposed, to denote half a tone (ἡμισυ τόνου) in the same way as ἡμιπήχιον was used to denote ἡμισυ πήχεως, but ὡς ἔλαττον τοῦ τόνου μελωδητὸν διάστημα, proceeds:—

δείκνυται γὰρ ὁ τόνος μὴδ' ὅλως εἰς δύο ἴσα διαιρεῖσθαι δυνάμενος, ἐν λόγῳ θεωρούμενος ἐπογδόῳ, καθάπερ οὐδ' ἄλλο τι ἐπιμόριον διάστημα. τὰ γὰρ θ οὐχ οἷόν τε διαιρεθῆναι εἰς ἴσα.

Theon seldom, if ever, proves the propositions he states; the proofs must be sought elsewhere, and, in this case, are to be found in Euclid *sect. can.* 13. τὸ ἄρα τονιαῖον διάστημα ἐστὶν ἐπόγδοον: "The interval of a tone is given by the ratio 9:8"; 16. ὁ τόνος οὐ διαιρεθήσεται εἰς δύο ἴσα οὔτε εἰς πλείω: "The tone cannot be divided into two or more equal parts." 3. ἐπιμορίου διαστήματος οὐδεὶς μέσος, οὔτε εἰς οὔτε πλείους ἀνάλογον ἐμπεσεῖται ἀριθμός: "There is no geometric mean between two numbers which are in the ratio of $n+1:n$, nor can either one or more numbers be inserted between them in continued proportion." These propositions, which are fully proved by Euclid, cover all the statements of the text of Theon, except the last sentence:—τὰ γὰρ θ οὐχ οἷόν τε διαιρεθῆναι εἰς ἴσα. These words must be rejected as the gloss of an ignorant interpolator: they profess to give a reason for the impossibility of dividing a tone into two equal parts; and the reason given is manifestly false, however the words are translated. Two translations are possible:—(a) "Because 9 cannot be resolved into two equal factors": this is the most natural meaning of the words, but it is so obviously untrue that even the interpolator cannot have meant the words to be so understood; (b) "Because 9 cannot be divided into two equal parts": this must have been what the interpolator meant, but cannot be assigned to Theon,

for it is not because 9 is an odd number that the interval cannot be divided into equal parts, but because no mean proportional can be inserted between two numbers which are in the ratio $n + 1 : n$.

The error, of which this is an instance, arose from an inaccurate conception of the technical meaning of *διάστημα* as used by the writers on the mathematical relations of musical sounds, and is a fruitful source of corruption in manuscripts. Late Greek commentators find fault with the Pythagoreans for confusing *διάστημα* with *λόγος*; and, even recently, van Jan, *Mus. scrip.*, p. 129, follows them:—"Summus ille Euclides saepe intervallum ponit pro ratione, lineas describit pro rationibus"; and *note*: "Euclides sectio, prob. 1—ἐὰν διάστημα πολλαπλάσιον(!) δις συντεθὲν ποιῇ τι διάστημα καὶ αὐτὸ πολλαπλάσιον ἔσται—at non intervalla sunt multiplicia, sed eorum rationes (λόγοι)."

The propriety or impropriety of speaking of a *διάστημα πολλαπλάσιον* depends entirely upon the definition of the term *διάστημα*: the definition of Thrasyllus is given by Theon, p. 48, 8: "*διάστημα δέ φησιν εἶναι φθόγγων τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιὰν σχέσιν*," with which we may compare Euclid's definition of ratio "*λόγος ἐστὶ δύο μεγεθῶν ὁμογενῶν ἢ κατὰ πηλικότητα ποιὰ σχέσις*"; now *φθόγγοι* were regarded by Greek musical theorists as *μεγέθη ὁμογενῆ*, and the question arises—how did *διάστημα* differ from *λόγος*?

The differences are stated by Theon (p. 81), first in his own words, and then, according to Eratosthenes. They are two:—(1) in order that there may be a *διάστημα*, the quantities must be different, but a ratio (*λόγος*) of equality is possible; (2) the *διάστημα* between two notes is the same whether we proceed from the lower to the higher, or from the higher to the lower, but the ratio of $a : b$ is different from that of $b : a$. When the boundaries of the *διάστημα* are given in numbers, *e.g.* 256 and 243, we must be careful not to fall into the common error of

supposing that the διάστημα is 13 : the proper name of this difference was ὑπεροχή, or διαφορά. This is very clearly expressed by Theon, p 67—τὸ δὲ λείμμα τοῦτό φησιν (Plato) ἀκατονόμαστον εἶναι, ἐν λόγῳ δὲ εἶναι ἀριθμοῦ πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ὃν ἔχει το $\overline{\sigma\upsilon\varsigma}$ πρὸς $\overline{\sigma\mu\gamma}$. τὸ δὲ διάστημα τοῦτό ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ὑπεροχὴ $\overline{\iota\gamma}$; and by Nicomachus, *Ench.* c. 12—διάστημα δ' ἐστὶ δυοῖν φθόγγων μεταξύτης· σχέσις δὲ λόγος ἐν ἐκάστῳ διαστήματι μετρητικὸς τῆς ἀποστάσεως· διαφορά δὲ ὑπερβολὴ ἢ ἔλλειψις φθόγγων πρὸς ἀλλήλους· κακῶς γὰρ οἰόνται οἱ νομίζοντες διαφορὰν καὶ σχέσιν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι. A διπλάσιον διάστημα is one whose σχέσις is the ratio 2 : 1; it is only in consequence of the error of confusing the διαφορά with the σχέσις, and of identifying διάστημα with διαφορά, that such an expression as διάστημα διπλάσιον is condemned. A διάστημα may be expressed in numbers; and if one of these numbers is a multiple of the other, it is quite legitimate to speak of a πολλαπλάσιον διάστημα.

Each διάστημα or interval has two names, one derived from the number of notes contained in it, *e.g.* διὰ πασῶν, διὰ πέντε, διὰ τεσσάρων; the other from the ratio involved: the διὰ πασῶν is a διπλάσιον διάστημα, and is such in two ways:—(1) the lower note is given by a string twice as long as that which produces the higher note; (2) the higher note has twice as many vibrations as the lower note; or, as Theon expresses it, ἀντιπεπόνθασιν οἱ ἀριθμοὶ τῶν κινήσεων τοῖς μεγέθεσι τῶν διαστημάτων: the numbers of the vibrations are inversely as the lengths of the strings which give the intervals. Thus a tone is an ἐπόγδοον διάστημα, the lower note being given by a string $\frac{2}{3}$ of that of the higher note, and the number of vibrations in the higher note being $\frac{3}{2}$ of the number of vibrations in the lower note. In all cases, so far as I know, when an interval is expressed as a ratio, the higher number is given first, *e.g.* τὸ διάστημα τὸ τῶν $\overline{\sigma\upsilon\varsigma}$ πρὸς $\overline{\sigma\mu\gamma}$.

p. 69. 12 f. ὅτι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ διάστημα τὸ τῶν $\overline{\sigma\nu\tau}$ πρὸς $\overline{\sigma\mu\gamma}$, τουτέστι τὰ $\overline{\iota\gamma}$, ἑλαττόν ἐστιν ἡμιτονίου, δῆλον. τοῦ γὰρ τόνου ἐπογδίου ὄντος τὸ ἡμιτόνιον δις ἐπόγδιον ἔσται, τουτέστιν ἐφεκκαιδέκατον. τὰ δὲ $\overline{\iota\gamma}$ τῶν $\overline{\sigma\mu\gamma}$ ἐστὶν ἐν λόγῳ πλείονι ὀκτωκαιδεκάτου, ὃ ἐστὶ μέρος ἑλαττον ἐκκαιδεκάτου.

In the first sentence of this passage the words τουτέστι τὰ $\overline{\iota\gamma}$ must be omitted as an unintelligent gloss, for 13 is not the διάστημα, but the ὑπεροχή: they were evidently inserted by one who had fallen into the error discussed in the last note; though Theon in the preceding lines had said that no particular stress was to be laid upon the number 13, because Plato was dealing, not with a definite number, but with a ratio of numbers:—οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμὸν ὠρισμένον ἔλαβεν ὁ Πλάτων, ἀλλὰ λόγον ἀριθμοῦ. Dupuis, p. 112, suggests καὶ ἡ ὑπεροχὴ $\overline{\iota\gamma}$ for τουτέστι τὰ $\overline{\iota\gamma}$, which, besides being palæographically improbable, reduces the grammar of the sentence to confusion.

The remainder of the passage is intended to prove that the semitone—defined as the difference between two tones and the interval of a fourth—is less than a true half tone, but as it stands is unintelligible: the line of argument is mathematically clear, but the text, owing to lacunæ and wrong readings, misrepresents it. The manner in which the ratio 256:243 is obtained is clearly explained in the preceding section: it depends on the facts that the interval of a fourth consists of two tones and a semitone, and that $\frac{2}{3} \times \frac{2}{3} \times \frac{3}{2} \times \frac{3}{2} = 1$. It is clear, says Theon, that the interval represented by the ratio 256:243 is less than half a tone. For, since the tone is represented by the ratio of 9:8, the true half tone, as distinguished from the λεῖμμα, or semitone, taken twice over, must produce the ratio 9:8. Here δις must stand for δις συντεθέν, or συντεθέν may have been in the original

text. It is easy to prove that the ratio of the true half tone must be less than $17:16$ (ἑφεκκαιδέκατον), and greater than $18:17$ (ἑπτακαιδέκατον) (this is proved in a similar passage in Boetius *Inst. Mus.* 3, 1); but the ratio of a semitone is $\frac{256}{128} = 1\frac{1}{2}$, and 243 is more than 18 times 13; therefore $\frac{256}{128}$ is less than $1\frac{1}{18}$, and *a fortiori* less than $1\frac{1}{17}$; but the ratio of a half tone is greater than $18:17$, hence a semitone is less than half a tone. This might have been expressed in Greek as follows:—

ὅτι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ διάστημα τὸ τῶν $\overline{\sigma\nu\tau}$ πρὸς $\overline{\sigma\mu\gamma}$ ἑλαττόν ἐστιν ἡμιτονίου, δῆλον. τοῦ γὰρ τόνου ἐπογδόου ὄντος τὸ ἡμιτόνιον δις <συντεθέν> ἐπόγδοον ἔσται, <τὸ δὲ ἡμιτόνιον πλείον μὲν ἐστὶ ἑφεκκαιδέκατου ἑλαττον δὲ ἑφεκκαιδέκατου>. τὰ δὲ $\overline{\iota\gamma}$ τῶν $\overline{\sigma\mu\gamma}$ ἐστὶν ἐν λόγῳ πλείονι ὀκτωκαιδέκατου, ὃ ἐστὶ μέρος ἑλαττον ἐπτακαιδέκατου.

The words *τουτέστιν ἑφεκκαιδέκατον* were added to *δις ἐπόγδοον ἔσται* by some very ignorant person, who took *δις* with *ἐπόγδοον* and imagined that the result of multiplying *ἐπόγδοον* ($1\frac{1}{2}$) by 2 was *ἑφεκκαιδέκατον* ($1\frac{1}{18}$); these words, assisted by homœoteleuton, ousted the proper words from the text, and the last word of the next sentence, *ἐπτακαιδέκατου*, was altered to *ἐκκαιδέκατου* in a vain attempt to produce some semblance of logic.

p. 70. 1, ἀμέλει τοῦ ἐπογδόου πυθμένος τὸ διάστημα τουτέστι τῶν $\overline{\theta}$ πρὸς τὰ $\overline{\eta}$ ἢ μονὰς οὐ τέμνεται.


Dupuis translates:—"Le fond de l'intervalle sesqui-octave étant le rapport de 9 à 8, la différence des termes qui est l'unité n'est assurément pas divisible": this translation does not represent the Greek, and moreover inverts the argument, for the indivisibility of the unit is not deduced from that of the ratio $9:8$, but the indivisibility of the ratio is deduced from that of the unit. Hiller's suggested emendation—τοῦ ἐπογδόου πυθμένος τῶν $\overline{\theta}$ πρὸς τὰ $\overline{\eta}$ τὸ

διάστημα, τουτέστιν ἡ μονάς, οὐ τέμνεται—introduces the error, of which the interpolator was so fond, that the διάστημα was the same as the ὑπεροχή. It is quite correct to describe the διάστημα by the words τουτέστι τῶν $\bar{\theta}$ πρὸς τὰ $\bar{\eta}$, and all difficulty is removed by omitting the words ἡ μονάς: the sentence means that the interval of the ἐπόγδοον in its lowest terms, that is the ratio 9 : 8, cannot be divided.

p. 70. 14. ὅτι δὲ ὁ τόνος δίχα οὐ διαιρεῖται δῆλον οὕτω. πρῶτον μὲν ὁ ἐπόγδοος πυθμὴν τὸ διάστημα ἔχει μονάδα, ἥτις ἀδιαίρετος.

Here we should read τὴν ὑπεροχὴν for τὸ διάστημα; the proof, based on the indivisibility of the unit, that, when the difference (ὑπεροχή) between two numbers is 1, no mean proportional can fall between them, is given by Euclid *sect. can.* 3, and is worth quoting:—

ἔστω γὰρ ἐπιμόριον διάστημα τὸ B, Γ· ἐλάχιστοι δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τοῖς B, Γ ἔστωσαν οἱ ΔΖ, Θ. οὗτοι οὖν ὑπὸ μονάδος μόνης μετροῦνται κοινῷ μέτρῳ. ἄφελε ἴσον τῷ Θ τὸν ΗΖ. καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐπιμόριός ἐστιν ὁ ΔΖ τοῦ Θ, ἡ ὑπεροχὴ ὁ ΔΗ κοινὸν μέτρον τοῦ τε ΔΖ καὶ τοῦ Θ ἐστὶ μονὰς ἄρα ὁ ΔΗ· οὐκ ἄρα ἐμπεσεῖται εἰς τοὺς ΔΖ, Θ μέσος οὐδεὶς· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ ἐμπίπτων τοῦ ΔΖ ἐλάττων, τοῦ δε Θ μείζων, ὥστε τὴν μονάδα διαιρεῖσθαι, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. οὐκ ἄρα ἐμπεσεῖται εἰς τοὺς ΔΖ, Θ τις..



The general theorem is then deduced by Euclid from *Elements* 8. 8.

p. 70. 16. εἴτα ἐν μὲν ἀριθμῷ οὐκ ἀεὶ εἰς ἴσα τέμνεται τὸ ἐπόγδοον διάστημα. καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν $\overline{\sigma\iota\tau}$ πρὸς $\overline{\sigma\mu\gamma}$ ἡ ὑπεροχὴ $\overline{\kappa\zeta}$ οὐ τέμνεται εἰς ἴσα, ἀλλὰ εἰς $\overline{\iota\gamma}$ καὶ εἰς $\overline{\iota\delta}$.

In 70. 15 the word πυθμὴν means that the ratio is expressed in its lowest terms, and the proof of the theorem depended upon the indivisibility of the unit; in this

passage, where the ratio is ἐν ἀριθμῷ, i.e. not in its lowest terms, a different line of argument is adopted. It is easy to prove that, if it be possible for a mean proportional to fall between two numbers, which are in the ratio 8 : 9, the difference between the two numbers, the ὑπεροχή, will *always* be divisible by 2; but 216 and 243 are in the ratio 8 : 9, and the ὑπεροχή 27 is odd; hence no mean proportional can fall between them.

The text should run :—εἴτα ἐν μὲν ἀριθμῷ οὐκ ἀεὶ εἰς ἴσα τέμνεται ἡ ὑπεροχή τοῦ ἐπογδόου διαστήματος. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.

The interpolator, who imagined that the ὑπεροχή and the διάστημα were the same, would naturally misunderstand the expression ἡ ὑπεροχή τοῦ ἐπογδόου διαστήματος, and alter it to τὸ ἐπόγδοον διάστημα: but that Theon meant the ὑπεροχή, not the διάστημα, is clear from the use of the word in the numerical example.

p. 74. 24 Theon, having divided ratios, of which the first term is larger than the second, into three classes οἱ μὲν πολλαπλάσιοι, οἱ δὲ ἐπιμόριοι, οἱ δὲ οὐδέτεροι, proceeds according to the interpolated text :—τούτων δὲ οἱ μὲν ἐν συμφωνίᾳ εἰσὶν, οἱ δ' οὐ. αἱ μὲν οὖν συμφωνίαι τῶν πολλαπλασίων ὃ τε διπλάσιος καὶ ὁ τριπλάσιος καὶ ὁ τετραπλάσιος, ἐν δὲ ἐπιμορίοις ἡμιόλιος ἐπίτριτος, ἐν οὐδετέρῳ δὲ ὃ τε ἐπόγδοος καὶ ὁ τῶν σνς πρὸς σμγ. On this Hiller remarks: "αἱ συμφ. neglegentur dictum: nisi scr. ἐν μὲν οὖν συμφωνίᾳ": this emendation may be accepted, but the corruption goes much deeper. The last clause contains two manifest blunders :—(a) the ἐπόγδοος is ἐπιμόριος and therefore not ἐν οὐδετέρῳ; (b) the ἐπογδοος and ὁ τῶν σνς πρὸς σμγ are not ἐν συμφωνίᾳ (that the interpolator regarded the tone and semitone as ἐν συμφωνίᾳ is indicated by p. 48. 20). σύμφωνα δὲ κατὰ συνέχειαν οἶον τόπος, δέσεις.¹ There is no doubt that these words should be omitted, for the statement is immediately contradicted, p. 49. 2. διάφωνοι

¹ "σύμφωνα—δέσεις fort. del. cf. Marquard, p. 235."—Hiller.

δ' εἰσὶ καὶ οὐ σύμφωνοι φθόγγοι, ὧν ἐστὶ τὸ διάστημα τόνου ἢ διέσεως. (The interpolator has even gone so far as to change οὐ in this sentence to οἱ, thus reducing the passage to nonsense.) The easiest corrections of the text are:—
 ἐν μὲν οὖν συμφωνίᾳ τῶν πολλαπλασίων ὃ τε διπλάσιος καὶ ὁ τριπλάσιος καὶ ὁ τετραπλάσιος, ἐν δὲ ἐπιμορίοις <ὃ θ' > ἡμιόλιος <καὶ ὁ> ἐπίτριτος, <οὐκ ἐν συμφωνίᾳ δὲ> ὃ τε ἐπόγδοος <ἐπιμόριος ὧν> καὶ ἐν οὐδετέρῳ ὁ τῶν συντ. πρὸς σμγ. At p. 75. 13 the same error is repeated; Hiller truly remarks “13 ἐν οὐδετέρῳ κ. τ. λ. — 25 : haec plane supervacua sunt, quaedam etiam inepta”; the paragraph may, without hesitation, be assigned to the interpolator.

p. 82. 14 διαπλάσιον is obviously a misprint for διπλάσιον, but is retained in the text by Dupuis, p. 134. 2.

p. 84. 17 ἐγχωρεῖ γάρ τι κατὰ τάξιν μέσον ὃν μὴ ἔχειν ἀναλόγως πρὸς τὰ ἄκρα· ὥς τὰ δύο μέσα ἐστὶ τῇ τάξει τῶν $\bar{\gamma}$, καὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ τὰ $\bar{\gamma}$ καὶ τὰ $\bar{\delta}$ καὶ τὸ $\bar{\epsilon}$. ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦ ἐνὸς οὐχ οἷόν τε ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὰ $\bar{\iota}$ μὴ πρότερον ἐλθόντα ἐπὶ τὰ $\bar{\beta}$ καὶ τὰ $\bar{\gamma}$ καὶ τὰ $\bar{\delta}$. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν τούτων ἀναλόγως ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ἄκρα.

Theon, in these words, is illustrating the difference between μεσότης and ἀναλογία. The exact meaning assigned by him to μεσότης is not clear; it is a more general term than ἀναλογία, for he says εἰ μὲν τι ἀναλογία, τοῦτο καὶ μεσότης, εἰ δὲ τι μεσότης, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀναλογία.

The corrupt text is thus restored by Hiller:—ὥς τὰ δύο μέσα ἐστὶ τῇ τάξει <τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ> τῶν $\bar{\gamma}$, καὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ <τῶν $\bar{\iota}$ > τὰ $\bar{\gamma}$ καὶ τὰ $\bar{\delta}$ καὶ τὰ $\bar{\epsilon}$. He accordingly supposes that two examples of μεσότης, which is not ἀναλογία, are given:—
 (a) 2 is a mean by position between 1 and 3, (b) 3, 4, and 5 are means by position between 1 and 10. Dupuis accepts this interpretation, but suggests τὰ $\bar{\beta}$ καὶ τὰ $\bar{\gamma}$ καὶ τὰ $\bar{\delta}$ for τὰ $\bar{\gamma}$ καὶ τὰ $\bar{\delta}$ καὶ τὰ $\bar{\epsilon}$, which is a slight improvement. The first of these examples is bad, because 2, as a mean

between 1 and 3, is also an instance of 'arithmetical analogy,' one of the three analogies mentioned by Theon in the next paragraph; in the other example the reason for selecting 3, 4, and 5 (or 2, 3, and 4) as means κατὰ τάξιν between 1 and 10, to the exclusion of 6, 7, 8, and 9, is not obvious.

It is not improbable that Theon in this passage means by μεσότητες any intermediate numbers passed through in the process of deriving one number from another; thus the Pythagoreans obtained 10 from 1 by passing through 2, 3, and 4; the numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4 formed a *tetractys* and by addition give 10; hence 2, 3, and 4 are μεσότητες between 1 and 10, but there is no ἀναλογία. It may be noticed that on p. 93 Theon repeats the distinction between the two words:—*νυνὶ δ' ἐπανεέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸν τῶν λοιπῶν ἀναλογιῶν καὶ μεσοτήτων λόγον ἐπειδὴ ὡς ἔφαμεν ἡ ἀναλογία καὶ μεσότης, οὐ μέντοι ἡ μεσότης καὶ ἀναλογία. καθὼ δὲ ἡ ἀναλογία καὶ μεσότης ἐστίν, ἀκόλουθος ἂν εἴη ὁ περὶ τῶν ἀναλογιῶν καὶ περὶ τῶν μεσοτήτων λόγος*; he then immediately describes this, the first Pythagorean *τετρακτύς*. This meaning can be obtained by much smaller changes of the text than those of Hiller or Dupuis:—(a) τῶν $\bar{\iota}$ for τῶν $\bar{\gamma}$, which is palæographically no change at all, (b) the transposition of καὶ τὰ $\bar{\gamma}$ καὶ τὰ $\bar{\delta}$, (c) the omission of καὶ τὰ $\bar{\epsilon}$.

Read:—ὡς τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ $\bar{\gamma}$ καὶ τὰ $\bar{\delta}$ μέσα ἐστὶ τῇ τάξει τῶν ι καὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς· ἀπὸ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.

p. 90. 22 ἀντιπεπόνθασι δ' αἱ λοιπαὶ τῶν κινήσεων κατὰ πυκνοῦ τοῦ ἐπογδόου τόνου καὶ ἐπιτρίτου διὰ τεσσάρων καὶ ἡμιολίου διὰ πέντε τοῦ κανόνος. ἐπεὶ τὸ κ.τ.λ.

This astounding sentence is printed by Hiller and Dupuis as the beginning of a new paragraph, and doubtless so appears in the MS. Dupuis translates: "Les nombres de vibrations sont soumis à la proportion inverse, puisqu'on trouve condensés dans le canon le ton dont la raison est

sesquioctave (9/8), la consonance de quarte dont la raison est sesquitierce (4/3), et la consonance de quinte dont la raison est sequialtère (3/2)"; the logic of which is as surprising as the Greek of the text.

The three preceding paragraphs contain an account of the division of a string into 3 and 4 parts, and numerical examples of such divisions; the first ends with the words καὶ ὁμοίως ἀντιπεπόνθασιν οἱ ἀριθμοὶ τῶν κινήσεων τῇ διαφέρει τῶν μεγεθῶν, the second with the words καὶ ὁμοίως ἀντιπεπόνθασιν οἱ ἀριθμοὶ τῶν κινήσεων τοῖς μεγέθεσι τῶν διαστημάτων; the third paragraph, containing the numerical examples which bring out most clearly the fact that "the number of vibrations is inversely proportional to the length of the strings," has, as the text stands, no such conclusion. The sentence should surely run ἀντιπεπόνθασιν δ' οἱ ἀριθμοὶ (so Hiller) τῶν κινήσεων τοῖς μεγέθεσι τῶν διαστημάτων, and be attached to the preceding paragraph. The paragraph itself deals with καταπύκνωσις, and probably began ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἡμιόλιον κ.τ.λ.

The error may have been produced by a combination of the inscription of the section, καταπύκνωσις τοῦ κανόνος, written in two lines in the margin, and a gloss on διαστημάτων written between them thus:—

καταπύκνωσις
τοῦ ἐπογδοοῦ τόνου καὶ
ἐπιτρίτου διὰ τεσσάρων
καὶ ἡμιολίου διὰ πέντε
του κανονος

These words, written continuously, then took the place of τοῖς μεγέθεσι τῶν διαστημάτων.

p. 91. 22. τὸ δὲ ὄγδοον ὑπερβιβάσαντες ἔξομεν τὴν παρανήτην διεzeugμένων· ἢ αὐτὴ καὶ διάτονος καὶ νήτη συνημμένων, τόνῳ βαρυτέρα τῆς νήτης διεzeugμένων· τοῦ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς νήτης ἕως τῆς τελευτῆς τὸ ὄγδοον

λαβόντες καὶ ὑπερβιβάσαντες ἔχομεν τὴν τρίτην τῶν διεzeugμένων τόνῳ βαρυτέραν.

The first sentence describes the construction of the *paranete diezeugmenon*; if we add to the length of the string which produces the *nete diezeugmenon* an eighth of its length, we obtain the *paranete diezeugmenon*, which is also the *diatonos (diezeugmenon)* and the *nete synemmenon*, a tone lower in pitch than the *nete diezeugmenon*. The following words are ambiguous; a reader would naturally suppose that the *nete* referred to was the *nete diezeugmenon*, and not the *nete synemmenon*, which is only named parenthetically; but this is not the case, because the note so constructed, the *trite diezeugmenon*, is not one tone, but two tones lower than the *nete diezeugmenon*. The reading in l. 25 should be either τοῦ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς παρανήτης, or τοῦ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς νήτης συνημμένων, instead of τοῦ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς νήτης; of these the first is the better, because it is palæographically easier, and because it is more in accordance with the line of construction followed by Theon.

p. 92. 26. καὶ οὕτως συμπληρωθήσεται τὸ πᾶν ἀμετάβολον σύστημα κατὰ τὸ διάτονον καὶ χρωματικὸν γένος· τὸ δὲ ἐναρμόνιον ἐξαιρουμένων τῶν διατόνων καθ' ἕκαστον τετράχορδον διπλωδουμένων γίνεται.

That the second sentence is corrupt is indicated by the facts that the word καὶ is found erased in A after τῶν, that the strange word διπλωδουμένων has no proper construction, and that the statement, however translated, is obviously false. If the notes called by Theon διάτονοι be removed from each tetrachord of this complete diatonic and chromatic system, the remainder will be the χρωματικὸν γένος; in order to obtain the ἐναρμόνιον γένος, it is necessary to remove also the notes named chromatic by Theon from each tetrachord, and to divide each *trite* and *parhypate* into two parts. Possibly the whole sentence should be struck out, for this *sectio canonis* professes to be that of Thrasyllus,

who throughout calls the semitone τὸ διεσιαῖον λείμμα, and probably paid no attention to the enharmonic genus. If it be retained, we should read:—τὸ δὲ ἐναρμόνιον ἐξαιρουμένων τῶν διατόνων <καὶ τῶν χρωματικῶν> καθ' ἕκαστον τετράχορδον διπλωδουμένων <δὲ τῶν παρυπατιῶν καὶ τῶν τρίτων> γίνεται, taking διπλωδουμένων to mean “being divided into two notes.” Dupuis reads τὸ δὲ ἐναρμόνιον ἐξαιρουμένων τῶν διατόνων καθ' ἕκαστον διὰ πασῶν διπλωδουμένων <καὶ δίχα διαιρουμένων τῶν ημιτονων> γίνεται. (ημιτονων is probably a misprint for ἡμιτονίων): if we refer to his translation for the meaning of this, we find:—“Quant au système enharmonique, il se déduit du système diatonique en supprimant les diatones que nous faisons entendre deux fois dans chaque octave et en divisant en deux les demi-tons.” This is objectionable, because the words “du système diatonique” are not represented in the Greek, and Theon has constructed the complete diatonic and chromatic system; because the agreement of the two participles ἐξαιρουμένων and διπλωδουμένων with διατόνων is very harsh, and to obtain the meaning required by Dupuis it would be necessary to read τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον διὰ πασῶν διπλωδουμένων; because the diatones are not heard twice in each octave, and even if it were possible to suppose that Dupuis meant that ‘the diatones are heard twice, once in each octave,’ such cannot be the meaning of the Greek; because the two octaves are not exactly similar; because the *diatonos synemmenon* is not repeated in the lower octave; and because the system is not regarded as composed of two octaves, but of five tetrachords.

p. 93. 2. εὐροιμεν δ' ἂν ταῦτα καὶ ἐν ἀριθμοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς νήτης τῶν ὑπερβολαίων ἀρχόμενοι, ὑποτεθείσης αὐτῆς $\bar{\mu}$ τξη. οἱ ἐφεξῆς ἐπόγδοί τε καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ κατὰ τοὺς προειρημένους λόγους λαμβάνονται, οὓς περίεργον ἐκτιθέναι· ῥάδιον δὲ τῷ παρηκολουθηκότι τοῖς προειρημένοις.

In this sentence $\bar{\mu}$ τξη stands for \bar{M} τξη = 10,368; the line over the μ represents the α , and Hiller is not quite

correct in expanding it into *μυρίων*: \dot{M} represents *μυρίαδος μιᾶς*. The passage may be translated:—"We can express these results in integer numbers also, starting from the *νήτη ὑπερβολαίων*, if we assign to it the number 10,368. The intervals of $\frac{9}{8}$ and the other fractions are constructed according to the ratios already indicated; but it is superfluous to set them forth; since it is easy for anyone who has followed our previous statements to calculate them."

No alteration of the text is required; but Dupuis, p. 152, proposes to read *ὑποτεθείσης αὐτῆς <μονάδων τπδ' καὶ ἡ προσλαμβανομένη> μυρίων τξή' <γενήσεται>*, and translates:—"Nous trouverons les résultats en nombres en commençant par la nète des hyperbolées que nous supposerons composée de 384 parties, dont on prend successivement les $\frac{9}{8}$ et les autres fractions que nous avons indiquées. La proslambanomène en vaudra 10,368." M. Dupuis has been misled by the fact that these numbers 384 and 10,368 represent the extreme notes of the scale described in the *Timæus* of Plato; but he has overlooked two important differences between the two scales: that of Plato is diatonic, while that of Theon is diatonic and chromatic; that of Plato extends to four octaves and a major sixth, while that of Theon contains only two octaves. In the first place, the scale described by Theon is the complete diatonic and chromatic system—*τὸ πᾶν ἀμετάβολον σύστημα κατὰ τὸ διάτονον καὶ χρωματικὸν γένος*—; but if the *νήτη ὑπερβολαίων* be represented by 384, though all the diatonic notes are expressible in integers, the chromatic notes will involve fractions. In the second place, since the whole system contains only two octaves, the number for the *proslambanomenos* must be four times that of the *nete*, i.e. 1536, not 10,368 (= 384 × 27).

It will therefore be well to calculate the numbers—*οὓς περίεργον ἐκτιθέναι*—according to the rules laid down by

Theon. Those of the principal notes are calculated by him, p. 89, and are :—

νήτη ὑπερβολαίων	. . .	3
νήτη διεzeugμένων	. . .	4
μέση	6
ὑπάτη	8
ὑπερυπάτη	9
προσλαμβανόμενος	. . .	12

The numbers are proportional to the length of the strings which produce the notes. The numbers of the other intervals can now be calculated according to the rules given in the section on καταπύκνωσις, p. 91. 10 :—

νήτη ὑπερβολαίων	3	10,368
1. διάτονος ὑπερβολαίων	$3 \times \frac{9}{8}$	11,664
3. χρωματική ὑπερβολαίων	$4 \times \frac{9}{8}$	12,288
2. τρίτη ὑπερβολαίων	$3 \times \frac{9}{8} \times \frac{9}{8}$	13,122
νήτη διεzeugμένων	4	13,824
4. παρανήτη διεzeugμένων	$4 \times \frac{9}{8}$	15,552
8. χρωματική διεzeugμένων	$6 \times \frac{9}{8} \times \frac{9}{8}$	16,384
5. τρίτη διεzeugμένων	$4 \times \frac{9}{8} \times \frac{9}{8}$	17,496
7. παραμέση	$6 \times \frac{9}{8}$	18,432
6. τρίτη συνημμένων	$4 \times \frac{9}{8} \times \frac{9}{8} \times \frac{9}{8}$	19,683
μέση	6	20,736
9. διάτονος μέσων	$6 \times \frac{9}{8}$	23,328
11. χρωματική μέσων	$8 \times \frac{9}{8}$	24,576
10. παρυπάτη μέσων	$6 \times \frac{9}{8} \times \frac{9}{8}$	26,244
ὑπάτη μέσων	8	27,648
12. ὑπερυπάτη	$8 \times \frac{9}{8}$	31,104
13. παρυπάτη ὑπατῶν	$8 \times \frac{9}{8} \times \frac{9}{8}$	34,992
14. ὑπάτη ὑπατῶν	$12 \times \frac{9}{8}$	36,864
προσλαμβανόμενος	12	41,472

The numbers at the left indicate the order in which the notes are constructed by Theon; and it should be

observed that, except the *ὑπερυπάτη*, the principal notes are not constructed a second time.¹ In order to clear these results of fractions, it is necessary to multiply each of them by $6 \times 8 \times 8 \times 9 = 3456$: hence the smallest number for the *νήτη ὑπερβολαίων* is $3 \times 3456 = 10,368$, which is the number given by Theon.

The subject of the second part of the work of Theon is the form of the Earth and astronomy; the text depends on a manuscript (B) different from that which contains the first part (A). A has suffered much at the hand of an ignorant interpolator; B seems to have been produced by a conscientious scribe who copied all he could read, with many omissions, however, and mistakes in numbers; the text has been freely corrected by Martin with much learning, but not always with success.

p. 126. 5. Theon here states the volume of the Earth calculated according to rules fully explained by himself; the text according to B runs:—*ἡ δὲ ὅλη γῆ σφαιροειδὴς λογιζομένη, στερεῶν σταδίων ἔχει μυριάδας τρίτων μὲν ἀριθμῶν μυριάδων μὲν δευτέρων δὲ μὴ πρώτων δὲ μυρίων καὶ ἐπὶ σταδίων ςςςξς τεσσαρακοστόδιον*. It is obvious that the writer of the MS. could make nothing of the numbers in the text before him; nearly all the numerical symbols are omitted except a few at the end, which really have some resemblance to the right numbers; we may therefore assume that the original text contained the correct number. In calculating the volume of the Earth, Theon

¹ Hence the alterations of the text proposed by Dupuis on p. 150, 6–10 [Hiller, p. 92, 2–6] are wrong; for, according to his reading, we have only an allusion to the construction of the *παραμέση*, and a superfluous construction of the *μέση*, while the *τρίτη συνημμένων* is entirely omitted. This

note, the *τρίτη συνημμένων*, is the characteristic note of the important tetrachord *τῶν συνημμένων*, since all its other notes are identical in pitch with notes of other tetrachords. M. Dupuis, however, omits all mention of this tetrachord in his analysis of the scale in XII. p. 343.

starts from the estimate of Eratosthenes, that the circumference of the Earth is 252,000 stades; and, by the theorem of Archimedes, that the circumference of a circle is $3\frac{1}{2}$ times the diameter, deduces that the diameter of the Earth is 80,182 stades. The rule for finding the volume is this:—find the cube of the diameter, divide it by 14, and multiply the quotient by $7\frac{1}{2}$; the result is the volume of the sphere. Unfortunately Martin made an arithmetical mistake in his first operation, making the square of 80,182 to be 6,427,153,124 instead of 6,429,153,124; consequently all his subsequent figures are wrong, the error of two millions in the square becoming by multiplication an error of more than one hundred and sixty thousand millions in the final result. Hiller has adopted Martin's numbers without verification; but Dupuis has observed the error, and gives the right number. Since, however, I differ from him as to the proper restoration of the text, I shall subjoin what I believe to be the correct reading. The word ἔχει of the text involves several subsequent alterations of genitives to accusatives, and the usual construction in Theon is ἐστὶ with the genitive. It should be observed that the notation adopted by Theon for high numbers is that of Apollonius, not that of Archimedes (see *Mélanges Nicole*, p. 157f); τρίτων ἀριθμῶν is a technical term of the system of Archimedes, and has no meaning in that of Apollonius; probably the scribe in despair wrote down the word ἀριθμῶν to indicate that there were numbers in the MS. which he was copying, and then made a very poor attempt at copying them. The text should run thus:—ἡ δὲ ὅλη γῆ, σφαιροειδῆς λογιζομένη, στερεῶν σταδίων ἐστὶ τρίτων μὲν μυριάδων σο, δευτέρων δὲ σν, πρώτων δὲ ἄτν καὶ ἐπὶ σταδίων ἩσϞΖ καὶ δυοκαίτεσσαρακοστὸν σταδίου, i.e. "the whole Earth, if supposed to be spherical, contains 270,0250,4350,8297 $\frac{1}{2}$ ($=\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4}$) cubic stades." On p. 127. 19–23 the text of B, as

far as it goes, contains many traces of the right numbers—about half the numbers are correct—but naturally differs entirely from the reading of Martin and Hiller for which we should substitute :—*ἡ περίμετρος τῆς γῆς ἐστὶ σταδίων μ.κε'Β, ἡ δὲ διαμέτρος μ.η.ρπβ, τὸ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς διαμέτρου τετράγωνον μμ.ξδ.μ.ΒΤιε.Γρκδ, ὁ δὲ κύβος μμμ.φιε.μμ'Εκγ. μ'Εφοη.Ηφξη, τοῦ δὲ κύβου τὸ τεσσαρεσκαίδέκατον μμμ.λς. [μμ.Ησιε.μ.Θχπδ.Βμλίδ' οὗ τὸ ἐπταπλάσιον καὶ τριτημόριον, ἴσον τῷ ὅγκῳ τῆς γῆς, στερεῶν σταδίων ἐστὶ μμμ.σο.μμ.σν.μ. 'Δτν.Ησϙζλμ'β'.]* Which is, being interpreted, “the perimeter of the Earth is 250,000 stades, the diameter is 80,182, the square of the diameter is 6,429,153,124, the cube is 515,502,355,788,568, the fourteenth part of the cube is 36,821,596,842,040 $\frac{1}{4}$; the result of multiplying this by $7\frac{1}{2}$ is equal to the volume of the Earth, and is 270,025,043,508,297 $\frac{1}{2}$ cubic stades.”

p. 126. 8 πάλιν γὰρ ἀποδεικνύς σχῆμα τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς κύκλου περιφερείας εἰς εὐθείαν ἐξαπλουμένης περιεχόμενον ὀρθογώνιον τετραπλάσιον εἶναι τοῦ ἐμβαδοῦ τετάρτου μέρους τῆς περιφερείας ἴσον τῷ ἐμβαδῷ τοῦ κύκλου.

So B; but as it stands the text is unintelligible. Martin, followed by Hiller and Dupuis, changes ἀποδεικνύς to ἀποδείκνυται, probably correctly, and τῆς περιφερείας ἴσον to τῆς σφαίρας, ἴσον. Thus corrected, the Greek may be translated :—“Again, it has been proved (by Archimedes) that the rectangle contained by the diameter (of a sphere) and a straight line equal to the circumference of a (great) circle is equal in area to four times a quarter of the (surface of the) sphere, which is equal to the area of the (great) circle.” The statements, though curiously expressed, are true, but not to the point; it is true that the surface of quarter of the sphere is equal to the area of the circle; but the problem is to find the volume, not the surface of the

sphere ; and Archimedes' theorem about the volume of the sphere is not introduced till p. 126. 24. In the following discussion no use whatever is made of the surface of the sphere, but a quarter of the circumference of the circle is used ; hence we must retain the reading of B περιφερίας, ἴσον. The argument is as follows :—It has been proved that the area of the rectangle contained by the diameter of a circle, and a straight line equal to the circumference, is four times the area of the circle ; hence the area of a rectangle contained by the diameter of the circle and a quarter of the circumference is equal to the area of the circle. This theorem is employed by Theon to prove that the square on the diameter is to the area of the circle as 14 is to 11. “For since the circumference is $3\frac{1}{7}$ times the diameter, if the diameter contains 7 units, the circumference will contain 22 units : *a quarter of the circumference* contains $5\frac{1}{2}$ units ; hence if the square on the diameter contains 49 units, the area of the circle will contain $38\frac{1}{2}$ (i.e. $7 \times 5\frac{1}{2}$) units ; multiplying by 2 to get rid of fractions, if the square contain 98 units, the circle will contain 77 ; this ratio reduced to its lowest terms is 14 : 11. Hence, etc. —.” The text may be restored thus :—

πάλιν γὰρ ἀποδείκνυται σχῆμα τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς κύκλου περιφερίας εἰς εὐθείαν ἐξαπλουμένης περιεχόμενον ὀρθογώνιον τετραπλάσιον εἶναι τοῦ ἐμβαδοῦ <τοῦ κύκλου· τὸ δ' ὑπὸ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τοῦ> τετάρτου μέρους τῆς περιφερίας ἴσον τῷ ἐμβαδῷ τοῦ κυκλον.

J. GILBART SMYLY.

ON AN INSCRIBED SARCOPHAGUS AT PENRICE CASTLE, SOUTH WALES.

THE sarcophagus which is the subject of the present note, and of which I give a print from a photograph, was brought to my notice by the Rev. David Price, M.A., Rector of Port Eynon, Glamorgan. It is in the possession of Miss Talbot, of Penrice Castle, by whose ancestor, Thomas Mansel Talbot, it was brought from Italy in the latter part of the eighteenth century. Of this collection Professor Michaelis writes thus (*Ancient Marbles in Great Britain*, p. 102) :—"The activity of Thomas Mansel Talbot, who also amassed his sculptures through the help of [Gavin] Hamilton and Jenkins, dates perhaps from a somewhat earlier period, apparently not later than the eighth decade of the century. His little collection included two or three specimens of considerable merit, quite undeserving of the fate which they shared with the Petworth marbles, of lying packed up for a long time in their cases until a place was cleared for them in the conservatory. To the remoteness of Margam Abbey (it is probably the only place in Wales which can boast of a collection of ancient marbles) we must ascribe the fact that the antiques in the conservatory, and afterwards in the hall, have remained scarcely less unknown to the learned world than at the time when they were still shut up in their cases."

In the same work, p. 595, under the heading Penrice Castle, he says:—"At this ancestral mansion of the Mansel

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family, twelve miles from Swansea, there is, according to what I was told by the gardener at Margam, the sarcophagus described by Dallaway, p. 348 (ii., p. 96), under No. 18 of the Margam collection, as fluted, with cover, in the middle the group of the Graces." The references are respectively to Dallaway's *Anecdotes of the Arts in England* (1800), and the French translation of the same by Millin.

The sarcophagus is hollowed out of a solid block, and measures 83 inches by 23½.

Dallaway seems not to have seen the sarcophagus; and neither he nor Michaelis says anything about an inscription. Mr. Price, however, having detected some traces of letters, had the accumulated dirt removed, and thereby revealed a very remarkable inscription, which is as follows:—

D . M .

M . VLPivs . CERDO .

TITVLVM . POSVIT . CLAVDIAE . TYCHENI .

CONIVGI . KARISSIMAE .

CVM . QVA . VIX . ANNOS . IV . MENS . VI . DIEB . III . HOR . X .

IN . DIE . MORTIS . GRATIAS . MAXIMAS . EGI .

APVT . DEOS . ET . APVT . HOMINES .

While the inscription is curious in itself, it acquires additional interest from the fact that it is practically identical with one in the Townley Gallery in the British Museum, said to have been cut from the front of a sepulchral *cippus* ("Townley Gallery," ii., p. 269). This inscription is given in the C. I. L. vi. 29149, where it is noted as in the Villa Pelucchi, and reference is given to Marini, *Iscrizioni dei palazzi Albani* (1785). It is also given by Orelli, *Inscriptionum Selectarum Lat. . . . Collectio* 4636.

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It reads as follows :—

D . M .
M . VLPIVS . CERDO
TITVLVM . POSVIT
CLAVDIAE . TYCHENI
CONIVGI . KARISSIM .
CVM . QVA . VIX . ANNIS
. . III . MENS . VI . DIEB .
III . HOR . IX IN DIE
MORTIS . GRATIAS
MAXIMAS . EGI
APVT . DEOS . ET
APVT . HOMINES.

It will be observed that, in the latter inscription, ANNIS replaces ANNOS. In inscriptions of this class, the case varies between the ablative and the accusative, the former being the more frequent. The accusative occurs—e.g. Gudius, pp. 263-6, and pp. 764-6; also C. I. L. 29272, 29277. In the case of the sarcophagus, the graver seem to have forgotten that he had written ANNOS, and proceeded to write DIEB.

The concluding clause is strange. Orelli justly calls it “mirum dicterium.” The words, however, may be intended to be those of the deceased. “In die mortis,” without “eius,” naturally means “in the day of my death,” and accordingly the verb “egi” is in the first person. In any case the expression seems to be unique.

T. K. ABBOTT.

THUCYDIDES, BOOK I., CH. 69.

χρῆν γὰρ οὐκ εἰ ἀδικούμεθα ἔτι σκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὃ τι ἀμυνούμεθα. οἱ γὰρ δρῶντες βεβουλευμένοι πρὸς οὐ διεγνωκότας ἤδη καὶ οὐ μέλλοντες ἐπέρχονται. καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα οἷα ὁδῶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι κ.τ.λ.

THIS passage in the speech of the Corinthian envoy, which the latest editor of Book i. (Mr. E. C. Marchant) terms "notoriously difficult," appears to me to admit of an obvious and easy explanation. All the commentators I have read (1) regard the sentence οἱ γὰρ δρῶντες κ.τ.λ. as explaining καθ' ὃ τι ἀμυνούμεθα, (2) take βεβουλευμένοι πρὸς οὐ διεγνωκότας closely with ἐπέρχονται. This leaves οἱ γὰρ δρῶντες practically meaningless, as it can hardly bear the sense of "the aggressor," as Jowett translates it; and the other translation, "men of action," is vague, and does not point necessarily to the Athenians.

I would suggest, then, (1) to make the sentence οἱ γὰρ δρῶντες κ.τ.λ. give the reason why χρῆν οὐκ εἰ ἀδικούμεθα ἔτι σκοπεῖν, (2) to take the participle clause βεβουλευμένοι πρὸς οὐ διεγνωκότας closely with δρῶντες, and (3) to regard ἐπέρχονται here as equal to ἀδικοῦσι. This last assumption is amply justified by Thucydides' usage elsewhere; e.g. at the end of this chapter we have κατηγορία replacing ἔχθρα; and in a well-known passage in ch. 84 this feature in his style occurs thrice in the same sentence, τὸ πολεμικὸν being replaced by εὐψυχία, τὸ εὐκοσμον by σωφροσύνη, and αἰδῶς by αἰσχύνη. In these cases there seems to be no apparent reason for the change; but in the passage we are now dealing with the transition from the general sense of ἀδικεῖν to the specific one of ἐπέρχονται is natural, and

almost inevitable, owing to the intervening *αμυνούμεθα* = 'repel an attack.' Now, if Thucydides had written *ἀδικοῦσι* instead of *ἐπέρχονται*, I think no one would have doubted that the meaning of the passage was as follows:— "We ought no longer to debate whether or not we are being injured, but how we will repel the attack; for men who act in a deliberate line of policy before their opponents have made up their minds are already injuring them, and not (merely) likely to do so." Substitute, then, *ἐπέρχονται* for *ἀδικοῦσι*, and "are attacking" for "are injuring," and we have an equally obvious meaning of our present passage. The sentence *οἱ γὰρ δρῶντες κ.τ.λ.*, though put in general terms, refers plainly to the Athenian action in regard to Corcyra and Potidaea from the Corinthian standpoint.

An alternative explanation on the same lines is possible if we make the sentence *οἱ γὰρ δρῶντες* refer to the implied object of *ἀμυνούμεθα*, which would be naturally *τοὺς ἐπιόντας*. In this case some ellipse in thought may be supplied, such as "and that they are attacking us is clear, for," &c. This would avoid the assumption of the equation *ἐπιέναι* = *ἀδικεῖν*; but, in view of our author's usage in the other passages referred to above, there seems to be nothing gained by doing so. I may add that the next sentence, describing the notoriously insidious nature of Athenian aggression, agrees best with this interpretation, being introduced by a simple *καὶ*, and obviously continuous in thought with the preceding one, and not antithetic, as Marchant proposes to consider it.

E. S. BROWN.

THE HUMAN ELEMENT IN THE GOSPELS.

WHATEVER may be the ultimate verdict of scholars on the critical value of the conclusions suggested by Dr. Salmon on the mutual relations of the Synoptists, there can be no question as to the profound interest of his remarks on the human element in the Gospels; and I propose in this paper to consider the significance of what has seemed to some a change of tone as well as a reversal of some critical judgments evidenced in the great Provost's posthumous work as contrasted with his earlier *Introduction to the New Testament*.

I may say at once that it would not be as true to say that his later sentiments are inconsistent with those of an earlier date as that he has in his last work made further statements for which his earlier published books had not prepared us.

In the first place, the most important of Dr. Salmon's theological works were written as prelections for the Divinity School of the University of Dublin, in which he was for many years the Regius Professor. This fact has to be borne in mind when we are seeking to correlate the utterances of one period of his life with those of another and, in a sense, less responsible period. Perhaps it is true in every case that the provenance of a sentiment or opinion determines its significance. We are naturally disinclined to act in the spirit of the caution from *The Imitation*: "Enquire not, Who said this? but attend to what is said." The function of a divinity school—on its intellectual

side—is to impart to the future instructors of the people the formal theology of the Church to which they belong. Original research and speculation are no part of the business of a divinity school, at least in the relation of the teachers to the taught. For the teachers themselves original research and study are necessary if they wish to keep their theology alive; but the business of a divinity school as such is a practical one—provision for the moral and spiritual edification of the Church as it is, not as it may be in years to come; and spiritual and moral edification must be based upon convictions of the intellect which have become settled and matured.

As the generations succeed one another, and the speculations of a few win their way into general acceptance—when what was once new has become old—the theology of the people also advances; but it is always a little behind that of the official teachers of the Church, as theirs is a little behind that of the independent speculator, the pioneer. The Church must *abide in the teaching of Christ*; yet this involves a *going onward*. In this advance a divinity school performs much the same function in the Church that a House of Lords does in the State: it retards hasty decisions until the will of the people has settled down into a fixed resolution.

But the divinity school of which the late Provost was so long the official head, while it has always been a hand-maid to the Anglican Communion all over the world, has been naturally most closely in touch with the Church of Ireland, a Church which from the very vigour of its popular life is somewhat uneasy at, and intolerant of, any variation from the profession and practice of the majority of its members. In this Church Dr. Salmon's name stood for orthodoxy; and orthodoxy in the Church of Ireland means conservatism. His *Introduction to the New Testament*, while it repudiated the extreme views of Bible inerrancy of an

older generation, more than satisfies the requirements of the most exacting modern imposer of the sixth of the Anglican Articles. In the case of the Epistle to the Hebrews, indeed, Dr. Salmon felt himself at liberty to follow Tertullian in supposing the author to be Barnabas ; but in other respects traditional opinions are maintained : all the Johannine books are claimed for the Apostle John, and good reasons are given for believing in the genuineness and authenticity of 2 Peter. The book, in fact, was a weighty contribution to the side of conservative criticism ; and as such it is not likely to be out of date for a long time to come.

I do not myself see why because Dr. Salmon's opinions, e.g., about the Fourth Gospel, underwent a change, therefore his earlier views should cease to have the weight they had at first. The authorities that ought to influence us in our decision on controverted points are arguments, not the minds of other men, however justly venerated. If we have been convinced by an argument that such and such is the case, nothing ought to alter our conviction except a counter-argument which we ourselves perceive to be of compelling force. Whatever value Dr. Salmon's *Introduction* had in 1906 that will be its value in 1908, no matter what we have learnt in 1907 about his more recent views.

The *Introduction*, then, was the official public utterance of a divinity professor, true to his own convictions when he spoke, but true also to his trust, the confirming in their faith the future teachers of the Church. But, quite apart from that, the scope and purpose of the *Introduction* are quite different from those of the later work. In the *Introduction* the criticism of the Gospel, as of the other books of the New Testament, is from the external standpoint—their date, authorship, reception in the Church, &c. The Synoptic Question is, indeed, dealt with both in one of

the original lectures, and in a note in the later editions; but the discussion is still from the outside; it does not give rise to questions as to the sources and comparative credibility of the narratives.

To those who are familiar with the opinions put forward during the last few years by scholars who are not considered by any means advanced critics it may seem a needless and impertinent task to attempt to explain how Dr. Salmon came to write as he has done in *The Human Element in the Gospels*. But there are in Ireland many persons who, while they are deeply interested in theology, have not "supp'd full with horrors" in the way of Biblical criticism, and who have always venerated Dr. Salmon as a guide in that department. For such as these the present paper is designed.

I have indicated above that the features in *The Human Element in the Gospels* which may distress some of those who have hitherto followed Dr. Salmon implicitly are things which we would not have expected him to say rather than things which are fundamentally inconsistent with his previous teaching. These are the adoption of what, to a superficial reader, seems to be a minimizing attitude towards the miraculous, and also his depreciatory parenthetical language concerning the Fourth Gospel.

"I felt as if I had been set to make a dissection of the body of my mother; and could not feel that the scientific value of the results I might obtain would repay me for the painful shock resulting from the very nature of the task."

These words from the Author's Preface are something more than the heart-cry of a Christian believer wounded in the painful quest of truth. They are suggestive of a profound analogy between our relations to human persons and to the Bible record. We are so constituted that we must regard the human beings with whom we are brought

into daily contact both from the physiological and psychological standpoints, as animals and as persons: as animals possessing definite bodily organisms that can be cut to pieces and manifestly destroyed, as persons standing in moral and spiritual relationships to our own personality; and we instinctively feel that these relationships are independent of our bodies, and do indeed constitute the truest realities of life. A man's mother is to him a person standing to him in a relationship mysterious and sacred. She is a presence, a power, an object of love and respect. The physical body which is the medium through which her personality is seen, heard, and touched by the bodily senses is, of course, known to exist; it is presupposed. Nevertheless, not only does it not obtrude itself on the imagination, but it is not thought of at all. Yet, of course, everyone is aware that, while this is the true account of one's own mother, other people do not share this sentiment about her. Materialism, and realism falsely so called, regard her as a female specimen of the human animal; and, of course, the materialistic, physiological view is the basal conception, and cannot be ignored; though civilized society could not be carried on for a day unless in our thought of one another the notion of personality did not predominate.

Similarly there are two standpoints from which it is possible to view the history of Jesus Christ. St. Paul had them in his mind when he wrote: *Even though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now we know Him so no more.* And, speaking as a pastor of souls, St. Paul was right. The critical spirit which knows Christ only *after the flesh* is spiritually impotent, just as the materialistic view of human life is powerless to raise the race morally. At the same time it is the glory of the Catholic Church that she has always insisted on the actuality of our Lord's manhood and its permanence in His risen life. In no

respect, perhaps, is the guiding of the Church into all the truth by the Holy Spirit more evident than in this fact, that although the natural devotional instinct of Christians has ever been to think of Jesus exclusively as Son of God, the framers of the Church's creeds have always uncompromisingly asserted that He was also Son of Man, without any reservation, the act of incarnation only excepted. As in the ordering of society we ignore physiological facts at our peril, so as regards the Christian life the Fathers of the Church were able to perceive the absolute necessity of not letting go the reality of our Lord's manhood, the actuality of His manifestation in history, in the conditions of time and space, as a corrective to a false spiritualism.

The relevance of these considerations to the matter before us will appear if we note that there are times, like the present, in the development of the race, as well as of individual minds, when there is an imperative desire to examine the foundations of belief. Such periods are undoubtedly, for those who are affected by them, and while they are affected by them, periods of spiritual depression. That it should be so is deplorable; but there is no use in wasting time in wringing our hands, or in feebly wailing, *If the foundations be destroyed, what can the righteous do?* We must just take pick and spade, and dig down and examine the foundations. They are all right. Investigations below the surface have, it may be, disabused our minds of some harmless illusions; they have possibly altered our estimate of the relative stability of this or that unimportant out-house; but as regards the main building, the house in which we live and worship, we have ascertained the truth of what our fathers have told us: it is founded upon a rock.

Moreover we do not well to forget that while *the things of the Spirit of God are foolishness unto the natural man*, yet Christianity would not have existed at all if it had not

possessed a foundation of such historical facts as *the natural man* is able to *receive*.

This is the task to which Dr. Salmon set himself during the last years of his life—to dig down to the foundations, to endeavour to state the history of our Lord's ministry as seen by *the natural man*; and we have good reason to be grateful to him for having prosecuted his labours undeterred by the depressing critical atmosphere in which such a task must be performed.

In this method of investigation the supernatural claims of Christianity must of necessity take a secondary place; secondary, I mean, in the logical and chronological sense; since when they were first accepted, say, by St. Paul, they followed from a conviction that the supernatural character of Jesus Christ was the easiest and most satisfactory solution of the problem presented by the facts of history. We are therefore precluded, in the first place, from assuming that the Gospel writers had any miraculous means of obtaining information; and this admission necessarily involves as a consequent, that in cases where two Gospel writers make what seem to be discrepant statements, they must be treated in precisely the same way as a secular historian treats respectable authorities when they disagree. He does not pronounce one or other to be a liar; but if all attempts at reconciliation fail, he adopts the account that seems on the whole to be the more probable, and considers the other a mistaken account, due to human frailty; for *humanum est errare*.

In some instances this may involve the rejection of a miraculous story: "If we are comparing two accounts of the same occurrence, we cannot help judging on the same principles as would guide us if we were judging between two different accounts of a contemporary event. And in that case we naturally give a preference to the account most in harmony with our ordinary experience. Thus, without

having any desire to eliminate miracle from the story, we may be led to account some things as non-miraculous which on a different system had been thought capable only of a supernatural interpretation." (pp. 6, 7.)

In point of fact, the only instance dealt with which is at all of this nature is the two stories of the feeding of a multitude, which Dr. Salmon was disposed to consider two accounts of one event. But in the sentence just quoted what he probably had in his mind was the possibility of a naturalistic explanation of what was undoubtedly considered supernatural by the Gospel writers. For example, the angelic ministration and bloody sweat during our Lord's Agony in the garden, the walking on the waters, the healing of Peter's wife's mother. His treatment of these circumstances illustrates Dr. Salmon's desire to reproduce, as he expresses it, "the report of the occurrences as published in a Jerusalem newspaper next morning."

And although with regard to the walking on the water Dr. Salmon has now entertained as possible the explanation of Paulus which he held up to ridicule in the *Introduction*, he was not by any means a minimizer himself. A minimizer, in this connexion, is one who, starting with a total disbelief in the supernatural character of Jesus Christ, attempts, by offering explanations of miracles which are plausible, or possible, in a few cases, to insinuate that all Christian miracles, even the Resurrection, could be similarly explained away. Dr. Salmon, on the other hand, started with a firm belief in the supernatural character of Jesus Christ; and there is nothing to show that he ever wavered in this belief. The following passage from his sermon entitled *Non-miraculous Christianity*, preached in Cambridge, 1880, is significant: "There might be differences of enumeration if we were asked to state what were the supernatural facts which we should

pronounce essential to Christianity; but on this point we can be agreed that Christianity requires faith in a supernatural person."

It makes all the difference possible whether we are engaged in apologetics or in a purely historical investigation. The Virgin-Birth, Resurrection, and Ascension of Jesus Christ are, according to the creeds of the Church, the essentially miraculous element in Christian history. If these are accepted as true, as Dr. Salmon did accept them, then "the lore of nicely calculated less or more" as to the amount of miraculous incident in the ministry of Jesus, is evidently a trifling waste of time. But such discussions are not waste of time in an attempt to ascertain what actually happened at a given time and place any more than are other attempts to ascertain precisely the details of the life of any interesting historical personality. There was no question in Dr. Salmon's mind as to the supernatural character of Jesus Christ, but only as to whether particular incidents of His life-history were miraculous in character or not; and as, in arguing with *the natural man*, we cannot assume the inerrancy of the Gospel record, we have also to concede that "the first reporters were [not] less likely than we should be now to ascribe a supernatural origin to what they had witnessed." If we have mental patience, we shall come to learn that such an historical investigation is an immense strengthening of the external evidence of Christianity: *Those things which are not shaken . . . remain.*

Moreover, persons who are disquieted by the conclusions that are gathered from higher criticism, the study of sources, must be reminded that the lower, or textual, criticism, the dicta of which are received with equanimity, has also affected—though very slightly—the miraculous element in the Gospels. For example, no one who is acquainted with the Revised Version feels himself any

longer bound to believe that the troubling of the waters of the pool of Bethesda was caused by the periodical descent of an angel. The "many ancient authorities" which omit the Angelic Ministration and the Bloody Sweat in Luke xxiii. 43, 44, cannot be charged with a bias against the miraculous, as neither can any modern editor or preacher who treats the incidents in question as unhistorical. Similarly, no one supposes that the excision of the text of the Three Heavenly Witnesses (1 John v. 7) was due to anti-Trinitarian tendencies on the part of the Revisers.

A childlike, thoughtless reverence demands a Bible like the Koran, which textual criticism cannot disturb, since there are in it no various readings—though this has not preserved the Koran immune from the disintegrating assaults of higher criticism. But we have good reason to be thankful that the greatest book in the world, the Divine Library, has not differed, in kind, in the conditions of its transmission from other books; and that consequently not everything in it is attested by an equally compelling authority.

Of Dr. Salmon's depreciatory attitude towards the Fourth Gospel it is not so easy to speak. The subject of St. John's Gospel is not only a very large one, but also one in the discussion of which it is impossible to use precise and definite language without large qualifications. On the Fourth Gospel opinions the most opposed to each other are "probable," in the sense in which Roman Catholic theologians use the term. It is sufficient here to say that what Dr. Salmon says (p. 34) of Tischendorf is applicable in this case to himself: "Tischendorf's decision seems . . . to have been biassed by partiality for the manuscript which he had himself made known to the world." Dr. Salmon's judgment on the historical value of John was possibly biassed by his discovery, for

himself, of the historical value of Mark ; and though this was not a "fancied discovery," it does not constitute the whole truth. To this must be added the fact that Dr. Salmon's intellectual temperament, acute and powerful as was his reasoning faculty, was not naturally in sympathy with the abstract theological ideas preserved in the Fourth Gospel, and the elusive, subtly simple style in which they are presented. The Divine voice did not, and does not, sound alike to all. Matthew (xi. 27) and Luke (x. 22) have preserved only one utterance of what we may call the Johannine tone of Jesus; but the fact that they have preserved that one utterance cannot be ignored in the controversy about the Fourth Gospel. Many are inclined to hold that Westcott was the greatest theologian produced by the Church since St. Augustine, and that Westcott did not see more in the Gospel according to St. John than what really is there. It is not without significance that Dr. Salmon did not think as highly of Westcott as he did of Lightfoot, the range of whose spiritual vision was narrower than that of his greater successor, but who expressed simply and clearly what he did see. Yet whether we agree or not with Dr. Salmon in his latest critical judgments, we cannot but admire and wonder at the courage and candour with which, at an age when most men are taking their ease, he grappled with the literary problems of the faith in which he lived and died.

NEWPORT J. D. WHITE.

NOTE ON THE REGISTER OF ARCHBISHOP ALAN.

THE official records of the medieval Church of Ireland are few in number. The diocese of Dublin, which is unusually fortunate, possesses no more than five volumes and one roll;¹ and, of these, two are due to the industry and learning of John Alan, who was appointed Archbishop on the eve of the Reformation, in 1529, and whose brief episcopate was brought to an end by his murder at Artane, by the adherents of Silken Thomas, on 27th July, 1534. Alan was actively engaged in political affairs, being for some time Chancellor of Ireland, and subsequently vicelegate under Wolsey; and he lived in stirring times. Nevertheless, he found leisure to undertake elaborate investigations into the antiquities of his diocese, the results of which are preserved in the two works already mentioned. One of these Alan commonly refers to as the *Nova Rotula*, though it is now more usually called the *Repertorium Viride*. It is a vellum roll, containing notes on the various churches of the Diocese of Dublin and Glendalough, and was compiled about 1532. The other, which is the subject of this paper, is his Register, frequently cited as the 'Black Book,' or 'Liber Niger Alani.' This book is of a character with which students of ecclesiastical antiquities are familiar. It is a collection of copies of deeds of very various kinds—Papal Bulls, Royal Letters Patent,

¹ Monastic Registers are not here reckoned.

Inquisitions, Charters, and so forth—the originals of which, with few exceptions, have long ago disappeared. The documents which it preserves are our main sources of information as to the history of the Diocese of Dublin from the end of the twelfth to the beginning of the sixteenth century. But Alan did more than select and arrange these documents, and cause them to be transcribed. When the work was completed, he annotated it throughout with his own hand. Most of his notes, indeed, are of little value. They consist merely of references from one part of the book to another, supplying very imperfectly the place of an index. But, in many cases, he supplements the information given in the text; and when he does so, he almost always mentions the authority on which his statements rest. He refers, for instance, many times to ‘an ancient book of the Vicars Choral’ of St. Patrick’s, to the Register of the Chapter of the same Cathedral, and to rolls which he describes as ‘*Rotula pauperum prima*’ and ‘*Prima papiri rotula*.’ He mentions also a collection of original deeds kept in his ‘iron chest,’ from which many of the documents in the Register were copied. And in addition to these he quotes from a book called ‘*Inspeximus*’—a title which appears to have been subsequently transferred to his own Register.¹ All these seem to be irrecoverably lost. But of another volume, which Alan frequently cites as the ‘*Antiquum Registrum*’ or ‘*Crede Mihi*,’ a considerable part still remains, and has been printed by Sir J. T. Gilbert.²

¹ Certain documents were enrolled, 11th February, 1576, from ‘a Booke of the Lord Archebusshoppe of Dublin, called *Crede Michi*,’ and ‘another Booke of the said Lord Archebusshops, called the *Inspeximus*, otherwise called the Bushopp Allen is Booke.’—*Dignitas Decani*, p. 258. The latter was undoubtedly the *Registrum Alani*.

² ‘*Crede Mihi*’: the most ancient register book of the archbishops of Dublin before the Reformation, now for the first time printed from the original manuscript, edited by John T. Gilbert, Dublin, 1897. This edition is unfortunately not of such accuracy as to render consultation of the original unnecessary.

It is worthy of remark that many of the original documents to which Alan refers had been discovered, or at any rate restored to the archives of the See, by his own efforts. Thus, he says (pt. i. f. 2) of a document of the time of Edward IV., ‘Hujus originale *reposui* in cista nostra,’ and (*ib.* f. 7) of the *Rotula pauperum prima*, ‘anno 1533 recuperavi.’ The autograph of the Register of Archbishop Alan—or so much of it as still remains—is preserved among the muniments of the Diocese of Dublin. We shall denote it by the letter A.¹

Before entering upon a consideration of the secondary authorities for the text, it will be well to transcribe from the series of Miscellaneous Papers in the archives of St. Patrick’s Cathedral, Dublin, vol. ii., p. 49, a passage in which two of them are referred to :—

‘The Black Book otherwise called Allan’s Register . . . has been frequently admitted in evidence in y^e common-law Courts, and was so admitted in y^e year 1720. The original Book can’t now be found, But there are two copies of it, the one in Parchment taken by one Loveless, a writing Clerk, by y^e order and at the expense of Arch Bishop King in y^e year 1708 who gave Loveless 20 guineas on that acct. [*interlined in another hand*: or before 1708 for the Index to it is dated in that year]. And y^e copy remained in y^e custody of A. B. King during his life, and after his death came into y^e hands of his successor Doctor Hoadley, and upon his translation came into y^e hands of his successor Doctor Cobbe. This Copy was procured by A. B. King because the orig^l. from it’s great antiquity was beginning to decay. The other copy is on Paper and wrote in an old hand and is supposed to be much more antient and to have been taken in A. Bp. Buckley’s time, about 100 years agoe. It was found about 8 or 10 years agoe among the Papers of one Buckley. But how or when it came there, does not appear. It has been since kept in y^e Library at St. Sepulchres. There were notes in y^e margint

¹ The symbols by which the manuscripts are indicated in this paper are those suggested by Dean Bernard in

his Calendar of the *Dignitas Decani*, Proc. R.I.A., vol. xxv. C, p. 481.

and at y^e bottom of y^e Pages in y^e orig^l. Book, written in a very difficult hand, which Loveless, y^e Clerk employed by A: B: King, could not read, and therefore he left Blanks for y^e notes, and the notes were soon after added to y^e copy in another hand w^{ch} is supposed to be y^e hand of D^r. Bolton late a: B^p. of Cashell [*the same hand as before crosses out Bolton . . . a: . . Cashell, and writes above the line, Stearne . . . Clogher*], who was, at y^e time, an intimate acquaintance of a: B: King. . . The Paper copy now in y^e Library, wants y^e notes; But, in all other Respects, agrees wth y^e Parchment copy. In y^e Margint of the Parchment copy there is reference to y^e Pages of y^e orig^l. Book . . .

The paper from which these statements have been extracted was apparently written after the death of Bishop Stearne (6th June, 1745); certainly after that of Archbishop Bolton (January, 1744); and it can scarcely be later than 1750, since 'Archbishop Bukley's time' is defined as 'about 100 years agoe,' and Bulkeley was Archbishop from 1619 to 1650.

We now proceed to give a brief account of the manuscripts.

A₁.—In the custody of the Archbishop of Dublin. A volume of very large size, the leaves measuring 18½ inches by 11½ inches. There can be no doubt that it is the copy stated in the foregoing to have been executed by Loveless; for it exactly tallies with the description given of that manuscript. The text is written by a single scribe in a fine, bold hand, obviously of the early part of the eighteenth century. The folios of the original are noted in the margins throughout. The scribe who copied the text did not transcribe Alan's notes, but left space for them; they were subsequently inserted by a different hand. The statement of the corrector of the document quoted above that they are from the pen of Bishop Stearne is disproved by a comparison with undoubted specimens of his writing. I have not been able to find examples of Bolton's hand.

That the manuscript was finished in the year 1708 is manifest from the index to which the corrector refers. There are many blank leaves of parchment at the end of the volume, apparently intended to be utilized for an index; and what seems to be the rough draft of the index which was to have been written on them still exists in a paper volume in the Archbishop's keeping. It is dated 1st September, 1708. There is no reason to doubt that A₁ was copied from the autograph.

A₁.—In the custody of the Archbishop. An imperfect paper copy apparently of no value.

M.—Marsh's Library MS. V. 2. 2. A paper manuscript of the first half of the seventeenth century. The leaves measure $11\frac{3}{4}$ by $7\frac{3}{4}$ inches. This is beyond doubt the copy mentioned above as found 'among the papers of one Buckley'; and we seem to be justified in the inference that it was prepared for Archbishop Bulkeley. When it was recovered, about 1740, it had lost a few leaves at the end, the place of which is supplied by two leaves in a hand of that period, copied no doubt from A₁. Shortly afterwards it was bound, and (as we are informed in a note at the top of the first page) 'paged according to y^e Black book in y^e possession of y^e AB.' The meaning of the latter statement, as we learn from actual comparison of the MSS., is that the numbers of the pages of A₁ were entered in the margins. This fact and the manner of expressing it are noteworthy; they seem to show that A₁ was then the only copy of the Register in the Archbishop's keeping, and that it had acquired some sort of authority as a quasi-original. M does not reproduce Alan's notes; and it occasionally omits portions of customary legal formulæ in deeds, and (what is more to be regretted) names of witnesses to documents and jurors in inquisitions. But that it was copied from A is proved by the fact that, on p. 87 (56), the scribe passes without break from the last word of f. 5a in A,

part ii.; to the first word of f. 6*b*, obviously through the accident of turning over two leaves together. Apart from the closing leaves, and two leaves inserted between p. 89 and p. 90, six scribes appear to have been at work upon the manuscript, as follows: (1) pp. 1-44¹; (2) pp. 44-203, 251-334, 357-417, 465-476; (3) pp. 203-244; (4) pp. 244-251; (5) pp. 336-357, 417-465; (6) pp. 389-392. With the exceptions already noted, M is a fairly accurate copy.

T.—Trinity College MS. 554 (F. 1. 8). Of this manuscript it is sufficient to say that it is a badly written and not very correct copy of A₂. It is wrongly dated 'seventeenth century' in the Catalogue.²

R.—Trinity College MS. 1061. This modern copy was prepared under the supervision of the late Dr. William Reeves, Bishop of Down, Connor, and Dromore. He does not say from what exemplar it was transcribed; but a short prefatory note makes it clear that the only MSS. which he knew were A, M, and T. He states that he corrected his transcript from A wherever it was available; and from A in those portions he also copied Alan's notes. M he consulted occasionally, and marked its variants in blue ink. But that his acquaintance with it was slight is manifest from his statement that 'it omits in almost every instance the names of the witnesses to the instruments'—a remark which far surpasses the facts. T (which he professes to have 'consulted'), or some manuscript copied from it, appears to have been the source of his text. Readings in R, which were evidently derived from T, are

¹ The pages of M are not numbered beyond p. 200. Hence for the purpose of reference, one must use the marginal numbers (i.e., the pages of A₂), as is here done.

² The scribe of T seems to have done a considerable amount of work on Irish diocesan registers. One of the Trinity College copies of the 'Liber

Niger' of George Dowdall, Archbishop of Armagh (MS. no. 558 = N. 2. 11), is in his hand. So also, I believe, is the table of contents of the 'Liber Ruber' of Ossory: but I have not been able to put it beside the two specimens of his writing in Trinity College Library.

numerous; but one or two examples will suffice. 'Bridio' on p. 7 is a pardonable misreading of 'Bndco,' which in T stands for 'Bñdco' = 'Benedicto,' the reading of A,M. Similarly 'Sancto' on p. 8 represents a scrawl in T, which was intended for 'Santlo', A,M giving Seintlo. And, again, 'sanctarum monialium' (p. 9) appears in T as a correction of 'stimonialium' originally written by the scribe. The reading of A,M is here 'stīmonialium' = 'sanctimonialium.' It should be remarked, however, that in R the various articles are supplied with headings, the source of which I have not been able to discover. It seems unlikely that they were composed by Dr. Reeves himself; but there are very few headings in the autograph, which in this respect is followed by A,A,M,T, and such as are found differ from those in R. Where A was not available, Reeves in most cases—though not in all—omitted Alan's notes, feeling, no doubt, that a blunderer like the scribe of T could not be expected to give them correctly.

But it is now time to say a word about the autograph (A): The leaves, which are about 11 in. by 8½ in., were once 230 in number. Only 163 now remain. It is, indeed, a matter of some surprise that the manuscript still exists. For it has had many vicissitudes. We have seen that a copy of the entire text was made from it in 1708. It must at that time have been in the hands of the Archbishop, and complete. It was still in the Archbishop's keeping in 1720, when it was produced in a court of law, as the document already quoted informs us. But from the same document we also learn that before the middle of the century it was lost; and the references to A, in M give ground for supposing that it was already missing when M was deposited in Marsh's Library—i.e., by about the year 1740. It may be conjectured that it went astray in the interval of over six months between the death of Archbishop King (8th May, 1729) and the appointment of

his successor Archbishop Hoadley. On its recovery, in a sadly mutilated state, it was bound, apparently for the first time. For even a cursory examination of the volume proves that the greater number of the leaves which are now wanting had disappeared before it received its present binding; and those losses are just such as might easily occur in the case of an unbound book. Binding, however, did not save the Register from further mutilation, at least seven leaves at the end, and one in the middle of the book, having been subsequently cut out with a knife. These acts of vandalism gave occasion for one of two notes on what is now the penultimate leaf (originally f. 192), which throw light on the later history of the manuscript. They run thus :—

‘Received pursuant to an order of Lord Manners Lord Chancellor of Ireland and His Grace Charles Lord Archbishop of Cashel for that purpose—June the 15th 1816. Tho^s. Clarke D. Register.’

‘This was the end of this Book when it was deliverd by me to Tho^s. Clarke Esq^r. Register of the Consistory Court of the See of Dublin this 15 day of Jnne 1816. John Hare agent to the Earl of Normanton who presented the same to the see of Dublin.

From this it would seem that the book passed with the private library of the first Earl of Normanton, who was Archbishop from 1801 to 1809, to his heirs, and that it was only recovered for the see from his son, the second Earl, as a result of legal proceedings.¹

¹ The carelessness with which ancient diocesan records were treated in recent centuries almost passes belief; and it is the more surprising when we remember that they possessed far more than an antiquarian value for their custodians. They constituted, in fact, the ultimate title-deeds of episcopal and capitular estates, and were constantly

used in the ecclesiastical courts. Nevertheless, as we have seen, Alan's Register was twice lost in the century between 1720 and 1816. That the companion work of Archbishop Alan—his *Repertorium Viride*—was also lost at the end of the seventeenth or early in the eighteenth century is proved by the following note which is written in

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The leaves have two sets of numbers—one at the top, the other at the foot of the pages. The former are referred to by Alan in his notes, and are therefore contemporary. The latter disregard the earlier mutilations, and were clearly added after the book was bound.

The portions of the Register now lost are as follows: The whole of the first part has disappeared. It contained 21 leaves, as we learn from A₁. Of part ii., which now alone remains, what seem to have been three complete gatherings of 4, 8, and 8 leaves respectively (ff. 17–20, 85–92, 142–149, according to Alan's numbering), had disappeared before binding; so, also, had seven consecutive leaves which may have formed a complete gathering (ff. 193–199), the middle pair of leaves in three gatherings (ff. 163, 164, 172, 173, 185, 186), and three single leaves (ff. 57, 63, 140). The last nine leaves (ff. 201–209) are also gone, of which at least seven (including ff. 202, 203, 205¹) were cut out

a hand like that of William King (Archbishop, 1703–1729), if it be not his: 'Repertorium Viride—which may now be read in a Court of Law; as the original is recovered, and is now among the Records of the See of Dublin' (*Miscell. Papers, St. Patrick's Cathedral*, vol. ii. p. 13). That the volume called *Dignitas Decani*, the only remaining medieval book belonging to St. Patrick's Cathedral, was lost sight of for some years in the early part of the nineteenth century, has been pointed out by Dean Bernard (*Calendar of Dignitas Decani* in the Proceedings R.I.A., Vol. xxv., Section C, p. 483); that it was missing a century earlier is made plain by the Chapter Acts of 14th May, 1728, from which we learn that the Dean and Chapter ordered an advertisement to be printed, offering a reward for its recovery. Whether the *Crede Mihi* of the Archbishop, and the

Liber Niger and *Liber Albus* of Christ Church, have had a similar history, I do not know; nor can I attempt to estimate the number of priceless historical manuscripts which have been lost for ever through the neglect of the ecclesiastics whose duty it was to preserve them.

¹ These leaves have been identified with the aid of A₂ by a few letters of the text which have not been cut away with the remainder. They are in the order: 205, three (or more?) unidentified leaves, 202, 203. The last of the unidentified leaves was conjugate with f. 202, and held with it the middle place in a gathering. From these facts we may conclude with certainty that the binder misplaced several of the concluding leaves, and with probability that ff. 200–209 formed a single gathering of ten.

after binding, but apparently before the later numbering of the leaves; and after the later numbering a single leaf (f. 115) was similarly dealt with. In all 67 leaves have been lost, amounting to nearly one-third of the Register.

For supplying these serious lacunæ, we can fortunately make use of the two independent transcripts, A₂ and M. It is but seldom that these two agree in error; and where they differ from each other there is usually little doubt which is correct. For the notes, of course, we get no help from M; and we are obliged to content ourselves with the far from satisfactory witness of A₂.

We may, perhaps, hope that Alan's Register will some day be printed from the three MSS. A, A₂, M. Meanwhile the most accessible of all the manuscripts, and the most convenient for use, is R. And it must here be observed that some work has recently been done upon it, by kind permission of the Librarian, which may fairly be expected to increase its value for students. In the first place, in all portions of the Register for which A is not available, the text has been corrected so as to bring it into conformity with A₂, the ultimate exemplar, as has been explained above, of Reeves' transcript. In the same portions M has been systematically collated, and its variants noted in blue ink, words or sentences omitted in M being enclosed in square brackets, also in blue ink. Archbishop Alan's notes have also been copied in the margins from A₂ where A is not available.

Those who have attempted to verify the references to the Register given in the published writings of antiquaries and historians will recognize the importance of another task which was begun by Bishop Reeves, and has now been completed. Some authors have referred to the Register according to Alan's foliation of A, others according to the later foliation of the same MS., others according

to the pagination of *A*, or *M* or *T* ; while a few have combined two (or more) of these methods of reference without giving their readers notice when they passed from one to another. This variety has led to much difficulty and confusion. For the future it will be possible for all writers to give their references according to the original numbering of the leaves ; and at the same time the verification of references given otherwise will be facilitated. For the numbers of the leaves or pages of all existing MSS., except *A*, now stand in the margins of *R*, distinguished from one another as follows :—

Alan's numbering of *A* is denoted by roman figures in red ink. (The numbers of lost leaves of *A*, copied from *A*, are enclosed in square brackets.)

The later numbering of *A* is denoted by arabic figures in red ink.

The pages of *A*, and the marginal numbers in *M*, are denoted by arabic figures in blue ink, enclosed in square brackets.

The pages of *M* are denoted by arabic figures in blue ink, enclosed in round brackets.

The pages of *T* are denoted by arabic figures in black ink, preceded by the letter *T*, or the letters *T.C.D.*

HUGH JACKSON LAWLOR.

THE APOSTOLIC PREACHING OF IRENAEUS AND ITS LIGHT ON HIS DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

THE interest created by the discovery of an Armenian version of the tract of Irenaeus, εἰς ἐπίδειξιν τοῦ ἀποστολικοῦ κηρύγματος, justifies our examination of a treatise concerning which Dr. Harnack, its German editor, remarks: Alle Hauptpunkte der Religionslehre in *Adv. Haer.* finden sich auch hier: sie waren dem Irenäus nicht Theologie, sondern die Religion selbst (p. 66). The authenticity of the tract is established by a comparison of it with the fourth and fifth books of *Adversus Haereses*, which were found bound with it. The tract itself was written as a sort of introduction to Christian Evidences and Church Catechism combined for one Marcianus. References to Church doctrine are casual and informal, but some of these, which shall be considered, throw an interesting light on 'die Gotteslehre' of Irenaeus.

Dr. Harnack states his position with regard to 'die Trinitätslehre' of the tract in a note on c. 47, of which the German is:—So ist Herr der Vater und Herr der Sohn, und Gott der Vater und Gott der Sohn, denn der von Gott geborene ist Gott. Und somit ist nach seinem Sein und nach der Kraft seines Wesens ein Gott zu erkennen, nach der Ökonomie unserer Erlösung aber recht eigentlich sowohl Sohn als auch Vater. Denn weil der Vater von Allem unsichtbar und unnahbar für die Geschaffenen ist,

so müssen diejenigen, die vorherbestimmt sind Gott nahe zu treten, durch den Sohn dem Vater gewonnen und erobert werden. . . . Denn der Sohn, da er Gott ist, nimmt vom Vater, d. h. von Gott, den Thron des ewigen Reiches und das Salböl wie keiner seiner Genossen. Und das Salböl ist der Geist, mit dem er gesalbt ist, seine Genossen aber sind die Propheten, die Gerechten und die Apostel, und alle, welche teil haben an der Genossenschaft seines Reiches, d. h. seine Jünger. The note is: Eine so ausgeprägt 'nicänische' Stelle wie der Anfang dieses Kapitels findet sich kaum in *Adv. Haer.*; aber eine Interpolation liegt hier doch nicht vor; nicht nicänisch ist, dass die Differenzierung von Vater und Sohn hief allein aus der Ökonomie der Erlösung begründet wird (eine Art von Modalismus wie in *Adv. Haer.*). Das ist vor-nicänisch, vororigenistisch und irenäisch. Auch die Salbung durch den Geist (s. d. Schluss) in diesem Zusammenhang ist nicht nicänisch; dagegen s. iii. 6. 1 (nach Anführung derselben Stelle, Ps. 45. 7 f.) "utrosque dei appellatione signavit Spiritus et eum qui ungitur Filius, et eum qui ungit, i.e. Patrem."

This note suggests an interesting line of study—the comparison of the various theological passages in the tract with the utterances of Athanasius and other Nicene writers. During this work of comparison one might also consider certain positions assumed by Dr. Harnack in his *History of Dogma*, regarding the Persons of the Holy Trinity—(1) "The second hypostasis is viewed by him (Irenaeus) as existing from all eternity, just as much in the quality of Logos as in that of Son; and his very statement that the Logos has revealed the Father from the beginning shows that this relationship is always within the sphere of revelation" (*H. of D.* ii., Eng. Trans., p. 265). (2) "This is another clear proof that in Irenaeus the equality of Father, Son, and Spirit is not unconditional, and that

the eternity of Son and Spirit is not absolute" (*ibid.*, p. 267). (3) "It has been correctly remarked that with Irenaeus the Godhead and the Divine personality of Christ merely exist beside each other" (*ibid.*, p. 266); and (4) "Even the personality of the Spirit vanishes with him" (*ibid.*, p. 267).

A certain, if not a satisfactory, light is thrown on these statements by passages in the tract, which will be taken as nearly as possible in their order.

c. 2. Denn diese Gottlosen sind es die den wirklich seienden Gott nicht anbeten. Und deswegen sagt das Wort zu Moses: "Ich bin der ich bin." In *Adv. Haer.* iii. 6. 2 these words, Ex. iii. 14, are ascribed to God the Father, "Qui est omnium Deus et Dominus qui et Moysi dixit, 'Ego sum qui sum'"; while Ex. iii. 8 is attributed to the Son. The tract seems to assign greater importance to the Being of the Son than the treatise. Compare Athanasius, *Orat.* iv. 1: ὡςπερ δὲ μία ἀρχὴ, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο εἰς Θεός, οὕτως ἡ τῷ ὄντι καὶ ἀληθῶς καὶ ὄντως οὐσα οὐσία καὶ ὑπόστασις μία ἐστὶν ἡ λέγουσα "Ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὢν." The expression ὁ ὢν was the root of the Nicene test word ὁμοούσιον. The Platonic distinction between τὸ γιγνόμενον and τὸ ὄν underlies the argument: cf. *Adv. Haer.* ii. 34, "Sine initio et sine fine vere et semper idem et eodem modo se habens, solus est Deus qui est omnium Dominus."

c. 3. Denn der Glaube baut sich auf die Dinge, die wahrhaftig da sind, damit wir an das Seiende (τὰ ὄντα), wie es ist, glauben; und indem wir an das Seiende glauben, wie es immer ist, die Zuversicht zu ihm festhalten. . . . Vor allem unterweist er uns zu gedenken dass wir die Taufe empfangen haben zur Vergebung der Sünden im Namen Gottes des Vaters, und im Namen Jesu Christi, des Fleisch gewordenen und gestorbenen und auferstandenen Sohnes Gottes, und im heiligen Geiste Gottes; und

dass diese Taufe das Siegel des ewigen Lebens sei und die Wiedergeburt in Gott . . . damit das Ewige und Beständige (in uns?) Gott werde und hoch über einem jeden der Gewordenen stehe, und ihm alles unterstellt werde, und die ihm Unterstellten alle ihm (zu eigen) gemacht werden, damit Gott nicht über irgend ein Anderes (Fremdes) herrsche und Herr sei, sondern über das Seinige, und dass alles Gottes sei und dass deshalb Gott Allherrscher und alles von Gott sei.

With this reference to the immanence of Deity, which is saved from Pantheism by the Divine transcendence, compare *Adv. Haer.* v. 18. 3, a passage on the Word:—“in hoc mundo existens et secundum invisibilitatem continet quae facta sunt omnia et in universâ conditione infixus.” In *Adv. Haer.* v. 36. 2, he had thus described the ascension of man:—“per hujusmodi gradus proficere, et per Spiritum quidem ad Filium, per Filium autem ascendere ad Patrem: Filio deinceps cedente Patri opus suum . . . Cum autem ei fuerint subdita omnia tunc ipse Filius subjectus erit ei qui sibi subjecit omnia, ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus”—words which give some foundation for Harnack's position (2). But in this passage, which also concludes in the strain of 1 Cor. xv. 23–28, the point is not the dependence of the Divine Son and Spirit, but of all creation, man included, upon God.

c. 4. Denn es ist nötig dass wir Gewordene von irgend einer grossen Ursache den Anfang des Seins haben; und Gott ist der Anfang von Allem, denn er selbst ist nicht von irgend einem geworden, von ihm aber ist Alles geworden. Und deshalb ist es notwendig und würdig zuerst zu bekennen, dass der eine Gott der Vater erst ist der alles geschaffen und gebildet und das nicht Seinende zum Sein gebracht hat, und, in dem er Alles trägt, allein untragbar ist. Unter allen (Dingen) befindet sich aber

auch diese uns gemässe Welt und in der Welt der Mensch: also ist auch diese Welt von Gott geschaffen worden.

The second *Anfang* seems to be used in sense of originating principle, the *initium* that initiates. Cf. ἡ ἀρχὴ ἀγέννητος of Plotinus (5 Enn. 4. 1). Clement (Alex.) St. viii. 829 describes the Second Person as ἀναρχος ἀρχή. With this strong passage on the Creation by the Father and His monarchy, compare *Adv. Haer.* iv. 20. 4, "Ipse est qui per semetipsum constituit et elegit et adornavit et continet omnia: in omnibus autem et nos et hunc mundum qui est secundum nos. Et nos igitur cum his quae continentur ab eo facti sunt;" iv. 38. 3, ὁ θεὸς ὁ καὶ μόνος ἀγέννητος καὶ πρῶτος πάντων καὶ τοῦ εἶναι τοῖς πᾶσι παράτιος; and iii. 8. 3, "quae vero ab eo sunt facta initium sumpserunt."

c. 5. Ein Gott, Vater, ungeworden, unsichtbar, Schöpfer von Allem, über dem es keinen anderen Gott gibt und nach dem kein anderer Gott ist; und weil Gott ein vernünftiges Wesen ist, deshalb hat er durch das Wort das Gewordene geschaffen; und da Gott Geist ist hat er durch den Geist Alles geschmückt.

The first clause is an echo of the Gnostic controversy. Cf. *Adv. Haer.* i. 22. 1, "Super quem alius Deus non est; ii. 20. 9, neque praeter ipsum neque super ipsum." With the second compare *Adv. Haer.* ii. 30. 9, "Qui fecit mundum per semetipsum, hoc est per Verbum et per sapientiam suam," which Dr. Harnack would not take in a "modalistic sense" (*H. of D.* ii. 264). For God as Reason, see *Adv. Haer.* ii. 28. 5, "Deus autem totus existens Mens et totus existens Logos, quod cogitat, hoc et loquitur et quod loquitur hoc et cogitat. Cogitatio ejus Logos et Logos Mens et omnia concludens Mens ipse est Pater." For the parts played by the Word and the Spirit in the creation, cf iv. 20. 2, "Qui Verbo fecit et

Sapientia adornavit"; also ii. 30. 9. Tertullian, *Apol.* 21, assigns both offices to the Word, "Et nos autem sermoni atque rationi itemque virtuti, per quae omnia molitum Deum ediximus, propriam substantiam Spiritum inscribimus, cui et Sermo insit pronuntianti, et Ratio adsit disponenti, et Virtus praesit perficienti." Irenaeus speaks more clearly on the subject of the Personality of the Word in *Fragment* 19 (Harvey), τοῦ ἐνυποστάτου Λόγου τύπον, Verbi subsistentis figura, which shows that he was not open to Mercurius Mercator's indictment of Paul of Samosata, "Nestorius circa Verbum Dei non ut Paulus sentit qui non substantivum sed prolatitium potentiae Dei efficax Verbum esse definit," but would be in sympathy with Athanasius' description of the Word, οὐσιώδης Λόγος καὶ οὐσιώδης σοφία. ἥτις ἐστὶν ὁ Υἱὸς ἀληθῶς. In *Adv. Haer.* ii. 28. 5, 6, he censures those who illustrate the origin of the Word of God by the *prolatio* of the word of men, assigning to it just such another beginning or production, playing the part of the midwife (quasi ipsi obstetricaverint) to the Word of God, Whose generation is ineffable, "Qui ergo dicit mentem Dei et prolationem propriam (special origin) menti donat compositum eum pronuntiat tanquam aliud quiddam sit Deus, aliud autem principalis Mens existens." This means that the simplicity of the Divine nature was challenged. This idea is frequently found in Irenaeus; e.g. ii. 73. 2, "Omnium Pater . . . simplex et non compositus et similimembrius," and may be derived from Philo, *Leg. Alleg.* ii. 1. 66, ὁ θεὸς μόνος ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν οὐ σύγκριμα, φύσις ἀπλῆ, ἡμῶν δὲ ἕκαστος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γέγονε πολλά. The word *prolatio*, condemned by Irenaeus because of its Valentinian tinge, had, however, been used by Justin, *Tryph.* § 62. τὸ τῷ ὄντι ἀπὸ τοῦ Πατρὸς προβληθὲν γέννημα πρὸ πάντων τῶν ποιημάτων συνῆν τῷ Πατρί. Greg. Naz. calls the Father ὁ προβολεύς of the Spirit (*Orat.* 29. 2). But Origen and Athanasius,

Expos. § 1, repeat the protest of Irenaeus. In *Adv. Haer.* ii. 28. 4, he declares the Word is not an *instrument*, pointing out the Greek distinction, "aliud enim est secundum Graecos logos, quod est principale quod excogitat, aliud organum per quod emittitur logos. He also avoids the Stoic distinction of Λόγος ἐνδιάθετος (conceived) and Λόγος προφορικός (uttered). See ii. 12. 5, "Si autem endiatheton Logon dixerint endiathetos erit et sige et nihilomenus solvetur ab endiatheto Logo. Quoniam autem non est endiathetos ipsa haec ordinatio ipsorum emissionis significat." Athanasius, *Orat.* ii. 35, declares that the Word of God is not προφορικός, a term which was supposed to compromise the true genesis and substantiality of the Word. Irenaeus avoids the dangers of both terms, one of which led in after-ages to Sabellianism and the other to Arianism. He uses a significant phrase in *Adv. Haer.* iv. 6. 6, "Invisibile Filii Pater, visibile autem Patris Filius"; and in v. 15. 2, after pointing out that before the Incarnation the Word was invisible, he says, "Consimilem faciens hominem invisibili Patri per visibile Verbum."

The next paragraph Weil nun das Wort festmacht, d.h. Fleisch werden lässt und die Wesenheit der Emanation verleiht, is perplexing. Dr. Harnack writes: Der Text ist an dieser Stelle wohl verderbt. Wörtlich: des Leibes Werk ist. The German seems to mean, "The Word makes fast, that is, materialises and lends existence to the emanation." Do these words establish the independent action of the Word as artist and creator of the world? In *Adv. Haer.*, iv. 20, 1, he had written of the Father, "Ipse a semetipso substantiam creaturarum et exemplum (= typum) factorum et figuram in mundo ornamentorum accipiens." to which we have a parallel in c. 11 of this tract, Denn er hat dem Geschöpfe seine eigenen Formen gegeben, damit auch das Sichtbare (in ihm) Gottförmig sei. In

iv. 38. 3 of *Adv. Haer.*, he had also given the initiative in man's salvation to the Father, τοῦ μὲν Πατρὸς εὐδοκοῦντος καὶ κελεύοντος, τοῦ δὲ Υἱοῦ πράσσοντος καὶ δημιουργοῦντος, τοῦ δὲ Πνεύματος τρέφοντος καὶ αὔξοντος. Eusebius also regarded the Word as dependent on the Father for the designs and archetypal ideas of the creation, writing, "As a skilful artist, taking the archetypal ideas from the Father's thoughts, He transferred them to the substances of the works" (Eccl. Theol. iii. 3, p. 165). But Irenaeus seems to imply here that the Word supplied substantiality to the creation. He proceeds:—Der Geist aber die Verschiedenheiten der Kräfte anordnet und bildet, so wird mit Fug und Recht das Wort der Sohn, der Geist aber die Weisheit Gottes genannt. For this Work of the Spirit, cf. *Adv. Haer.* ii. 30. 9, "Omnia aptavit et disposuit Sapientia sua," and iv. 36. 9, "Unus enim Spiritus Dei qui disposuit omnia." The idea is borrowed from 1 Cor. xii. 4 διαιρέσεις δὲ χαρισμάτων εἰσὶ, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ Πνεῦμα. Verschiedenheiten = διαιρέσεις, Kraft = δύναμις (cf. c. 11 of this tract, "und (der Vater) seine Kraft in bestimmtem Mass mit der Erde zusammengemischt hat"). There is also here a reminiscence of 1 Cor. xii. 11, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ἐνεργεῖ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ Πνεῦμα διαιροῦν ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστω καθὼς βούλεται. For the administrative function of the Spirit see *Adv. Haer.* iv. 33. 7 καὶ εἰς τὸ Πνεῦμα θεοῦ . . . τὸ τὰς οἰκονομίας Πατρὸς τε καὶ Υἱοῦ σκηνοβατοῦν. Irenaeus seems to imply that, as the Word gave substantiality, the Spirit gave form to the creation. Athanasius, *Orat.* ii. 78, calls the Son, not the Spirit, Wisdom, ἡ ἀληθινὴ καὶ δημιουργὸς Σοφία. In the same passage he described the condescension of this Wisdom to created things in order to impress its 'type' upon them, ἠὲ δόκησεν ὁ θεὸς συγκαταβῆναι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ Σοφίαν τοῖς κτίσμασιν· ὥστε τύπον τινὰ καὶ φαντασίαν εἰκόνης αὐτῆς ἐν πᾶσί τε κοινῇ καὶ ἐκάστω ἐνθεῖναι; and in *Orat.* ii. 22, he uses the words ἐργαζέσθω δὲ ὁμῶς οὕτω τὴν ὕλην ὁ Λόγος προσταττόμενος καὶ ὑπουργῶν τῷ θεῷ (the Word would still

work up the materials at the bidding and in the service of God), which may be compared with Weil nun das Wort festmacht, d. h. Fleisch werden lässt, und die Wesenheit der Emanation verleiht.

Irenaeus proceeds :—Ein Gott Vater, der da ist über allen und mit allen und in uns allen. Denn über allen ist der Vater, mit allen aber das Wort da durch ihn Alles vom Vater geworden ist, in uns allen aber der Geist der ausruft “Abba, Vater,” und den Menschen zur Ähnlichkeit Gottes rüstet.

Cf. *Adv. Haer.* v. 18, 1, where Eph. iv. 6 is also cited and interpreted thus: “et sic Unus Deus Pater ostenditur qui est super omnia et per omnia et in omnibus. Super omnia quidem Pater et ipse est caput Christi, per omnia autem Verbum et ipse est caput Ecclesiae; in omnibus autem nobis Spiritus et ipse est aqua viva quam praestat Dominus.” It is the *monarchia* of the Father rather than the coinherence or *περιχώρησις* of the Divine Persons that we have here. Athanasius, *Orat.* iii. 15, also used Eph. iv. 6 to establish the *μία ἀρχὴ θεότητος*, writing ἐν γὰρ εἶδος θεότητος, ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ καὶ εἰς θεὸς ὁ Πατήρ, ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ ὦν κατὰ τὸ ἐπὶ πάντῳ εἶναι καὶ ἐν τῷ Υἱῷ δὲ φαινόμενος κατὰ τὸ διὰ πάντων διήκειν, καὶ ἐν τῷ Πνεύματι δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐν ᾧ ἀπασὶ διὰ τοῦ Λόγου ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνεργεῖν. The context shows that it is the Oneness of the Godhead that is the point here.

Irenaeus falls into line with the Nicene theologians who opposed the *τρεῖς ἀρχικαὶ ὑποστάσεις* of the Platonists, and referred everything ultimately, if indirectly, to this *μία ἀρχή*: cf. Ath. *Orat.* iv. 1, τοῦ ἐνὸς γὰρ Θεοῦ Υἱὸς ὦν ὁ Λόγος, εἰς αὐτόν, οὗ καὶ ἔστιν, ἀναφέρεται. The relationship of the Logos to God is described in John i. 1 by *πρός*, and of the Son to the Father by *ἐν* (John xiv. 20). Cf. *Adv. Haer.* iii. 8. 3 “cum enim dixisset de Verbo Dei quoniam erat *in* Patre adiicit, ‘Omnia per eum facta sunt et sine eo factum est nihil, . . . ut is quidem qui omnia fecerit *cum*

Verbo suo iuste dicatur Deus et Dominus solus.'” We may note here that, in their citations of John i. 3 Athanasius and Irenaeus, in *Adv. Haer.* and this tract, omitted δ γέγονεν. They were followed by Augustine. In *Orat.* iv. 3 Athanasius states that the Son is not ἐξωθεν, but ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ: otherwise there would be two principles. In *Adv. Haer.*, Irenaeus, iii. 6. 2, expresses the relationship thus: “Filius est in Patre et habet in se Patrem.” And in c. 70 of this tract he writes: Dann sagt er: “Wer wird seinen Stamm erzählen?” Damit wir also nicht seiner Feinde wegen und der von ihm ertragenen Leiden wegen ihn verschmähen, wie einen unscheinbaren und geringen Menschen, ist das zu unserer Zurechtweisung gesagt worden. Denn derjenige der dies alles erlitten hat, *hat einen unerzählbaren Stamm*, da er doch mit Stamm seine Abstammung meint, d. h. seinen Vater, der unerzählbar und unsagbar ist. This is after Justin, *Apol.* i. 51, ὁ ταῦτα πάσχω ἀνεκδιήγητον ἔχει τὸ γένος, with which compare the Latin of Irenaeus iv. 33. 11, “inenarrabile habet genus.” But here he identifies parentage and parent, and thus more emphatically refers the Son back to the Father, of whom He is, and sees the Father in the Son, and the Son in the Father.

With regard to the relations of the Three Divine Persons see c. 47 of this tract, Denn der Sohn, da er Gott ist, nimmt vom Vater, d. h. von Gott, den Thron des ewigen Reiches und das Salböl wie keiner seiner Genossen, und das Salböl ist der Geist, mit Dem er gesalbt ist. Here Salböl = the *unctio* of *Adv. Haer.* iii. 18. 3 “in nomine Christi subauditur qui unxit et qui unctus est et ipsa unctio in qua unctus est,” where *unctio* is also used in a personal sense. See *Adv. Haer.* iii. 6. 1, “Utrosque Dei appellatione signavit Spiritus et eum qui ungit, id est Patrem: cf. Athanasius, *ad Serap.* i. 14, “The Blessed and Holy Trinity is indivisible and one with itself, and

when the Father is mentioned, His Word is present, too, and the Spirit in the Son ; and if the Son is named, in the Son is the Father, and the Spirit is not external to the Word." The following passage on the relation of the Son and Spirit is significant :—

c. 5. In uns allen aber der Geist, der ausruft Abba, Vater, und den Menschen zur Ähnlichkeit Gottes rüstet. Der Geist zeigt nun das Wort an und deswegen verkündeten die Propheten den Sohn Gottes, das Wort aber gestaltet den Geist, und deswegen ist es selbst der Verkünder der Propheten und führt den Menschen zum Vater hin.

For the indwelling Spirit cf. *Adv. Haer.* v. 9. 1 "Et per fidem constituunt in cordibus suis Spiritum Dei." For the preparatory work of the Spirit, cf. *Adv. Haer.* iv. 20. 4 " Spiritu quidem praeparante hominem in Filium Dei, Filio autem adducente ad Patrem, Patre autem incorruptelam donante in aeternam vitam," and v. 9. 1 " Quia habent Spiritum Patris qui emundat hominem et sublevat in vitam Dei." In *Adv. Haer.* the *similitudo*, or *ὁμοίωσις*, of God is brought about by union with the Spirit in the case of those who have received the *imago*, or *εἰκών*, which is realized in the body, from the Word, e.g. v. 6. 1 "Imaginem quidem habens in plasmate, similitudinem vero non assumens per Spiritum." In v. 9. 2 " Caro a Spiritu possessa oblita quidem sui qualitatem autem Spiritus assumens, conformis facta Verbo Dei," the process seems reversed. In *Adv. Haer.* iv. 7. 4 the Son is Progenies, and the Spirit the Figuratio of the Father. " Ministrat enim ei ad omnia sua progenies et figuratio sua, id est Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, Verbum et Sapientia." Basil (*Adv. Eunom.*) described the Spirit as the likeness of the Son, *εἰκὼν μὲν θεοῦ Χριστοῦς ὃς ἐστί, φησιν, εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου, εἰκὼν δὲ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὸ Πνεῦμα.* Athanasius,

Orat. iii. 5, describes the Son as the εἰκὼν of the Father, and in *Ad Serap.* 1 the Spirit as the σφραγίς of the Son.

For the Spirit's indication of the Word cf. *Adv. Haer.* iii. 21. 4 "Unus enim et idem Spiritus qui in prophetis quidem praeconavit quis et qualis esset adventus Domini." The Spirit is styled *propheticus* both in Justin and Irenaeus. The exact meaning of "Das Wort *gestaltet* den Geist" is hard to find. But from *Adv. Haer.* v. 9. 1 "perfectus homo constat carne, anima et Spiritu et altero quidem salvante et figurante qui est Spiritus; altero quod unitur et formatur, quod est caro," we may infer that, as the Divine Spirit gives form and shape to the spirit of man, the Word gives form and shape to the Divine Spirit. The expression also recalls the use of εἶδος in Ath. *Orat.* iii. 15 ἐν γὰρ εἶδος θεότητος ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ. iii. 3 τοῦ γὰρ εἶδους καὶ τῆς θεότητος τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐσης τὸ εἶναι τοῦ Υἱοῦ. In iii. 5 Athanasius used ἰδιότης τοῦ Πατρὸς in a similar sense. As the Son in Athanasius is the εἶδος, or face, and μορφή, or form, of the Father, so in Irenaeus He gives His εἶδος to the Spirit, who may be called His εἶδος, or *figuratio*. For this use of *Gestalt* in connexion with the Spirit cf. c. 49 of this tract, Dieser (der Geist Gottes) nimmt Gestalt und Form in den Propheten je nach der Ähnlichkeit der betreffenden Person an.

Irenaeus appears to identify the Son and the Spirit in c. 71 of this tract: Und an einer anderen Stelle sagt Jeremiah, "Geist unseres Angesichts der Herr Christus, und wie wurde er in ihren Fallstricken gefangen, von dem wir dachten, in seinem Schatten wollen wir leben unter den Heiden." Und das Christus, Geist Gottes seiend, leidensfähiger Mensch werden sollte, das deutet die Schrift an. The passage is Lam. iv. 20, after LXX, πνεῦμα προσώπου ἡμῶν Χριστὸς Κύριος. Justin Martyr, who reads πνεῦμα πρὸ προσώπου ἡμῶν (*Apol.* 1. 55), interprets πνεῦμα as 'breath.' The Scholiast explains it in *Const.*

Apost. v. c. 20, οἱ γὰρ θεοφιλεῖς διὰ παντὸς τὸν Χριστὸν ἀναπνέουσι πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν αὐτὸν ἔχοντες. Irenaeus seems the only one to interpret πνεῦμα as 'Spirit.' For this apparent identification of Word and Spirit there are parallels in other writers : e.g. *II. Clem.* 9 ὧν μὲν τὸ πρῶτον πνεῦμα ἐγένετο σὰρξ; Justin. *Apol.* i. 33 τὸ πνεῦμα οὖν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐδὲν ἄλλο νοῆσαι θέμις ἢ τὸν λόγον, ὃς καὶ πρωτότοκος τῷ θεῷ ἐστι; Hermas, *Pastor* iii. 5 "Filius autem Spiritus Sanctus est"; Ignatius, *Ad Smyr.* 3 κρατηθέντες τῇ σαρκὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῷ Πνεύματι, where πν. is used of the Divine nature of the Son (cf. 1 Peter iii. 19 ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ Πνεύματι); Tertullian, *Apol.* 23 "Christus Dei Virtus et Dei Spiritus et Sermo et Sapientia et Ratio et Dei Filius"; also *de Carn. Christ.* 19 "If the Spirit of God did not descend into the womb to partake of flesh from the womb, why did He descend at all?" Athanasius, *Serap.* i. 4-7, points out that the Holy Ghost is never in Scripture called simply 'Spirit,' without some addition, as 'Holy,' 'of God,' or 'of Truth,' etc. In *Adv. Haer.* v. 1. 3, Irenaeus had written "Sic in fine Verbum Patris et Spiritus Dei *adunitus* antiquae substantiae plasmationis Adae viventem et perfectum *effecit* hominem," but had added shortly afterwards "ex placito Patris manus eius *perfecerunt* hominem," showing that co-ordination, not identification, was his point. This point is still clearer in iii. 24. 1 "Communicatio Christi, id est Spiritus Sanctus"; v. 1. 2 "Effundente [Domino] Spiritum Patris in adunionem et communionem Dei et hominis"; and v. 20. 2 "Adunans hominem Spiritui et Spiritum collocans in homine, ipse [Dominus] caput Spiritus factus est et Spiritum dans esse hominis caput." With these passages compare c. 97 of this tract, So hat er den Geist Gottes des Vaters mit dem Geschöpfe Gottes vermischt und vermengt damit der Mensch nach der Ähnlichkeit Gottes sei—a comment on Baruch iii. 29-iv. 1, which is some-

what fuller than the comment on the same passage in *Adv. Haer.* iv. 20. 4 "Adventum per quem commixtio et communio Dei et hominis secundum placitum Patris facta est." In *Fragment* 8 (Harvey), which is very probably Irenaeus, the body of Christ is described as ἔσωθεν μὲν τῷ Λόγῳ κοσμούμενον, ἔξωθεν δὲ τῷ Πνεύματι φρουρούμενον, where the Spirit is distinguished from the Word. A suitable commentary on the position would be Athanasius, *Orat.* iii. 25 ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὁ Λόγος ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ Πατρὶ, τὸ δὲ Πνεῦμα ἐκ τοῦ Λόγου δίδοται, θέλει λαβεῖν ἡμᾶς τὸ Πνεῦμα, ἵνα, ὅταν ἐκεῖνο λάβωμεν, τότε ἔχοντες τὸ Πνεῦμα τοῦ Λόγου τοῦ ὄντος ἐν τῷ Πατρὶ, δόξωμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς διὰ τὸ Πνεῦμα ἐν γίγνεσθαι ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ τῷ Πατρὶ, which Newman, *Athanasius*, ii. 77, cites as instance of coinherence.

c. 6. Und dies ist der Kanon unseres Glaubens und der Grund des Gebäudes und die Festigkeit des Wandels. Gott, Vater, ungeworden, untragbar, unsichtbar, ein Gott, der Schöpfer von Allem; das ist der allererste Punkt unseres Glaubens. Der zweite Punkt aber ist das Wort Gottes, der Sohn Gottes, Christus Jesus unser Herr, der den Propheten erschienen ist gemäss der Form ihrer Prophezeiung und gemäss der Tragweite der Ratschlüsse des Vaters, durch den Alles geworden ist: der auch am Ende der Zeiten, um alles zur Vollendung zu bringen und zusammenzufassen Mensch unter Menschen . . . Und der dritte Punkt ist der heilige Geist, durch den die Propheten prophezeit . . . haben . . . und der sich am Ende der Zeiten auf eine neue Weise auf die Menschheit über die ganze Erde ergoss, indem er den Menschen für Gott erneuerte.

This strongly Trinitarian passage has many echoes of *Adv. Haer.*, e.g. the descriptions of the Father, 'incapabilis et incomprehensibilis,' 'investigabilis' (iv. 20. 5), 'omnia capiens solus autem a nemine capi potest' (ii. 30. 9), 'invisi-

bilem et indeterminabilem' (iv. 6. 2); the ἀνακεφαλαίωσις or *recapitulatio* of the Son (v. 29. 2, etc.), and the connexion of the Spirit with newness of life (iii. 17. 1, v. 19. 3). The words "Gemäss der Tragweite der Ratschlüsse des Vaters," which are parallel to *secundum placitum Patris* (*Adv. Haer.* iv. 20. 3), suggest an interesting study. Athanasius (*Orat.* iii. 65) objected to ἐκ βουλήσεως and similar phrases when applied to the *genesis* of the Son, who is ἡ ζῶσα βουλὴ τοῦ θεοῦ . . . καὶ δύναμις τοῦ Πατρὸς, cf. Clement (Alex.) *Paed.* iii. 309 θέλημα παντοκρατορικόν, but Ignatius *ad Smyr.* 1 υἱὸν θεοῦ κατὰ θέλημα καὶ δύναμιν θεοῦ, Justin. *Tryph.* 127 ἐκεῖνον τὸν κατὰ βουλήν τὴν ἐκείνου καὶ θεὸν ὄντα; Hilary, *Syn.* 37 "etiam ex consilio eius et voluntate nascatur." Arius' position θελήματι καὶ βουλῇ ὑπέστη (*Theod. Hist.* 1. 4. 750), doubtless caused Athanasius to hold that "it is all one to say βουλήσει and ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν" (*Orat.* iii. 31). Athanasius, however, in *Orat.* iii. 31, says of the Son, διακοσμῶν τε κατὰ τὸ βούλημα τοῦ Πατρὸς τὰ πάντα; and Irenaeus, who does not state that the Son was according to the Father's will, but that His appearance was so—a point which is made still clearer by c. 37 of this tract, Das Wort Gottes ist Fleisch geworden nach dem Ratschluss inbetreff der Jungfrau—would not fall under his censure. For it is not the *genesis* of the Divine Son, but the mode and means of the Incarnation, that is purposed. Cf. *Adv. Haer.* iii. 23. 1 "Omnis dispositio salutis quae circa hominem fuit, secundum placitum fiebat Patris." For the Son's obedience to the Father's Will, see *Adv. Haer.* iii. 16. 7 "diviti enim et multae voluntati¹ Patris deservit," v. 19. 3 "voluntati Patris deserviens." In this passage *sich ergoss* suggests more independent action of the Spirit than

¹ For the Will of God see *Adv. Haer.* ii. 30. 9 "est substantia omnium voluntas eius," and *Frag.* 5. (Harvey) θέλησις καὶ ἐνεργεία θεοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ παντὸς

χρόνου καὶ τόπου καὶ αἰῶνος καὶ πάσης φύσεως ποιητικὴ τε καὶ προνοητικὴ αἰτία.

“effusus est in nobis” (*Adv. Haer.* iv. 33. 4). This may be due to the translator; but, as we shall show, the Personality of the Spirit is more distinct in this tract than in the treatise.

c. 7. Deswegen geht die Taufe unserer Wiedergeburt durch diese drei Punkte vor sich, indem Gott Vater uns zur Wiedergeburt begnadet mittels seines Sohnes durch den heiligen Geist. Denn die den Geist Gottes in sich tragen, werden zum Wort geführt, d. h. zum Sohne; der Sohn aber führt sie dem Vater zu, und der Vater lässt sie die Unverweslichkeit empfangen. Also nicht ohne den Sohn kann man dem Vater nahe treten; denn die Erkenntnis des Vaters ist der Sohn und die Erkenntnis des Sohnes Gottes ist durch den heiligen Geist, den Geist aber erteilt der Sohn seinem Amte gemäss nach dem Wohlgefallen des Vaters an diejenigen die (der Vater) will und wie der Vater will.

The three Divine Persons are here associated with the regeneration of man, as in Athanasius, *Serap.* i. 20: “the sanctification which takes place from the Father through the Son in the Holy Ghost.” The new birth is given by the Son in Baptism, *Adv. Haer.* i. 21. 1 and iii. 17. 1 “potestatem regenerationis in Deum dans discipulis;” and regeneration generally, *Adv. Haer.* iii. 22. 4 “(Dominus) in sinum recipiens pristinos patres regeneravit eos in vitam Dei.” For the Son’s connexion with the Father’s “grace” (χάρις, cf. *begnadet*), cf. *Adv. Haer.* iv. 20. 7 “Verbum dispensator paternae gratiae.” Adoption is discussed in connexion with the Son’s gift of the Spirit (*Adv. Haer.* v. 18. 1), cf. Athanasius *Orat.* i. 50, where man receives the grace of the Spirit through the Son. διὸ καὶ βεβαίως ἐλάβομεν (τὸ πνεῦμα), αὐτοῦ λεγομένου κεχρῖσθαι σαρκί· Τῆς γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ σαρκὸς πρώτης ἁγιασθείσης, καὶ αὐτοῦ λεγομένου δι’ αὐτὴν εἰληφέναι,

ὡς ἄνθρωπον, ἡμεῖς ἐπακολουθοῦσαν ἔχομεν τὴν τοῦ Πνεύματος χάριν. For the expression "den Geist tragen," cf. *Adv. Haer.* iv. 14. 2 "assuescens hominem *portare eius Spiritum* et communionem habere cum Deo"; and for the spiritual ascent to the Father, and His gift of incorruptibility, cf. v. 36. 2 "per Spiritum quidem ad Filium, per Filium autem ascendere ad Patrem," and iv. 20. 5 "Spiritu quidem praeparante hominem in Filium Dei, Filio autem adducente ad Patrem, Patre autem incorruptelam donante." For the knowledge of the Father obtained through the Son, cf. *Adv. Haer.* iv. 6. 5 "Agnitio Patris Filius, agnitio autem Filii in Patre et per Filium revelata," and through the Spirit, cf. *Frag.* 24 (Harvey) εἰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει ἅγιον Πνεῦμα οὐκ ἔχει γινῶσιν τοῦ κτίσαντος. Cf. *Ath. Orat.* ii. 78 δεκτικοὶ γινόμεθα τῆς δημιουργοῦ Σοφίας καὶ δι' αὐτῆς γινώσκειν δυνάμεθα τὸν αὐτῆς Πατέρα. The Spirit gives knowledge of the Son through the prophets in *Adv. Haer.* iv. 33. 1, iv. 7. 2, and iv. 6. 6 "accipiens testimonium a Patre, a Spiritu, ab angelis," etc. For the general idea of the Unity of the Trinity in their gift to man, cf. Cyril, *Cat.* 16. 4, "The Father through the Son with the Holy Ghost bestows all things." For the Son's gift of the Spirit, cf. *Adv. Haer.* v. 18. 1 "Verbum portatum a Patre praestat Spiritum omnibus quemadmodum vult Pater," cf. *Ath. Orat.* i. 48 ὥσπερ πρὸς τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως Λόγος ὧν ἐχορήγει τοῖς ἁγίοις ὡς ἴδιον τὸ Πνεῦμα, οὕτως καὶ ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος ἀγιάζει τοὺς πάντας τῷ Πνεύματι.

In this tract Irenaeus indicates that the Son's gift of the Spirit is "seinem Amte gemäss," admitting subordination of the Divine Persons as touching their offices. And here as in *Adv. Haer.* iv. 6. 7 "Ab initio enim assistens Filius suo plasmati revelat omnibus Patrem quibus vult et quando vult et quemadmodum vult Pater," the Son's work is regulated by the Father's supreme will, so that "in omnibus et per omnia unus Deus Pater, et unum Verbum et unus

Filius et unus Spiritus et una salus omnibus credentibus in eum." Cf. *Ath.* i. 64 οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι μετὰ ταῦτα γεγόνασ διὰ τοῦ Λόγου ὅτε αὐτὸς ὁ Πατήρ ἠθέλησε. The unapproachable nature of God here, as in *Ath. Orat.* i. 64 καὶ ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς ἀόρατος καὶ ἀπρόσιτος τοῖς γεννητοῖς καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἐπὶ γῆς ἀνθρώποις, . . . τότε φιλόανθρωπος ὢν ὁ ἀόρατος ἐπιφαίνεται διὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ εὐεργεσίας ἣν διὰ τοῦ ἰδίου αὐτοῦ Λόγου καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ποιεῖται, is given as the reason for the mediation of the Word. Cf. also *Adv. Haer.* iv. 6. 4 "Et per Verbum visibilem et palpabilem factum Pater ostendebatur. Invisibile enim Filii Pater; visibile Patris Filius."

c. 9. Und deshalb ist der heilige Geist ausgiebig bei seinem Innewohnen und wird vom Propheten Iesaias in sieben Weisen des Dienstes aufgezählt, welche sich auf den Sohn Gottes niederlassen, d. h. auf das Wort, bei seinem Kommen wie ein Mensch. Cf. *Adv. Haer.* iii. 9, 2 et unctus est a Patre Spiritu, i.e. from the Father (for connexion of Father and Spirit see *Adv. Haer.* iv. 14, 2 aquae multae Spiritus Dei quoniam dives et quoniam magnus est Pater). These words are followed by Is. xi. 2 after LXX as here. For the unction of the Spirit see c. 47 of this tract, "das Salböl ist der Geist," and *Adv. Haer.* iii. 18, 3 "Unctionem qui est Spiritus." Athanasius *Orat.* i, 47 regards the χρίσμα in the case of our Lord's humanity as ἡ τοῦ Πνεύματος κάθοδος, but in *Orat.* iv. 36 as the Logos itself, τὸ χρίσμα ἐγὼ ὁ Λόγος. Greg. of Naz. also has "anointing the manhood with the Godhead." Irenaeus also seems to waver. See c. 53 of this tract, Er wird nämlich Christus genannt, weil der Vater durch ihn alles gesalbt und geschmückt hat—words which recall Justin, *Apol.* ii. 6 κατὰ τὸ κεχρῖσθαι καὶ κοσμηῆσαι τὰ πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ, where Grabe took κεχ. as active; but Scaliger proposed κατὰ τὸ καὶ χρῖσαι, which finds an unforeseen support in this passage. So far *Christus* is used as active, but he proceeds: Und weil er bei seinem Ankommen wie ein Mensch durch den Geist Gottes und

seines Vaters gesalbt worden ist. With the former part of sentence cf. *Ath.* iii. 31 αἰὲν ὦν θεὸς καὶ ἀγιάζων πρὸς οὓς ἐγένετο, διακοσμῶν τε κατὰ τὸ βούλημα τοῦ Πατρὸς τὰ πάντα ; and with the latter the warning of Athanasius i. 15 ἄλογόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν τοῦτον (τὸν Υἱόν) ἀγιάζεσθαι παρ' ἐκείνου (τοῦ Πνεύματος). The Spirit in certain passages in this tract seems identified with the Divine Nature of Christ, but really represents His part in the Incarnation, e.g. 71 Christus Geist Gottes seiend; c. 30. dem Leibe nach ein Sohn Davids ist . . . nach dem Geiste aber der Sohn Gottes; l. 51 dass er vom Geiste Gottes geboren sei = c. 40 dieser ist nach Judäa gekommen von Gott durch den heiligen Geist gesät und von der Jungfrau Maria geboren. In c. 53, the Father, however, is the author of the Incarnation ; “ Der Vater von allem selbst seine Fleischwerdung wirkte.” Cf. *Adv. Haer.* v. 1. 3 “ Filius Altissimi Dei Patris omnium qui operatus est Incarnationem eius.” In c. 89, the Spirit pours forth the Spirit. Weder das Wort ging durch sie (cf. c. 39, er selbst die Welt durchzog, c. 34 durchzieht, *Adv. Haer.* iv. 14. 2 “ Et per omnes illos *transiens* Verbum ”), noch *der heilige Geist tränkte sie*, welcher den neuen Weg . . anbahnte und reiche Ströme hervorsprudeln liess, d. h. den heiligen Geist hat er auf der Erde ausgestreut, wie er durch die Propheten verheissen hat, den Geist in den letzten Tagen über die ganze Erde auszugießen. Cf. c. 6, der sich ergoss. The personality of the Spirit does not vanish here. See also c. 26 . . . geschrieben mit dem Finger Gottes; der Finger Gottes ist das was vom Vater zu dem heiligen Geist ausgestreckt ist. In Luke xi. 20 ἐν δακτύλῳ θεοῦ = Matt. xii. 28 ἐν Πνεύματι θεοῦ. But here Irenaeus seems anxious to save the Spirit from identification with the Finger of God, and to safeguard His Personality.

c. 11. Den Menschen hat er mit seinen Händen gebildet. Cf. *Adv. Haer.* iv. 20. 1 “ Quasi ipse suas non haberet

manus. Adest enim ei semper Verbum et Sapientia, Filius et Spiritus." v. 6. 1 "per manus enim Patris, id est, per Filium et Spiritum." v. 1. 3 "Ex placito Patris manus eius vivum perfecerunt hominem": also v. 28. 3. Athanasius also calls the Son the Hand of God, *Orat.* ii. 71 εὐδηλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὁ Υἱὸς ἔργον ἀλλ' αὐτός ἐστιν ἡ χεὶρ τοῦ Θεοῦ.

The Arians preferred the word ὄργανον to express this relationship, as it implies separateness and dependence: 'Hand,' on the contrary, implies consubstantiality. Athanasius, *Orat.* ii. 31, rejects the notion that God framed us through the Son ὡς δι' ὄργάνου, but holds that the Father ὡς διὰ χειρός, ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ ἐργάσατο τὰ πάντα. But when expressing relationship of His humanity to His Divinity, he says τούτῳ χρώμενος ὄργάνῳ (*Orat.* iii. 31). Irenaeus would side with Athanasius against Eusebius, Arius, and Asterius, who held that, when God saw that nature (φύσιν) was unable μετασχεῖν τῆς τοῦ Πατρὸς ἀκράτου χειρὸς καὶ τῆς παρ' αὐτοῦ δημιουργίας, He first of all created One, that through Him as an intermediary (μέσου γενομένου) all other things might be brought into being (*Orat.* ii. 24). For he says: Den Menschen aber hat er mit seinen Händen gebildet, indem er das Reinste und Feinste und Weichste von der Erde genommen und seine Kraft im bestimmten Mass mit der Erde zusammengemischt hat. The former statement would make the creation external to God, and the latter internal to Him, as in Athanasius. The latter admits that creation could not endure τὴν φύσιν ἄκρατον of the Father; and that a συγκατάβασις, or condescension, of the Son was necessary (*Orat.* ii. 64). Irenaeus also reminds us that the Father made the world by 'His Hands.'

c. 22. Denn nach dem Bilde Gottes hat er den Menschen geschaffen. Das Bild Gottes aber ist der Sohn,

nach dessen Bild auch der Mensch geworden ist. We may evidently assume (with Zahn) that, according to Irenaeus, "God placed Himself in the relationship of Father to Son, in order to create after His image and in His likeness the man who was to become His Son" (Harnack, *Hist. of Dog.* ii. 266, Eng. T.). This statement seems to make the creation of man the *raison d'être* of the existence of the Divine Son and His personality, if one could speak of personality in such a case. It also introduces the idea of time into that Divine relationship of Father and Son, which is inherent in the existence and being of the Father—an idea which Athanasius censures in *Orat.* i. 14. For to say ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν ὁ Υἱός is to say of God ἦν ποτε τοῦ ἰδίου Λόγου καὶ Σοφίας χωρίς. But when was light without a radiance, or the fountain without a stream? But did Irenaeus look at the subject in the same light as Athanasius? Would he say, with Tatian, Theophilus, and Tertullian, that the Word "was not fully a Son from eternity, but that when, according to the Divine counsels, the creation was in immediate prospect, and with reference to it, the Word was born unto Sonship, and became the Creator," &c.? (Newman, *Athanasius*, ii. 233). Would he say: "There was a time when the Son was not"? See *Adv. Haer.* ii. 25. 3 "non enim infectus es, O homo, neque semper coexistebus Deo sicut proprium eius Verbum"; and iii. 18. 1 "non *tunc* (at Incarnation) coepit Filius Dei existens semper apud Patrem." Here no difference is felt between the coexistence of the Divine Word and the coexistence of the Divine Son; but *semper* is vague. Does it, or does it not, imply the eternity of the Son *a parte ante*? See c. 43 of this tract, Gott aber soll man in allem glauben, denn Gott ist in allem wahr, auch in dem was das Dasein des Sohnes Gottes betrifft; und er war nicht nur vor seiner Erscheinung in der Welt, sondern auch vor dem Werden der Welt . . . Denn für Gott hatte

Anfang der Sohn vor dem Bau der Welt, für uns aber jetzt als er erschien. This last sentence—für Gott hatte Anfang der Sohn vor dem Bau der Welt—seems to indicate a beginning in time, and simply asserts that the Son präexistent beim Vater war, vor der ganzen Schöpfung der Welt geboren (c. 30). For as Athanasius points out, *Orat.* i. 14, the saying *πρὸ χρόνων* is not inconsistent with the admission of *διαστήματα τινα*, certain intervals, in which He was not. In c. 70, where Ir. identifies His Stamm with His “Abstammung, d. h. seinen Vater,” he approaches somewhat the position of Athanasius, that the idea of a perfect Father implies the coexistence of a coequal Son (*Orat.* i. 14) from the view-point of the Son. But it is evident that he never had to face the question in the same way as theologians of a later generation, and that if he had, he would never have diminished aught of the ‘unerzählbarer Stamm’ of the ‘ewiger Sohn’ (c. 10). With regard to Dr. Harnack’s statement (*Hist. of Dog.* ii. 266), that “Irenaeus very frequently emphasizes the idea that the whole economy of God refers to man,” we can show that if, on the one hand, we have such passages as *Adv. Haer.* v. 29. 1 “non homo propter conditionem, sed conditio facta est propter hominem,” we have, on the other, *Adv. Haer.* ii. 30. 9 “Semper coexistens Filius Patri olim et ab initio semper revelat Patrem et *Angelis et Archangelis et Potestatibus et Virtutibus* et omnibus quibus vult revelari Deus,” and c. 9 of this tract, Die Welt aber ist von sieben Himmeln umgrenzt, in denen Mächte und Engel und Erzengel wohnen indem sie Anbetungsdienst leisten Gott dem Allherrscher und dem Schöpfer von Allem, nicht als ob er das bedürfte, sondern damit auch sie nicht tatenlos und unnütz und segenlos seien, where part of the economy of God at least does not refer to mankind. See also c. 10, where the Eternal Son and Spirit and the angel host glorify the Father with endless song, and

alles was es immer im Himmel für Wesen gibt, bringt Ehre Gott, dem Vater von Allem. The statement of Athanasius (*Orat.* ii. 31) is ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ γὰρ Λόγος οὐ δι' ἡμᾶς γέγονεν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἡμεῖς δι' αὐτὸν γεγόναμεν.

The word εἰκὼν, Bild (Wisdom vii., Col. i. 15), is used by both Irenaeus and Athanasius, not to express an external or separate copy, as the Arians used the word—ἀπαράλλακτος εἰκὼν κατ' οὐσίαν being the symbol of semi-Arianism (Newman, *Athan.* ii. 371)—but the exact reproduction of the Father, a Personality commensurate and co-equal with His. See Ath. *Orat.* i. 31. οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀγέννητος ὁ θεός, οὐ γεννητή, ἀλλὰ γέννημά ἐστιν ἡ τούτου εἰκὼν ἣτις ἐστὶν ὁ Λόγος αὐτοῦ καὶ Σοφία: cf. *Adv. Haer.* “Invisibile Filii Pater, visibile autem Patris Filius,” iv. 6. 6; “Immensum Patrem in Filio mensuratum, mensura enim Patris Filius quoniam et capit eum,” iv. 4. 2; “Filius est in Patre et habet in se Patrem,” iii. 6. 2. And in iv. 31. 2 he calls Verbum Dei “Pater generis humani.”

c. 31. Nun hat er den Menschen mit Gott vereinigt und eine ausgleichende Eintracht zwischen Mensch und Gott hergestellt; denn es lag nicht in unserem Vermögen, auf eine andere Weise der Unverweslichkeit teilhaftig zu werden wenn er nicht zu uns gekommen wäre. Denn so lange die Unverweslichkeit unsichtbar und nicht erschienen war, nützte sie uns nicht; nun wurde sie sichtbar, damit wir in jeder Hinsicht an der Unverweslichkeit Anteil nehmen können.

Cf. *Adv. Haer.* iii. 19. 1 “Quemadmodum autem adunari possemus incorruptelae et immortalitati, nisi prius incorruptela et immortalitas facta fuisset id quod et nos?” iii. 18. 6 καὶ εἰ μὴ συνηνώθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῷ θεῷ οὐκ ἂν ἠδυνήθη μετασχεῖν τῆς ἀφθαρσίας. Teilhaftig werden = μετέχειν. Ath., *Orat.* i. 16, points out that, while the Son οὐδενὸς μετέχει, we, on the contrary, αὐτοῦ τοῦ Υἱοῦ μετέχοντες τοῦ θεοῦ μετέχειν λεγόμεθα. The distinction in Athanasius,

and also we may say in Irenaeus, is that the Son is ἐξ οὐσίας (*Orat.* iv. 1), and man is κατὰ μετουσίαν (*Orat.* iii. 4) of the Father. For the communication of sonship see *Adv. Haer.* iii. 18. 7 "Quâ enim ratione filiorum adoptionis eius participes esse possemus nisi Verbum eius communi casset nobis caro factum?"

c. 32. Zu einer nochmaligen Vollendung dieses Menschen hat sich der Herr der Anordnung derselben Fleischwerdung unterzogen, indem er von der Jungfrau gemäss dem Willen und der Weisheit Gottes geboren wurde, damit auch er die Ähnlichkeit seiner Fleischwerdung mit der Adams zeige; und das im Anfang geschriebene geschehe, "der Mensch nach der Ähnlichkeit und nach dem Ebenbilde Gottes." Cf. *Ath. Orat.* ii. 70 οὕτω γὰρ καὶ προσελάβετο τὸ γεννητὸν καὶ ἀνθρώπινον σῶμα ἵνα τοῦτο ὡς δημιουργὸς ἀνακαινίσας ἐν ἑαυτῷ θεοποιήσῃ, καὶ οὕτως εἰς βασιλείαν οὐρανῶν εἰσαγάγῃ πάντας ἡμᾶς καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἐκείνου.

c. 34. Denn er ist selbst das Wort des allmächtigen Gottes, welches in unsichtbarer Gestalt in uns allgemein in dieser ganzen Welt verbreitet ist und ihre Länge und die Breite und die Höhe und die Tiefe durchzieht, denn durch das Wort Gottes hat das Universum seinen Bestand; und in ihm ist der Sohn Gottes gekreuzigt, kreuzweise an allem gezeichnet. Denn es gebührte ihm, dass er, nachdem er sichtbar wurde, die Kreuzesgemeinschaft unser aller mit ihm in Erscheinung bringe, damit er jene seine Wirkung im Sichtbaren durch sichtbare Form zeige. Denn er ist es, der die Höhe ins Licht stellt und die Tiefe welche weit unter der Erde liegt, fortsetzt, und die Länge von Ost zu West hinstreckt und Nord und Süd durchschifft und die Zerstreuten von allen Seiten zur Erkenntnis des Vaters zusammenruft.

The first part of this passage was inspired by Justin, *Apol.* i. 55 κατανοήσατε γὰρ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, εἰ ὄνεν τοῦ

σχήματος τούτου (i.e. τοῦ σταυροῦ) διοικεῖται ἡ κοινωνίαν ἔχειν δύναται . . . τὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπειον σχῆμα . . . οὐδὲν ἄλλο δείκνυσιν ἢ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ σταυροῦ. Cf. *Adv. Haer.* ii. 24. 4 “Et ipse habitus crucis, fines et summitates habet quinque, duos in longitudine, et duos in latitudine, et unum in medio, in quo requiescit qui clavis affigitur . . . adhuc etiam totus homo in hunc numerum potest dividi, caput, pectus, venter, femora, pedes.” With the concluding part of the passage cf. *Adv. Haer.* v. 17. 4 “Hoc ergo Verbum absconditum a nobis manifestavit . . . ligni dispositio. Quoniam enim per lignum amisimus illud, per lignum iterum manifestum omnibus factum est, ostendens altitudinem et longitudinem, et latitudinem in se et (quemadmodum dixit quidem de senioribus) per extensionem manuum duos populos ad unum Deum congregans.” The Greek of this passage has τὸ ὕψος καὶ μῆκος καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος, the last of which is omitted in the Latin, and curiously reappears here in the tract.

For the invisibility of the Word cf. *Adv. Haer.* iv. 24. 2 “Verbum naturaliter invisibile,” and v. 16. 3 “Adhuc enim invisibile erat Verbum.” For the immanence of the Word cf. *Adv. Haer.* v. 18. 3 “In hoc mundo existens et secundum invisibilitatem continet quae facta sunt omnia et in universâ conditione infixus quoniam Verbum Dei gubernans et disponens omnia; et propter hoc in sua invisibiliter” (v. l. visibiliter supported by this passage of tract) “venit et caro factum est et perpendit super lignum uti universa in semetipsum recapituletur.” Here the cross and ‘die Kreuzesgemeinschaft’ are also associated with that immanence. For the immanence of the Word in man cf. *Ath. Orat.* ii. 61 διὰ τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς οἰκοῦντα Λόγον; *Orat.* iii. 25 ὥσπερ υἱοὶ καὶ θεοὶ διὰ τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν Λόγον, οὕτως ἐν τῷ Υἱῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ Πατρὶ ἐσόμεθα . . . διὰ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν εἶναι Πνεῦμα. Cf. c. 40 Dringt das Wort Gottes in allen zur einträchtigen Gemeinschaft vor.

c. 37. Der Sohn Gottes ist Sohn Davids . . . geworden; denn er hat dieses erfüllt und es in in sich selbst von neuem vollbracht, damit er uns ermögliche das Leben zu erhalten. Cf. *Adv. Haer.* iii. 22. 4 “Regeneravit eos in vitam Dei, ipse viventium *initium* factus,” where *initium* = ἀρχή, in the sense of ‘source,’ the ‘initium’ that initiates. Cf. Ath. *Orat.* i. 48 ἀλλ’ οἱ ἄνθρωποι εἰσιν, οἱ ἀρχὴν ἔχοντες τοῦ λαμβάνειν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ δι’ αὐτοῦ. This ἀρχή is also ἀγέννητος (see c. 38). “Denn der ungeborene und unsterbliche und nicht durch die Geburt gegangene kann auch nicht unter den Tod fallen.” Cf. Clement’s ἀναρχος ἀρχή. In c. 40 He is also the ἀρχή of creation, “Sohn des Vaters . . . von dem Alles stammt.”

c. 38. Er sandte das schöpferische Wort: cf. Ath. *Orat.* iii. 15 τὸν τε δημιουργὸν Λόγον; ii. 31 ἔστι γὰρ ὁ Λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ δημιουργός. Er (das Wort) hat unsere Geburt geheiligt: cf. Ath. *Orat.* iii. 31 ἀγιάζων πρὸς οὓς ἐγένετο. Der Erstgeborene von den Toten: cf. c. 39, Als erstgeborenes, ersterzeugtes Wort des Ratschlusses des Vaters hat er alles vollbracht indem er selbst die Welt durchzog und in ihr Ordnung schaffte. . . . Denn er war der Erstgeborene der Jungfrau, ein heiliger Mensch. Athanasius, *Orat.* ii. 62, has a note on Πρωτότοκος, which never in Scripture expresses the Son’s relation to the Father like μονογενής. Μονογενής μὲν διὰ τὴν ἐκ Πατρὸς γέννησιν, πρωτότοκος δὲ διὰ τὴν εἰς τὴν κτίσιν συγκατάβασιν καὶ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν ἀδελφοποίησιν. In *Orat.* ii. 61. 62 Athanasius follows the same order as Irenaeus here, speaking first of ὁ πρωτότοκος ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν, and then of ὁ πρωτότοκος τῆς κτίσεως. For the latter term, cf. *Adv. Haer.* v. 26. 2 “ut progenies eius primogenitus Verbum descendat in facturam, hoc est in plasma.” For ‘ersterzeugtes Wort des Ratschlusses des Vaters,’ cf. Justin, *Dial.* 127 τὸν κατὰ τὴν βουλήν τὴν ἐκείνου καὶ θεὸν ὄντα, υἱὸν αὐτοῦ. There is no support here for Tatian’s ἔργον πρωτότοκον τοῦ Πατρός, as ‘ersterzeugtes’ = πρωτογενής.

c. 41. Der Christus . . . auf dem der Geist Gottes ruhte, sich mit seinem Leibe vermischend. Spiritus Dei is evidently used here of the pre-existent Christ, as in c. 97: So hat er den Geist Gottes des Vaters mit dem Geschöpfe Gottes vermischt und vermengt, damit der Mensch nach dem Bilde und nach der Ähnlichkeit Gottes sei. Cf. Tert. *Apol.* 26 "Dei virtus, Dei Spiritus . . . et Dei Filius." In *Adv. Haer.* iii. 19. 3, Logos is used of the Divine nature of Christ, ἡσυχάζοντος μὲν τοῦ Λόγου ἐν τῷ πειράζεσθαι. For the hypostatic union of word and flesh cf. Frag. 26 οὕτω τοῦ θεοῦ Λόγον ἐνώσει τῇ καθ' ὑπόστασιν φυσικῇ ἐνωθέντος τῇ σαρκί. And see Frag. 8 τὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ σῶμα . . . ἔσωθεν μὲν τῷ Λόγῳ κοσμούμενον ἔξωθεν δὲ τῷ Πνεύματι φρουρούμενον. For the blending of God and man in Christ, cf. *Adv. Haer.* iii. 19. 1 "Filius hominis *commixtus* Verbo Dei," and Ath. *Orat.* iv. 33 ὁ Λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ . . . ἥνωται δὲ φιλανθρώπως ἡμῖν τὴν ἀπαρχὴν ἡμῶν περιθέμενος καὶ ταύτῃ ἀνακραθείς. See also *Adv. Haer.* iv. 20. 4 "Eius secundum carnem adventum per quem commixtio et communio Dei et hominis facta est."

42. Denn auch der Seele wird Auferstehung zuteil, indem die Leiber der Gläubigen von neuem Person annehmen und mit ihr zusammen durch die Kraft des heiligen Gottes auferweckt und in das Reich Gottes eingeführt werden. Cf. *Adv. Haer.* v. 13. 3 "Si nunc corda carnalia capacia Spiritus fiunt, quid mirum si in resurrectione eam quae a Spiritu datur capiunt vitam." See also iii. 24. 1 "arrha incorruptelae"; v. 9. 1 "caro sine Spiritu Dei mortua est"; v. 13. 3, and iv. 20. 6. The vividness of the Spirit's part in the resurrection here throws light on His Personality, for which see also c. 49, es nicht ein Mensch ist der die Propheten hersagt, sondern der Geist Gottes; dieser nimmt Gestalt und Form in den Propheten je nach der Ähnlichkeit der betreffenden Person an und spricht zuweilen als Christus, und zuweilen führt er das Wort als

der Vater. This is one of Justin's ideas. See *Apol.* i. 56 ποτὲ δ' ὡς ἀπὸ προσώπου τοῦ δεσπότου πάντων καὶ πατρὸς θεοῦ φθέγγεται, ποτὲ δ' ὡς ἀπὸ προσώπου τοῦ Χριστοῦ. As an instance of the former, he cites Is. i. 3, sq.; of the latter, Is. l. 9-8. Irenaeus seems, however, to give more prominence to the personal work of the Spirit than Justin. With 'Dieser nimmt Gestalt' cf. c. 5, "Das Wort aber gestaltet den Geist."

We are now in a position to return to c. 47, and Dr. Harnack's note printed in the beginning of this essay. With regard to the first portion of that note, it is true that there are passages in *Adv. Haer.* like 25. 2 "Ostendimus in tertio libro nullum ab Apostolis ex sua persona Deum appellari nisi eum qui vere sit Dominus, Patrem Domini nostri." But there are also many to show that Irenaeus was unable to think of the Father apart from the Son, or of the Son apart from the Father, e.g. iii. 6. 2 "per Filium qui est in Patre et habet in se Patrem, is qui manifestatus est Deus, Patre testimonium perhibente Filio et Filio annuntiante Patrem." The Godhead of the Son is stated in iii. 6. 1 "Haec enim est Synagoga Dei, quam Deus, hoc est Filius ipse per semetipsum collegit." Cf. also in the same chapter, "neque igitur Dominus, neque Spiritus Sanctus, neque Apostoli eum qui non esset Deus, definitive et absolute Deum nominassent aliquando nisi esset vere Deus, neque Dominum appellassent aliquem ex sua persona nisi qui dominatur omnium Deum Patrem et *Filium eius qui dominium accepit a Patre suo.*" An equally strong Nicene passage as that in the tract occurs in *Adv. Haer.* iii. 6. 1 "Vere igitur cum Pater sit Dominus et Filius vere sit Dominus, merito Spiritus sanctus Domini appellatione signavit eos . . . Utrosque appellatione Dei signavit Spiritus et eum qui ungitur Filium et eum qui ungit, id est Patrem." Cf. Justin, *Dialog.* 56 εἰ οὖν καὶ ἄλλον τινὰ θεολογεῖν καὶ κυριο-λογεῖν τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ Ἅγιόν φατε ὑμεῖς παρὰ τὸν Πατέρα τῶν

ὅλων καὶ τὸν Χριστὸν αὐτοῦ. In *Adv. Haer.* iii. 6. 1 he also points out that it was the Son Who spoke to Abraham. cf. c. 45 of this tract, Denn nicht etwa der Vater von Allem . . . sprach auf einer kleinen Stätte sich aufhaltend mit Abraham, sondern das Wort Gottes, welches immer mit der Menschheit war. To pass on to the words—Und somit ist nach seinem Sein und nach der Kraft seines Wesens ein Gott zu erkennen, nach der Ökonomie unserer Erlösung aber recht eigentlich sowohl Sohn als Vater—*Sein* seems a translation of οὐσία, substance, *Wesen* of ὑπόστασις, subsistence, and *eigentlich* of κυρίως. For κυρίως in sense of properly and in connexion with the Father and the Son, cf. *Ath. Orat.* i. 21 ὁθεν ἐπὶ τῆς θεότητος μόνης ὁ πατήρ κυρίως πατήρ ἐστι, καὶ ὁ “υἱὸς” κυρίως υἱός ἐστι, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων καὶ μόνων ἔστηκε τὸ πατήρ αἰὲ πατήρ εἶναι καὶ τὸ υἱός αἰὲ υἱός εἶναι. “By the Substance (οὐσία) of God we mean nothing more or less than God Himself” (Newman, *Athanasius* ii. 455): cf. Tertullian, *Adv. Prax.* 2 “Tres autem non statu sed gradu; nec substantia sed forma, nec potestate; sed specie; unius autem substantiae et unius status et unius potestatis.” Again ὑπόστασις (*Wesen*) is sometimes found as denoting the Una Res which is God Almighty, but is more often used to express that Being viewed personally. For the use of the two terms together as here, cf. *Ath. Orat.* iv. 1 ὥσπερ δὲ μία ἀρχὴ, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο εἷς θεός, οὕτως ἡ τῷ ὄντι καὶ ἀληθῶς καὶ ὄντως οὐσα οὐσία καὶ ὑπόστασις μία ἐστὶν ἡ λέγουσα. For *Kraft* = δύναμις, potestas, as here applied to the undivided substance of the Godhead, compare Tert. *Adv. Prax.* 2 Unius autem substantiae, et unius status et unius potestatis; and δύναμιν δὲ μίαν (Hippolytus contr. Noet. 11, of Father and Son). Chrysostom (*In Joan.* Hom. 61. 2) argues that if the Father and Son are one κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν, they are also one in οὐσία. Cf. Athanasius, *Seraph.* 1. 28 τριάς ἀδιαίρετος τῇ φύσει καὶ μία ταύτης ἡ ἐνέργεια. Δύναμις is often used of the

Word—e.g. Hipp. *contr. Noet.* 7 τοῦ Πατρὸς δύναμις λόγος ; Ath. *Orat.* iv. 33 ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ . . . δύναμις καὶ δεξιὰ ; Clement Alex. *Str.* v. 546 δύναμις θέλημα παντοκρατορικόν ; Tertullian *Orat.* 4 ‘voluntas et potestas Patris.’

With regard to the words “Nach der Ökonomie unserer Erlösung aber recht eigentlich sowohl Sohn als auch Vater,” Dr. Harnack remarks : “nicht nicänisch ist, dass die Differenzierung von Vater und Sohn hier allein aus der Ökonomie der Erlösung gegründet wird (eine Art von Modalismus wie in *Adv. Haer.*). Das ist vornicänisch, vororigenistisch und irenäisch.” There are, indeed, many passages in *Adv. Haer.*, where the doctrine of the Trinity is stated in connexion with man’s salvation, e.g. iv. 6. 7 “Unus Deus Pater, et unum Verbum, et unus Spiritus, et una salus omnibus”; iv. 20. 6 “Spiritu operante, Filio administrante, Patre comprobante, homine vero consummato ad salutem”; and iv. 38. 3. This is because Irenaeus regards the nature of God chiefly from the standpoint of man, and describes it, therefore, in terms of man’s needs. The Incarnation is his chief concern, and his thoughts are fixed on it in such a way that the Divine Persons have interest for him chiefly as they effect the regeneration and salvation of man. But there are passages like c. 10 of this tract—“Nun wird dieser Gott von seinem Wort verherrlicht, das sein ewiger Sohn und von dem heiligen Geist, der die Weisheit des Vaters ist”; and c. 10, where the employment of the angels is described, which show that man is not altogether the centre of his system, and that he could think of the Trinity apart from their relations to humanity.

In conclusion, we have found many striking parallels to the positions of Irenaeus in his treatise and in his tract in Nicene and pre-Nicene writers; and, in response to Dr. Harnack’s criticism, we have seen (1) that in some places the relationship of the Father and the Son in

Irenaeus seems conditioned by the essence of God Himself, and independent of the sphere of revelation ; (2) that if he does not describe the absolute eternity of the Son in the manner of Athanasius, it is because he does not consider the subject from the same metaphysical standpoint, and does not venture to discuss the ineffable genesis of the Son, and that if he makes the Word dependent on the supreme will of the Father, he is followed by Athanasius ; (3) that in this tract the Monarchia of the Father is more pronounced, while the Being and Initiative of the Son assume a unique importance in the economy of creation and man ; and (4) that the Personality of the Spirit, if at times seemingly confused with the Divine Logos, becomes more vivid in this tract.

F. R. MONTGOMERY HITCHCOCK.

THE CONTRACTED CASES OF *DEUS*.

DEUS is unique amongst Latin nouns in the way in which, in classical times, it forms its nominative, dative, and ablative cases in the plural number. The plural of *deus* was, in classical times, normally *dī*; but the plural of *reus* was not **rī*, nor did any other Latin noun or adjective form its plural by changing *-eus* to *-ī*. It is true that two other words, *is* and *idem*, often show a similar contraction in the corresponding cases; but they are not nouns, and they do not end in *-eus* in the nominative singular, and the contraction in their case can be explained with comparative ease. My purpose, therefore, is to inquire why the nominative plural and dative-ablative plural of *deus* differed from the corresponding cases of *reus*, or any other noun or adjective ending in *-eus*. It is possible that to some readers the question may seem not very important, and hardly likely to repay investigation. I cannot admit that any apology is needed for inquiring into the cause of any seeming irregularity or exception in language, or in any other part of nature. That no apology is needed here, and that investigation is not fruitless, will, I hope, appear in the following pages, where at least an attempt will be made to show that this slight-seeming irregularity is connected with other facts; and that their common cause is a psychological fact which connects the men of ancient and of modern times, showing them to be of one blood, and animated by like feelings.

But although *deus* stands alone amongst Latin nouns as regards two of its case-forms, the whole group of nouns and adjectives in *-eus*, together with the pronominal stem *eo-*, had, in republican Latin, certain distinguishing peculiarities, of which there are many scattered traces in the inscriptions. It appears that the *e* of the stem-suffix *-eo-* was changed into *i* before certain case-endings. Thus, in the first volume of the Corpus, we find ABIEGNIEIS and AESCULNIEIS beside ABIEGNEA in 577 (of 105 B.C.); MIEIS in 38 (later than 139 B.C.); IEI (nom. pl.) in 185 (very early; but the stone has perished, and the reading is not quite free from doubt); the same form seven times in 204 (of 71 B.C.), twice in 205 (c. 49 B.C.), and once in 206 (45 B.C.); IEIS (dat.) three times in 204. This peculiarity, whereby, as we must infer, all words in *-eus*, and the pronominal stem *eo-*, changed *e* to *i* in Republican Latin before *-ei*, places those words in a class apart. Obviously, also, it has something to do with the irregularities of *deus*; for it is precisely in those cases having *ei* in the ending in early Latin that *deus* shows irregularity. *Deus*, therefore, must have agreed with all other nouns and adjectives in *-eus* in showing an irregularity in its nom. and dat.-abl. cases plural in republican times; but the contraction which, at least in classical times, it showed in the same cases was peculiar to itself. These facts suggest that *deus* was subject to those influences which affected the group of words in *-eus* generally, and that, in addition, it underwent some other influence confined to itself. I hope to show that what I here suggest actually happened. It will be convenient, therefore, first to set in a clear light what was peculiar in the declension of the nouns in *-eus* generally in republican Latin; and then, against that background, to throw into relief what was unique in the history of *deus*, in order to discover the cause of the divergence of that noun, as regards some of its inflexions,

from the general pattern of its class. In the course of the inquiry it will be necessary to consider, and I hope decide, the question of the prosodic value of *dī* and *dis* in the time of Plautus.

Complete statistics of Plautus' metrical treatment of the admittedly disyllabic forms *deos*, *deus*, *deum*, *deo* are given by W. Abraham in his *Studia Plautina*, p. 204 f. There is also a learned dissertation on this subject by Dr. E. H. Sturtevant: *Contraction in the case-forms of the Latin iō- and ia- stems, and of deus, is, and idem*. Chicago, 1902. It contains much useful information; but its conclusions are not satisfying. Dr. Sturtevant does not recognise the uniqueness of *deus* amongst nouns as regards the contraction which it suffered in certain case-forms. He derives *dī* from an earlier **dē* (a contraction of **deē*, i.e., **deei*), and assumes that in like manner **mē*, **ē*, and so forth, must once have existed, and have become **mī* and *ī* (p. 34 f). *Mēī*, *ēī*, and so forth, are supposed to have been (as they undoubtedly were) "analogical re-formations," and to have been "earlier and more widespread" than the corresponding re-formations of *dī* and *dis*. But *mēī* absolutely superseded **mī*; while *dēī* was so far from superseding *dī* that, as Dr. Sturtevant observes, it was "peculiar to the literary language and never became universal even there." It is this very failure of the analogical form *dēī* to supersede *dī* which separates *deus* from all other nouns and adjectives in *-eus*, and which needs to be explained. Dr. Sturtevant also seems to be wrong in supposing that *iei* in *abiegnieis*, *mieis*, &c., represents merely *ī*. It is true that *ei* (= *ē*) became *ī* about 150 B.C. in all ordinary positions; but it is by no means clear that it did so after *i*, either in writing or in pronunciation. We have a clear trace of the special persistence of *-ei* after *i* in C. I. L. i. 38:

progeniem mi *genui* facta patris *petiei*.

Dr. Sturtevant also concludes that *dī* and *dis* were

always monosyllables in Plautus. I hope to show that they were always disyllables. I have myself also, in the course of another inquiry, touched upon the peculiarities in the declension of nouns in *-eus* generally (HERMATHENA, xxx. (1904), p. 149). For the convenience of my readers, I shall here repeat anything that seems necessary to the connexion of the argument.

II.

We have seen that we find in the inscriptions such forms as MIEIS, ABIEGNIEIS. From manuscripts of republican literature they have naturally disappeared; but *mieis* survives in B at Plaut. *Men.* 202. In the classical vocative *mī* we have an enduring trace of the same change of *e* to *i*. *Mī* can only be from **mie* (cf. *fīlī*, from **fīlie*)¹. We see, therefore, that *e* changed to *i* not only before *ei*, but also before *e*. Before the *-ī* of the gen. sing. (never *-ei* in the older inscriptions) there was no change. We have evidently here scattered traces of a quite symmetrical practice; and we are entitled to infer that this change of *e* to *i* occurred in all words in *-eus* before the endings *-ei* or *-e*. That is to say, it was a dissimilative change. In the time of Plautus, therefore, *meus* must have been declined as follows:—

Sing. N. meus.	Plur. miei.
V. mī (mīē? e.g. <i>Cas.</i> 138).	miei.
A. meum.	meōs.
G. meī.	meōrum.
D.-Ab. meō.	mieis.

¹ Sommer (*Handbuch d. lat. Laut- u. Formenlehre*, p. 446) derives *mī* from **meie*, the regular vocative of *meios*, by syncope of *-e* (which must

have occurred before loss of *i*), and change of **mei* to **mei* and *mī*. But syncope of a case-ending would be without a parallel.

The *ei* which was the ending of the nominative plural of the second declension in the time of Plautus was, as is known, pronounced \bar{e} . At a certain time, therefore, the nominative plural of *meus* must have been **meei*, pronounced *meē*. By the law of contraction then operative, **meē* became **mē*. But the analogy of *meus*, etc., restored the lost *e* of the root; whereupon it must have again disappeared at once, had it not been changed to *i* under a law explained by me in HERMATHENA, l. c., p. 145 ff., and to which I shall here refer as the law of conflict.¹ In the same way the *e* of the stem in an early vocative **mee* was changed to *i*, whence **mie* and *mī*. The same law of conflict changed *i* to *e* in *soci-e-tas* (cf. *san-i-tas*), *u* to *o* in *paruos* (cf. *magnus*), *ī* to \bar{e} in *lani-ē-na* (cf. *tostr-ī-na*), and *ī* to *ei* (= *e*) in PETIEI (cf. GENUI in the same line), in I. 38.

When final *-ei* became *-i* (about 150 B.C.), *miei* and *mieis* became *miī* and *miīs* respectively, and at once suffered contraction into **mī* and **mīs*. But the analogy of *meus*, etc., restored *e*, and the case-forms of *meus* became what they were in classical times. We see, therefore, that twice in its history the nominative plural of *meus* underwent contraction,—first into **mē*, secondly into **mī*. In both cases reintroduction of the lost vowel through analogy would be practically simultaneous with the contraction. After the first contraction the lost vowel was restored as *i*, by the law of conflict; after the second, it was restored as *e*. The modern Italian *mio*, *miei* bear witness to the fact that in late imperial times, in spoken Latin, the words for 'my' were *méum* (with close *e*) in the singular, and *méi* (with open *e*) in the plural. The phases through which the

¹ This name may, perhaps, sound too magniloquent; but, for logical reasons, it cannot be denied that the law as formulated (*loc. cit.*) must operate

in all languages at all times. I hope to have another opportunity of showing that it does.

nominative plural of *meus* passed may be summarily represented as follows :—

1. **meoi*.
2. (a) **meei* (= *meē*).
- (b) **mei* (= *mē*), by the law of contraction.
- (c) **meei* (*meē*), by the analogy of *meus*, etc.
- (d) *miei* (= *miē*), by the law of conflict. Plautine form.
3. (a) **miī*.
- (b) **mī*, by the law of contraction.
- (c) *meī* (a disyllable), by the analogy of *meus*, etc.

As already said, the changes (a), (b), (c), (d) in phase 2, and the changes (a), (b), (c) in phase 3, would be practically simultaneous.

III.

Having shown what was the form taken in early Latin by the nom. and dat.-abl. plur. cases in words in *-eus* generally, I proceed to inquire how, at what period, and owing to what causes, the same cases in *deus* diverged from the general pattern. *Deus*, as is well known, is derived from *deiuos*, later *dīuos*, by loss of *u* before *o*. After losing *u*, *deiuos* became **dēos*, either through **deios* by the loss of intervocalic original *i*, or through **dēos* by the shortening of antevocalic *ē*. Its nom. pl. must originally have been **deiuōs*; but, at some period later than the primitive Italic, the case-ending *-ōs* of the nom. pl. fell into disuse; and the case-ending *-oi*, properly belonging to the pronominal declension, became the mark of the nom. pl. masc. throughout the second declension. It is not necessary to determine whether the new ending of the nom. pl. became attached to the stem as *-oi* or as *-ei*,

nor at what exact stage of its development the stem had arrived at the time of the attachment: in any case the nom. pl. must at a certain time have arrived at the stage **deei* (*deē*). Therefore the subsequent development of the form **deei* (*deē*) must have been exactly the same as the development of **meei*, unless at some point it diverged. It certainly did diverge, since **meei* had arrived at *mei* in Cicero's time, while **deei* was normally *dī*. **Deei* must have failed to recover from one or the other of the two contractions which, as we have seen, it must have undergone if its development was normal. Either it remained contracted when it reached the stage **dei* (*dē*), or not till it reached the stage *dī*. We can only decide between these two possibilities by discovering whether the nom. pl. of *deus* was a monosyllable or a disyllable in the time of Plautus. If it was the former, Plautus wrote **dei* (*dē*), which form passed regularly into *dī* without recovering its disyllabic state: if it was the latter, Plautus wrote *diei* (*diē*), and that form subsequently passed through the changes **dī* and *dī*, and was there arrested in its development (at least for the spoken language).

IV.

It seems to be generally accepted that the nom. and dat.-abl. pl. of *deus* were always monosyllabic in Plautus. Abraham assumes it to be so, Sturtevant tries to prove that it is so, and Lindsay says: "Disyllabic *dei* and *deis* seem not to occur" (*Capt.*, p. 27). That view, therefore, merits very respectful consideration; but no apology is needed for examining the facts and considerations on which it is based. I take first what may be called the direct evidence of metre.

1. The plural of *deus* is never necessarily a monosyllable in Plautus (cf. Sturtevant, p. 18). (a) It never occurs at

the end of a verse where a long syllable (to the exclusion of two short ones) is *de rigueur*. Other undisputed monosyllables are found in such positions: e.g. *mī* (voc.) at *Trin.* 353; *te* *ibid.* 661; *mī* (dat.) at *Most.* 175. (b) It is never so placed that we must suppose it to be totally elided (Skutsch in *Philologus*, lix. 496): e.g. *di immortalēs* (*Aul.* 785, and often) can be scanned *dī(ei) immortalēs*: cf. *īl(a) igno-rābitur* (*Men.* 468); or *di omnes pērdunt* (*As.* 467, and often) can be quite well scanned *dī(ei) omnes pērdunt*: cf. *quōd omnes mōrtales* (*Mil.* 55), *sīne omni cūra* (*Trin.* 621).¹

2. The nom. pl. of *deus* is necessarily scanned as a disyllable in three places, which are usually altered by editors. They may be restored thus:

Most. 222: *diē me faciānt quōd uolūt e. q. s.*

Mer. 436: *hērcle illūnc diēi infelīcent e. q. s.*

Rud. 1316: *diēi hōmines rēpiciūt e. q. s.*

In one or two other places *diēi* may have originally stood. In *Pseud.* 767 MSS. have:—*cui seruitutem di danunt lenoniam*. *Danunt* is normally found only at the end of a line (or colon). Possibly Plautus wrote:—

quōdiēi sēruitutem dānt diē lenoniam.

Again in *Aul.* 50 MSS. have—

utinām me diui adaxint ad suspendium.

¹ It is not surprising that some dubious instances, in which *di* seems to be elided, have been introduced into the text by its correctors. E.g., at *Trin.* 944, MSS. have *calliclise ad uillam aiebant*. This was corrected by Acidalius to *dlii di isse ad uillam aiebant*, which is now commonly read. The scansion *dī isse ad* would be just possible, owing to the elision of the final syllable of *isse*. But I suggest

that the original reading, in the spelling that Plautus may have used, was: *ALIEI IUISE AD UEILAM*. The archaic final *-ei* has been the starting-point of many similar corruptions in Plautus: e.g. original *quoiei* underlies the *quid discimus* (P) or *QUO *** SCIMUS* (A) of *Pseud.* 681, which may be restored: *bēne ubei quōiei scimus cōsilium*. Cf. *Am.* 520, *Aul.* 420, *As.* 589, *Pers.* 120.

That Plautus should have used *diui* in an oath is improbable. Originally the line may have been—

uteĩnám *diel me* adaxint ad suspendium.

So far, therefore, the balance of the direct evidence is, perhaps, slightly in favour of a disyllabic form.

Yet, when one considers that the nom. pl. of *deus* occurs two hundred times in Plautus (excluding the *cantica*), it is certainly remarkable that there are not more than three or four places in which it is even possible to suppose that it has the full value of an iambus. At first sight this fact seems to prove that the nom. pl. of *deus* was a monosyllable in Plautine Latin, and editors seem to be justified in emending those places in which it seems to be found with iambic value. But other facts and considerations modify the force of this evidence, and point to the opposite conclusion.

1. *Deos* is scarcely more often found with the full value of an iambus than *di* is; and *deos* was undoubtedly, and is universally admitted to have been, a disyllable. I am not forgetting that some Plautine scholars still refuse to admit the action of the law of Iambic Shortening when iambic words having vowels in hiatus are found with dimoric value, preferring to assume that in such cases there was some sort of compression, which is vaguely called 'synizesis.' But advocates of Plautine 'synizesis' admit that words like *meos*, *eos*, were disyllabic no less than those who allow the law of Iambic Shortening to operate as freely in the case of *měös*, *ěös* as in the case of *bönös*. They assume not permanent contraction, but temporary compression, from which the word, with notable elasticity, could at any moment recover; for, as is well known, words like *meos*, *eos* are far more often used with iambic

value than with dimoric. Therefore *deos* was undeniably a disyllable.

In all the plays of Plautus, *deos* occurs 58 times (Abraham, p. 204). In 52 places it is certainly dimoric; in only four indisputably Plautine places is it certainly iambic (Abraham omits *Cist.* 242); while in two places it is doubtful. Of the four certain instances of *deos* with full iambic value, two are in bacchiac metre (*Cas.* 670, *Rud.* 191), and two in the first foot (*Bacch.* 387, *Cist.* 242). The two doubtful places are *Rud.* 6, as occurring in a prologue, and *Poen.* 950, which it is generally agreed should be altered. Abraham prefers Studemund's *diuos diuasque*: perhaps <ego> *déos dedsque*. Omitting the two doubtful instances, we have 56 instances of *deos* in Plautus, in only 4 of which must the word be scanned as an iambus—that is to say, in 7 per cent. This proportion is strikingly different from what we should expect. Words of exactly the same type—iambic words having vowels in hiatus, *meos*, *dies*, and the like—are found with iambic far more often than with dimoric value. In the first 700 lines of the *Menaechmei*, iambic words of this type (*meos*) occur 106 times; and in no less than 82 instances, or 77 per cent. of the whole, they have their full iambic value.¹ It is true that, if we take all the instances of *di*—more than 200—we find that the proportion of iambic to dimoric instances is still smaller, about 2 per cent. But the difference cannot safely be pressed, having regard to the extraordinary difference between the metrical treatment of *deos* and such words as *meos*. It should be remembered that a disyllabic *di* was more likely to be changed in later times than a disyllabic *deos*. Moreover, the very fact that *di* occurs so much more often than *deos* is significant. The reason for the disparity is that *di* was constantly used in formulas of

¹ I include words like *suo* even when standing in synaloepha, regarding them as having iambic value when the first syllable forms a full thesis.

cursing and blessing: *di te perduint, ita me di ament* occur on almost every page; and in such formulas the pyrrhic pronunciation was especially appropriate, as will be shown later—*dīēi te pérduint, ita me dīei ament*.

2. The evidence of metre is still only slightly in favour—in a negative sort of way—of a disyllabic *di* in Plautine Latin, that is, of a form *diei* (*diē*). At any rate, there is no place in Plautus in which *di* may not be *diei*; and if it is true that it may nearly always be taken as a monosyllable, the same is true of *deos*, which was certainly a disyllable. It seems probable therefore that the normal pronunciation of both words was pyrrhic: *dēōs, dīēi*, under the law of Iambic Shortening, or *Breues Breuiantes*. But I think it is possible to apply another metrical test, the evidence of which is of a more positive kind—a test by which a latent iambic word may be forced to reveal its identity.

An iambic word shortened under the law of *Breues Breuiantes* and a long monosyllable are both dimoric in value; but they are not always metrically interchangeable. They are prosodic, not always metrical equivalents. For example, a word like *domi* cannot be as freely used in thesis as a word like *cor*. Klotz asserted, and even tried to prove, that iambic words could not be shortened in 'inner' theses of iambic and trochaic verse.¹ He was refuted by Mr. R. C. Manning, Jr., in *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, ix., p. 87 ff., who easily proved that such shortenings occur in every part of the verse. But it still remains true that a word like *lupo* or *eri* cannot be as freely used to form a thesis as it can to form an arsis. Generally speaking, iambic nouns and verbs (except auxiliary verbs, as in *cāuē fáxis*) cannot be used to form a resolved thesis in the body of a verse, though they may be freely so used

¹ Grundzüge Altöömischer Metrik, p. 56 ff.

in the first foot of a colon. Examples in the first foot are:—

uěhēs pól hodie me sei quidem hocc argéntum ferre speres.

Asin. 699.

lícět laúdem Fortunam, tamen ut né Salutem culpem.

ibid. 718.

nón *uőtō* téd amare quei dant quoía amentur gratia.

ibid. 536.

Such theses would be irregular in the body of a verse, that is to say, theses consisting of a shortened noun or verb.¹ I have classified and tabulated all the instances in which a shortened iambic word forms a thesis in seven Plautine plays; and I will set down in a formula the conclusion to which I have been led.

Any iambic word, shortened under the law of Iambic Shortening, may be used in any part of any verse (except the close) to form a resolved arsis; but, except in the first foot of an iambic or trochaic colon, and in anapaestic metre, it may not be used to form a resolved thesis unless its prose accent would have been subordinate in that context, but not entirely suppressed.

The present inquiry would be seriously overweighted by any attempt to demonstrate the truth of the proposed rule. For my present purpose it will be necessary only to make a simple deduction therefrom, which is easily tested by experiment. It is this: if a shortened iambic word could be used freely as an arsis, but only under restrictions as a thesis, it follows that such words must occur more often in the arsis than in the thesis.

In the first 200 iambic verses of *Trinummus* (beginning with v. 39), and the first 200 trochaic verses of the same

¹ They also, though rarely, occur before the diæresis of the trochaic septenarius.

play, there are 122 instances of iambic words used with dimoric value, excluding words like *eos*, *dies*, *scio*, in which some scholars refuse to recognise iambic shortening. Of these 122 instances, 79 are in arsis, 43 in thesis. That is to say, 65 per cent. are in arsis. If words like *ěös*, *dĕēs*, *sciō* be included, the percentage will be slightly higher. There is no obvious reason why a long monosyllable—the prosodic equivalent of a shortened iambic word—should stand more often in the arsis than in the thesis. For example, the noun *cor*¹ occurs 18 times in Plautus (excluding the *cantica*). It stands in the arsis 9 times. A shortened iambic word, therefore, resembles a long monosyllable in having dimoric value, but differs from it in being placed about twice as often in the arsis as in the thesis.

Applying this test to the Plautine nom. pl. of *deus*, we find that it occurs 200 times with dimoric value in dialogue.¹ It is found in the arsis 132 times, in the thesis 68 times. That is to say, 66 per cent. of the instances are in the arsis. Applying the same test to dimoric *deos*, we find that it occurs 51 times in dialogue, and in 34 instances it stands in the thesis, or 66 per cent.² These results may be exhibited in tabular form as follows:—

	Total number.	In Arsi.	In Thesi.	Per-centage in Arsi.
Shortened iambic words in 400 vv. } <i>Trin.</i> , }	122	79	43	65
Instances of dimoric nom. pl. of } <i>deus</i> in Plautus, }	200	132	68	66
Instances of dimoric <i>deos</i> in Plautus,	51	34	17	66
Instances of <i>cor</i> in Plautus (dia- } logue), }	18	9	9	50

¹ References in Lodge, *Lexicon Plautinum*, s. v.

² The same test may be used in order

to decide the value of *suo*, *dies*, *scio*, and the like. It is conclusive for *sūō*, *dĕēs*, *sciō*, as against *suo*, cte.

It appears, then, that Plautus places *di* in the arsis about twice as often as he places it in the thesis. The fact is inexplicable if *di* was a monosyllable at that time, but is at once explained if it was a disyllable; for we have seen that it is a characteristic of shortened iambic words to occur about twice as often in arsis as in thesis. I conclude, therefore, that the only inference to be drawn from a careful examination of all the evidence is, that *di* was a disyllable in Plautus, that is, *diei*, though it was nearly always used with pyrrhic value, under the law of *Breues Breuiantes*.¹

V.

The disyllabic *diei* of the Plautine age would become *dī* about the time of Lucilius, and would necessarily be contracted to *di*. As *di* it remained in spoken Latin;² as *di* it was normally used in prose, and often in verse. But

¹ Dr. Sturtevant sees a positive proof that Plautine *di* was monosyllabic in the hexameters of Plautus' younger contemporary Ennius. He says that we must read *di* and *dis* at *Ann.* 116 f. M. (= 73 B):

qualem te patriae custodem *di*
genuerunt!
o pater, o genitor, o sanguen *dis*
oriundum!

The testimony of these lines is really in favour of disyllabic *di* and *dis*. The fifth foot in hexameters, like the first foot, is a part of the verse in which we very often find either true proceleusmatics or natural proceleusmatics which may be made into artificial dactyls by a trick of recitation, such as synizesis, or syncope. Thus the natural proceleusmatics *abiete*, *pariete*, *ariete* often become artificial dactyls in Vergil, but always, I believe, in the fifth or

first foot. So the natural proceleusmatic *teginine* became an artificial dactyl in the same places: e.g. *Lucr.* ii. 663; *Cic. Arat.* 233, 423; *Verg. B.* i. 1. (cf. *Priscian K.* ii. 14). Consequently we may scan—

qualem te patriae custodem *diei*
genuerunt!
o pater, o genitor, o sanguen *dieis*
oriundum!

Or, in hexameter verse, it is permissible to speak of synizesis, and to pronounce *diei*, *dieis*. In the verse-close *cum magneis dieis* (*Ann.* 143 B), we have the same phenomenon as in Virgil's *aureo*, and the like, in the same place. At *Ann.* 69 B we should certainly read *cum dieis agit aeuom* (cf. *Cic. Tus. Dis.* i. 28), where *dieis* again stands in the fifth foot, and before a vowel.

² Cf. Sturtevant, p. 23.

the **mi*, which we must, on theoretic grounds, suppose to have had, at least, a momentary existence, recovered its disyllabic state as *meī*; for that *mei* was the popular as well as the literary form is proved by Ital. *miei*, where *mie* represents Lat. *mē*- : cf. *piede* from *pēdem*. So also *abiegnieis* became *abiegnēis*, not **abiegnīs*, and so forth. Why, then, did not *di* become *deī*? That is the only question which now remains to be answered.

When we were investigating the prosodic value of *di* in Plautus, a curious fact emerged for which we were not then seeking, namely, that the poet's metrical treatment of the word *deos* differed remarkably from his treatment of any other word whatsoever, of similar measure, in the Latin language. We saw that, out of 106 instances of words like *meos*, *scio* occurring in the first 700 lines of the *Menaechmei*, no less than 77 per cent. had their full iambic value; whereas, of the 56 instances of *deos* in Plautus, only 4 are used with iambic value, or 7 per cent. As *deos* is a noun, it may be better to compare its metrical treatment with that of some other noun of the same measure and circumstances—that is, whose syllables are not divided by a consonant. I have examined the 25 Plautine instances of *dies* given in Lewis and Short's dictionary. In 3 cases the metre is indecisive. Of the remaining 22 instances, only 5 have dimoric value, while 17 have iambic value, or 77 per cent.¹ But *deos* is only one of the

¹ Prof. Radford, therefore, seriously understates the case when he says (*Trans. Am. Phil. Ass.*, 36, p. 184, n. 1) that *dies* and *uia* are "less often slurred" than *deos*, &c. He also suggests that "In the case of *deūm* an explanation" (of the comparative frequency with which it occurs with dimoric value) "may perhaps be found in the trite use of the noun." I do not know why *deum* should be separated from *deos*, &c. The words

"trite use" can only mean that the forms of *deus* were used more often than the forms of *dies* and *uia*, which could not possibly be shown. But even if it could be shown, it is not true that the sounds or the accentuation of a word vary in any sort of relation to the frequency of its use. That would be a novel principle, which would overthrow the science of language.

inflexions of *deus*. As a further precaution, it will be well to examine the Plautine treatment of the rest of them. Taking all the admittedly disyllabic forms of *deus* given by Abraham (l. c., p. 204 f.) as occurring in Plautus—excluding, that is, *di* and *dis*—we find that their total number is 83, and that only 7 of them have certainly iambic value, or something over 8 per cent. These statistics may be conveniently combined in a table:—

—	Instances examined.	Dimoric scansions.	Iambic scansions.	Per- centage of iambic scansions.
<i>Meos, dies, scio, et sim, . . .</i>	106	24	82	77
<i>Dies,</i>	22	5	17	77
<i>Deos,</i>	56	52	4	7
<i>Deus, deum, deo, &c., . . .</i>	83	76	7	8·4

In the opening sentence of this inquiry I stated that *deus* is unique amongst Latin nouns in forming its plural by changing *-eus* to *-i*. It is clear that it is equally unique in its metrical treatment by Plautus. We shall be acting in obedience to the elementary precepts of the inductive method if we suspect that the two circumstances are 'causally related.' How are we to interpret this unwillingness of Plautus to allow the forms of *deus* to fill out a whole foot? We might reasonably argue that the poet wished these forms to occupy an unobtrusive position in the line; but against that view seems to be the fact that they occur 55 times in arsis against 23 times in thesis (Abraham, l. c.). We must be cautious, however, in interpreting the latter fact, or we shall go

utterly astray. When we are dealing with ancient metric, our subjective impressions should count for nothing. There is evidence that the placing of a shortened iambic word in the arsis rather than in the thesis (and we have seen that all iambic words occur more often in arsis than in thesis) was a matter of practical necessity, and not a matter of æsthetic choice. Whenever a shortened iambic word was placed in the thesis, metrical ambiguity must always have been produced. But in arsis a shortened iambic word could never have caused hesitation. Thus Terence wrote:—

ex Graécis *bónis* Latinas fecit non bonas;

and the verse could be recited in only one way. But suppose he had written something like

sed quí *bõnās* fáciét nón meliόres . . .,

intending the words to be scanned as I have marked them,—how could the actor have known that he was not to scan

sed quí bonás faciét non méliorés . . . ?

He could not know till he came near the end of the verse, when it would be too late. Therefore, the fact that the forms of *deus* occur in arsis more than twice as often as in thesis by no means indicates that the poet wished the words to be prominent, or that they were prominently accented in prose. In the fashionable assumption that the metrical accentuation of a Plautine verse almost exactly reflects the accentuation of prose (a dogma based on imperfect and unsystematic observation) there is no scientific soundness. The metrical accentuation of a Plautine verse is most definitely related to the prose accentuation—so definitely that from it we can recover

the prose accentuation where the knowledge of it has not been preserved by tradition; but, simply as it stands in the verse, it cannot reflect the prose accentuation.¹ The forms of *deus*, when used as pyrrhics, share with all other iambic words so used the peculiarity that they stand about twice as often in arsis as in thesis. Why they do so, we have seen. But what is peculiar to the forms of *deus* is the fact that they are hardly ever used with iambic value. That treatment, as we have seen, is the very reverse of that invariably found in the case of all other iambic words. There can be only one explanation of the fact that the forms of *deus* were so very rarely allowed to fill out an entire foot: the poet would not have them dwelt upon, but wished them to be swiftly passed over.

When the geologist wishes to understand how the physical features of the earth were carved out, he studies the rains that beat and the winds that blow in his own day. And the philologist, if he would understand the forces that moulded ancient tongues long dead, must assume that they were no other than the forces that live and work now. We ask why an early Roman poet arranged that such words as *deos*, *diei* should not be dwelt upon: Schiller's precept is—

Willst du die andern verstehn, blick' in dein eigenes Herz!

In modern, as in ancient times, the divine name is too often used in oaths and curses. In several modern languages there is evidence of an effort to veil the harshness and irreverence of the practice by a more or less disguised pronunciation of the word 'God,' or its equivalent. These efforts take the strangest and, apparently, the most capricious forms. In the old English oaths 'God's blood!', 'God's death!', and others of the same pattern, the first syllable was so lightly accented that it fell away altogether,

¹ Cf. *Classical Rev.*, xx., p. 31 ff.; and the rule proposed above (p. 349).

and they became 'Sblood!' 'Sdeath!', and so forth. The vulgar and now meaningless exclamation 'drat it!' was originally the shocking execration 'God rot it!' At other times, the word which it is desired to disguise retains its accent, but suffers a vowel-change. 'Good God!' and 'by God!' become 'good ged!', 'by gad!' or 'egad!'. In Ireland a consonant is often changed into *b*: 'begob!' and 'bejabers!' were once 'by God!' and 'by Jesus!'. In the New England States of America 'land sakes!' is often used, with no consciousness that it means 'For the Lord's sake!' When a Californian gold-digger speaks of 'this dodgasted place,' his real meaning is obscured by consonantal changes. The old French oaths 'par Dieu!' 'mort Dieu!' and 'corps Dieu!' became 'parbleu,' 'morbleu,' and 'corbleu'; and the obsolete 'palsambleu' was once 'par le sang Dieu!', the English 'Sblood!' In Germany 'Sacrament' became 'sapperment!', and 'O Jesus!' becomes 'O je!' One might multiply almost indefinitely such examples; but those I have given are enough, perhaps more than enough. It even seems as if in formulas of blessing, too, when their use has become merely conventional, the employment of the divine name may be felt to be too familiar. At least, that seems to be the reason why the old English 'God be with you!' has become the now meaningless valedictory 'Good-bye!' Since, then, we are all formed of one clay, why should not the ancient Roman have felt a similar desire, and have made a similar effort? I see no other possible explanation of the unique Plautine treatment of all forms of the noun *deus*, by which he makes sure that they shall not be dwelt upon, but swiftly passed over, than that we have in it a manifestation of the same human weakness.

But the monosyllabic *di* and *dis* are not yet explained. The change from *di*, *dis* to *dei*, *deis* would be due to the 'analogy' of *deos*, etc. That is to say, the speaker would

have missed in *di*, *dis* the connexion with the other cases. But if I am right in my interpretation of the many strange changes which the corresponding word undergoes in modern speech, obscuration of the connexion between *di*, *dis* and *deos*, *deorum*, etc., could not have been displeasing to an ancient Roman when he used the former words in oaths or the like—as even Cicero does in a speech (*Deiot.* 21). The plural was always used in such expletives; the nominative most often, but the ablative also frequently. Plautine examples of the ablative are: *i cum dieis beneuolentibus!* (*Mil.* 1351), a valedictory formula which corresponds exactly with our 'Good-bye!', as is manifest from its origin in 'God be with you!'; *dieis inimiceis nate!* 'misbegotten knave!' (*ibid.* 314). When therefore those very inflexions of the word *deus* which were most often used in expletives passed, by a natural development, into forms in which their proper and original meaning was somewhat veiled, it would be no cause for wonder if the Roman acquiesced, and if his mind did not experience that unconscious distress at broken symmetry and obscured connexion with kindred forms which is the parent of those changes in language which we attribute to analogy.

For more serious occasions the forms *dei*, *deis* came into existence. The forms *dii* and *diis*, as Dr. Sturtevant observes (l.c. p. 23), were certainly pronounced *di*, *dis*—a mere grammarian's spelling, invented to satisfy their 'analogical' rule that the nom. pl. of the second declension must have the same number of syllables as the nom. sing. Dr. Sturtevant gives statistics showing the comparative frequency with which the monosyllabic and disyllabic forms were used in classical verse. *Dis* seems to have been more carefully avoided than *di*, possibly because of ill-omened association with the prefix *dis-*, and with the proper name *Dis*. Vergil uses only *di*, *dis*. He may have thought those forms nearer to the archaic *diei*,

dieis, which he would find in old MSS. of Ennius, and would probably pronounce *dīi*, *dīs*. It is clear that though the forms *dī*, *dis* must have had some familiar, and even vulgar, associations, they were not thereby felt to be unfitted for use in elevated poetry. They were not distorted forms, like some of their modern analogues, but had come into existence naturally, free from the suggestion of caprice. Their monosyllabic condition was but a slight and almost transparent veil to their meaning, not ungraceful, and likely to be not displeasing even to reverence.

Of course the same cause might have perpetuated the monosyllabic **dei*, (*dē*), which, for theoretical reasons, we have assumed to have been one phase in the evolution of *dī*. If it could be proved that *dī* was a monosyllable in Plautus, it would be necessary to assume that the cause which I suppose to have prevented the restoration of *dī* to a disyllabic form had operated in an earlier age. But the inference that *dī* was a disyllable in Plautus rests on objective evidence; and the analogy of modern languages suggests that the cause in question is less likely to operate in a ruder and less sensitive age. Moreover, when **dei* (*dē*) became a disyllable, it could only do so as *diei*, in which shape its connexion with *deos*, &c., was actually slightly disguised.

Perhaps a few words should be said about the contracted forms *ī* (nom. pl.), *īs* (dat.-abl. pl.), *īdem*, *īdem*. Why did not, e.g., *īdem* (pl.) recover a trisyllabic state *ēidem* as definitely and fully as **mī* recovered a disyllabic state *mēi*? The change from **mī* to *mei* was due to the analogy of *meus*, etc. But the nom. sing. of *īdem* (pl.) could not have exerted any similar influence over that form. Irregularity had been from the first present in the case-systems of *is* and *īdem*; and any new irregularity naturally arising could not be felt to mar the symmetry of a scheme.¹

¹ The development of the nom. pl. of *is* must have been exactly similar to that of the nom. pl. of *meus* until the stage *ī* was reached. Starting from

The modern science of language is founded, as is well known, on the postulate that all changes therein are due either to sound-laws which admit no exceptions, or to 'analogy.' At first sight, some of the changes mentioned in this last section seem to infringe that postulate. For example, the old French 'par Dieu!' was variously changed to 'parbleu,' 'pardi,' 'pardienne,' 'pardine,' and so forth. The changes seem to be capricious; and, though they could not be undetermined, it is obvious that they have nothing to do with sound-laws; and it would be difficult or impossible to show that they are caused by 'analogy.' But words like 'parbleu,' and expletives generally, are really interjections; and interjections are outside language. They are incapable of serving as logical terms or connecting them; and they convey no more information to the hearer than an inarticulate cry may convey. Therefore the postulate on which the science of language rests is not infringed by any form mentioned in these pages; and it remains true that in language, as in every other part of the phenomenal world, the reign of law is absolute.

**eioi*, it must have passed through the phases **eoi*, **eei*, **ei* (*ē*), *iei*, *iī*, *ī*. The Plautine forms were *iei*, *ieis*, usually

dimoric, *iei*, (*iē*). *iei*s (*iēs*). Details are given by Sturtevant, p. 24 f.

CHARLES EXON.

NOTES ON APULEIUS.

I.—THE APOLOGIA.

THE admirable article by Rudolf Helm, *Quaestiones Apuleianae*, in 'Philologus' (Supplement-Band ix. (1904), pp. 513–588), and his still more admirable critical edition of the *Apologia* (1905) in the series of Teubner texts, have done much to fix what are the right principles on which to base the restoration of Apuleius. Helm is rightly loth to leave the guidance of F and its early copy ϕ unless under grievous compulsion. The excellence of these manuscripts, and the almost complete worthlessness of all others, render them our necessary guides; but they are undoubtedly corrupt in many places. This has led editors to be too ready to have recourse to emendation; and even where the readings of F ϕ are quite sound, the habit of emendation once formed has introduced alterations which have injured rather than increased our knowledge of the language of Apuleius. We should accordingly adopt as our principle to explain the readings of F ϕ , if possible; and we fancy that in some cases in which even strong conservatives have had recourse to alteration or to the adoption of emendations already made, subsequent scholars will find that there was no need to have departed from the manuscript reading. But Helm himself has done much to show the general excellence of the

deliverances of Fφ. As an instance of that general excellence, let me refer to Apol. c. 50 (p. 57. 7, Helm).¹ Apuleius is explaining after Plato (in the *Timaeus*) the cause of epilepsy. Owing to the internal heat, some of the flesh turns into an *albida et tumida tabes*. If that comes to the surface in blotches, the patient is not any longer subject to the disease. Apuleius continues — *enimvero* ('but') *si pernicioſa illa dulcedo intus cohibita et bili atrae sociata venis omnibus furens pervasit, dein ad summum caput viam molita dirum fluxum cerebro immiscuit, ilico regalem partem animi debilitat*. At first sight *dulcedo* seems quite inappropriate; and Colvius altered to *albedo*, which (though a violent change) seems convincing when we turn to Plato, *Timaeus* 83 D τὸ δ' αὖ μετ' αἶρος τηκόμενον ἐκ νέας καὶ ἀπαλῆς σαρκός, τούτου δ' ἀνεμωθέντος καὶ ξυμπεριληφθέντος ὑπὸ ὑγρότητος, καὶ πομφολύγων ξυστασῶν ἐκ τοῦ πάθους τούτου . . . χρώμα ἔχουσῶν διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀφροῦ γένεσιν ἰδεῖν λευκὸν ταύτην πᾶσαν τηκεδὸνα ἀπαλῆς σαρκὸς μετὰ πνεύματος ξυμπλακεῖσαν λευκὸν εἶναι φλέγμα φαμέν. The emendation has been accepted ever since the days of Colvius (1588), and is approved by the new Latin Thesaurus (i. 1488. 74). Yet the learning of Haupt (*Opuscula* iii., p. 314) has shown it to be wrong, and that *dulcedo* is right. Among the meanings of that word not found in our Dictionaries is one which, in various degrees, approaches to that of 'itch,' 'irritation.' In proof, Haupt refers to Cicero, *Leg. i. 47 quae natura bona sunt quia dulcedine et scabie carent non satis cernunt*: Grattius 408 (ed. Postgate) *At si deformi lacerum dulcedine corpus Persequitur scabies, longi via pessima leti*: Vegetius, *Mulom. 3 (2). 52 urigines etiam in pedibus cruribus unguibusque vel sub armis aliquando generantur quas quidam dulcedines vocant: habent similitudinem scabiei*. Quae cum se diffuderint

¹ The references are to the chapters lines in Helm's edition given in of the *Apologia*, with the pages and brackets.

pedes exulcerant ad similitudinem leprae, et urgente *prurigine* animalia sibi partes illas corrodunt vel alternis pedibus confricando vulnerant: ib. 5 (4). 14. 4 *dulcedo* sequitur (which in the Greek Hippiatrica is ἐπιθισμός according to Schneider): Ausonius, Epigr. 106 (108) "in scabiosum Polygitonem," line 11 Donec marcentem calidi fervore lavacri Blandus letali solvat *dulcedine* morbus. Of course, Helm rightly retains *dulcedo* in his edition with due recognition of Haupt. I have given this case in full, not only for its intrinsic interest, but also that it may be seen how cautious one must be before any violent departure from the reading of F is definitely adopted.¹

2 (2. 2 Helm).

In this notorious passage the corrupt word is *tacerem*. I venture to read and punctuate as follows:—

De morte cognati adolescentis subito *tacet et* tanti criminis descriptione; <ne> tamen omnino desistere videretur, calumniam magiae eam solum delegit ad accusandum.

'He is suddenly silent about his young kinsman's death and details of such a heinous crime: lest, however, he should seem to give up altogether, he chose the false charge of magic for the accusation.' F omits *ne*. ϕ has it over *omnino*: it probably fell out after *descriptione* (Helm). F ϕ read *calumnia*, and one should like to take it with *desistere*: but it would be a bold proceeding to alter *magiae* (for this seems to be the reading of F ϕ , not *magia* as Vliet says) to *magiam*, or to read *calumnia*, <*calumniam*> *magiae*. It is rare to find a genitive after *calumnia* defining the false charge; but Apuleius uses the same expression

¹ In one other passage of the *Apolo-*
logia, Haupt (Opuscula iii. 381-2) has
again shown his genius. In the pretty
poem (c. 9) he thus corrects the eleventh

verse: Quod si animam inspires *donaci*,
iam carmina nostra Cedent victa tuo
dulciloquo calamo, where the MSS.
give *dona et*.

c. 67 (75. 19). That *t* and *r* were liable to confusion may be seen from 41 (47. 22) *rusparet* for *rusparer*. For the resumptive use of *eam* cp. 4 (5. 21), 50 (57. 21). The very numerous cases in which *a* and *u* are confused in F make one inclined to follow Rohde in reading *solam* for *solum*. See below, p. 376, note, for interchange of *a* and *u*.

4 (5. 19).

Zenonem illum antiquum Velia oriundum, qui primus omnium sollertissimo artificio ambifariam dissolverit (*dissolveret* codd.), eum quoque Zenonem longe decorissimum fuisse.

With this should be compared Florida 88 (182. 1-3 Vliet)¹ *Protagoras . . . anceps argumentum ambifariam proposuit*. This parallel certainly leads us to think that *argumentum* is the object to *dissolverit* in the passage of the Apologia, and this word has been added by Vliet, and is virtually adopted by Helm: he adds *argumenta*. But perhaps *omnium* may have been corrupted from *omne argumentum*. This latter word, being in considerable use, was abbreviated into '*a*^m' (see Chassant, p. 2): then *omne a*^m became *omnium*. Zeno's destructive criticism was wholesale, so that some word signifying that he applied his principles universally is required: cp. Timon ap. Plut. Pericl. 4 ἀμφοτερογλώσσου τε μέγα σθένορος οὐκ ἀλαπαδνὸν | Ζήνωνος, πάντων ἐπιλήπτορος. Hence the older editors read *omnium* <*dictionem*> (vulg.), *omnia* (Bosscha), *omnimoda* (Hildebrand), *omnium* <*omnia*> (Hand.). This last reading is that adopted by the Thesaurus (i. 1837. 77). Salmasius and Oudendorp conjectured *orationem* for *omnium*.

¹ In the Florida the references are to pages and lines in parentheses. the pages of Oudendorp, with Vliet's

9 (11. 17).

Tu mihi das contra pro verno flore tuum ver.

F ϕ seem to read *das*, altered by Kruger to *des*, and *des* is read by Vliet and Helm. I should prefer to adopt the vulg. *da*, not only on account of *redde* in the next hexameter, but also because *s* is often wrongly added at the end of words in F, e.g. 48 (55. 10) *illis*: 57 (65. 11) *cauponis*: 70 (79. 10) *solitudinis*: 92 (102. 6) *coniugis*.

10 (12. 8).

Note that the MSS. read *Virgilianos*, not *Vergilianos*.

12 (14. 6).

Alteram vero caelitem Venerem *praeditam quae sit* optimati amore solis hominibus et eorum paucis curare.

The other Venus is described a few lines before as *vulgariam quae sit percita populari amore*, which is right and forcible, and did not require alteration to *praedita . . . amoris*, as was suggested by Price. Venus Vulgaria is regarded as herself inflamed with the passion she excites in all living things. But the suggestion of Price introduces an Apuleian usage of *praedita* 'set over': cp. De Deo Socratis 15 fin. (19. 1 Goldbacher)¹ deos, . . . qui . . . *hominibus praediti*: 16 (19. 15) eundem illum (genium) qui *nobis praeditus* fuit. De Dogm. Plat. ii. 25 (101. 10) magistratibus . . . *ei negotio praeditis*: cp. Fronto p. 47. 19 (Naber) deus *ei rei praeditus*: 146. 3 Mercurius *nuntiis praeditus*; and Vliet adopts this sense in the description of Venus Caelestis, reading *praedita quae sit optimati amoris*.

¹ References to the philosophical works of Apuleius are by book and chapter, with the pages and lines of

Goldbacher's edition (Vienna, 1876) given in parentheses.

Helm more fitly adheres to *amore*, saying that here, as in the description of the other Venus, she is supposed to possess the love which she excites. He reads *praedita quae sit optimati amore*, but is naturally offended by the order of words, and suggests *praedicatam, quae* understanding (if I apprehend him aright) *percita* from the clause five lines before, *quae sit percita populari amore*. But, if this is Helm's meaning, that clause is too remote to allow the word *percita* to be easily supplied; and besides Fϕ give *praeditam*. We may suggest then *praeditam quasi optimati amore*. The word *popularis* is of wide application; but *optimas* strictly has only a political significance, applying to aristocratic as opposed to democratic; and accordingly in the connexion given in the text it requires some kind of apology for its metaphorical usage. The use of *curo* with the dat. is not classical, but it is found in Plautus Rud. 146, Trin. 1057. It is frequent in Apuleius: cp. Apol. 36 (41. 17), De Deo Socr. 2 fin. (7. 6), and Hildebrand's note there.

13 (15. 21).

Si choragium thymelicum possiderem num ex eo argumentarere etiam uti me consuesse tragoedi syrmate, histrionis crocota, *orgia*, mimi centunculo.

Orgia, of course, has no business here at all; and the vulgate *vel ad trieterica orgia* is an obvious interpolation, which may show some knowledge of Virgil (Aen. iv. 302), but nothing else. Haupt (Opuscula iii. 541) ingeniously suggests *archimimi*: but the passage in the Florida, 18 (179. 9 V), where there is a somewhat similar enumeration, speaks of *mimus*, not *archimimus*. Perhaps *orgia* has got out of place, and was originally a gloss on *Cereris mundum* at the end of the chapter. The rare use of *mundus*—a use, however, apparently attractive to Apuleius, cp. Met. ii. 9

(29. 16 Vliet): iv. 33 (93. 7): vi. 1 (119. 81): xi. 8 (258. 3),¹ especially in reference to Ceres—may have suggested the not altogether happy gloss of *orgia* ‘mysteries.’ If this view is rejected, I would suggest *crocata Phrygia*: cp. Met. xi. 8 (258. 12) *simiam pilleo textili crocotisque Phrygiis . . . aureum gestantem poculum*. If *Phrygia* were written *Frigia*, the corruption might easily have come about. But the addition of *Phrygia* somewhat spoils the symmetry of the passage.

15 (18. 9).

In this passage Apuleius discusses the various theories of vision in connexion with the scientific theory of reflexion of light. Talking of the emanation theory of vision, he says:—

An . . . radii nostri seu mediis oculis proliquati et lumini extrario mixti atque ita uniti, ut Plato arbitratur, seu tantum oculis profecti sine ullo foris amminiculo, ut Archytas putat, seu intentu aeris (*veris* codd.; corr. Pithoeus) *facti*, ut Stoici rentur &c.

The Stoical doctrine of vision is thus set forth by Plutarch, De Placitis Philosophorum, 901 D Χρύσιππος (λέγει) κατὰ τὴν συνέντασιν (*intentionem*) τοῦ μεταξὺ αἰέρος ὁρᾶν ἡμᾶς, νυγέντος μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁρατικοῦ πνεύματος, ὅπερ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι τῆς κόρης διήκει, κατὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς τὸν περικείμενον αἶρα ἐπιβολὴν ἐντείνοντος αὐτὸν κωνοειδῶς, ὅταν ᾗ ὁμογενὴς ὁ αἶρ (‘on its impact with the surrounding air, extending itself like a cone when the air is of a kindred nature,’ i.e. illuminated). The apex of the cone is the eye, the base the bounds of the body seen. Plato held that the fiery emanations from the eye mingled with the reflected light from the body, and with the light in the intervening air which joined with it in its projection, all three lights

¹ References to the Metamorphoses are by book and chapter, with Vliet’s pages and lines added in parentheses.

uniting and coalescing in the light of vision. This was what the later Academy called *συναύγεια* (see Plato, *Timaeus* 45 B-E; Plutarch l.c. 901 B,C: also Prof. Beare's admirable discussion "Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition," p. 45). Archytas and the Stoics held that the fiery emanations from the eye did not mingle with air, but went straight to the object: they differed, however, as to whether these emanations could effect their journey and escape dissipation without some force keeping them together. Archytas thought they could; the Stoics seemed to believe that they needed this confining force, and that this force was supplied by the *συνέντασις*, *intentio*, elasticity, confining pressure, of the air. It is the course of the emanations under the confining pressure of the air that Apuleius wants to describe by *intentu aeris facti*. We thus see that *facti* cannot be right. The best emendation which has been suggested would seem to be Schoene's *farti*, which is palæographically excellent, but in its meaning, 'stuffed,' not suitable to describe that equable pressure which prevents diffusion, besides having a somewhat undignified tone. Helm, having originally conjectured *fulti*, now omits *f*, and reads *acti*; but not to speak of the lack of explanation of the appearance of *f*, the pressure of the air was not the cause of the motion, but the cause of the rays remaining concentrated. Perhaps the right word is *coacti* (*c̄acti*) 'marshalled *together*, by the pressure of the air.' The emphatic word is '*together*'; it was this cohesion which was effected by the pressure of the air. Thus the *συν-* of *συνέντασις*, which was probably the recognized word in the Stoic school to express the idea, will obtain its due recognition. *Cogere* is quite common in the sense of keeping together things which would tend to separate, e.g., Virg. *Ecl.* 3. 20 Tityre *coge* pecus; especially in a military sense, e.g. *cogere agmen*, which will well suit with *profecti*.

16 (18. 17).

Videturne vobis debere philosophia haec omnia vestigare et inquirere et cuncta specula vel uda vel suda *soli* videre? Quibus praeter ista quae dixi etiam illa ratiocinatio necessaria est, cur, &c.

Apuleius here proceeds to other questions of optics. Commentators usually correct to *videnturne philosophi*, and in justification appeal to *soli* (which they apparently interpret as M. Bétolaud does, who translates, with no little elegance, 'dans une solitude contemplative') and to *Quibus*. Helm, in his masterly discussion on this passage (Philologus, l.c. p. 564 f.), rightly defends *philosophia*, which means 'the body of philosophers' (cp. Cic. Fin. iv. 22), and can thus take the phrase *Quibus* by a sense-construction. But *soli* causes some difficulty. In form it strains the sense-construction rather far, as being a plural adjective in the same clause as the singular *philosophia*; and in meaning it is exaggerated, for Apuleius cannot want to say that no one but philosophers ought to look into mirrors. Helm, with great ingenuity, maintains that *soli* is the genitive of *solum*, then *specula soli* will be 'natural mirrors'—mirrors which the open country before you supplies, pools and bright objects; and he compares Lucret. iv. 98 *Postremo speculis in aqua splendoreque in omni Quaecumque apparent nobis simulacra, necesse est, Quandoquidem simili specie sunt praedita rerum Extima, imaginibus missis consistere rerum*. I fail to see the difficulty which Helm finds in *vel uda vel suda*. In both cases *vel* is disjunctive, and before *uda* it does not mean 'for instance.' Translate 'and all mirrors, whether moist or dry, in nature.' In the somewhat strange expression *specula soli*, it may be that Apuleius, who was something

of a lawyer,¹ had in his mind the technical expression for real estate, *res soli*.

17 (20. 4).

Ego adeo *servosne* an habeas ad agrum colendum an ipse mutuiarias operas cum vicinis tuis cambies, neque scio neque laboro.

The reading of F for *servos* is ^{uor}*serior*, and there is no doubt that *ior* is an alteration by a later hand, and that originally it was *servuor* (see Helm, l.c. p. 567). This has been altered by ϕ into *servos*,² and this alteration is accepted by the editors, who are then compelled either to eject *an* (Krüger) or to read *tu* for *an*, as is the usual proceeding which is adopted by Helm in his edition. It is certainly better to read *tu* than to suppose that Apuleius varied the construction in such a short and simple sentence. But I think we should rather suppose *an* to be the remnant of *-um*, and that the original reading was *servorumne*, the \bar{u} having been written above the line in the MSS. from which F was copied, and transcribed into the wrong place. A somewhat more difficult hypothesis, though by no means impossible, would be to suppose *ne* is a corruption of *-um*. But at any rate the reading of F undoubtedly points to *servorum*. It will be governed by *operas* in the next clause. 'I for my part neither know nor care whether it is slave-labour you possess for the cultivation of your land, or reciprocal labour that you swop (i.e. exchange)'. For the genitive after *operae*, which is fairly frequent, cp. Digest.

¹ See Friedrich Norden's edition of the Cupid and Psyche (Vienna, 1903), Introduction, pp. 25, 26. He promises a treatise (it may be already published), *De iurisprudentiae apud Apuleium vestigiis*.

² *s* is often confused with *r* in F 40

(47. 2) *rum me* (for *Summe*): 41 (47. 24) *accurandam*: 41 (48. 13) *beneficiis eum* for *veneficii reum*: 44 (51. 22) *accuratorum*: 93 (103. 18) *se* for *re*—but none of these cases of *r* for *s* is an example of the error in the last letter of a word.

33. 1. 2 si diurnas *operas Stichī* dare damnatus non a mane sed a sexta diei hora det, totius diei nomine tenetur. For *operas mutuarias* cp. Gell. ii. 29. 7. The rare word *cambiare*, from which comes the English 'change,' was doubtless fairly common in ordinary use, as it is mentioned not infrequently by the grammarians and glossographers. However, in literature, it is only found here and once in Sículus Flaccus (second century) until the sixth century in the Lex Salica. Possibly it was a word of somewhat colloquial nature, like our 'swop.' If so, it will suit the contemptuous tone of this passage of Apuleius. The passage quoted in the Thesaurus from the Lex Salica has to do apparently with swopping horses. It is not derived, as Priscian (ii. 541. 13 Keil) supposed, from κάμπτω, but is a Celtic word, connected with the Irish *cimb* 'tribute,' and the modern Irish *gaimbín* 'interest'; in fact, with that unestimable person, the 'gombeen man' (see Walde's Lat. Etym. Wörterbuch, p. 87).

18 (21. 17).

Enim paupertas olim philosophiae vernacula est, frugi, sobria, parvo potens, aemula laudis, adversum divitias possessa, habitu securo, cultu simplex, consilio benesuada, neminem unquam superbia inflavit, neminem impotentia depravavit, neminem tyrannide efferavit, delicias ventris et inguinum neque vult ulla neque potest. Quippe haec et alia flagitia divitiarum alumni solent.

The clause *adversum divitias possessa*, consisting as it does of three words, spoils the symmetry of this elaborate sentence. Helm takes it (if I understand him aright) 'possessed as the true property in comparison with wealth (which is a frail and fleeting possession).' But this puts too much significance and weight into the single word *possessa*, which only means 'being possessed.' I think we must add <*habens*>, which may

have fallen out before *habitu*. Then, though we need not and should not put a comma after *divitias*, the four-worded clause nevertheless breaks into two divisions 'as opposed to (in comparison with) riches owning wealth'—and thus the symmetry and harmony of the passage is maintained, and *possessa* gets its pregnant sense of 'wealth,' 'true possessions,' by the antithesis *adversum divitias*.

With hesitation I accept the usual interpretation of *solent* in the last clause, viz., that we must supply with it *velle et posse* from the preceding clause, though 'the children of riches,' in the sense of people of wealth, seems to be a needlessly stilted phrase, and the ellipse not at all elegant, though Meursius says it is. Casaubon suggested *alumna sunt*: cp. 24 (28. 7) *illa terrae alumna* (sc. vinum et bolus) (neuter plural). But *sunt* would hardly have been corrupted into *solent*. Vliet reads *alumni <esse> solent*, which Helm stigmatises as 'inepte.' If we altered to *alumna*, the sense would certainly be excellent.

The interchange of *i* and *a* is frequent in F, e.g. 63 (71. 1) *larvilem*: 77 (86. 5) *quadrigiens*: Flor. 86 Oud. (180. 26 Vliet) *utrique* (for *utraque*): 90 (183. 8) *obsticula*. The idea is a common Greek one: cp. Solon 8 τίκτει τοι κόρος ὕβριν όταν πολὺς ὄλβος ἔπηται, and Theognis 153; also Aeschyl. Ag. 750 παλαίφατος δ' ἐν βροτοῖς γέρων λόγος τέτυκται, μέγαν τελεσθέντα φωτὸς ὄλβον τεκνοῦσθαι μηδ' ἄπαιδα θνήσκειν, ἐκ δ' ἀγαθᾶς τύχας γένει βλαστάνειν ἀκόρεστον οἰζύν. But, as it is difficult to see how *esse* could have been omitted, it is best to adhere to the ordinary interpretation.¹

¹ We might, perhaps, conjecture *divitiarum alumnari solent*, 'are wont to be reared from riches,' a Greek construction of the genitive: cp. Soph. Phil. 3 ἐνθ', ὃ κρατίστου πατρὸς Ἑλλήνων τραφεῖς. Apuleius is inclined to Greek usages of the genitive, e.g. the partitive, Flor. 1, init. *religiosis*

viantium, the comparative Met. xi. 30 (276. 25 V.) *deus deum magnorum potior*. The word *alumnari* is a favourite of Apuleius. It occurs only six times in ancient Latin, four times in Apuleius, and twice in his imitator Martianus Capella.

20 (24. 16).

Pauper enim scis appetendi egestate.

So F: ϕ has *scis*. The old emendation is *fis*, and that is adopted by Helm. Rohde reads *eris*. Possibly *scilicet es* (*sc. es*): 'for you are poor obviously by the want inherent in desire, but rich by the satiety inherent in absence of wanting.' The mistake of *i* for *e* is not uncommon: 63 (71. 24) *timpora*: 80 (83. 23) *nisciit*: Flor. 82 (179. 19, Vliet) *partim*: 99 (187. 25) *victorem* (for *vectorem*): though the converse of *e* for *i* is more frequent 2 (3. 5) *infamaret* for *-it*: 67 (76. 3) *adnexi* (for *adnixi*): 74 (83. 2) *nisi* (for *ne si*): 75 (83. 20) *deperduint* (for *di perduint*): 88 (97. 22) *matres* (for *matris*): Flor. 30 (155. 15) *palleata*: 49 (164. 4) *palleastri*: 92 (184. 11): *Perseus* (for *Persius*): 97 (186. 15) *rhetores* (for *-is*).

23 (27. 5).

Idque (i.e. patrimonium) a me longa peregrinatione et diutinis studiis et crebris liberalitatibus *modice* imminutum.

Apuleius wished, says Casaubon, to continue to appear a fairly rich man, notwithstanding the various expenses which he had been compelled to incur: and so say most of the commentators, including Helm, who holds that *modice* means 'aliquantum,' 'somewhat.' Yet after the disquisition on poverty in chapter 22, the line of argument we should suppose Apuleius would adopt is, "True I was poor when I came to Oea; but I was born of a rich family, and my poverty was due to honourable causes." I cannot help believing that a negative is required; but I would not add *haud* before *modice*, with Vulcanius; or *non*, with Kronenberg. Rather read *<im>modice*, and compare 60 (68. 22) *quamquam sunt insolita* (so Jahn,

whom Helm follows: Fϕ have *solita*) audacia et importuna impudentia praediti.¹ Similarly I think we should read in 31 (37. 19) *Mercurius carminum <in>vector* 'introducer (importer) of chants'; he is generally the *vector* or *evector* 'conductor away.' The usual reading is *inventor*; but this introduces two changes, and *invector* expresses the idea fairly well. For Mercury's discovery of the lyre and the pipe, cp. Apollodorus, iii. 10. 2.

24 (27. 22).

De patria mea vero, quod eam sitam Numidia et Gaetuliae in ipso confinio meis (*mei* codd.) scriptis *ostendi scis*, quibus memet professus sum, cum Lolliano Avito C. V. praesente publice dissererem, seminumidam et semigaetulum, non video quid mihi sit in ea re pudendum.

Casaubon emended to *ostendisti*, which Rohde improved by altering to *ostendistis*; and Helm, with his usual thoroughness, proves that Apuleius addresses the prosecution sometimes as consisting of one accuser, and sometimes of several accusers. Of course nothing is commoner in all MSS. than confusions of *c* and *t*; though I can only on the spot discover one instance in the *Apologia*, 86 (95. 2) *immeditatum* (for *immedicatum*). Still I think that Wilmanns (in C. I. L. viii. 1, p. 472) is perhaps right in reading *ostendis, scilicet quibus*. The writings of Apuleius were mostly of a literary or philosophical nature; and thus a merely formal business document, if styled 'a writing of mine,' would naturally require some clause of explanation. I should prefer, however, to read *ostendi, scilicet iis* (or *is* for *iis*) *quibus*.

¹ In that passage, Koziol and Prof. Ellis read *stolida*, which, however, does not very well suit the sense, or balance *importuna*.

33 (39. 10).

Amicis meis negotio dato quicumque minus cogniti generis piscis inciderit ut eius mihi aut formam commemorent aut ipsum vivum, si id nequierint, *vel* mortuum ostendant.

The old editors transposed *vel* to precede *si*, which is too bold. Vliet makes a violent re-arrangement of the words *ut aut ipsum vivum vel mortuum ostendant, aut si id nequierint, eius mihi formam commemorent*. Helm rightly retains the text of the manuscripts, and gives the right sense, "si quirent vivum, si id nequirent vel mortuum," and refers to Sallust Jugurtha, 46. 4 persuadet ut Iugurtham maxume vivum, sin id parum procedat, necatum sibi traderent (cp. also Jug. 35. 4). But the parallel is not a perfect one; for in *maxume* is concealed the alternative *si fieri possit*. Similar is the case with such passages as Ter. Eun. 502 Fac ores *primum* ut redeat: si id non commodumst Ut maneat; Andr. 326 Nunc te obsecro, *principio* ut ne ducas . . . Sed si id non potest . . . saltem aliquod dies profer. An obvious correction would be to read aut ipsum vivum si <quierint, si> id nequierint vel mortuum ostendant. Still the passage does not seem one that necessitates any addition; and Helm has shown sound judgment in adhering to the MSS. reading, notwithstanding its harshness. This harshness may be somewhat alleviated by punctuating thus: *aut ipsum vivum—si id nequierint vel mortuum—ostendant*.

The construction of *piscis* seems strange. I think we should either read *piscibus*, or better *pisci*. [For *s* final wrongly added see above, p. 364]; or else add *in* before *minus*.

37 (43. 2).

Ob argumenti sollertiam et coturnum facundiae.

Fulvius altered to *cothurni facundiam*, which is not to be thought of. *Cothurnus* sometimes wholly loses its

literal sense, and means no more than 'lofty style': cp. Plin. H. N. xxxv. 111 *cothurnus* ei (sc. Nicophanes, a painter) et gravitas artis multum a Zeuxide et Apelle abest. Quintil. x. 1. 68 (Sermonem Euripidi) quem ipsum quoque reprehendunt quibus gravitas et *cothurnus* et sonus Sophocli videtur esse sublimior (cp. Virg. Ecl. 8. 10). Sidonius Ep. ii. 9. 4 hi *coturno* Latiaris eloquii nobilitabantur. Also Apuleius Flor. 29 (155. 11) dictum . . . ad limam et lineam certam redigitis, cum torno et *coturno* vero (MSS. *verum*: excellently corrected by Leo 'Archiv' xii. 98, note, from considerations of symmetry) comprobatis, 'the true elevated (grand) style.'

38 (44. 3).

De solis aquatilibus dicam nec cetera animalia nisi in communibus *differentes* attingam.

Since Casaubon, nearly all editors agree in reading *differentiis*, which easily led through *differentis* to *differentes*. This is much more probable than Bosscha's emendation *ceteras animales . . . diferentes*, in point of both palæography and sense. At first sight 'common differences' seems like a contradiction in terms. Helm (p. 570) explains it thus:—"Cum differentias aquatiliū tractet Apuleius . . . cetera animalia negligit nisi in eis nominibus quae etiam ad terrestria animalia pertinent, velut ὀστρακόδερμα et καρχαρόδοντα." This led me to think that we should read *cognominibus* for *communibus*. (For the adjective *cognominis* cp. Met. 1. 23 (19. 8 Vliet) si contentus lare parvulo Thesei illius *cognominis* patris tui virtutes aemulaveris.) But it is not necessary. What Apuleius means is that he will only mention land-animals when they present the same features of difference within their own genus as fishes do within theirs. Thus take συναγελαστικά (44. 9). Most fishes go in shoals, but some solitary, such as the

pike. Of land-animals similarly, some go in flocks, as sheep, and others solitary, as foxes. Such a point of difference in fishes is shared by them (*communis*) with land-animals.

40 (46. 13).

An remedia nosse et ea conquirere magi potius esse quam medici, quam denique philosophi putas qui illis non ad quaestum sed ad suppetias *usura est*? Veteres quidem medici etiam carmina remedia vulnerum norant.

It appears to me quite impossible to suppose that Apuleius wrote anything else than *usurus est*, as is read by the old editors. In this clause Apuleius had only the philosopher in his mind, the word *denique* showing that he had concentrated his attention on the unselfish service of the scientific man: and besides he could not say that doctors did not work *ad quaestum*, the ensuing sentence about the doctors being introduced merely to show that medical practice which verged on magic was not deemed blame-worthy. Originally the last word of the clause was *usurust*. The final syllable became altered into *-ast*, there being no commoner form of confusion in F than that of *a* and *u*.¹ Thence easily came *usura est*. This seems a great deal simpler than either of the corrections proposed by Helm (pp. 543-4) *qui<bus>* (sc. medico et philosopho) *illis* (sc. remediis) . . . *usura est* or *<quippe> qui illis . . . usura est*, though the use of *quippequi* for simple *quoniam*, the *qui* being enclitic like *atqui*, *edepolqui*, &c., is genuinely Apuleian, as Vliet (Index) and Helm have shown.

¹ For the interchange of *a* and *u* Helm (562 note) quotes 5. 14 (ed. Helm), 18. 13, 40. 24, 42. 7, 50. 4, 52. 17, 53. 26. Add to these 39. 4, 40. 2, 40. 6, 43. 16 (we should read

genitus), 47. 4, 48. 14, 49. 20, 65. 14, 68. 5, 78. 26, 83. 21, 87. 7, 102. 27, 104. 13, 111. 6, 112. 1: and in Florida 170. 7 (ed. Vliet), 184. 11.

40 (47. 16).

Quod Aristoteles si unquam profecto omisisset scripto prodere, qui . . . memoravit.

Helm reads *si* <*scisset n*>*unquam* with the interpolated manuscripts. But the passage does not seem to be one which imperatively demands an addition. Surely Goldbacher's emendation *nunquam* for *si unquam* makes everything plain. The omission of the protasis, especially in sentences in which it can be easily supplied, can be paralleled without difficulty, e.g. Liv. xxii. 54. 10 *Nulla profecto alia gens tanta mole cladis non obruta esset* (i.e. *si sustinere coacta esset*). Goldbacher seems to refer to 92 (101. 23) *capens* F (*capens* ϕ), which is doubtless for *capensis*, as Jahn has suggested. In c. 74 fin. (83. 17) we have *exomis* in F ϕ , plainly for *exossis*. We might also explain the corruption by supposing a dittography of the final letter of *Aristoteles* with *i*, and that *n* had been corrupted into *i* as in 10 (12. 14), where F has above the line *ierant* for *non erant*.

41 (48. 7).

Aiunt mulierem magicis artibus, marinis illecebris a me petitam eo in tempore quo me non negabunt in Gaetuliae mediterraneis montibus fuisse, ubi pisces per Deucalionis diluvia reperientur.

Of course we must not alter *per* into *post* and add *non* before *reperientur* with Vliet. The MSS. are indubitably sound. Helm interprets the words as ironical,¹ 'where the fishes to be found must come from Deucalion's flood. This makes very good sense: but perhaps the plural *diluvia* may lead to the interpretation 'where it will take floods like those of Deucalion to enable fish to be found.'²

¹ This view was held also by Mr. J. F. Myres: see *Class. Rev.* xv (1901), p. 48.

² As far as I know the actual flood of Deucalion is always in the singular.

There is certainly a note of scorn in the passage ; and one cannot easily agree with Schwabe in Pauly-Wissowa Real-Encycl. ii. 248, who seems to take the words very seriously, and says that they point to a scientific expedition made by Apuleius into the southern mountains of Gaetulia to study fossilized fish.¹

42 (48. 18).

Accipe aliud pari quidem stultitia sed multo tanta vanius et nequius excogitatum.

Fϕ give *tanta*, and such must be retained and not altered to *tanto*. This is shown conclusively by Leo in the 'Archiv' xii. 100. He proves that *multo tanta* is the regular form with comparatives or comparative ideas, and refers to Met. vii. 15 (153. 5 Vliet, who, however, fails to notice that F has *tanta*, though it had been indicated in Hildebrand's and Eyssenhardt's editions) ; Apol. 3 (4. 20) ;² Florid. 90 (182. 22 Vliet) ; De Deo Socr. 11 (14. 16 Goldbacher). Helm refers to Apol. 3 (4. 20), where reference is made to Havet's article in the 'Archiv' xi. 579, which called forth Leo's more learned discussion. The Plautine passages are Men. 680, 800, Rud. 521, Stich. 339. Leo considers that *tanta* (like *dextra*, *media*, *eadem*) stands beside *tanto* as *intra* beside *intro*, *protinus* beside *protinam*, *rursus* beside *rursum*, and was used for variety's sake.

¹ His words are—"An der letzten Stelle (sc. c. 41) wird ein Ausflug des A. in die südlichen Berge Gaetuliens zur Untersuchung versteinerner Fische erwähnt: vgl. auch Flor. 18. 90." This passage from the Florida (183. 9 Vliet) only proves that Apuleius performed

astronomical calculations. Apuleius, of course, made scientific investigations ; but one cannot find evidence in these words of investigations into fossils.

² For this passage see below, p. 380, note.

44 (51. 11).

Omnium rerum convictum me fatebor nisi rus *adeo omnium diu* ablegatus est in longinquos agros.

Helm reads *a <se>de omnium diu*, which is most ingenious.¹ Hildebrand, with his love of rare words, has *a tuore omnium diu* (*tuor* meaning 'sight,' cp. De Deo Socr. 11 (15. 1 G) radios omnis nostri tuoris; and the Index to the Glosses C. G. L. vii. p. 374 *tuore . visu*). Prof. Ellis (Class. Rev. xv. (1901) 48) most cleverly conjectures *ideo omnium odio*: but it is difficult to dispense with *diu*. Kroll's suggestion seems more on the right lines, *a domino diu*, which perhaps might be improved by reading *a domino me iam diu* (*domino* might have been written *do*^o). But the passage cannot be considered as yet cured. The older editors read rus *de omnium consensu diu* from interpolated MSS.

48 (55. 27).

Recte factum vel perperam docere id vero multo arduum et difficile est.

Is this right? It would seem that we require *<magis>* before *arduum*, as is suggested by Leo ('Archiv' xii. 100, note), who also thinks that *magis* has been lost after *multo tanta* in 3 (4. 20). The dictionaries quote for *multo* with a positive Terence Hec. 159 *maligna multo et magis procax facta ilico est*: but the influence of the comparative in the next clause virtually extends over the whole line. Passages like Sall. Cat. 8. 1 fortuna res cunctas ex libidine *quam* ex vero celebrat (cp. Apul. Flor. 69 (172. 11 V.) ut omnia utensilia emere velis *quam* rogare, like the Greek βούλομαι ἤ); or like Tac.

¹ Perhaps we might suggest *a domo iam diu* (for *a de oīu diu*).

Ann. i. 68. 5 *quanto inopina* tanto maiora (cp. Apul. De Mundo 9 (113. 5 G) nimbus autem *quanto repentinus* tanto vehementior: Met. 8. 5 (167. 3) tanto . . . fidentius *quanto* crederet ferri vulnera *similia* futura prosectu dentium) are fairly common. But such passages as these from the Apologia, which are not accompanied by a clause of comparison, seem to be different. But they are so simple, and carry their meaning so plainly on their face ('is by much the difficult and laborious thing'), that it seems preferable to acquiesce in the omission of the comparative word (of which one only perceives the lack after analysis of the sentence) rather than suppose such a strange omission by Fϕ as that of *magis* or *potius* in both these passages.¹

53 (60. 13).

Magicae res in eo [*sc.* linteo] occultabantur: eo negligentius adservabam, *sed enim* libere scrutandum et inspiciendum.

F has *sed eui*, but ϕ has *sed enim*. No doubt *enim* has, as Helm says (pp. 575-6), a strongly affirmative force, like δὲ, as *sed enim* in 25 (29. 19 Helm): 31 (37. 3): 64 (73. 2), quoted in Vliet's Index; and Helm (p. 576) quotes others 33 (39. 20); 56 (63. 18): 77 (86. 4): 81 (89. 25): 85 (94. 20). But in all these passages, except possibly the last, *sed* has an adversative force: here it seems to have an intensive force, 'aye and,' a usage which so often occurs in post-Augustan Latin (cp. Mayor on Juvenal 5. 147).² 'Aye and indeed to be freely examined and inspected.' For passages where this usage is found in Apuleius, see Met. v. 10 (102. 28 V.)

¹ In 3 (4. 20) *innocentius quisque . . . contumeliae insolens multo tanta ex animo laborat*, the omission of the comparative is undoubtedly harsh; but there is an indication of a comparison in *ex animo*, 'really' containing the

notion of 'exceptionally' 'more than usual,' and we may perhaps translate 'suffers ever so much real pain.'

² Add to his examples Silius xvi. 489, Eurytus et primus brevibus *sed* primus abibat Praecedens spatii.

lares pauperes nostros *sed* plane sobrios revisamus : vii. 12 (151. 19) cuncti denique *sed* prorsus omnes ; cp. x. 22 (240. 5) totum me prorsus *sed* totum recepit (where Vliet's transposition *sed prorsus*, though an improvement, is not necessary).

59 (67. 20).

Sed fortasse nec tantulum potuit *ebria* sibi temperare.

Here Hildebrand, with extraordinary ingenuity, reads *a bria*, 'from the cup'; *bria* being a word for 'cup,' εἶδος ἀγγείου C. G. L. ii. 31. 19 : cp. Arnobius Adv. nat. vii. 29 bibebant scyphos, *brias*, pateras : and it appears to be the word from which *ebrius* is derived (Charisius 83. 16 Keil) : and *e* for *a* is sometimes found in F, e.g. 47. 22 (Helm) : 92. 3 : 108. 1. Still the older editors appear to be right in reading *ebrius*. The omission of *s* final is found in 94 (104. 25) (*tempore* for *temporis*) : Flor. 98 (187. 14 Vliet) *pene* for *penes* : 99 (187. 26) *vivace* for *vivacis*. It could otherwise be accounted for by *sibi* which immediately follows : and the interchange of *a* and *u* is most common, see above, p. 376, n. A too loyal desire to retain the *a* has led Vliet to conjecture *ebria<cus>* and Helm *ebria<mine>*, the latter word meaning 'intoxicant,' and occurring in the Itala, Numbers 6. 3 and Tertull. De Jejun. 9.

59 (68. 2).

Cum animadvertisses caput iuvenis barba et capillo populatum, madentis oculos, cilia turgentia, rictum <restrictum> (so Acidalius ; Helm adds *latum*), salivosa labia, vocem absonam, manuum tremorem, †ructuspinam.

So Fφ. Rutgers altered to *ructus spumam* : Price to *ructus popinam*, which, as Helm justly says, should be *ructum popinae*. Lennep reads *ructus poenam*, which palæographically is excellent, but too feeble in sense.

Prof. Ellis (Class. Rev. xv., p. 48) suggests *ructum, spumam*; but surely the whole course of the sentence calls for a double-worded final clause. Helm reads *ructus spiramen*, cleverly indeed; but it is somewhat weak as the final word in the climax of the passage. I thought of *ructus putrinam*, 'stinkery' being tolerably strong; but the word does not occur elsewhere, and is rather too far from the MSS. So I venture to suggest *ructus sentinam*, as being a sufficiently offensive phrase; cp. Claudianus Mamertus, De Statu Animae, ii. 9 (vol. xi., p. 137. 1 of the Vienna Corpus of Ecclesiastical Writers) *Cernas hic alium situ fetidinarum turpium ex olenticetis suis ac tenebris cloacam ventris et oris inhalare sentinam interque ructandum quasi suggillatiunculas fringultientem ab alio, qui stipem suam variis conlurcationibus dilapidavit, parasitico more laudari*—a passage which positively reeks of the Apologia of Apuleius; cp. 8 (9. 12): 98 (109. 6): 75 (85. 2).¹

¹ That Claudianus Mamertus imitated Apuleius to some extent is sufficiently proved by A. Engelbrecht (the editor of Mamertus in the Vienna Corpus) in the Sitzungsberichte der Kais. Akad. der Wissenschaften in Wien, Phil.-hist. Cl. cx. (1885) 438–442. The imitations are confined to the Apologia and the philosophical writings. There are no certain ones from the Metamorphoses; cp. Weyman 'Studien zu Ap. und seinen Nachahmern' in the Sitzungsberichte der k. bayr. Akad. der Wiss. (1893), pp. 376 ff. The only other obvious imitation of the Apologia is Mamertus, p. 45. 8–11, compared with Apol. 15 (18. 10 ff.); but unfortunately he omits the clause in which *facti* occurs. *Multiuga volumina* (Mam. 135. 18 compared with Apol. 36 (42. 2)): and *nubilum* applied metaphorically (*ignorantiae* Mam. 145. 3 compared with *mentis* Apol. 50 (57. 17)) are fairly common usages, and do not

necessarily prove imitation. In Mamertus (see above) Engelbrecht (l.c. p. 441; cp. his edition Praef. p. xlv) thinks that we should read *conlucernationibus* (which all the MSS. of Mamertus give, *conlurcationibus* being an emendation of Schottus), and alter *conlurchnationibus* of Apuleius (85. 2) into *conlucernationibus* 'revels over the lamps,' 'nightly revels.' The word is not found elsewhere, but is a possible formation. Engelbrecht refers to Horace, Carm. i. 27. 5 *vino et lucernis*. But *lurco* or *lurcho* (subst.), *lurcor* or *lurchor* (verb)—cp. *lurchinabundus*, Quintil. i. 6. 42—are found both in authors (Plautus and Lucilius) and in the Glosses; but there is no sign of *conlucernatio* or *lucernatio*. Indeed, 'lampings together' would be a strange term to form in order to express 'revels by lamp-light,' and would require to be supported by a parallel before it could be accepted.

64 (72. 17).

Respondeam quisnam sit ille non a me primo sed a Platone βασιλεὺς nuncupatus, περὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλέα πάντ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πάντα, quisnam sit ille βασιλεύς.

Vahlen, in *Hermes* xxxiii. (1898), p. 255, has shown admirably by such passages as Cic. Cael. 37 and others (Apul. Apol. 100 (111. 1) is not so striking, cp. Hor. Sat. ii. 5. 100) that quotations are often introduced without any word of saying like *inquit*, as is this quotation from Plato, Epist. ii. 312 E. The resumption in *quisnam sit ille βασιλεύς* is most Apuleian: but I think such resumptions always require the addition of some word of support which is not in the previous clause, such as *igitur* 17 (21. 4): 58 (66. 14); or *ergo*, Flor. 56 (166. 17 V.); or *quoque* Apol. 4 (5. 21); or a demonstrative pronoun, 44 (51. 19), Flor. 87 (181. 17), Met. i. 2 (2. 8 V.) *eam Thessaliam*; or *inquam*, Apol. 22 (26. 21) *ipse denique Hercules . . . ipse inquam*. This use of *inquam* is common in Cicero. I think we should add it here after *quisnam*.

II.

65 (73. 25).

ἐλέφας δὲ ἀπὸ λελοιπότος ψυχὴν σώματος οὐκ εὐχερι ἀνάθημα.

So F ϕ read this passage from Plato's Laws 956 A. The reading of the MSS. in Plato is εὐχερές, which most editors alter into εὐαγές, as that is the word used by Clement of Alexandria (Strom. 585 A) and Eusebius (Praep. Evang. 99 D); and no doubt also by Cicero (Leg. ii. 45—*haud satis castum donum deo*; cp. Lactantius Inst. vi. 25) in the passages in which they quote or translate the passage. This is very strong support for the reading εὐαγές

in Plato; but that does not preclude the possibility of Helm's (p. 550) admirable conjecture εὐχαρί in Apuleius. Apuleius, quoting a famous passage, probably from memory, may have well made such a slight error: cp. his error in the quotation from Catullus in 6 fin. (8. 6) dentem atque russam *pumicare* gingivam, where the word used by Catullus (39. 19) was *defricare*. Apuleius has also made a few mistakes in the names of the men mentioned in 66 (74. 18 ff.). Compare below, p. 404.

66 (75. 1).

Quippe *homines* eruditissimi iuvenes laudis gratia primum hoc rudimentum forensis operae subibant, &c.

After a list of five young men, who accused politicians in order to acquire name and fame, Apuleius adds this sentence. It is difficult to agree with Helm that the word *homines* is sound. Surely Abrami's and Bosscha's reading *hi omnes* is right.

67 (75. 16).

Cuivis *clari dilucet* aliam rem invidia nullam esse quae, &c.

Jahn reads *clarius die lucet*, and refers to 83 (92. 14) *luce illustrius* apparent, which is, as Helm says, unsatisfactory as making two alterations. Krüger's *claritus* is such a rare word (it is quoted by Charisius (214. 4 K) as occurring only in Celsus: see Neue-Wagener ii³. 737) that we could not accept it except under great compulsion; and the same may perhaps be said of Prof. Ellis's *claridie* (adverb), formed on the analogy of *postridie* (Class. Rev. xv. 49). Far better is Helm's *clarius dilucet*, 'exceptionally clearly,' i.e. *clarius solito*. He compares 69 (78. 14) *recita, quaeso, clarius*; and refers to the frequent use of *altius* in.

the Metamorphoses 1. 11 (9. 9 Vliet): 5. 23 (111. 13): 8. 15 (174. 11): 8. 18 (177. 3): 9. 29 (209. 30). Still the confusion of *e* and *i* is so common (see p. 372, above), that it would seem that the reading of the old editors was the simplest, *clare dilucet*.

67 (76. 5).

Me grandem dotem mox in principio coniunctionis nostrae mulieri . . . amanti remotis arbitris in villa extorsisse.

In F after *mulieri* there is a lacuna of three letters, in ϕ a lacuna of two. In the margin of F is the letter *d* by the first hand. Possibly <*de*>*amanti*. This seems preferable to adding *scilicet* with Bosscha. *Deamare* seems to have been the regular example of *de*-intensitive: cp. Servius on Aen. viii. 428.

69 (77. 22).

Nubtiis valetudinem *medicandum*.

So F ϕ : but should we not read *medicandam* with older editors such as Fulvius, and later editors such as Novák? Bosscha says that *medicandum* is "magis ex more Appuleii," which is decidedly questionable; and the confusion of *a* and *u* is so very frequent in F (see above, p. 376, note). The passive form has generally the passive meaning: cp. Neue-Wagener iii³. 55, 56.

72 (80. 15).

Nam (Pontianus) fuerat mihi non ita pridem *ante multos annos* Athenis per quosdam communis amicos conciliatus.

Helm (p. 524) rightly defends *ante multos annos* against the doubts and excisions of previous commentators as an amplification of the word *pridem* "ne quis putaret dies

[or perhaps better menses] tantummodo praeteriisse," and refers to 3 (4. 4) quae etsi possent ab his *utiliter* blaterata ob mercedem, 'interestedly for pay,' where he has excellently retained the MSS. reading *utiliter*, rejecting *futiliter*, which has received so much favour from the days of Colvius. But this is not such a simple amplification or correction, 'not so long ago' [for that is the meaning of *non ita pridem*], 'a good many years ago.' I think we should read *non ita pridem*, <id est> ante multos annos 'not so long ago, that is a good many years ago.' The number of years was apparently about eight.¹ The amplificative and explanatory *id est* is frequent in Apuleius Flor. 68 Oud. (172. 8 V), 74 (175. 1), 100 (187. 27), Met. xi. 10 (259. 27), De Deo Socr. 8 (12. 14 G).

75 (84. 6).

Cum ipso (marito), nec mentior, cum ipso, inquam, de uxoris noctibus paciscuntur. *Hic iam inquam illa* inter virum et uxorem *n̄ tā* collusio.

For *Hic* in F appears the mysterious symbol which is like *Ic* or *K* corrected in the margin into *hic*. In ϕ we have ^e*Ic*, *h* added by a second hand, and in the margin ^e*c* (= corrige) *hinc*. In F we have ^{inquam}*iā illa*, but in Helm's opinion *inquam* is by a second hand. It appears, however, in ϕ . Helm ejects *Hic* or *Hinc* altogether. He supposes it a faulty interpolation from the strange *Ic* which he thinks (p. 529) is the mark of a new chapter, though he acknowledges that "nunc quidem, ubicunque invenitur, nunquam fere gravius sententias separat." It occurs at 6 (7. 17) : 74 (83. 1, 5) : Met. i. 1 (Hymettus Attica), and apparently ii. 24 (40. 5)

¹ Apuleius was born about 125 A.D., was in Greece about 150 with Pontianus, was married about 157, and pleaded this case about 158. It would

be a very long business to argue all this out; and it is rather a matter for a separate discussion.

Hic placito. The uncertainty of this symbol makes me slow to eject *Hic* here, as it appears in ϕ . Again, for the same reason, it seems undesirable to eject *inquam* merely on an individual opinion of diversity of handwriting, as handwriting often appears different in a correction from what it is in the text,—especially as *inquam* is found in ϕ , and though repeated in very close proximity to *inquam* in the preceding line, is yet suited to the excited tone of the passage.¹ Perhaps we should read *Hic iam illa, <illa,> inquam.*

But, be that as it may, we must certainly for $\bar{n} \bar{t}\bar{a}$ adopt the correction of the old editors *nota*. Such a collusion was indeed well known: the *leno maritus* was even a stock character of the rhetorical school-exercises: see Mayor on Juv. i. 55 (pp. 110 and 337 ed. 4, and Index). It is surely simpler to suppose errors in two strokes than to introduce (with Helm) such an extensive addition as *non tam <concordia quam> conclusio*, and one which enfeebles the sense. The passage is not one that imperatively calls for an addition of words; rather the contrary.

76 (85. 7).

Ceterum uxor iam propemodum vetula et effeta totam domum contumeliis abnuit.

No one will deny the ingenuity of Helm (p. 531) in reading *contumeliis <alere> abnuit*,² referring to Demosthenes in Neaeram § 39 θρέψουσιν τὴν οἰκίαν: § 67 τρέφειν τε ὁπότε ἐπιδημήσειε τὴν οἰκίαν ὅλην.³ The ordinary reading is *nunc*

¹ Errors arising from the repetition of adjacent words are very rare in Apuleius. There is no doubt at all about *magnae artis* in Met. v. 1 (95, 24 V.); but *prorsus adhibendum est*, in the excited and distracted speech of Venus in v. 30 (117-18), is not at all such a certain interpolation.

² I cannot understand why Helm in

his edition adds *sustinere* and not *alere*. There is a general resemblance of *alere* to *-eliis*, which might have caused its omission; and it better expresses τρέφειν.

³ This latter passage is not quite apposite, as it tells how the lover, not the courtesan, supported the whole establishment.

demum for *totam domum*. Casaubon conjectured *alut* (qu. *aluit*) or *abluit* (in the sense of the Greek πλύνειν 'to deluge with insults,' a meaning which the Latins express, I think, by *aspergere*) for *abnuit*, but finally decided for *nunc demum . . . abnuit*: Acidalius *obruit*; but we should expect the pluperfect. Vliet reads *tot iam domus*; but the repetition of *iam* is inelegant. If we do not read with Hildebrand *tota demum* (Bosscha had already suggested *tota iam demum*), I should propose *effeta tota in domum contumeliis abnuit*, 'entirely worn out by these outrages on the house, gave up' (or 'refused to continue'). The phrase *in domum contumeliis* had best be taken as abl. with *effeta*, and *abnuit* taken absolutely. In c. 75 (84. 4) we have *lecti sui contumelia*, but there is no difficulty in supposing that Apuleius varied the expression; and the preposition after *contumelia* may be paralleled by such a sentence as Cic. N. D. iii. 84 *Ad impietatem in deos in homines adiunxit iniuriam*, and Pis. 40 *tuis nefariis in hunc ordinem contumeliis*.

76 (85. 23).

Immedicatum os et purpurissatas genas.

F has *imeditatum*, φ *meditatum*. Hildebrand reads *medicatum*, which should, I think, be adopted. It is the regular form for artificial colouring, cp. Hor. Carm. iii. 5. 28, *Lana refert medicata fuco*, on which passage see the commentators, cp. Ov. R. A. 707. Hildebrand indeed supposes that *medicatum* is the reading of F. But F elsewhere adds a superfluous *i* at the beginning of a word; cp. Flor. 53 (165. 10 V.) *istriis* for *striis* 'folds' (cp. Lindsay's 'Latin Lang.,' p. 106); and note besides that F has not a double *m*.

79 (88. 16).

'Sed' inquit 'animi fuit, efflictim te amabat.'

The old editors read *inquiēti* for *inquit*, and Hildebrand conjectured *inquies animi* while adopting the reading of

the old editors. Helm adds *furens*, comparing Met. vi. 2 (119. 23 V.). Vliet adds *impos*. Rather, perhaps, we should read *inquit* <ita> *animi fuit*, 'she was in this state of mind, she was distractedly in love with you.' Helm rightly defends *inquit* by reference to 27 (32. 5); 40 (46. 20); 41 (47. 19).

81 (89. 18).

Superest ea pars epistolae quae similiter pro me scripta in memet ipsum vertit cornua, ad expellendum a me crimen magiae sedulo missa (MSS. *omissa*; corr. Casaubon) memorabili *laude* Rufini vicem (MSS. *vice*: corr. Lipsius) mutavit, et ultro contrariam mihi opinionem quorundam Oeensium quasi mago *quaesivit*.

Helm retains *laude*, and refers to the words *dolo memorandi* (90. 2), and to the fame in villainy to which Sisyphus, Eurybates, and Phrynondas attained. Even so, I think, we should read *fraude* with Acidalius and Salmasius. The *distinction* in villainy is sufficiently expressed by *memorabili*; and the *villainy* requires expression in some word. The ablative of attendant circumstance—it would seem that *memorabili laude* is to be so classified—is more awkward than the ablative of the cause, which would be the classification of *fraude*.

As to *quaesivit*—I do not feel sure about the proper explanation. Should we translate 'has actually sought to obtain with some of the citizens of Oea an opinion detrimental to me, that I am a magician'? This is possible; but still *quaesivit* does seem strange. Perhaps we should read *concivit* as in 82 (90. 21) quae purgandi mei gratia scripta erant, eadem mihi immanem invidiam apud imperitos *concivere*.

83 (92. 14).

Patent artes tuae, Ruine, fraudes hiant, detectum mendacium est: veritas olim interversa nunc se *fert* et velut alto barathro *calumnias emergit*.

A marginal note in ϕ suggests *effert*, which seems certain; and editors compare Cic. Lael. 100, constantia, quae

cum se extulit. But the greatest diversity of opinion exists as to the emendation of the next clause. Salmasius suggested *calumnia se emergit*, and Lipsius *calumniae se emergit*, the older editors having simply altered to *calumniae emergit*. This means apparently 'emerges from the deep gulf into which calumny has thrust her (i.e. truth).' It might seem as if we should read *calumnias demergit* 'and thrusts calumnies into, if I may say so, the deep gulf.' Helm (p. 581) quotes Lucian *Calumniae non temere credendum*, fin. ὥς εἴ γε θεῶν τις ἀποκαλύψειεν ἡμῶν τοὺς βίους οἵχοιτ' ἂν φεύγουσα ἐς τὸ βάραθρον ἢ διαβολὴ χώραν οὐκ ἔχουσα, ὥς ἂν πεφωτισμένων τῶν πραγμάτων ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας; but he warns us against taking it as an assistance in the emendation of our passage 'quia alia ille de veritate usus est similitudine.' No doubt: but the two passages may agree in relegating calumny to a βάραθρον. Possibly Apuleius had vaguely in his mind the saying of Democritus ἐν βυθῷ ἡ ἀλήθεια (which is a gulf, not the proverbial 'well'): cp. Cic. Acad. i. 44, ut Democritus *in profundo* veritatem esse *demersam*. Truth emerges now, and plunges calumnies as it were into the deep abyss. But there are two objections to this: (1) it involves an emendation, and (2) we should expect as Truth does one thing, so its opposite Calumny (in the singular) should do the opposite. These objections can be obviated by reading with Elmenhorst (from the MS. which Hildebrand calls F 1) and Vliet *calumnia se mergit*.¹

88 (98. 3).

Cohibeam me in tam prolixo loco, ne tibi gratum faciam, si villam laudavero.

The older editors read *cohibebo*, and this seems right. Helm (p. 585) alters to *cohibeam*, taking the subjunctive as

¹ Of course, it is not claimed that a deliverance of F 1 is of more weight than a conjectural restoration.

one of exhortation 'let me restrain myself,' comparing 9 (11. 1) *recitem* denuo: Met. iii. 19 (60. 19 Vliet) *videam* 'let me see her,' 'I would fain see her.' But the future is simpler, and less unusual. The *m* arose from *me*, or perhaps was a mere mistake as in 56 (64. 1), *gratiam* (before *manum*), 71 (79. 26) *Romam*, 96 (106. 17) *Carthaginem*. The confusion of *a* and *o* is quite common, e.g. *a* for *o* 1 (1. 20), *accepit* (for *occepit*), 40 (47. 4) *locarum*, 60 (68. 12) *damna* (for *damno*), 61 (69. 12) *persequar*; *o* for *a* in 28 (33. 8) *falso*, 103 (114. 3) *splendidos*.¹

89 (99. 4).

Si triginta annos pro decem dixisses, posses videri computationis gestu errasse, quos circulare debueris digitos *adperisse* (so F: ϕ has *aperisse*), cum vero quadraginta, quae facilius ceteris porrecta palma significantur, ea quadraginta tu dimidio auges, non potes (*potest* F ϕ : corrected by the older editors) digitorum gestu errasse, nisi forte triginta annorum Pudentillam ratus binos cuiusque anni consules numerasti.

The method by which the ancients expressed numbers by certain positions of the fingers is to be found in a chapter of the Venerable Bede's work 'De loquela per gestum digitorum et temporum ratione' (p. 132^b, ed. Colon. 1612). This chapter can be found also in an article by E. F. Wüstemann in Jahn's Jahrb. Suppl. xv. (1849), pp. 511-514, which gives pictures of the various positions of the fingers as indicated by Bede in the text. The counting of units and tens was done on the left hand; that of hundreds and thousands (up to ten thousand) on the right: cp. Juv. 10. 249, atque suos *iam dextra* computat annos, which means that the trisaecclisenex Nestor had reached the age of one hundred (here *saeculum* = a generation). It may amuse the readers of HERMATHENA to see the method exemplified: so I shall quote Bede's description of

¹ In 48 (55. 11) F ϕ read *eorum* for *earum* according to Vliet (p. 62. 11), and Hildebrand (p. 546); but it is not noticed by Helm.

the gestures which indicated the tens, and give illustrations of some half dozen of them. Here is what Bede says—
 ‘Quum dicis Decem, unguem indicis in medio figes artu pollicis. Quum dicis Viginti, summitatem pollicis inter medios indicis et impudici artus immittes. Quum dicis Triginta, ungues indicis et pollicis blando coniunges amplexu. Quum dicis Quadraginta, interiora pollicis lateri vel dorso indicis superduces, ambobus dumtaxat erectis. Quum dicis Quinquaginta, pollicem exteriore artu instar Graecae litterae Γ curvatum, ad palmam inclinabis. Quum dicis Sexaginta, pollicem (ut supra) curvatum indice circumflexo diligenter a fronte praecinges. Quum dicis Septuaginta, indicem (ut supra) circumflexum pollice immisso superimplebis, ungue dumtaxat illius erecto trans medium indicis artum. Quum dicis Octoginta, indicem (ut supra) circumflexum pollice in longum tenso implebis, ungue videlicet illius in medium indicis artum infixio. Quum dicis Nonaginta, indicis inflexi ungulam radici pollicis infiges.’
 [The hundreds, 100 to 900, were represented by the same positions of the fingers of the right hand as the tens, 10 to 90, were by those of the left; and the thousands, 1000 to 9000, by the same positions of the fingers of the right hand as the units, 1 to 9, were by those of the left.]

This being so, it would appear that when Apuleius said *si triginta annos pro decem dixisses*, he meant ‘if you intended to say thirty years instead of ten (which you did say)’; for *circulare digitos* surely points to the position which indicates thirty. But what are we to make of *adperisse*? It cannot be *aperuisse*, for forty is the only number among the tens to which that word could possibly apply; and Apuleius goes on to describe forty rightly by *porrecta palma*. Helm reads *adgessisse*. He quotes 93 (103. 18) *se* for *re*, and 99 (110. 1) *semet* for *rem ei*;¹ and

¹ Better for his purpose would be (51. 22): 52 (59. 6). See above, 40 (47. 2) *rum me* for *summe*; 41 (47. 24) *accurandam* for *accusandam*; cp. 44 p. 369, note.

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10



40



50



30



60

98 (108. 12) and 98 (109. 7) as examples of *s* for *ss*. We should perhaps be nearer to the MSS. if we read *adpressisse*, as Bede says "quum dicis Decem, unguem indicis in medio *figes* artu pollicis."

The last clause is delightful chaff. "Take care that it isn't thirty she is. Perhaps to make up your sixty you have counted *both* consuls in each year."

91 (101. 14).

Neque eam (sc. dotem) datam sed tantummodo.

Here is a passage which undoubtedly demands emendation. A reader of ϕ added *promissam* in the margin: Vliet supplies *pactam*, and Helm *creditam*. Hildebrand reads *pactam* for *tantum*. We can hardly hope to be certain of the exact word which Apuleius used to balance *datam*; but when we remember his love of alliteration, it may not perhaps be thought too audacious if we suggest either to add *commodatam* after *tantummodo*, or to suppose that the latter word is a corruption of *commodatam*.

96 (106. 20).

Ut sciat frater eius, accusator meus, quam in omnibus *Minervae* curriculum cum fratre optumae memoriae viro currat (F ϕ read *vir occurrat*, corrected by the older editors).

The corruption undoubtedly lies in *Minervae*. It was not merely in learning, but in every respect, especially in conduct, that Pontianus was superior to Sicinius Pudens. It seems strange that scholars will not accept the admirable restoration of Lennep,¹ in omnibus *minor vitae*

¹ Prof. Ellis (Class. Rev. xv. 46) rightly throws the weight of his authority in favour of *minor*; but, with the parallels given above, I cannot help feeling that *vitae* is a more probable restoration of *uae* than *ipse* or *ille* would be.

curriculum . . . currat. The 'race of life' was a very familiar metaphor among the Latins, as among all other peoples: cp. Cic. Acad. i. 44; Arch. 28 in hoc tam exiguo *vitae curriculo*; Rabir. 30 exiguum nobis *vitae curriculum* natura circumscripsit, immensum gloriae: cp. Sest. 47, Verr. ii. 179.

98 (108. 13).

Si puerum velis.

Casaubon emended to *si verum velis*, and that is certainly the usual phrase 12 (15. 1), 52 (58. 25), 88 (97. 17). But even with the attraction of the adjacent *puerum*, it may be doubted if the *p* would be inserted from a succeeding word. Hildebrand conjectured *si perverum velis*. Perhaps *si per verum velis* = *si povelis verum*. For the tmesis cp. Cic. Att. xv. 4. 2.

103 (114. 7).

Prior natu is est.

Colvius emended *is* to *ea*. In ϕ there is a marginal note *Is refertur ad feminam sive Pudentillam*. This is worthless: *is* is never feminine. Hildebrand altered to *is<ta> est*, and this is generally adopted. Apuleius says he will make answer in two words. This does not preclude one of the accusations from consisting of three words. But all the other accusations are in two words, except this and the next. I think we should read *prior natast* and *lucrum sectatu's*. We can suppose that *nata'st* was copied as *natust* (see above, p. 376, note), and *natust* amplified as *natu is est*; or perhaps *prior natust*, was what Apuleius wrote, the gender of the subject being sufficiently indicated by the preceding charge *uxorem ducis*. For these kinds of Prodelision, see Lindsay's 'Latin Language,' § 135.

103 (114. 13).

Si philosophiae honorem nusquam minui, immo contra
ubique si cum septem pinnis eum tenui.

The metaphorical expression *cum septem pinnis* refers to the gladiator called *pinnirapus*, who was generally matched with a Samnite (cp. Varro L.L. v. 142), and whose aim was to snatch the crest of his opponent's helmet. It was only a very expert fighter who could get seven crests, that is, presumably, win seven victories.¹ We should probably say 'with flying colours.' The scholiast on Juvenal 3. 158 quotes Lucilius (122 ed. Marx) *ille alter abundans Cum septem incolumis pinnis redit ac recipit se*. These are the only two places in which the phrase is found, so that it would seem to have been somewhat unusual. The position of *si* in this clause, too, is exceptional. Accordingly, we should possibly read *ubique quasi*.

II.—THE FLORIDA.

The 'Florida' are the quintessence of Apuleian artificiality. They seem to be portions of an anthology of 'elegant extracts' from his lectures.² The ideas are

¹ Marx thinks, judging from pictures of Samnites, that each combatant had originally five 'pinnae,' and that the victor seized two of his opponent's feathers. But why would he not take all? and if he only took two, could he be said to be *abundans* when he only increased his original five by such a small number? In a figurative sense Shakespeare (1 Hen. IV. v. 4, 72) makes Prince Henry say to Hotspur: 'And all the budding honours on thy crest I'll crop, to make a garland for my head.'

² Mr. Pater ('Marius the Epicurean,' ii, 97) thus describes them—"The *Florida* or *Flowers*, so to call them, he (Apuleius) was apt to let fall by the

way; no *impromptu* ventures, but rather elaborate, carved *ivories* of speech, drawn, at length, out of the rich treasury of his memory, and as with a fine savour of old musk about about them." At the dinner-party which Mr. Pater describes the recently published Lucianic *Halcyon* had been delivered. After that Apuleius is represented as giving one of his *Flowers*, "discussing, quite in our modern way, the peculiarities of those suburban views, especially the sea-views, of which he was a professed lover." We would fain have had such a discussion from the pen of Mr. Pater, who alone could reproduce the Apuleian style—not as a disciple, but as an equal.

commonplace to an extreme degree; but the elaborate way in which these trite themes are decked out with the flowers of artificial rhetoric is amazing. Now and then the general effect becomes quite artistic, such as the calm quietude with which the calm and quiet death of Philemon, the dramatist, is narrated. Carefully balanced and rhythmical and even rhyming clauses are the most striking feature; and nowhere have considerations based on this characteristic a greater claim on the critic than here. To take an example in No. xvi. 64 Oud. (169. 15 ff. Vliet), Apuleius is speaking of the skill with which Philemon treated the various stock characters of comedy—*nec eo minus et leno periurus et amator fervidus et servulus callidus et amica illudens et uxor inhibens et mater indulgens et patruus obiurgator et sodalis opitulatur et miles proelior, sed et parasiti edaces et parentes tenaces et meretrices procaces*. The manuscripts give *leno periurus*; and *periurus* seems to be one of the constant epithets for the *leno*, cp. Plaut. Capt. Prol. 57 *Hic neque periurus leno est nec meretrix mala neque miles gloriosus*. Cic. Rosc. Com. 20, *Ballionem illum improbissimum et periurissimum lenonem*; and *periurissime* applied to Ballio in the Pseudolus (351), and Labrax in the Rudens (1375). Yet, in the face of this, it is difficult to refuse assent to Arlt's conjecture, *perfidus*, when one sees the rhyming epithets in this and the other clauses. The even balance of the clauses also justifies Casaubon's correction a few lines before, where it is said that in Philemon you find *argumenta lepide inflexa, adgnatos lucide explicatos, personas rebus competentes, sententias vitae congruentes, ioca non infra soccum, seria non usque ad coturnum*. Colvius had altered to *ac nodos*; the word *nodos* was excellent (Hor. A.P. 191), but it will be seen that the asyndeton should not be broken, and accordingly that we must not find *ac* in *ad*-. Casaubon altered to

adgnitus ἀναγνώρισις ‘recognitions,’ one of the most common *dénouements* of comedy. Leo (‘Archiv’ xii. 98) indeed objects to this on the ground that *adgnitus* is not in the same class of ideas as the other words, *argumenta*, *personae*, *sententiae*; for recognitions are but a part of *argumenta*. He wishes to read *narratus*, as Philemon was especially admirable for narration. But this is too far from the MSS., and besides the emphatic words are not so much *argumenta* and *adgnitus* as *inflexa* and *explicatos*. It is ‘the charming involution of the plots and the luminous disentanglement in the recognitions’ for which he is especially deserving of praise. Again, in the next sentence—*rarae apud illum corruptelae, et uti errores, concessi amores*, Leo has rightly judged that the conjunction is out of place, and has admirably emended to *corruptelae, tuti errores*. It will thus be seen that great consideration must be paid to the balance and general form of the sentences; and when extended researches are instituted into the rhythms which Apuleius most affects, those researches will probably, in a special degree, be concerned with the *Florida*, and will prove of great value in the criticism of this artificial, yet attractive, writer.¹

II. 7 Oudendorp (146. 11 Vliet).

Homines enim neque longule dissita neque proxume adsita possumus cernere, verum omnes quodam modo caecutimus; ac

¹ Some studies have already been made on the rhythms of the *Metamorphoses*, e.g. Schober (E.), ‘De Apulei Metamorphoseon compositione numerosa,’ 1904: Kirchhoff (Alf.), ‘De Apulei clausularum compositione et arte Quaestiones criticae,’ 1902: cp. also Norden, *Die Antike Kunstprosa*, p. 944. Norden is very severe on the prose of Apuleius, pp. 600 ff. But he lays just emphasis (p. 603) on the dif-

ferent styles which Apuleius adopts according to the nature of the different subjects of which he treats; and in the manner in which Apuleius leaps from one style to another according as the topic varies, he sees the meaning of the obscure *desultoriae scientiae stilus*, in which Apuleius (*Met.* i. 1) says his novel is written: cp. Leo, ‘Hermes’ (1905), p. 605.

si ad oculos et obtutum istum terrenum *redigas* et hebetem, profecto verissime poeta egregius dixit velut nebulam nobis ob oculos effusam nec cernere nos nisi intra lapidis iactum valere.

We require an object for *redigas*. Hildebrand conjectured *haec* for *ac*. Rather, perhaps, add *res* before *redigas*. The passage referred to is Iliad iii. 12, the dust raised by the march of the Achaeans was like a mist on the mountains, when *τόσσον τίς τ' ἐπιλεύσει ὅσον τ' ἐπὶ λαῶν ἴησιν*.

8 (147. 3).

(Aquila) inde cuncta despiciens ibidem pinnarum eminus infessa remigia circumtuetur.

The superfluous word is *eminus*; the great height to which the eagle had attained is described in the fine phrase 'the base of the aether and the pinnacle of the storm'¹ (solo aetheris et fastigio hiemis), and is repeated in *inde* and *ibidem*. Heinsius conjectured *despiciens et inhibens pinnarum eminularum ceu defessa remigia*, which is too bold when we consider the general fidelity of Fφ. But he is right in supposing that we require a participle expressing the idea of 'slowing down'; and the passage can be fairly corrected by reading either *inhibens* (or perhaps *deminuens*) for *eminus*.²

The ensuing words ought, as Prof. Thomas (loc. cit. p. 290) points out, to be punctuated thus:—et quaerit

¹ Rohde (Rh. Mus. 40. 110) alters *hiemis* to *aeris*, which is possible; but it turns a poetical into a prosaic phrase. Storms only rage in the region of the atmosphere; so the pinnacle of the storm is that of the atmosphere.

² I find that this correction of the passage has been virtually anticipated by Goldbacher in a Dissertation 'De

L. Apulei Floridorum quae dicuntur origine et locis quibusdam corruptis,' Leipzig, 1867, pp. 21, 22, and Prof. P. Thomas (Bulletin de l'Acad. royale de Belgique (1902), pp. 289, 290). For *eminus* Goldbacher reads *imminuens*, and Prof. Thomas *remittens*. Neither of these corrections is mentioned by Vliet.

quorsus potissimum in praedam superne sese ruat fulminis vicem de caelo improvisa, simul campis pecua simul montibus feras simul homines urbibus uno optutu sub eodem impetu ('lying under the one swoop') cernens, &c.

III. 10 (147. 14).

Nondum quidem *tam infexa anima* sono nec tamen pluriformi modo nec tamen multiforatili tibia.

The brilliant emendation of Lipsius *flexanimo* is rendered certain by considerations of symmetry with the other two compound epithets. It is rightly adopted by Leo ('Archiv' xii. 97); and he further improves the passage by showing that the *in-* is the remains of *-en* of *tamen*, and that thus we have *tamen* with all the three clauses, so that the symmetry of all the clauses is wholly perfect.

13 (148. 17).

(Marsyas) laudans sese quod erat et coma *relicinus* et barba squalidus et pectore hirsutus et arte tibicen et fortuna egenus: contra Apollinem adversis virtutibus culpabat quod Apollo esset et coma intonsus et genis *gratus* et corpore glabellus et arte multiscius et fortuna opulentus. 'Iam primum' inquit 'crines eius praemulsis antiis et promulsis caproneis anteventuli et propenduli, corpus totum gratissimum, &c.'

The description given here of Apollo seems to be the somewhat feminine form of the god, such as the Apollino of Florence or the Pythian Apollo of the Louvre (Rev. Arch. xl (1902), p. 196 ff, pl. vii), with the addition that his ringlets appear here more marked and prominent.¹ This may, perhaps, help us to the meaning of *relicinus*. The Glosses interpret the word by *subrecta* (e.g. C.G.L. iv. 162. 5); and it appears to be a compound of *licinus*, which

¹ The brow is considerably narrowed of Praxiteles: see Baumeister's Denkmäler (ii. p. 1400).
by the hair in the Apollo Sauroctonos

is applied to the bend upwards of the horns of animals, *licini* boves qui cornua sursum flexa habent, says a gloss (C.G.L. v. 506. 23), cp. Servius on Georg. iii. 55. A Greek gloss (ib. ii. 123. 8) interprets *licinus* as ἀνάθριξ (cp. ἀνάτριχος in Porphyrius), where the margin of one codex gives *relicinus*. Vulcanius here conjectured τετανόθριξ 'with straight hair'; but ἀνάθριξ probably means 'with hair drawn up from the forehead.' Etymologists connect the word with the root *lak* 'to curve,' λέχριος (Vaniček 825). It would then mean literally 'curving back in hair,' 'with hair drawn back,' the brow not being covered with ringlets, but the hair drawn back, and in that case naturally cut somewhat short. Possibly it is a technical term of artists. The word also occurs in vii. 26 (153. 14) of Alexander the Great, eadem gratia *relicinae frontis*, 'the same charm in his uncovered brow,' i.e. his brow was fully exposed and not narrowed, like a woman's, by any profusion of hair: cp. Aelian Var. Hist. xii. 14 'Ἀλέξανδρον δὲ τὸν Φιλίππου ἀπραγμόνως ὥραϊον γενέσθαι λέγουσι· τὴν μὲν γὰρ κόμην ἀνασεύρθαι αὐτῷ, ξανθὴν δὲ εἶναι. In a similar meaning the word occurs in Pliny H. N. xxxvii. 14 Erat imago Cn. Pompei e margaritis, illa *relicino honore* grata; cp. also Plutarch, Pomp. 2 ἦν δέ τις καὶ ἀναστολὴ τῆς κόμης ἀτρέμα καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ ὄμματα ῥυθμῶν ὑγρότης τοῦ προσώπου, ποιοῦσα μᾶλλον λεγομένην ἢ φαινομένην ὁμοιότητα πρὸς τὰς 'Αλεξάνδρου τοῦ βασιλέως εἰκόνας.¹

The epithet *gratus* does not seem distinctive enough as a contrast to *squalidus*—not to speak of the recurrence of the word a few lines further on, where it is eminently suitable. Colvius conjectured *rasus*: but Apollo was *imberbis*, and is so especially in this description. It is difficult to say what the word can be. It might be *teres*,

¹ See also Pliny H. N. vii. 53, Magno Pompeio Vibius quidam . . . et Publicius . . . indiscreta prope specie fuere

similes, illud os probum reddentes ipsumque *honorem eximiae frontis*.

cp. *genae teretes* of the youthful statue at Samos 51 (165. 5): but a more likely word to have been corrupted is *tertus*, a rare collateral form of *tersus*, cp. Nonius 179. 4 *Terta* pro *tersa*. Varro Ἐχω σε, περὶ τύχης: "Aerea *terta* nitet galea." Idem Cato vel de liberis educandis: alii ita sunt circumtonsi et *terti* adque unctuli ut mangonis esse videantur servi.

Note the antithesis, *tibicen* 'a musician,' meaning a real musician, no amateur, and *multiscius* 'many-sided,' 'acquainted with many subjects,' with the implication that he was an expert in none, a dilettante. In Apol. 31 (42. 8) *multiscius* is used of Homer without any such implication: but in Met. ix. 13 fin. the word is used in a depreciating sense, nam et ipse gratas gratias asino meo memini quod me suo celatum tegmine variisque fortunis exercitatum, etsi minus prudentem, *multiscium* reddidit—as Heraclitus said πολυμαθίῃ νόον οὐ διδάσκει.

IX. 31 (156. 5).

Nec revocare illud nec *a me* mutare nec emendare mihi inde quidquam licet.

Lipsius and Colvius suggested *autem*; but there is not the same opposition ('on the other hand') here that there is a few lines before where *neque augeri* is naturally balanced by *neque autem minui*. We should probably read with Vulcanius *nec immutare*. The three verbs will then be quadrisyllables.

33 (157. 6).

Id quoque pallium *copertoris* ipsius laborem fuisse.

As early even as Vulcanius it was seen that some part of *comperio* must lurk in this word; and it is difficult to think of any other suitable word for the rest of the corruption except *repertoris* 'deviser.' As it was not the fact

that Apuleius learned that this was one of the devices of Hippias which needed statement, but that the audience at Olympia learned it from Hippias himself, we should probably read *comper<iunt reper>toris*.

36 (158. 4).

Non eo infitias nec radio nec subula nec lima nec torno nec id genus *ferramenta* uti nosse.

It is quite impossible that Apuleius would have used two different constructions with *uti* in a passage in which the parts are so closely joined together as here; and further I am not sure that he uses *uti* with the accusative, though he certainly so uses *fungor*, *fruor*, *potior* (see Kretschmann, 'De latinitate L. Apulei,' p. 132). We must read *ferramento* as Hildebrand suggests, 'or tool of that class.' For the interchange of *a* and *o* see above, p. 391. This is better than to transpose *uti* to follow *torno*, which first occurred to me.

36 (159. 9).

Moderationem tuam in provincialium negotiis contemplor qua effectius te amare *debeant* experti propter beneficium, expertes propter exemplum.

Vliet alters *effectius* into *effecisti ut*. But in 76 (175. 19) Apuleius uses *effectius*, and it is surely right. But there does not seem any place for the subjunctive *debeant*. Read *debebant*.

39 (159. 22).

Manente nobis Honorino, minus sensimus absentiam tuam quam te magis desideraremus.

Wower reads *quamvis*, Oudendorp (after Lipsius) *quamquam*, and Hildebrand *quum*. All these commentators interpret the passage in this sense: 'As your son remained with us, we felt your absence less, although our sense of

loss of you was the keener' (we who saw what an excellent governor you were when you left us such an admirable young deputy).¹ This seems somewhat forced, though it is very rash to question an opinion in which Lipsius and Oudendorp agree. Perhaps *quam* may be retained: 'we felt your absence the less than would have otherwise been our greater sense of your loss' (as would have been the case if you had gone away and not left us such an admirable substitute in your son).

X. 40 (160. 12).

Sol qui candentem fervido cursu atque equis
Flammam citatis fervido ardore explicas.

Priscian (ii. 424. 20 Keil) quotes the first lines of this translation of the opening of the *Phoenissae* of Euripides by Accius thus:—

Sol qui micantem candido curru atque equis

which seems more probable, as Attius would not have used *fervido* in two successive lines, and *curru* more appositely expresses δῖφοις than *cursu*. It is possible, however, that Apuleius read *curru*, as *s* and *r* are frequently interchanged in F, see p. 369, note. As to *candentem fervido* we may perhaps put it down to the account of mistakes made by Apuleius, cp. p. 384, above: but it is quite possible to suppose that *fervido* was an error of some copyist, owing to *fervido* in the next line, and that a corrector put *cand-* in the margin, intending it to correct *fervido*, and that a succeeding copyist supposed it referred to *micantem*. In such highly elaborated compositions as these *Florida*, the author

¹ The actual words of Oud. are—
“quum filium tuum hic reliquisti,
minus quidem sensimus tuam absen-
tiam, sed tamen ideo te ipsum magis

desideravimus, qui videbamus quam
esses egregius proconsul qui tam ad-
mirabilem ‘iuvenem nobis dedisses’”
(160. 1).

would most probably be studious of perfection and would not have left a false quotation, as he may have done in a work like the *Apologia*, wherein, even if it were revised after the trial, a few trifling errors might have been left in order to give the appearance of the written speech being the same as that actually delivered: cp. p. 384, above.

XII. 45 (162. 10).

Ut si vocem (sc. psittaci) audias, hominem putes: † nam quidem si audias idem conate non loqui. Verum enimvero et corvus et psittacus nihil aliud quam quod didicerunt pronuntiant.

The plainly corrupt passage most probably contained a reference to the raven. Hildebrand reads *corvi* for *nam*, and *conare* for *conate*.¹ With much hesitation I suggest *nam quidem si audias idem conantem* <*corvum, conari*> non loqui. We should wish to suppose that *quidem* has got out of place and should follow *conari*; but *nam quidem*, with *quidem* in a somewhat unusual position, may be paralleled from the *Apologia* 7 (11. 17 Vliet = 8. 24 Helm) *est enim ea pars hominis (sc. os) loco celsa, visu prompta, usu facunda. Nam quidem feris et pecudibus os humile, &c.*

XIV. 46 (163. 8).

‘Crates’ inquit ‘Crates te manumittes.’

The editors from the earliest time saw that there was no place for the second person, and corrected to *manumittit*. The passages cited by Prof. Ellis (*Class. Rev.* xv. 50) also point to the accusative *Cratetem*; and such a form seems to be recognized by Neue-Wagener i³. 231, like *Thaletem*

¹ He takes *conare* as infinitive; but there is no example of the active form in ancient literature, though it is noted

in a gloss (*C. G. L.* iv. 497. 34), and is found in medieval writers.

besides *Thalem*:¹ but Prof. Ellis prefers *Cratem de manu mittit*.²

A few lines later on quod erat *aucto* gibbere seems correctly emended by Oudendorp, after a marginal note in the Junta edition, into *acuto*. This is better than *alto* of Burmann.

Immediately after, for ne post *querelam eam caperet*, I would not read *querelae causam caperet* with Colvius, or *querelae ansam caperet* with Oudendorp, but *querelam ea inciperet*.

In the next line do not read with Krüger *accipit* and *respondet*, but *accepit* and *respondit* (MSS. *accipit* . . . *respondit*). After *Exinde* all the verbs are in the past tense.

In the much discussed passage at the end of this extract, I venture to suggest ni Zeno procinctu palliastri circumstantis coronae obtutu<m a>³ *magistri insecreto defendisset*. Hildebrand had already suggested *obtutum*. The *a* dropped out owing to its similarity to *ū*, see above, p. 376, note. In defence of *insecreto* 'non-reserve,' 'non-privacy,' which is a coined word, one may plead the many compounds with *in-* which Apuleius affects, and which do not appear to be found elsewhere, e.g. *inabsolutus*, *incunctatus*, *invinius*, &c. Brant had already suggested <a> *circumstantis coronae obtutu magistri insecreta defendisset*. See Bosscha's edition, p. 49a. This is perhaps better than to eject *in-* altogether with Prof. Thomas (loc. cit. p. 295). Besides the very essence of the conduct

¹ Or perhaps even *Crateta*, as Servius uses *Thaleta* (on Georg. iv. 363, 381); but *Chremetem*, *Lachetem* *Philolachetem* (cp. Neue-Wagener, i³. 521-2) point decidedly to *Cratetem*.

² The expression *de manu mittere* seems unusual. Ulpian formally defines *manumissio* as *de manu missio*, Dig. 1. 1. 4; but that points rather to the

absence of the preposition as being normal. Plautus uses generally, if not always, *manu mittere*; but I cannot recall any example of *de manu mittere*.

³ Perhaps *a* is not necessary: cp. Virg. Ecl. 7. 47, solstitium *pecori* defendite. Hor. Carm. i. 17. 3 defendit aestatem capellis.

of Crates was that what is universally an act of privacy was by him performed openly.

XV. 50 (164. 10).

This section on Samos and Pythagoras has not been well treated by Vliet. Rohde's reading (which Vliet adopts) *ager . . . nec vinitori nec holeri* (Vliet reads *holitori*, suggested long ago early in the sixteenth century by Becichemus, perhaps rightly) *culpatur* (MSS. *sculpitur*) is, as Prof. Ellis has shown, very doubtful palæographically, and is erroneous in fact. Samos was notorious for its inferiority in respect of wine, though both a promontory and mountain in the island are called Ἀμπελος (Strabo 637, ἔστι δ' οὐκ εὖοινος, καίπερ εὖοινουσῶν τῶν κύκλῳ νήσων καὶ τῆς ἡπείρου σχεδόν τι τῆς προσεχοῦς πάσης τοὺς ἀρίστους ἐκφερούσης οἶνους); so that a Greek might "dash down yon cup of Samian wine" for more prosaic reasons than those of patriotic indignation. I think Prof. Ellis is right in virtually adhering to the MS., and reading *scalpitur* with Becichemus and Oudendorp (Oudendorp reads *vineto*, which is possible).

51 (164. 21).

Vel *inde* ante aram Bathylli statua . . . dicata.

Professor Ellis ingeniously suggests *indidem*. But we require rather a word signifying 'there,' not 'thence'; perhaps *ibidem* (*iuidē*). *Vel* is probably 'for instance,' as in Apuleius Apol. 55 (70. 15. Vliet = 62. 22 Helm) Nihil incognitum dico: *vel* unius Liberi patris mystae qui adestis scitis; and frequently elsewhere, e.g. in Cicero Fam. vii. 24. 1: ii. 13. 1: De Orat. ii. 284: Ter. Hecyra 60: Plaut. Mil. 55, Men. 873: Virg. Ecl. 3. 50 Audiatur haec tantum—*vel* qui venit, ecce, Palaemon.

54 (165. 16). The statue is probably not that of Pythagoras: Verum haec quidem statua esto cuiuspiam puberum *quis* Polycrati tyranno dilectus *anacreonte uel* amicitiae gratia cantilat. Many editors, from Colvius downwards, have conjectured *Anacreon Teius*; but then they are compelled to read *quem . . . dilectum* or *quos . . . dilectos* (for it is doubtful if we could read *quis . . . dilectis*, as Apuleius would have no reason to use exceptionally the contracted form *quis*). The course of the sentence leads us to *qui* for *quis*.¹ That would necessitate an accusative after *cantilat* (this form and not *cantillat* occurs also in Met. iv. 8 (73. 27 Vliet): cp. *ventilo, ustulo*); hence possibly *Anacreonteum melos*. Anacreon was such a distinguished and favourite member of the court of Polycrates that Apuleius supposes the courtier youth is warbling a strain of Anacreon's, whose friendship he enjoyed.

55 (165. 18).

Ceterum multum abest Pythagorae philosophi statuam esse.

Vliet (after Cuper) adds *non* before *multum*, which is unnecessary. No commentator seems to find any difficulty in the grammar of the sentence, so probably it is right; but I cannot discover a parallel. I would propose multum abest <ut> P. p. statua esset ('from having been,' hence the imperfect). <Is erat> (et Fϕ: etsi Salmasius) natu Samius . . . ac ferme id aevo quo (so Fϕ; no need to alter to *quom*) Polycrates Samum potiebatur; sed haudquaquam philosophus tyranno dilectus est. Or it is quite possible that no addition in the last sentence is required except *natus* (*nat*; F: *natu* ϕ²) for *natu*; and that Apuleius as the sentence went on altered the construction, and instead of reading *haud tamen, ut philosophus*, or something of the kind,

¹ For s final added see above, p. 364.

made a pause at *potiebatur*, and commenced a new construction with *sed haudquaquam*.

In 56 (166. 15) there is no reason to add *didicisse* with Elmenhorst; the force of *petisse* continues throughout the sentence. To add *illa* before *Indiae* seems quite gratuitous on Vliet's part. And he has certainly not punctuated rightly in the following sentence, which should appear thus:—*Chaldaei sideralem scientiam, numinum vagantium statos ambitus, utrorumque varios effectus in genituris hominum ostendere.*

The difficulty in 59 (167. 15) *tot tamque multiugis comitibus* disciplinarum toto orbe haustis is most distracting. Oudendorp's *caliculis*, Colvius' *fontibus*, Vliet's *calicibus*—all suit the sense excellently, but are far from the MSS. except that of Colvius, which may be right. Lipsius reads *fomitibus*; and he is followed by Scaliger, Vulcanius, and Elmenhorst. But what does it mean? 'Kindlings,' 'encouragements,' seems to make poor sense, and is too artificial even for the Florida. Prof. Ellis reads *summatibus* 'chiefs,' 'leaders' (in learning), but this does not go well with *haustis*. I thought of *crateribus*, as in 97 (186. 17); but Apuleius always uses the form *creterra*, except of the craters of volcanoes. Just possibly the word may have been *convictibus* 'feasts' (*cōuictibus*). But the inevitable word still awaits discovery.

60 (167. 20) *Linguam omnem* coercere is certainly strange, but perhaps not beyond the boldness of Apuleius. Rittershausen suggested *omnino*, and Rohde *mobilem*. Perhaps *linguae momen*.

In 60 (168. 2) *gravioribus viris brevi* spatio satis videbatur taciturnitas modificata: loquaciores enimvero ('but,' cp. Helm, p. 573) ferme in quinquennium velut exilio vocis puniebantur. The mention of *quinquennium* certainly gives much weight to the emendation of Brant for *brevi*, viz.

bienni—he compares Gell. i. 9. 4 non minus quisquam tacuit quam *biennium*—though Hildebrand stigmatises this venture as ‘inepte.’

A few lines further on, for *aeque et ipse*, read *egoque ut ipse*, or *utque et ipse*. We must get in *ut* some way.

XVI. 65 (170. 8–11).

Farto toto theatro ingens stipatio: occipiunt inter se *queri*: qui non adfuerant percontari ante dicta, qui adfuerant recordari audita, *cunctisque* iam prioribus gnaris sequentia expectare.

Apuleius had just given a lively description of the bustle that occurs in a theatre shortly before the time arrives for the curtain to rise, when most of the audience are taking their seats. As the bustle is quite normal, it is plain that *queri* is wrong. But I cannot agree with Vliet that it is necessary to supply for *queri* a verb like *colloqui*. Rather read *quieti*, and put either no stop, or else only a comma, after that word. ‘After having settled down (*quieti*) they begin, those who had not been present, to inquire about the previous recitation,’ &c. A few lines further on Krüger reads *cunctique*, which is probable, especially as s final is often erroneously added (see p. 364), and *prioribus* might readily exert some attraction; but is not absolutely necessary. For *gnaris* passive, cp. Gerber and Greef’s Lexicon Taciteum, p. 504.

67 (171. 7).

Haec ego ita facta, ut commemoravi, olim didiceram, sed †audies me† meo periculo recordatus.

This corruption has been emended by Oudendorp: sed *haud sine* meo periculo recordatus. A slight improvement might perhaps be attained by reading sed *haud essem sine* (*es<sē s>ine*) meo periculo recordatus. ‘I should not have recollected it except for my own accident.’

68 (171. 19).

Ante letum *obire* quam lectum.

Vliet says that F ϕ read *obire*, but he follows Stewechius in altering to *adire*. But Stewechius made this alteration under the idea that the MSS. gave *abire*. If they do, we must alter to *obire*, which was read by Pyrrhus Englebermaeus as long ago as 1518. For *obire* in the sense of 'going to' cp. *obire villas* and *obire cenas* in Cicero (Fam. vii. 1. 5 : Att. ix. 13. 6), which sufficiently justify *obire lectum*, and renders the alliterative contrast not too harsh.

70 (172 16-24).

Duplam igitur vobis gratiam debeo . . . quam ubique equidem et semper praedicabo. Sed nunc inpraesentiarum libro isto ad hunc honorem mihi conscripto, ita ut soleo, publice protestabor; certa est enim ratio quae debeat philosopho ob decretam sibi publice statuam gratias agere, a qua paululum demutabit (-avit F ϕ : corr. Stewechius) *libere quam* Strabonis Aemiliani excellentissimus honor flagitat: quem librum sperabo me commode posse conscribere *scitis* eum hodie vobiscum probare.

The book is plainly not yet written—quem librum *sperabo* me commode posse conscribere—so that Stewechius is undoubtedly right in reading *demutabit*, which is coordinated with *protestabor*. But then a difficulty arises in *inpraesentiarum libro isto . . . mihi conscripto*, which seems, as it stands, to imply that the book is already written. We must, I fear, suppose a lacuna, something like this sed nunc *inpraesentiarum* <*incondita haec dico, postea gratiarum*> libro isto . . . publice protestabor. But this is one of those passages on which it is impossible to feel certainty. The old editors altered rightly *libere quam* into *liber quem*. Probably the error arose from *quam* by the correcting *e*

being copied into the wrong place. Before *scitis* one must certainly supply *si*. What the corruption *scitis* contains is uncertain. Perhaps for *scitis eum* we should read *si scio istum* (i.e. Aemilianus).

A page later on, at 174. 3, there does not seem any alteration required, except to read with the old editors *tunc* for *nunc*. In 174. 12 it is simpler to transpose *longe ante ceteros* to follow *vobis*, and precede *locupletissimus*, than to add *honos* with Rohde and Vliet. In 174. 26 *insequentem curiam* protulisse, *curia* seems to be used for 'a meeting of the senate,' of which I do not know any other example.

XVII. 77 (176. 10).

Magisque sum tantae amicitiae cupitor quam gloriator, quoniam cupere nemo nisi vere †putem† potest, potest autem quivis falso gloriari.

Floridus reads nisi vere *putet*, and says that 'id quod cupit esse optandum' or something of the kind must be supplied; but this is impossible. Lipsius suggested *ut putem* or *mereri*. But the former would exhibit unnatural hesitation; and the latter is too wide of the MSS. Contarenus omits the word, which is a simple expedient. As a considerable amount of audacity may be allowed in such a passage as this, I suggest *vere pute*, a variety of *pure pute*; the latter adverb is not found, but it would arise if the adverbial form of *purus putus* had to be used. Or *vere putem* may be a corruption of *veritate*.

In 177. 22 for *et quidem* we should read *set quidem*: we must have a contrast, and *s* initial is at times omitted e.g. 181. 7 *uos* for *suos*, 77. 14 *celeti* for *sceleti*.

82 (178. 10).

Lusciniae in solitudine *Africana* canticum adolescentiae garriunt.

In the other clauses Apuleius says that blackbirds warble *in remotis tesquis* and swans *apud avios fluvios*.

But the commentators are puzzled over *Africana*. "Cur magis in illa quam in alia?" asks Bosscha. There is no reason at all. Read (not *aprica* with Krüger, or *opaca* as Vliet conjectures, but) *arcana*, as is suggested by Haupt (Opuscula iii. 326). It is somewhat strange that Vliet has not thought this emendation worthy of notice.

XIX. 93 (185. 7).

Ut qui diligentissime animadverterat venarum pulsus inconditos vel *praeclaros*.

The meaning of *inconditos* is 'irregular' cp. 103 (189. 22), not 'confused,' i.e. such that the several beats cannot be distinguished. Even if it were so, it is questionable if *praeclaros* could have the meaning assigned to it by Oudendorp, viz. 'pulsus qui bene discerni possunt et certa stataque habent momenta.' Such usages as *sol praeclarus*, *lux praeclara* in Lucretius which he adduces are not parallel. Stewechius read *praeceleres*, but *praetardos* would approach more nearly to the MSS. Scaliger conjectured *praevaros*; but if Apuleius wished to add a synonym to *inconditos*, he would have used a copulative and not a disjunctive conjunction.

L. C. PURSER.

NOTES ON LICINIANUS.

THE following remarks are based entirely on the *reported* readings of the palimpsest (Brit. Mus. Add. 17, 212), or rather codex ter rescriptus, as given by G. H. Pertz and his son Karl Pertz in their edition of 1857, which is substantially repeated in the edition of the Seven Bonn Scholars (1858). An opportunity seems to be offered for new criticism on these annalistic fragments by the publication, after a long period of neglect, of the new texts of *Guido Camozzi* (1900) and *Michael Flemisch* (Teubner, 1904). Both of these mark an advance, not indeed in the decipherment of the now unreadable codex, which, as Sir E. M. Thompson believes, and my own eyes satisfy me, is all but impossible, but in a more minute comparison of the various other historical accounts, Greek or Roman, of the events recorded by Licinianus. Camozzi, in particular, has made this a special aim; but the same ill-fortune which attends so many Italian works of merit has befallen him; for, though published in 1900, his edition had not reached the Bodleian Library in May of the present year. To some extent, indeed, this ill-luck has been less sensibly felt because Camozzi is largely and liberally quoted by his successor, Flemisch, whose apparatus criticus is fairly full, and generally mentions any suggestion of weight; to say nothing of the lucidity produced by printing the original uncials of the codex in capitals, and marking emphatically

to the eye by a bold black type those parts of the history, as it is recorded by other writers, which call for particular notice as illustrating Licinianus.

I may, perhaps, be allowed to express a hope that greater care should be taken in employing chemical reagents to revive faded or obscured writing. It is certain that in some instances chemicals have been used which did no harm to the MSS. upon which they were employed. More than twenty years ago I was allowed to examine at my leisure the very early uncial MS. of St. Gallen, containing fragments, as Niebuhr believed, of Merobaudes. I can testify that the writing was then perfectly distinct and legible; no doubt because the librarian of St. Gallen was sufficiently well-instructed to insist on a substance being used for reviving the letters which was innocuous, and left each of them well defined and clear. How sadly different is the case with Licinianus, and how much cause we have to regret that no English palæographer of eminence undertook the re-examination of the MS. soon after the publication of the first edition. For it must not be supposed that Licinianus is a commonplace or valueless author. Camozzi has done well in pointing out that not a few details of the history he has recorded are not to be found elsewhere.

In printing the text I follow the reproduction given by the Bonn Heptas (H.), also their paging; capitals only where the letters leave a doubt.

p. 4, col. 2, l. 20—

flexuntes a genere PNIIDILIUMQUODREGUM uocabant.

Placidus (p. 46 Deuerling) *Flexuntes equitis quoddam genus ab ornamento equi quod flexum uocant.* pensilium H. Can there have been a form in *u*, *pendulium*? QUODREGUM,

I think, is for *quo* (*quod*?) *regunt*. For *regunt* = *flectunt*, and *quo regunt* = *ornamentum quo equos flectunt*, i.e. *flexum*.

The preceding sentence I would write thus:—scio quos Spartiatae . . . , et quidam ἀνίππους hoc die, at ali(i) καλλίππους appella(n)t. hoc die = hodie, at the present time.

p. 8, col. A, l. 8—

Incertae naturae i]s LEVITATISQUAE SUL R(doubtful)ULIS-COMISABAR ENIRE

levitatisque summae Mommsen, but not convincingly. I think it possible that the letters point rather to ADULESCENTULIS. Both Polybius (xxvi. 1) ὅτε τῶν νεωτέρων αἰσθοιτό τινες συνευωχουμένους . . . παρῆν ἐπικωμάζων and Diodorus (xxix. 32) εἴ τινες τῶν νέων αἰσθοιτο . . . ἐπὶ κῶμον παρεγένετο mention revelling parties of young men as the occasion of Antiochus' eccentricities. For *comisabar* it seems probable we should prefer *comisator* to *comisans* or *comisabundus*. The Bonn editors supply [*interu*]enire very plausibly.

ib., l. 16—

asturcone pom(*pam*) . REBAT

Probably the lost letter was R, as Bernays thought—REGEBAT. In support of *asturcone* may be quoted from Götz's Thesaurus Glossarum *Asturco equus ambulator*. Such an ambling horse would suit anyone marshalling a procession.

l. 17:—

Et REI simulabat Hierapoli Dianam ducere uxorem et CET epulati EAQUEPERBERE sacro protulis causatus EMANSIS

. tulit ei dotem ex UM quem ILLUM omnium
deae donis reliquit.

SE for REI the Bonn editors (H.) ; and it is hard to offer anything better. The lacuna after CET is more plausibly filled up by their ERIS. The passage which follows may be, I think, so : epulatis *aquae perbreue* [*uas e*] sacro protulit, [*ob hoc*] causatus se mansisse, [*nec con*]tulit ei [ad] dotem ex[*tra anul*]um (this last is Keil's) quem *unum* (K. Pertz) omnium deae donis reliquit.

causatus is in any case to be retained. If *donis* is right, it must be dative 'left nothing to the goddess's store of offerings by way of a dowry on her marriage to him (Antiochus) but a single ring.'

p. 8, col. B, l. 11—

has ille METAPIOTANTISACRITERGLISCENTISEXTENDIT

A syllable has fallen out here, ME[RI]TAS. The rest follows easily : IN for IO, then *tantis sacrilegiis poenas expendit*. This is very near Bursian's has ille poenas tanti sacrilegi expendit ; but *poenas* seems to be disguised rather in CENTIS than in METAPIO. The palimpsest seems to have given either EXTENDIT or EXPENDIT : the meaning, however, leaves no doubt that the latter is the right word.

ib., l. 17—

Olympio[n] ETMURESLAPIDEMTAS . EINSULUERAT.

Probably ex (mar)moris lapide octa (? meta)s[tyl]on ei instituerat. The last two words were suggested by Keil, but are doubtful.

Bursian conj. *e lapide marmore* ; but ET is rather EX

than E. For *octastylon* cf. Vitruv. iii. 1 fin. *huius exemplar Romae non est, sed Athenis octastylon templo Olympio*.

If, however, the M before TAS is reliable, perhaps *μετάστυλον* 'colonnaded' might seem to express the same idea less particularly, since Licinianus goes on to say *nam columnas aliquot numero circumdederat*.

p. 10, col. A, l. 1—

The first words of this passage are, I believe, *et qu(a)e alia*; then perhaps *multi inueniuntur* followed by a participle (*fingentes, commenti, credentes?*): as Pliny says of Corn. Nepos (H. N. v. 5) *quaeque alia Cornelius Nepos audissime credidit*.

In l. 5 *RICRO* for which Mommsen conj. *ROGO* may be [FE]RETRO.

In the story of the two brothers Corfidii, I think it possible that the letters following *maior frater heredem* (p. 10, col. A, l. 9) represent *miliens fratrem minorem instituerat legtoque (= lectoque) testamento reuixit maior*: but if this is so, not only is *miliens* a somewhat unusual breviloquy, but the words *minorem fratrem* are rather an inference from Pliny's account of the same event than obtainable from the letters of the codex as reported by Pertz.

The sentence after this (l. 13) may have been as follows: [a] fratre s[u]o ait se dimissum, eum petisse funeri s[uo] erogaretur et locum (then a line lost, e.g. Flemisch's *in quo defodisset aurum*) edocuisse.

In this attempted restitution *edocuisse* is Mommsen's, but *indicasse* of H. is also possible. What the word was between *petisse* and *funeri*, represented by T in the codex, is very doubtful; it would seem to be some numerical abbreviation.

p. 10, col. B, l. 3—

tantumde(m) opus fuit NOSTROCORENOSCERE quantum memoria tradere.

Francken's *nos recognoscere* seems to me right; the corruption probably arose from the tendency to introduce a *g* after *con*, *recongoscere*. At any rate the suggestion of the Heptas *nostro corde noscere* is very hazardous; its strangeness and its not being the MS. reading combine to make it improbable. This would not matter so much if an argument had not been drawn from it in favour of an Antoninian era as the date at which Licinianus wrote. Between Fronto or A. Gellius and Licinianus it is difficult to trace anything like real similarity; archaisms are *rare* in the few passages of L. where the reading is ascertained.

p. 14, col. A, l. 6—

Senatus permisit agrum Campanum quem omnem priuati possidebant coemeret et publicus fieret.

I see no great reason for altering *et* to *ut*; the nominative changes from Lentulus to the land: 'allowed him to buy up the land, and the land to become in this way state domain.'

ib., 21—

INUISOSDIUISŪ. . . .

This is for in(di)uisos diuisum [iret].

ib., col. B, l. 10—

Antiochi Epiphanis regnum senatus filio Antiochi Antiocho puero adtribuit qui paulo POSTE . . ITATUIPIAPRELIATUSEST.

Here Mommsen has most excellently recovered the Greek name *Eupator*, possibly corrupted from a Greek-

written original, and *appellatus est* for APRELIATUS EST. But POST seems to have been followed by E[A], which would be a little in the manner of Livy.

l. 16—

petenti IUNGERAT seems to be for TUNC NEGABAT or TUNC ABNUERAT 'when he asked, at the time of the request, refused.'

l. 24—

Et cum habuit MIS.

After MIS, which are the last letters of the line, the page comes to an end. Hirschfeld has suggested -ERI-CORDIAM SENATUS as a probable supplement. Following in his track I would offer -ERATIO SENATUM.

p. 15, col. B, l. 11—

Legatos—ita contumeliose submouit ut desperata pace ADO . . . CAPTA postero die CASTR(A) eius non longe a Manli castris constituta.

ADO[rerentur] postero die H, omitting CAPTA. It seems possible that the missing letters were ADO[rta ac] CAPTA; the participle *adortus* was sometimes passive. Then *sint* might follow after CASTRA. Pertz, however, reports the letter following ADO as the left-hand half of U.

p. 18, col B, l. 9—

Militum UIECIUMQ.

May this have been *uelitumque*? It is nearer to the reported letters than *calonumque*.

p. 20, col. 1, l. 1—

Matrona quaedam qua[si] mente commota sedit in consilio Iouis

Solio Keil and so H. This seems improbable. I think *consilio* means the gods seated (in effigy) as assessors of

Jupiter. Horace uses the same words, Carm. iii. 25. 26 *Caesaris audiar Aeternum meditans decus Stellis inserere et consilio Iouis* 'Jove's council of assessors.' In the passage of Horace it is more than probable that the twelve signs of the zodiac, who were in a special sense called *βουλαῖοι θεοί*, are alluded to (Schol., Ap. R. iv. 262); in the passage of Licinianus, the assessors of Jupiter would naturally be the other eleven primary gods (Apoll. R., ii. 532 and schol.).

l. 8—

Et die quodam AN . . LUDOSQUI futuri erant.

K. Pertz's supplement an[te] ludos qui futuri erant is generally accepted as right; but it is not certain. May it not have been die quodam ante quam *ludi Osci* futuri erant—a more particular specification? Cic. Fam. vii. 1 non enim te puto Graecos aut Oscos ludos desiderasse praesertim cum Oscos uel in senatu uestro spectare possis. LUD. OSQUI = LUDI OSCI.

p. 20, col. A, l. 20—

Aliquod matronae [e]odem somn[i]o monitae [u]na eademque nocte de . . IB. SACRIS praestite[runt] hocque SACRIFICATU aliquotiens.

Perhaps *dei Liberi* sacris: such a simultaneous warning would naturally involve a religious rite of some expiatory kind. In SACRIFICATU is perhaps disguised, not *sacrificatum*, but *sacri factum*, or *factitatum*.

ib., col. B, l. 9—

This sentence seems to me to have been as follows:

Rutilius consul collega Manlii, (hoc anno Cn. Pompeius natus est, solus super rep. [b]onit[ate] aequae adque Cicero <laudandus>)

cum metus aduentantium Cimbrorum totam quateret ciuitatem ius iurandum a iunioribus exegit.

The words *hoc anno* to *aeque adque Cicero* seem, as the Heptas suggested, parenthetical: a deviation from the usual style of Licinianus justified by the importance of the event, the birth of Pompeius Magnus. *super rep. bonitate* = *propter bonitatem in remp.* The letters .ONITAEQ. are a quite explicable corruption of BONITATEAEQ.

It is very noticeable that the description of Rutilius as *consul collega Manlii* agrees exactly with Val. Max. II. 3. 3 *a P. Rutilio consule Cn. Manlii collega.*

p. 22, col. A, l. 2—

placuit — quid in libris fatalibus SERIEPOSSET palam recitari.

This is surely [quid] *i. l. f. reperiri posset*, not *scriptum esset*, as the first editors supposed.

l. 5—

Constabat notari EAGMINECINNASEACTRIB'PATRIAPULSIS tranquillum otium et securitatem futuram.

Read notari eo carmine (so Pertz) Cinna[m] ac sex tribunis patria pulsus. Mommsen, whom Camozzi and Flemisch follow, conj. *carmine* (without *eo*) *Cinna sexque tribunis*: but *notari* seems more likely to mean 'was marked out' than 'it was indicated.' The inversion *sex ac* for *ac sex* is supported by similar dislocations in the MS.

In the letters which immediately follow *futuram*, PETERAT auspiciū et superiore casu Mario oblatum, for which Bernays conj. REPETAM, the Bonn Heptas REFERAM, I offer SET ERAT, to which *et* appears to me to point, 'However, this was not the only instance of the divine favour towards Marius; an omen had befallen him before,' as Licinianus goes on to record.

l. 15—

uidet asellum forte ABIECTIS ET . . BARTIS.

obiectis ei Pertz, cf. Val. Max. I. 5 *cum ei pabulum obiceretur; cibariis* H: whence Flemisch restores, in my opinion rightly, *obiectis ei [ci]bariis*. In the next clause, *praecini* perhaps accords better with a *presage* such as this than *praecipi*, and TDE is perhaps INDE rather than IDEM.

l. 23—

Nauī peruenit IALS CHRONPROFECTUSETHISPANIA.

Here EX has palpably been corrupted into ET. IALS-CHRON probably disguises in the form of abbreviation TALS ACRON, i.e. *Telamonis promontorium* (Ptol. III. 1. 4). *Telamonis* is due to the younger Pertz; the name is sometimes spelt with an *a*, Talamon (Dict. of Geography s. v.). My own part of this conjecture ἄκρον I consider all but certain (Ptol. III. 1. 4 Τελαμὼν ἄκρον).

ib., col. B, l. 3—

cum de[for]mis habitu et cultu . . . uideretur qui eum [flo]rentem uictoriis no[rant].

After *cultu* not *ab is* (H), nor *ab iis* (Mommson), nor even *iis* (K. Pertz), but EIS seems to have fallen out. *florentem* is not quite certain, as the MS. is reported to give E . . . RENTEM.

This column (B. of p. 22) is only intelligible up to l. 12 *milites*. What follows is mostly conjectural. But I see no cause for altering *et praefecit* [eum] *Sertorio et Papirio*; at any rate, the change to *praecepit* is hazardous, and not particularly likely on palæographical grounds. In l. 14 it seems possible that *exercitus* was shortened into EUS. l. 15 is, I am afraid, beyond recovery. But in 17 [in ur]bem

ueniret quae 18 uideret SINE SUCCEN . . . it would seem that *uideretur* should be read. The following word, in my judgment, cannot be *successum* as the Heptas emended; and in the uncertainty of this, *Cinnae* for *sine* must be abandoned also, as indeed palæographically, and in the light of the palimpsest elsewhere, it is very improbable. Perhaps some form of *succenturiare* is to be supplied. Festus: *succenturiare est explendae centuriae gratia supplere subicere*. Similarly Placidus s.v. centuriae (Deuerling, p. 17) . . . *ut, si primi defecerint, isti quos subesse diximus, laborantibus primis subueniant unde et ad insidiandum ponitur succenturiatus quasi armis dolosis instructus*. The word is best known from Terence, Phorm. I. 4. 51 *Nunc prior adilo tu: ego in subsidiis hic ero Succenturiatus, si quid deficias*.

Lines 18–24, which end column B, are the more tantalizing, that much of the Latin is obviously preserved intact. One or two suggestions occur to me:—

1. 18 *uoluntate senatus* points to something like [*incer*]ta preceding.

1. 21 IUTUMUELLETIREREA is quite straightforward, except REA, for which I suggest [*inte*]rea, anticipating [*do*] nec of l. 23, like Liv. ix. 9. 13 *interea in indutiis res fuisset, donec ab Roma legati aut uictoriam illis certam aut pacem adferrent*.

1. 23 *subrepserat* of the codex seems to be an error for *subrepserit* as included in the clause [*ad*]iutum uellet ire *interea . . . donec*.

1. 24 NARBO looks like a mistake for *Carbo*. NESOS-PORTUM has a strange look of a semi-Greek compound *nesoportum* ‘island harbour.’ Is it possible that Licinianus,

called by this name the harbour of Ostia? I have not been able to find the word elsewhere; but such a translation of a Greek noun νησολίμην would have well suited the later post-republican descriptions of Ostia, as Dion Cassius says of Claudius' reconstruction of it: lx. 11. 4 τοῦτο δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ πελάγει χώματα ἐκατέρωθεν αὐτοῦ μεγάλα χώσας θάλασσαν εὐταῦθα πολλὴν περιέβαλε καὶ νῆσον ἐν αὐτῇ πύργον τε ἐπ' ἐκείνη φρυκτωρίαν ἔχοντα κατεστήσατο.

p. 24, col. A—

As I disagree with previous editors on the restitution of this column, I shall write it out on the lines which seem to me to be more probable.

¹Ad noctem usque ma[nēn]²s Ostia urbe potitur [pēr]³ Ualerium cuius equ[itēs]⁴ praesidebant. nec [Pō]⁵mpeius a Sertorio bel[lum]⁶ a]bstinuit sed palam pug[nā]⁷ uit. et frustra legati [ul]⁸tro citro remissi sunt [cūm]⁹ (? quoniam) se Cinna superiorem [aut pārem]¹⁰ aestimaret. Marius [una cu]m¹¹ suis Ianiculo [deici]¹² tur multis occisis; qui[busdam]¹³ Mari iussu ingulatis [Tūnc]¹⁴ et Octavius acceptis . . . cohortibus a Pompeio . . . tradidit se inimico . . . lus occiditur ceteri[que]¹⁸ su[b eod]em quos subsidio Mi[lo]¹⁹nio Sertorius miserat. [con]ciderunt(?)²⁰ Octauiani . . . milia et senator unus [Aeb]²² utius, aduersariorum [se]ptem²³ milia. potuit capi [Ia]²⁴niculum eodem die [nisi] Pompeius ultra Octauium progredi passus non fuisset.

2 manens *K. Pertz*; 3 per *K. Pertz*; 3 equites *K. Pertz*; 6 bellum abstinuit *H.*; 9 cum *K. Pertz*, the codex gives . . . IM, possibly *cum iam* or *quoniam*; 12 deicitur is my conjecture, and so seemingly Livy according to the 80th epitome,¹

¹ And so Appian i. 68 Κλαύδιον δὲ Ἀππίον χιλιάρχον, τειχοφυλακούντα τῆς Ῥώμης τὸν λοφὸν τὸν καλούμενον Ἰανουκλον, εὖ ποτε παθόντα ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ, τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἀναμνήσας ὁ Μάριος, εἰς τὴν

πόλιν ἐσήλθεν, ὑπανοιχθείσης αὐτῷ πύλης περὶ ἧς καὶ τὸν Κινναν ἐσεδέξατο. Ἄλλ' οὗτοι μὲν αὐτίκα ἐξεώσθησαν Ὀκταουίου καὶ Πομπηίου σφισιν ἐπιδραμόντων.

Cinna et Marius cum Carbone et Sertorio Ianiculum occupauerunt et fugati ab Octavio consule recesserunt: decutitur might also be suggested, cf. Val. Max. i. 4. 2, B. Afric. 50; 13 quibusdam *K. Pertz*, but the codex is reported as giving QUIS . . . DILAMARIUSIUGULATIS, the latter portion of which has been well restored by Camozzi MARI IUSSU iugulatis. The meaning seems to be that Marius, in the attempt to storm the Janiculum, was dislodged, and lost many of his men; some others he himself put to the sword for not showing enough boldness, and allowing themselves to be temporarily repulsed. 14 Tum *K. Pertz*; 16 tradidit se inimico *Camozzi*; the cod. gave TRADIDISSE.¹ 18 sub eodem is my conj. for SU . . . ENT cod.; that this was *submouentur* is hardly probable. 20 [con]ciderunt for . . . SEAERUNT of cod.; I suppose *consederunt* to have been written wrongly for *conciderunt*.

The story of the two combatants, one of whom after killing the other recognized him as his brother while stripping his body, and then stabbed himself on the funeral pile constructed for his brother's corpse, must have been famous, as it is mentioned by Livy, Epit. 70; Val. Maximus, v. 5. 4, Tacitus Hist., 4. 51, and Orosius, 5. 19. 12 (Flemisch). To these may be added the writer of two epigrams, Anth. Lat. 462, 463 Riese, in which, however, the event is placed at the time of the civil war at Actium. The story is given on p. 24, col. B, of Licinianus, and happens to be unusually well preserved. I demur, therefore, to the omission by the Heptas in the words (l. 20) *multa praecatus et inpraecatus gladio se traiecit* of *praecatus et*, though the excision is accepted by Camozzi and Flemisch. The unhappy slayer

¹ The meaning, I suppose, would be that Octavius, who might have been expected, after the reinforcement he had received from Pompeius, to take a more heroic part by attacking the party

of Cinna and Marius, gave up the senatorial cause as desperate, and by refusing to make an armed resistance acknowledged himself beaten (*tradidit se inimico*).

of his brother might well be described as offering, before he killed himself, many prayers and invoking many curses: prayers to the gods to forgive his rash act of murder, curses on the authors of the civil war, who had caused two brothers to fight as enemies.

p. 26, col. A, l. 18—

dignitatem ANTIREMPRÆSENTIB · PATRIB ·

d. antiquam prae se ferentibus patribus *H.* d. antiquam *P.R.* tuentibus patribus *Francken.* The words are very doubtful. Can *rem praesentibus* be for *repraesentantibus*? or should we write *d. ant[erio]rem praestantibus* 'the senators asserting their former dignity'?

col. B, l. 8—

cum Cinna consilia sociabat et Octauio FECER.

tegebat *Mommsen*, detegebat *H*: the antithesis seems to point to SECER[NEBAT].

p. 28, col. A, top.—

The loss of letters here allows nothing beyond a hazy view of the meaning. The general Pompeius Strabo is lying in his tent disabled by a lightning-stroke; and C. Cassius is sent to act for him whilst he recovers. Then follow, l. 6, the words ADQUEMPOMPEI . . . MREPENTESEERIGIT. The Heptas filled up the gap by reading Pompei[us nuntiu]m, which, if the codex is reported with anything like truth, can hardly be right. I suggest ad quem Pompei[us tum] repente se erigit, 'on whose arrival Pompeius roused himself for the moment,' like Catullus' *ut mihi tum repente uisum est*, x. 3.

Pompeius, instead of recovering, died. A description of his funeral follows, in which, however, the loss of letters

again causes perplexity. The following is an attempt differing in some points from those hitherto published:—

p. 28, col. A, l. 14—

Eius funus populus PADANUS dir(r)uit MOR . . . DUMQ.
 sIRNODESCUSU .. ARCA¹⁷ENUM trahere non destitit omnibus¹⁸
 consentientibus¹⁹ dignam caelo poenam²⁰ et perfidiae et ASA . . . UITIAE²⁰
 FESSTIDUM HOS . . DEM expendisse.

l. 15 Perhaps *mor[bi]dumque [uet]erno, decussum* (or *detrusum*) *ex arca caeno* trahere non destitit. ARCA, a common word for 'coffin,' would account for the loss of CA before -ENUM. Then, perhaps, et perfidiae et aua[ritiae et sae]uitiae: cf. Vell. II. 22: *saeuitiae causam auaritia praebuit*. Plutarch expressly states that the one cause of Pompeius Strabo's unpopularity was his χρημάτων ἀπληστος ἐπιθυμία (Pomp. 1). The two following words are probably *pessimum* (Keil), *hominem* (H).

l. 23 seq. I read thus—

Sed ora[to]res et tribuni repressa [m]ultitudine cadauer superin[iecta ueste non sinunt] in busta trahi; [alii dicunt] in lecticulam vulgariter eum elatum sepulturae datum.

There is some ground for retaining *oratores*. The funeral of Pompeius seems to have taken place at Rome (Plut. Pomp. 1, Vell. ii. 21), and was a proper occasion for the numerous orators of that time to protest, so far as they could, against an act of popular barbarity.

col. B, l. 9—

milites repente CIER'LEIS TOTIS clamore exercitum Cinnae salutant ac resalutantur.

Possibly *centurieis totis*.

l. 15—

ipse inter primos ad Cinnam de pace legatum TICISSENSDEBA.

Perhaps mittit paciscens de ea.

p. 32, col. A, l. 1—

Sulla Athenas re[ue]rsus in principes se[diti]onis et noxios
ANIM lentius necatis reli[qui]s necatis reliquis ab.

The dittography *necatis reliquis necatis reliquis* points to something wrong, which is also clear from the fact that the space between ANIM and LENTIUS is not large enough to admit the required supplement aduertit. I do not venture to theorize on the passage, and content myself with observing that *lentius* may be right, as Appian, Mithr. 20, says of Sulla on this occasion that he punished the ringleaders with death, *pardoned the rest* (τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις συνέγνω). It is not a little surprising to find a conjecture so uncertain as [uio]lentius accepted by both Camozzi and Flemisch.

l. 12—

quadrigas . . . ESSUAS septuaginta.

essedas *K. Pertz*, falcatas *H.* It may also have been
EIUS ET SUAS, sent by Dorilaus and Mithridates.

l. 16—

quae [inter]ea collegerat ETERNI . . . quae longis nauibus . . .
SUSUASTABAT.

Perhaps externis [locis] quae longis nauibus [quoquo-
uer]sus uastabat.

l. 20—

DEBUE . . . IETSUPPRESSOSENECTU . . . DERIDI continebant
. . . R

Part of this has been restored by Traube, *se noctu*
(*continebant*): *noctu*, I think, points to the antithesis *ad*

meridiem or *usque ad meridiem*. The whole may have been thus: debilitati ex inpressione se continebant noctu [usque ad] meridi[em], sed ocus impetu facto milites nostri castra capiunt.

P. 34, col. B, l. 1—

Hortensius RE fugauerat.

retro *Pertz*: perhaps *repulsos*.

l. 13—

oppida INPACASRU . redigit in suam potestatem

inpacata *K. Pertz*. I suggest *rursus* for the gap before *redigit*.

l. 15—

Nicomedi regnum Bithiniae restituit RUC . . ESTOPRELIATI PAPHLA . ON . .

The 'O' in ESTO is doubtful.

Camozzi is indubitably right in restoring the name *Paphlagonia* to this sentence; but the rest of his conjecture *cui est pars addita* is too remote from the letters, though I have nothing better to suggest of my own.

p. 36, col. A, l. 4—

The spelling here of the name Nicomedes Euergetes as [NI]CONEMES EUERSEIES is comical, but is expressly vouched for by *Pertz*.

In l. 5 I would write *merito ita dictus* for . ERITADICTUS. In l. 7 *alligabat*, not *alliciebat*, is demanded by *beneficiis suis*: the codex gave ALLI . EBAT.

l. 10 The letters ARISTONAS point to *Aristo[a]nas[sa]*, a form like *Plistoanax*. Such varieties of name are common enough. It is even not impossible that *Halie*, as the codex is reported to have given, is a real name; at any rate, the adjective *SICHEANA*, by which she appears to be described as belonging to *Sycae*, or *Syce*, a town of Cilicia (Steph. Byz. s. v., Athen. III. 78. 6), should be retained. The two words were corrected by Keil into *Hagne Cyzicena*; and Flemisch prints this as right. But though *Cyzicus* seems to be spelt in the codex *CELIEUS*, this does not justify so remote a corruption as *Sicheana* for *Cyzicena*. Reinach (*Revue de Numismatique* for 1897, pp. 241 sqq.¹) has suggested *Nicaeena*, de Ricci *Sigeana*.

In the gap, l. 10, quem . . . RARISTONAC, I suggest [UXO]R: for *procreare* is at times used of the mother: cf. Cic. de Orat. I. 3 *procreatricem quondam et quasi parentem*, and cf. Aen. x. 705, where Vergil seem to have written *Cisseis regina creat: Paris urbe paterna Occubat*.

Col. B, l. 3—

Haec (these events, the marriage of Nisa after the death of the former wife) Socrates ad regem FECIT REGEM refert bellum contra fratrem incitauisse.

Possibly recit[at . eam] refert. There seems to be a confusion of the readings AD REGEM RECITAT and RECITAT AD REGEM. Or may we believe that a line has fallen out containing an infinitive depending on *fecit*? Haec ad regem fecit | *per nuntios deferri*, *Nisam ad* | regem refert bellum c. f. incitauisse. *regem*, in both sentences, will of course be Mithridates: see Camozzi.

¹I would call the attention of my most recent writers on Licinianus seem readers to this paper, of which the to be unaware.

1. 8—

Chrestus etiam quasi meliore nomine ab eodem REUOCUAILIL.

It is difficult to explain *reuocari* of the *new name* given to Socrates. I suspect we should write ab eodem re[ge] uocari [*coeptus*].

In the fragment of B. xxxvi (p. 38 H.) Licinianus, recording the African triumph of Cn. Pompeius, mentions the story of his trying to enter Rome with a team of elephants, and finding the entrance too narrow to admit of it.

p. 38, col. A, l. 7—

QUI . . ADMEMORANTEIOTU TEMAELEPHA
 EPCINITINES RO . . MAUEREMINGRE ROIT . . CNRECUISSE
 ELE RADCURRUM TUNC¹ AIS . QUAMQUS RIS
 EXPERIRENTUR.

I supplement this as follows:—

Quidam admemorant Pompeium cu[m] sex uel sep[tem]
 elepha[ntis] Africis L]eptitanis Romam auentem ingre[di]
 int] roit[um] facere ne]quisse elephantis ad currum iunctis
 quamuis bis experiretur.

Admemorare, though the new Latin Thesaurus quotes no instance of it, must have existed before *admemoratio* could have been used by Augustine. It seems probable that *Leptis* (Plin. H. N. viii. 32 ultra Syrticas solitudines) in an adjectival form, whether *Leptitanis* or *Leptinis* or *Leptycinis*,² is disguised in the letters which follow. Pliny (H. N. viii. 4), while mentioning the fact that Pompeius Magnus, in his African triumph, was the first who yoked elephants before the eyes of the Romans, adds that Pro-cilius denied the possibility of such an elephant team passing one of the city gates.

¹ The three letters UNC form one composite letter in the codex.

² In Tac. Ann. iii. 74 the Medicean

MS. has *lepcinas*; the occurrence of *c* there and in Licin. is remarkable. Can there have been a form *Leptycinus*?

col. B, l. 14—

et Samnites q. qui Nol(a)e erant.

This must be, I think, *qui qui*, plural of *quis quis*.

p. 42, col. A, l. 22—

The characterization of Sallust here given by Licinianus is an almost unique literary remark in the scanty remains the palimpsest has preserved. Sallustium non ut historicum aiunt sed ut oratorem legendum, nam et tempora reprehendit sua et delicta carpit et con[tiones] ingerit et DATINCE loca montes flumina et hoc genus AMO . . . dat in censum *Mommsen*, dat invicem *Flemisch*: perhaps *dat in scaenam*. For AMO . . . Keil's *amoena* seems a plausible suggestion.

p. 44, col. A, l. 1—

In quorum ACRI . . cIsS deduxerat SA . . . FUERE.

ACRI or AGRI must be the remains of *agris*—a variation of construction for *in agros deducere*. The word which followed is very doubtful; *militēs* was suggested by the younger Pertz; *legiones* is also possible. But SA looks like the remains of *saluos* or *saluas*, with which the Heptas' supplement [*resti*]tuere for FUERE would well agree; since the outer margin of col. A had been torn away, and it is uncertain how many letters should be supplied—a remark which holds good also in l. 6, where I would supply [*muli*]eribus rather than [complur]ibus of the Bonn Heptas. Similarly, in l. 7 agros [*cap*]tos reddiderunt.

ROBINSON ELLIS.

ETHICS AND THEISM.

THERE is one great question that must precede all examination of the basis and ground of Ethics. Is it a Science or an Art? A pure Art is a series of homogeneous rules for producing certain effects, whether the rules and effects be cognitional, emotional, or practical. From this point of view, Ethics may be called the Art of distinguishing Right from Wrong—of interpreting the meaning of “Ought,” and bringing it to bear on conduct. But it is an Art only in the same sense as Logic is an Art: just as there is no Art of Reasoning that can make a man think of the right argument at the right time,¹ so there is no Art of Conduct that can make a man do the right thing at the right moment. Ethics is, then, a critical rather than a productive Art: it can judge of conduct under certain general rules of right: it can (in its work as “Casuistry”) decide between rules seemingly contradictory, or legislate for special cases: but it has never yet been able to alter a man’s motives or to change his character. As an Art, it starts from the “Ought”: in its work of examining *the meaning of “Ought,”* and finding its roots and sanctions, it is obviously a Science.

Again, Ethics as an Art is not a pure Art. If we call it “the Art of using the Will aright,” we find ourselves face to face with the fact that, for the right use of the Will, we must go outside the Will itself: for the right use of the

¹ See Mill’s *Logic*.

Will depends on motives and rules that belong, not to the Will, but to the Intellectual and Emotional parts of our nature. When we speak of the Will, we speak of a faculty that is quite unlike our other faculties: for the Will is simply the man acting practically and freely, as he is acted on and chooses among motives supplied by his Intellect or Emotion.¹ Ethics is therefore *personal*, involving the direction of the whole man. Its roots therefore lie outside the pure Will:—they *may* be simply intellectual or emotional. Again, its results may end in thought or feeling only, being marked as Ethical simply because they are voluntary. On the other hand, Ethics does not concern itself with *all* action. The action of a man who “takes long constitutionals on principle” may, as Tom Thurnall² suggests, be simply semi-maniacal; so may any of the thousand fads of normally sane men: but it is hard to see how any of these, even the sanest, can be the keeping or the breach of Ethical law. All that we can at present say is (1) that Ethical action comes *through* the Will, and the Art of Ethics deals with the *results* of Will—though not all of its results: so that (2) what is not voluntary is not Ethical, for good or for evil. The difficulty is further increased by another undoubted fact. (3) That which gives meaning and force to Ethical action is neither Intellect nor Emotion in itself. Thus the true root of Morality in one way resembles the Will itself: as the

¹ The neglect of this fundamental difference between the Will and our other faculties is the root-fallacy in all arguments for Determinism. Intellect and Emotion are separate and partial principles of Man’s mental or spiritual nature. The Will acts on motives supplied to it by the other faculties: its results are “Personal,” because its action is the action of the *whole* man. It cannot be conceived as “naked”

Will, containing its motives in itself. In fact, the Will is the pure Ego, and is supplied with food by the Intellect, &c., much as the Intellect and Emotion are supplied with food for thought and feeling by the Non-Ego. It needs thought and feeling for its existence, but is itself absolutely heterogeneous in relation to them, neither containing nor being contained by them.

² C. Kingsley’s *Two Years Ago*.

latter is intermediate between the true root and its results, so the ground of Morality is intermediate between Man's other faculties and the Will. To find the nature of this true Ethical concept is the work of the Science of Ethics, as distinguished from the Art of Morality.

Thus, no separate principle of man's physical or psychical nature can be the true ground of Ethics. And the absurdity of all attempts to reach the standpoint of a personal principle of Man's whole nature by the investigation of any separate part of that nature can be plainly shown by the failure of all systems based thereon.

Greek Ethics are very noble—and very ignoble. The pure Hedonism of the Epicurean is the simple abandonment of all Ethics. It found (and, under various names, still finds) the criterion and the root of moral action in *feeling* only. Its formula is "ought = pleasant": though both duty and honour (the two chief branches of Morality) are often very unpleasant indeed. Platonism rests on reason, and, as a system, gives the noblest results of Greek moral thought. But certain facts in the life of Socrates show that this system necessarily mixed the worst parts of the Epicurean ideal with the Rational—with dire results.¹ Stoicism, both in its original Phœnician-Greek form and in its later avatar as Pharisaism, presented a noble ideal of self-government. But it found its basis in the transformation of the grim worship of cruel Canaanite gods into the idea of the dominance of a self-locked Ego, as determined by Fate: and, since Fate or Predestination is beyond the control of the Individual, and annihilates Free Will, the Stoical systems voided the Ego of all true Will, and thereby of all real moral contents. Aristotelianism, on the other hand, is purely experimental. Aristotle gives a definition of Virtue which is not a real

¹ "Æstheticism" has been called death as a system was due to the revival of Greek thought": its revival of the worst Greek vices.

definition, and starts, without proving it, an experimental theory as to the manner in which men grow virtuous. He is himself conscious of the weakness of his own theory; and the theory itself is inconsistent with any deep or straightforward thought. For the rest, his main contribution to Ethical thought is the "theory of the mean": but he himself acknowledges that there is *one* curious exception to this rule; and, on examination, we find that the list of "virtues" by which he "proves" his maxim is superfluous in parts, defective in others, and, at its best, nothing but an experimental enumeration.¹

The Greek systems are, in fact, based on decaying Theology. There was Morality in Greece before they began to grow; and they represent an attempt to keep the old Morality without the old Religion. The sturdier Roman hewed a stern Morality out of his own Religion,—brought in the Greek gods and gradually substituted them for his own,—and gradually shaped for himself a new and milder Morality. But it was not until this new Religion failed in its turn, until the Greek and Roman gods became inhabitants of an Olympic Fairy-land, until their worship grew into a half-believing propitiation of dubious deities, who had lost all connexion with Life or Conduct, that Roman Ethics began—and soon ceased—to have influence over a few thoughtful men. Their speedy fall resulted from the rise of Christianity, which spoke alike to the Augustal and the slave, resting all its Ethical force on a pure Theism, and bringing in as a fellow-worker with its moral teaching the doctrine of a Power that could not merely shape the course for man to take, but could also give him strength to endure. So the old Ethics of the West, originally the child of Religion, died on the breast

¹ The long devotion of the Schoolmen to Aristotle's Ethics seems inexplicable when one considers that his views are absolutely inapplicable to

the Christian "Graces," inconsistent with any doctrine of "Grace," and have no Theistic or Theological root or sanctions.

of a more powerful Religion: and the new Religion taught what its predecessor taught in the beginning, but with greater power and stronger supernatural sanctions, that the "Categorical Imperative" of Ethics is simply Obedience to a Power higher, wiser, and more benevolent than any principle of man's nature, than the Will of man, than all alluring passions, than any passing hopes for passing benefits; than the whole mass of all man's selfishness and all man's fears. Thus, historically, Western Ethics sprang from the moral side of ancient Religions, grew as these Religions decayed, and were finally supplanted by a great religious system that contained its Ethical root and sanctions in itself. And, even as it is undoubtedly true that the moral force of Christianity proved more powerful than the pure Ethical systems it supplanted, I believe any honest inquirer will admit that the earlier Greek and Roman religious morality was more productive of, at the least, a consistent and fairly wholesome life than the non-Theistic Ethics which took its place. In fact, the Ethics of the New Testament are based, not only on the Theism of Judaism, but on the principle that supported all Western Religious Ethics—the principle of Obedience.

In examining the Morality of savage or half-savage nations—a task which cannot be accomplished in this paper—the general consensus of students and travellers shows that Morality grows out of Religion of some sort. The Totem on the ridge-pole was (Mr. Rudyard Kipling tells us) the guide and critic of the primeval poet; the primitive Moralist seems to have accepted the same small deity as his guide in conduct. I heard the late Mr. Bradlaugh ridicule the idea of a connexion between Religion and Morality on the ground that an Eskimo considers it his religious duty to kill a man whom he finds knocking the snow off his snow-shoes. But the lesson

is surely the contrary. The Eskimo's imperfect Religion gives a peculiar moral meaning to the act, and teaches him that the slaying of his brother-Eskimo is his duty. There is just the same *nexus* between Religion and Duty in his case as in ours; if we believed what the Eskimo believes, we should act as he does.¹ But, as there is—so far as I know—no savage code of pure Ethics, and as, most certainly, there is no historical connexion between savage Religions and modern Morality, there is no need to pursue the question any further.

The Ethical systems of the East—especially those which are supposed to be non-Theistic—have a claim on our attention, both because of their extent and on account of the large interest which they have awakened in the Western mind. If there be such a thing as a great atheistic Religion based on pure morality—if this system has sprung from no form of Theism—if it is satisfying, helpful to morality, and victorious over Polytheistic and Theistic belief—the continued existence of such a system would be a powerful argument against the views which, I contend, are the logical and necessary deductions from all Pneuma-Metaphysics.

But I can find no evidence for such a state of things anywhere in the East. Mohammedanism is pure Theism, and had its origin in a revolt against ancient Arabic Idolatry. The Ethics, too, are purely religious:—not very far removed from Christian Ethics, except that they absolutely exclude one element of Martin Luther's prescription for happiness, which our Ethics simply regulate, and allow far more latitude than Christianity does to another.²

¹ Mr. Bradlaugh may have slandered the Eskimo; but this does not affect the question.

² "*Als Doctor Luther sagt :
Wer liebt nicht Weib, Wein, und
Gesang,
Er bleibt ein Narr sein Leben lang !*"
(German Students' Song.)

And this difference springs simply from the personal character of Mahomet, which did not allow him to teach personal purity, coupled with his personal dislike of wine : so that it is an additional proof of the dependence of Ethics on Theology. There is—so far as I know—only one Mohammedan writer of “Pure” and non-Theistic Ethics—Omar Khayyám. Omar was a hard-drinking atheist (Carlyle calls him “an old Mohammedan blackguard”); and, in spite of the avidity with which his *Rubaiyát* (which simply means “Quatrains”) is now devoured, I can find nothing in his book but Fatalism, Hedonism, and the praise of the wine forbidden by the religion he left. In fact, the whole of the philosophy of the *Rubaiyát* (of Ethics proper it has none) may be summed up in one quatrain—which he somehow forgot to write :—

“ All things are failing us ! And who can think
 What vaster woes may wait beyond the brink ?
 How can we find sweet hope in hopeless life ?
 Hark to old Omar,—Come, and have a drink !”

Except for this literary rebel, Mohammedanism is Theism, and its morals are derived, historically and naturally, from Theism.

The other great Asiatic moral systems must be briefly dealt with :—pure Buddhism, Lamaism or Red Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism. For want of space to make a more lengthy examination, it may be enough to point out that none of these is a purely atheistic system. Buddhism (like the Indian Jainism) professes to recognise no God : but Buddhist and Jain alike retain a great deal of Theism. The Bodh-spirit is separated by subtle Oriental metaphysics from Deity, just as Nirvâna is separated from existence. But this is simply a mode of reconciling a belief in good with the doctrine that “the Wheel of Being” is bad. The few who keep this Buddhism free from mixture

with some form of Theism, and the few pure Jainists in India, believe that, somehow or other, they are going to enjoy themselves in Nirvâna, the best definition of which is "conscious non-existence."¹ The few ascetics who have kept their belief in the Bodh-spirit pure certainly believe that the Bodh-spirit has power. Else why do all Buddhists pray "universally, devoutly, absurdly"? Lamaism is practically Theistic:—the Bodhisatva of the coming Buddha, Maitreya, is not only worshipped under the name of "Avolokitesvara" as an existent being, but receives actual adoration, in the two great sects of Red Buddhism, as Incarnate in the person of the Grand Lama or the Dalai Lama. And Lamaism owes a great deal of its ritual and even of its doctrine to the Christian Missions, Nestorian and Orthodox, who visited Tibet when Nestorianism was still an active power in the Church. So whatever other elements may lie behind Red Buddhist Metaphysics, Theism—Christian Theism—is certainly one. Red Lamaism is a strong power in China, which is spiritually subject to the Dalai Lama; though, until quite recently, the Chinese Government showed their respect for their spiritual Head chiefly by poisoning him at the end of his "visitation" of that country. Now, however, he is suffered to live beyond the twenty-three years allotted to his predecessors, and his power in China has naturally increased. The main Religions—if they be Religions—associated with China are, however, Confucianism and Taoism. Kung-foo-tsü's writings seem, at first sight, to be atheistic: they teach nothing about a God or Gods. But (1) Kung-foo never professed to be a teacher of anything but "good manners"; one does not expect much Theology in a book of rigid etiquette. (2) His writings themselves bear witness to the fact that he was reared in, and that his code

¹ "Egstazizing zo happy in the Nebelsen, in Mr. Wells's *Fallen Idol*.
gonscious non-egziztence of Nirvana."

was based on, a Theistic Religion, associated with ceremonial worship. He teaches "good manners" towards gods and men, and dwells as minutely on the etiquette of sacrifice as on the etiquette of the Court. Probably he was simply a highly-refined courtier who cared nothing for Religion : but he is himself witness that he was reared in a religion that he never forsook ; and (even if we had not the direct evidence of his writings) it would be as idle to argue from his teaching that China was atheistic in his days as it would be to argue that Ireland is now a pagan nation because there is no Christian teaching in Thom's Directory. Lao-tsū, the founder of Taoism, certainly taught a mystic system of Philosophy and Ethics concerning the Divine Way, the TAO ; and this teaching reached far above the possible level of polytheism. But, in spite of this, there is no evidence that he either held or taught Atheism. He was a contemporary of Kung-foo-tsū, and there is good evidence that the two great Chinese thinkers knew and respected each other : so, since the writings of Kung-foo give indirect evidence of the existence of a Theistic State-Religion in China at that date, we have good reason for saying that, at least, the teacher whom Kung-foo named "The Phoenix" knew this Religion, and did not contradict it. But the curious point is that modern Taoism is avowedly polytheistic, and that the weird "josses" of Taoism are the Chinaman's dearest deities. It is the vengeance of the "Lord of death" that he dreads if he spits against the wind ; and punishment by the narrow spirit that slips through the chink of a half-closed door, and by the heavy spirit that falls on the head of a hatless man, is now the chief sanction of both Buddhist morals and Confucian manners in China. Thus we have every reason for saying that *no* Eastern philosophic system of Ethics is atheistic or preceded Religion. Out of Religion they grew ;

their influence was never separated from Religion, and into Religion they have returned.¹

How far can we bring modern European Ethics under the same rules? It is, of course, quite true that many now try to separate Ethics from Religion, and to believe that Morality can exist, as a code with strong and permanent sanctions, without the assistance of Religion. And it must be admitted that some men are strictly and honourably moral, though they have lost their Religion. But the development of non-Theistic Ethics is too recent, and its declared separation from Christianity too incomplete, for us to take this fact as any evidence against the Theistic origin of Ethical thought and action. Most believers in non-Theistic Ethics have at least grown up in a Christian country; and the influence of either past or present Christian thought and example cannot be disregarded. And, as a matter of fact—as we have seen already—the influence of Ethics based on the national or personal decay of Religion is always greatest at the beginning—at the moment of real or apparent decay. It can, however, be shown that modern Ethics are, as a matter of fact, generally the lineal descendants of Greek and Roman Ethics, and that the same defects which caused pre-Christian Western Ethics to fall before Christianity are inherent in the moral non-theistic systems of the modern world. And this can be proved from the systems themselves, quite independently of the fact that they have always been more or

¹ I have not included the Japanese "Shinto" in this examination. It is neither a Religion nor an Ethical code, but an absolutely harmless recognition of the existence of the departed, the nearest approach possible to the Christian doctrine of the "Communion of Saints." Its rites are simple, colourless, and free from superstition; and it has not been found necessary to suppress it in Christianising the Japanese.

As a Japanese writer states: "Some Japanese are Christians, and some are Buddhists; but we are all Shintoists." In practice, the chief Shinto "rite" is the pouring of a few drops of tea from her cup by the mistress of the house in memory of the dead: in theory this rests simply on the belief that the dead still exist, and are in sympathy with the living.

less subject to the avowed or unconscious influence of Theism.

It seems to me certain that all post-Christian Ethics split up, like all post-Christian Metaphysics, into two great schools, which we may distinguish as "Rational" and "Experimental," or as "a-priori" and "a-posteriori."¹

There is only one man, besides the Doctors of the Greek Schools, who has greatly influenced modern thought—Spinoza, a Jew, who certainly tried to overthrow the spiritual nature of the Deity, but did not succeed in doing so. And the power of Spinoza is far greater in Metaphysics than in Ethics.

The final development of the a-posteriori school is found in Utilitarianism—a system which may be defined as "unselfish Hedonism." Pure Hedonism says, "Let me be happy": Utilitarianism, certainly more unselfishly, says, "Make as many people as you can as happy as possible." The law is broad, though its application is often both doubtful and difficult. Does it apply to passing or permanent happiness—to temporal or eternal welfare? A man's beliefs on these points would make a difference: the Theist and non-Theist might find it necessary to extirpate each other, each in the interest of his peculiar views. In any case, it is purely Hedonistic—not so compressed, perhaps, as Egotistic Hedonism, but quite as subject to compression. But its real faults lie deeper. It is purely Emotional, and absolutely Experimental. Besides, its "Categorical Imperative" is obviously weaker than many of the practical Imperatives, from which it is, in fact, derived:

¹ I do not include eccentric and non-reasonable systems, such as that of Mr. Bax, who derives both his Metaphysic and Socialistic Ethic from a supposed "common sensibility" of mankind, or wild fairy-dreams like "Theosophy"—a system which Dr.

Salmon described as "obviously derived from the absence of the two elements present in its name." Yet I think it could be shown that even these either rest on a hidden Theistic basis, or are notable examples of the failure inherent in non-theistic systems.

and it does not include the particular side of Morality which we call "Duty." Mill's theory, in fact, breaks down not only because it concerns itself with only a part of human nature, but also because the Imperatives of daily life have been obtained from a different source, depend on a different sanction, and could not be reconstructed on a Utilitarian basis without destroying the results of over 1800 years of Ethical thought springing from an entirely different system. Besides, the basis of Mill's theory was unknown until the advent of a system with a different basis—it throws no new light on that basis—and in some respects it is far from equalling it. The "Golden Rule" is only one side of the Ethics of Christianity : but, even taken by itself, it is both broader and deeper than the one rule by which Utilitarianism seeks to replace it. *If Mill had not known Christianity, he could never have founded his Ethical system; and (as in many other cases) Utilitarianism is simply an attempt to retain Theistic morals without Theistic belief.*

The a-priori School, which finds its completion in Immanuel Kant, cannot be summarised within the limits of this paper—largely because thinkers are still greatly divided, both as to the actual teaching of that great "*Dingmeister*," and as to the validity of the processes by which he attained his results. His "Categorical Imperative" (which he has set forth in four different forms)¹ makes the element that Mill misses—rational self-consistency—the *only* test of the Moral Law. It is a deliverance of "Practical Reason," refined, attenuated, and (in its purest form) impotent. So careful is Kant to keep this "Categorical Imperative" pure, that he banishes as absolutely non-moral all "maxims" that are in any way based on *results*, or spring from any kind of affection, emotion, or feeling. A maxim that *includes*, even partially,

¹ See Dr. Abbott's translation of Kant's *Ethics*.

love or gratitude, on the one hand, or the desire to make anyone happier, on the other, is "mixed"; and its non-morality depends on the admixture of these elements with the pure desire to fulfil the Moral Law. Theoretically, Kant classes all motives that spring from *character* as non-moral: practically, *totidem verbis*, he declares that pre-disposition to good and habits of morality (the two great elements of character) are bars in the way of true moral progress. Thus Kant bans as "non-moral" the maxims on which most good and noble men act, and the process by which men become good and noble. The difficulty is increased by the fact that, while absolutely denying Hedonism, he makes the belief that every reasonable being is pleased at the sight of true Moral Action his starting-point; and that, in many passages, his arguments, when examined, are simply Utilitarian under a slight disguise. So, too, his position towards Theism is peculiar. Avoiding disputable matters as to the Theological aspect of his position towards the "Idea" of God, the following points are patent to all candid inquirers. (1) In examining the use of "pure Reason" in its relation to Theology, he sits so carefully on "the razor-edge of Thought" that he leaves one point only clear as to the *reasonable* evidence for the existence of God—i.e., that from this point of view Reason passes her bounds in claiming for this "empty Idea" any reasonably-established existence. (2) In his "Kritik of the Practical Reason"—i.e., in his Ethical system—he brings out the Idea of God, not as a Law-giver (since he believes that the purity of the "Categorical Imperative" is destroyed by its being too strongly recognised as "the Will of God"), but as a Power capable of adequately rewarding and punishing our Moral—or Immoral—Actions. (3) In order to make the Theistic evidence of the "Practical Reason" prevail over that of the "Pure Reason," he relies on "the Primacy" of

the Practical Reason : but he forgets that, if the object of the Pure Reason be *truth*, and that of the Practical Reason *action*, this is enough in itself to give an absolute Primacy to the latter for *action* only, and to the former for *truth* ; and that the question as to God's existence is not a matter of action, but of truth. Passing by other criticisms, this seems a sufficient ground for denying that Kant's Ethics are Theistic, if only because he does not derive Morality from God, but God from Morality. He is, rightly, absolutely clear as to the freedom of the human Will, as the primary postulate of Rational Morals : but he dwells so strongly on the "Autonomy" of the Will that the conflict between this Autonomy and the Stoic *αὐράκεια*, combined with his characteristic Dualism, invests his whole moral system with a great deal of the spirit of the Stoics. The fundamental distinction between Theistic and non-Theistic Ethics is not that the former finds a *Deus Remunerator* while the latter does not, but that the former—in contrast to the latter—springs from the thought of God as a *Law-giver* ; while the latter finds—either in the thought of God or in some other motives—the spring of moral action in present or expected rewards and punishments. This spring Kant himself considers non-moral, as he considers the desire to please God. Is his system one whit "purer" or more "Theistic" because he deduces, from a code that rests on the Autonomy of the Will, a God who rewards and punishes ? Is it possible for man to apprehend God without spoiling (Kantian) Morality by introducing the elements of Obedience, Hope, and Faith among his springs of action ? Thus Kant's position is that of one who is, inconsistently and illogically, a Theist : but he prepares the way for a more consistent Theism in Morals by making the recognition of the motive of *Obedience* a logical necessity. His system, as it stands, excludes all *Emotion* from the sphere of morals, and gives us only *Reason* : but

it gives us good grounds for a better and *personal* system of Ethics, which, being personal, can command the whole Man. Under such a system, the right use of Reason (though not necessarily its results) becomes a matter of *Conscience*, which is also our supreme guide in Action: so the whole man becomes subject to the Moral Law.

Again, Theistic Ethics meet another difficulty, suggested plainly enough by Kant's system. If there be a faculty whose end is *Truth*, and another whose end is *Action*—and if it be true, as it undoubtedly is, that neither has any right to interfere within the sphere of the other—the difficulty can be met in two ways, and in two only. These two ways are the principle of *Supremacy* and the principle of *Primacy*. By the former I understand the subordination of both principles to one supreme principle, that has the right and power to command¹ both; by the latter, the power of one principle to command the other. But, as we have already seen, “Pure Reason” and “Practical Reason” are each supreme in their own provinces: all the arguments in the world will not upset that fact. And, equally obviously, a purely intellectual faculty cannot have more power in the region of practice than the faculty whose whole end is good action; nor can a purely moral faculty be supreme in the region of truth. If this be so, there can no more be “primacy” between two heterogeneous faculties than there can be competition between the *data* of two different senses. We may (like Locke's blind man) think that scarlet is like the sound of a trumpet; but we can neither say wherein the resemblance consists, nor

¹ In Christian Theology the “Unity” is held together by the doctrine of the *Subordination*—a word that must be carefully distinguished from “Obedience,” since Christian doctrine recognises only one Will in God—of the

Son and Spirit to the *Supreme* Father, who is the one “Fount” of Godhead. In relations between the Infinite and the Rational Finite, “subordination” is practically another word for “obedience.”

(except "tropically") say that the sound has any "primacy" over the colour, or the colour over the sound. Thus, for the reconciliation of the results of Mental and Moral Philosophy, we must find a third and *Supreme Principle*. Without it, we cannot keep *both* results in harmony and unity. Without it, our Ethics cannot be *personal*, springing from and applying to the *whole* man. And the only possible common ground of Reason and Morality, the only possible supreme principle that can end the rebellions of Thought and of Practice, is that which has always (historically) been the foundation of Theistic (and, in the last resort, of Christian) Ethics—belief in a God or in gods, intelligent and moral.

By "gods," again, I mean beings recognised as supernatural—existing outside both the subject and the object worlds—intellectually and morally entitled to claim the subordination of our Reason and the obedience of our Will. Their *moral* superiority is necessarily involved in the thought that our moral notions are derived from them; their intellectual supremacy in the belief that they are our superiors in Reason. This belief is, of course, only the middle stage of Theism. There is one earlier stage, in which (consciously or unconsciously) these gods are demons—maleficent powers; and even Christian Morality does not always succeed in separating the Fear of God from the Dread of a Demon. But, little by little, the innate sense of "good" is so strengthened in even the worst idolaters that they begin either to cleanse their Pantheon or to reduce their outward religion to Monotheism. And by this very process (which a Theist of any kind must believe to be divinely inspired by an immanent moral faculty) both gods and their worshippers change, until, in the last resort, the highest Moral Ideal is recognised as, so far as it goes, the character of God. Once grasped as God's character, Man naturally and inevitably

demands that God's acts shall conform to this character—not as believing that he legislates for his Deity, but as believing that his Deity has already given him Moral Laws, and can neither legislate anew for the worse, nor be in His own Nature lower in character than the character He seems to have wished to impress on Man. This is the “Moral Evidence for Revelation”; and it will be seen that this is the only way in which we can conceive the inter-relation between Theism and Morality, without making the belief in God a very uncertain element, refusing to recognise an absolute moral character in the Deity, or so conforming to the dead systems of the Past as to make the historically earlier belief in Theism a derivative from the later belief in uprightness. Again, though we believe God to be possessed of both higher Intelligence and a better Character than our own, we can grasp only so much of His Character and Reason as is like our own; but if we believe that God is an actual, reasonable, moral being, greater than we can be, the way is opened for further development in Morality on our part. We always press to a moral goal just ahead of us, still realising that, because God is Infinite in Goodness, we must always press still further. So the Thought of God becomes an inspiration for an ever better life. The belief (which is essentially implied in *any* Moral Theism) that His moral principles are the same as ours, however difficult His actions may be to comprehend, keeps our Theism morally pure, and our Idea of Goodness an Ideal that is both fixed and growing; and the Thought of the Personality of the Infinite makes Him SUPREME over both Reason and Morality, and recognises (most of all in the movement of the Christian Absolute—the *Logos*—as God *becoming* a reasonable human being) the possibility of the Source of the Moral Law becoming both an *example* and a continual *source of strength* for the permanence of the Morality we have reached, and

the growth of yet higher Morality. The ultimate form of Theism, in fact, which is Christianity, brings Reason and the Moral Law into unity, not by the Primacy of either the "Pure" or the "Practical" Reason, but by finding a *Supreme* authority for both: in it the Wisdom in which alone perfection can exist, the Strength that Man needs to turn his "Moral Law" into "Moral Life," and the full beauty of a life that is both Divine in origin and practical for human beings on earth, are found to spring from the Idea of God—as a real Being—and to meet in the Thought of God, as both *Juridicus* and *Remunerator*. This belief brings with it both Immortality and Personality as absolutely necessary consequences. So the theory that Morality consists in obedience to an absolutely moral Deity exactly agrees with what we have shown to be the historical development of true Ethics, without requiring the break-up of the religion on which it depends as a condition prior to either its evidence or its efficiency.

From this principle there necessarily follows the *natural* development of Moral Science. *Duty* finds its place in the Thought that there is due from us to the Supreme Morality—God—the only thing one reasonable being can owe to another Wiser, Stronger, Better than himself—Obedience. It is no answer to this to say that such Obedience demands a belief in Man as not merely reasonable, but spiritual, since I have already shown¹ that the strongest *a priori* argument for Theism rests on the belief that Man² is a Spiritual Being. Therefore Man owes to God all that the spiritualising of his Intellect, Reason, and Volition can give to Him; and this must include the spiritual subordination of his Will, which (as we have already seen) must, in the relation of a finite Moral Being to a Supreme Moral Being, be identical with Obedience. Freedom, again, is a necessary postulate of Morality; so

¹ HERMATHENA, 1904.

² *Ibid.*, 1903.

this Obedience must be *free* Obedience. The theory that *free* Obedience to an Almighty and All-knowing Deity is impossible (as Calvin taught) is again no obstacle. An Almighty Being is under no compulsion to do all He can, and an "All-knowing" Being means simply a Being who knows *all that is knowable*. It is perfectly possible that the result of a free Volition may, by its very nature, be *unknowable in itself*, as may be the case with certain Mathematical Concepts. We work with $\sqrt{-1}$; but no human being has grasped, or probably will ever grasp, its meaning. We, too—in politics and social life—look ahead at the almost necessary results of massed "Free Wills," though we cannot imagine even the meaning of predicting the result of a single volition.¹ "*Honour*," again, is only Duty transformed by certain Emotional, &c., principles in Man's Nature. A peer declares—a gentleman promises—"on my honour"; and his word is taken, because it is supposed that, to a man of his breeding or habits of life, the duty of *Truth* has a specially strong force, and does not need those explicit appeals to the Supreme that are involved in an oath. So that, in both of their aspects, Religious Ethics rest on the thought of Obedience—primarily, to the Supreme Being Who is perfect in Power and in Character; secondarily, to the maxims concerning our dealings with ourselves and others which we believe to spring from the Everlasting Justice and the Everlasting Love that, in the long run, Man recognises as a part of His Nature.¹

¹ This seems to me to be the true solution of the "Antinomy" between Necessity and Free Will. Predestination must rest on knowledge; but we have no right to assume that "contingencies" are necessarily knowable. In a mixed equation the surd parts of both sides are always, *in the sum*, equal; so are the "rational" parts. But the rational parts are not equal

in their details, and it seems only reasonable to believe that the detailed values of each of the surds may also be absolutely unequal. For "rational part" read "Predestination," and for "surd" "Free Will," and the analogy seems complete.

¹ These duties do not differ in *strength*: both are equal parts of Theistic Morality. Both, though the

It follows, then, that Theistic Ethics are not only the system most in accordance with "Pneuma-Metaphysics," but that they contain in themselves another essential element of Morality. For the Obedience of a Free Will to a purer Free Will, of a Person seeking Perfection to a Perfect Person, of a Spirit to the Lord of Spirits, must necessarily involve continual growth. It may be satisfied, for a while and in days of religious degeneracy, with a priggish accuracy of conformity to fixed "copy-book" maxims, moral and non-moral, or with the purely Pantheistic conception that, blending the Infinite Law-maker with subject spirits, ends in the depersonalisation and demoralisation of both God and Man. But only for a while. The efforts of all great religious and moral reformers have always been directed towards the teaching, as a necessary consequence of Theism, of a Spiritual and Moral Law that "grows with our growth" and strengthens as our grasp of the moral character of God strengthens—a Law personal, deep-seated, and springing from what Kant calls a "good heart"—a phrase that seems to me to signify, not merely the tendency to follow a Moral Law, but the guardianship and development of both Intellect and Emotions, so that they may find in the Idea of Obedience to the SUPREME a good reason for "refusing the evil and choosing the good," by pure and free Volition in conformity with the Most Just and the Most Loving Will. And the reformers who have treated Religion and Ethics in this way have, in the long run, won their battle.

direct objects are different, spring from the same motive of Love to God. So Christ says that Love to God is the *first* and *great* Commandment; but He adds, "The *second* is *like* unto it." It is "second" in order, because it is *derivative*; but it is *like* unto the first—as *great* as it—because it is equally important. It will be noticed that

Christ, Who constantly appeals to the *intelligent* religious principle as a reason for *serving* God and one's neighbour, here rests Obedience to the Moral Law on the *Emotional* side, by making "Love" the spring of all our duties—a view in which He is explicitly followed by St. Paul.

This, then, is both the root and the purpose of Theistic (and of Christian, as Theistic in the highest degree) Ethical Science. It is Theistic, because it rests on God and takes Obedience to God as the highest possible ground for Obedience : it is truly Moral, since no Being can be All-Supreme Who is not Supreme in Morality. There is no danger, for the latter reason, of its being perverted into the form into which Dean Mansel twisted it, when he declared that the Moral Character of God might be different *in kind* from the Ideal Character of Man. Every moral, as well as every religious, man must answer as Mill did, when he declared that there was no moral ground for Obedience to a Being of unknown Morality, and that even the worst supernatural punishment was preferable to obeying a Deity who was absolutely immoral in principle.¹

From Theistic Ethics, based on the Pneuma-Metaphysical view of God and Man, we can easily derive both a final definition of Moral Science and a clear, distinct, and all-comprehensive "Categorical Imperative." "Ethics is the Science of the spiritual and moral relation between a Supreme and Good God and a subordinate and inferior Spirit" (in practice, Man), "and the Art of living in accordance with His Will." That His Will is "righteous" and "loving" and "reasonable" is implied in the definition itself. "So act as to will that thy ground of action be the Obedience that a lower Spiritual Creature owes to his

¹ "There is one thing such a Being cannot do : he cannot compel me to worship him. And if he can send me to hell for not worshipping him, to hell I will go." (*Mill on Hamilton.*) The meaning of this passage has often been perverted, as if Mill meant it to apply to Theism in general, or to Christianity. But it is simply a very just retort to the hideous dogma of Mansel, which (I believe) was origi-

nally intended as a defence against moral objections to such doctrines as "Substitution," Reprobation, and Everlasting Misery. Every Theistic Metaphysician and Moralist has good reason to regret Mansel's ill-judged and extravagant attempts to justify certain individual doctrines, by deeply undermining the foundations of both Theism and Morality.

Spiritual Master.” The details may be filled in from Ethics as an Art, or from Theology: if rightly filled in, both will agree. But the motive is, historically and rationally, the only one that is both logical and effective in guiding any Theist, in his whole personality, to τὸ καλὸ καὶ ἀγαθόν—an ideal that concerns the whole man, and is capable of an infinite approach to a true “Kingdom of ends”—a Kingdom that has, for the race and the individual, a τέλος—the natural and intelligible τέλος of perfection. If Man be a Spirit—if God be the greatest and best Spirit—if both be Personal Beings—the only self-consistent Ethics must rest on the Obedience of Man to the Highest, most Spiritual, most Moral, Personal Spirit—that is to say, to God.

ALEXR. R. EAGAR.

AN OLD PROBLEM IN LOGIC.

AT the foundation of Kant's philosophy there are two well-known principles—the distinction between synthetic and analytic judgments, and the distinction between *a priori* and empirical cognition. The first of these principles I intend to consider briefly, with apologies for reviving such a well-worn subject.¹

A.

A proposition may be considered from two points of view. We may regard the terms as purely subjective: the words standing for images which are, or have been, before the mind. Under these circumstances, the corresponding mental process must be an analytical judgment, if it can be called a judgment at all. The statements which we make about individual perceptions are those that are true of the perceptions as given to us. The subject contains the predicate. "The image of this book before me gives me the impression of blackness," is simply a direct remark about a subject given in its totality. Here there can be no dispute, except as to whether there is any judgment as distinct from immediate perception.

The question is more difficult if the terms in a proposition symbolize some actual entities other than immediate

¹In this paper I am dealing only with predication judgments. It must also be remembered that 'synthetical' and 'non-analytical' are not necessarily synonymous terms.

perceptions. In this field there is a great temptation—due to inexact thought—to believe in non-analytic judgments. Take the well-known example—“All bodies are heavy.” If ‘bodies’ stands for bodies as they are *in rerum natura*, the statement is either false or it is an analytic judgment. The definition of the real essence of the subject, if fully stated, must either contain the predicate or reject it—an obvious application of the Law of Excluded Middle. It is no answer to say that what is meant by ‘body’ is ‘extended thing,’ so long as ‘extended thing’ refers to an objective essence.

Let us next try making the subject have a purely subjective reference. If the predicate is still objective, the proposition now becomes “The impression of extension is heavy,” which is simply absurd. Neither do we mean “Every time I have an impression of extension, I have also an impression of weight,” for this is false.

The last paragraph may appear frivolous trifling, but it draws attention to the fact that we cannot avoid the objective reference in the terms of a judgment. What our proposition means in Hume-Kantian language is, that “the impression of extension is always caused by an object that is heavy.” But here, observe, the impression is treated *objectively*—and rightly so; hence, as shown above, it cannot be defined except by all its objective predicates, including the property of being caused by an entity possessing weight. Thus the judgment is analytical.

These reflections remind one of an error to which a reader of Kant and Hume is liable—the belief that an impression cannot be regarded as objective. It might be shown that this doctrine is an illegitimate offspring of the artificial dualism of Descartes, who treated mind and body as two essentially distinct entities, unrelated except by an arbitrary arrangement of the Deity. The truth is, that an ‘impression’ cannot be regarded as non-objective, being

both subjective and objective. The science of psychology is based on the recognition of this fact.

I have no doubt that all so-called synthetical judgments can be treated as the example given; and we must conclude that they are one and all analytical. The opposite view arises from obscurity in the use of the terms employed in a proposition. *If* the conceptions used in a judgment are clearly defined, the judgment must either follow from those conceptions, or be false.

Geometrical examples lead to the same conclusion. Kant would argue that the so-called *a priori* judgment "In any triangle the sum of two sides is greater than the third" is synthetical, because "triangle" is defined as "a rectilinear figure with three sides," and not as a "rectilinear figure with three sides, in which two are greater than the third." The same objections apply here as in the previous example. If a triangle is defined simply as a "rectilinear figure with three sides," then it has no further properties. In fact, no such figure exists; and it can be neither conceived nor yet imagined. We can get no more properties out of it nor 'put them into it' without *changing the definition*. The description we start with is only a practical guide, and in no sense a definition. Helped by intuition, or by experience, we find that *there is no such object as a mere figure with three sides*. There is a dialectic process in which our original 'definition' is found to be self-contradictory. All progress in knowledge is of this kind, as Hegel has pointed out. Experience teaches us, not to tag on new predicates to old subjects, but to abolish the old subjects as being self-contradictory. The triangle is not "a mere rectilinear figure with three sides"; it has a multitude of other properties, all of which have to be included in its perfect definition, though numbers of these properties are unknown to us.

Here then we have the real secret of Kant's distinction, which cannot be lightly thrown aside, in spite of his imperfect expressions. A 'synthetic' judgment is the discovery of the fact that a certain conception is limited, and therefore—regarded as representing existence—self-contradictory, and to be replaced by a more complex conception. In truth all our conceptions must be, in this sense, self-contradictory, until the fulness of knowledge is reached. We find, then, that Kant's view, that the progress of knowledge consists in the discovery of synthetic judgments, is less satisfactory than the doctrine of Comte and Hegel, that knowledge proceeds from the abstract to the concrete, from the simple to the complex. Kant was really obsessed by the traditions of predication logic, which teach the hard and fast fixation of judgments.

B.

From the purely philosophical standpoint these arguments appear to be unanswerable. It may, however, be objected that there must be a hidden flaw, because as a matter of fact the distinction between 'real' and 'verbal' propositions is commonly made and frequently used in practical life. If the objection is valid, there will be a divorce between theory and practice which will be utterly destructive of the former, and leave the latter in a state of hopeless confusion.

In considering this difficulty, it will be useful to bear in mind the distinction between 'real definition' and 'nominal definition.' A nominal definition is simply a convenient arrangement of ideas and words, depending on reality, but not expressing it properly. The traditional logic deals with nominal definitions. It treats of 'predicates,' 'properties,' 'attributes,' etc., as if they could be isolated and separated from concrete existence; or at

the most it refers them artificially to some unknown subject. Practically the nominal definition is simply a rule of selection of classes, giving a common 'property' by which we can determine whether any given object is or is not useful for a particular purpose. The 'real definition,' on the other hand, expresses all the properties of a thing—in fact, it *is* the thing from the intellectual point of view—and is in strong contrast with the nominal definition, which is only a collection of isolated predicates. It refers to an individual considered from the universal point of view; and if applied to a class, it must give not only the properties actually common to all the members of the class (called by Dr. Keynes the 'objective intension'), but also the separate properties of each member, and the inter-relations between the members and their properties. Unfortunately human beings are incapable of making or using such definitions, which involve the Absolute. Nevertheless, it is the business of Philosophy to draw continual attention to the existence of such definitions (Ideas, not merely regulative but concrete), without which progress becomes an unmeaning term.

The next point to consider is this: Do the symbols of Logic—including words in language—stand for real definitions or for nominal? Perhaps we shall get the clearest view of this question by remembering that any term or proposition has reference—whether explicit or otherwise—to three classes of entities which are liable to be confounded¹:—

(1) *Symbols*, including words and sentences. In this class the correlatives of propositions, definitions, and

¹ The risk of confusion is increased by the fact that from one point of view the first two classes are included in the third, and the first is included in the

second. Yet in spite of this we aim at a one-to-one correspondence between the three classes, a paradox leading into the theory of transfinite numbers.

inferences are mechanical rules of substitution exemplified perfectly in Algebra and Symbolic Logic, and with less precision in the laws of linguistic expression, and in the correlation between different languages. The rules would be quite arbitrary were they not justified by reference to (2) and (3). This aspect of language is often overlooked, because in concrete experience the three classes are indissolubly connected.

(2) *Representations*, including percepts, concepts, and judgments, to which the symbols are attached in human minds. To be definite we may refer to any one human mind or to an average consciousness. This class is the field of nominal definitions.

(3) *Real things*, possessing the unity of existence and (we must assume) the diversity that enables them to be symbolized and represented. Here are the objects of real definitions.

If human thought were perfect, there would be a complete correlation—perhaps even identity—between (2) and (3). The fact that there is no perfect correlation has produced the inevitable dualism of modern philosophy, appearing sometimes as an antithesis between mind and matter (which is identified with the third class), sometimes as a separation between the thoughts of man and the thoughts of God. That the dualism in any case is a fact must be admitted by those who are not prepared to assert that every mind is omniscient.

In the three classes above mentioned there is what may be called ‘an *order of symbolization*.’ In an ideal scheme, every member of (1) will symbolize some member¹ of (2), and every member of (2) will again symbolize some definite member of (3). But such a scheme would imply the identity of real and nominal definitions, and is impossible. The fact is that (1) and (2) contain a finite

¹ A class-concept is of course a single member in (2).

number of members, and (3) if not infinite in number, is so practically. We have to be satisfied with a very incomplete correlation.¹

It is now plain that nominal definitions exist in (2), and real definitions (= real things) in (3). In (2) almost everything is abstraction and isolation; in (3) all the terms form parts of the network of the Absolute, and there is no isolation or abstraction. Now consider the assertion "The three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles." In class (2) there exist certain representations corresponding to the terms here used. Thus the term in (2), corresponding to 'triangle' at first, may be only a vague concept arising from the visualized experience of a large number of triangles, or rather a representative image of a definite triangle; and this concept or image by no means represents to consciousness the real definition of a triangle as it exists in (3); in fact, it may have in (3) no correlative except itself regarded as an existing image. It follows that the proposition, strictly speaking, is meaningless unless it deals with the vague concept or image referred to; and in this case it is false, because in apprehending the concept or image first suggested by the word 'triangle,' we are not conscious of a property corresponding to Euc. I. 32, and the concept or image as such must be in consciousness.

Thus, from another point of view, or rather from the same otherwise considered, a non-analytical judgment is found to be an impossibility. This is indeed obvious if we assume a perfect correlation between classes (2) and (3); because in this case any concept completely represents some concrete thing, and therefore contains in its definition all the properties thereof. And though the distinction

¹ In this scheme the falsity of a judgment is conveniently represented as non-existence of a term in (3) corresponding to a term in (1). Also certain unthinkable combinations, as 'a square circle,' imply the non-existence of a correlative in (2) to a term in (1).

commonly made between the two kinds of proposition is suggested by the imperfection of the correlation between (2) and (3), we have found that, in spite of this imperfection, the term 'non-analytical judgment' is, strictly speaking, a misnomer.

C

The argument may also be expressed as follows, using the geometrical example as a fulcrum to avoid abstraction. When Kant asserts that propositions like Euclid I. 32 do not follow from the definition of a triangle, he expresses this truth, that the image of a triangle as immediately given to consciousness (the primitive intuition) does not make the proposition self-evident. But he is quite *wrong in identifying this image with the triangle—or image of the triangle—of which Euc. I. 32 is true*. In order to deduce this proposition, we must, as Kant himself admits, draw a construction; now the figure or image after the construction, imagined or real, is a different figure or image from the one without a construction; and the proposition is meaningless until some construction is made. The primitive image differs from the construction as the abstract differs from the concrete, or the simple from the complex. The whole confusion arises from the fact that we use the same term 'triangle' to represent the primitive image and the complex one. When we say that "'X is A' is a non-analytical proposition," what we really mean is that "'X is A' is false." When we again assert that "'X is A' is a true synthetical proposition," what we mean is that the image or concept called X must be 'abolished' (*aufgehoben*, as Hegel would say) as not being sufficiently concrete for our purposes, and that it must be replaced by a fuller concept Y representing the same outer object in a better way; and

that it is *analytically* true that Y is A. X and Y, however, are almost always merged into a single name: one more example of the effect of language in producing logical illusion !¹

The nominal definition, however, has its use; and the so-called 'non-analytical judgment' has its meaning, though not the one commonly accepted. The use of the nominal definition is like that of the grain of corn—it must die before it can bring forth fruit. It expresses the truth provided we recognize that the 'predicates,' 'properties,' &c., of which it speaks are abstract and isolated representations of entities that are parts of an organic whole. Nominal definitions are the ones that must be used; but progress is only made when their abstract nature is perceived.

I have made no reference to arithmetical judgments or to those involving causality, but the same arguments apply here. If my concept of 12 is such that ' $12 = 7 + 5$ ' is not analytically implied, it follows that I do not know what 12 means; in other words, the concept is untrue, and can then only be regarded as a suggestive symbol, leading me to replace the first concept by a fuller one, which I continue to call by the same name. In like manner, if I do not know the cause or effects and all the relations of a given phenomenon, I cannot be said to know the definition of the phenomenon itself; and with regard to further inquiries, I must consider my experience of it as a symbol by the aid of which I am led to replace the primitive representation by a more complex one, to which it is often convenient to apply the same name, though in many cases a more exact terminology is required.

¹It must be admitted that greater confusion and inconvenience would be introduced if we were to multiply names to avoid logical errors.

REGINALD A. P. ROGERS.

ON A SOURCE OF O'CLERY'S GLOSSARY.

MICHAEL O'CLERY'S Irish Glossary was first published in 1643. Its author, the chief of the Four Masters, has a reputation for scholarship; and his authority is often quoted in determining the meanings of rare words. It is therefore a matter of some interest for the purposes of lexicography to ascertain the sources from which he drew. He himself enumerates in his preface the following authorities:—

1. Amhra Coluim Chille.
2. Agallamh an dá Shúadh.
3. Félire na Náomh (i. e. the Martyrology of Oengus).
4. Félire úi Ghormáin.
5. Leabhar Iomann (i.e. the Book of Hymns).
6. Sanasán.
7. Beatha Phátruic.
8. "Seinscreaptra meamruim 7
9. seinleabhar páipéir ina bfríth mórán d'foclaibh cruaidhe gona míniughadh."
10. Foras Focal.
11. Deirbshiur don Eagna an Éigsi. } See Stokes' *Metrical Glossaries*.
12. "agus urmhor an leabhráin ó sin amach do réir na gluaise do glacadh ón mBáothghalach réumhraite."

O'Clery's ordinary practice is to set down one or more equivalents to the word he is explaining, without alleging any authority. Now and then, however, he adds a quotation to illustrate the usage. A. W. K. Miller, in reprinting the Glossary in the fourth and fifth volumes of the *Revue*

Celtique has indicated the sources from which a number of these quotations are taken. He has not, however (except in a few instances), looked beyond the documents which O'Clery mentions by name. What were the *seinscreaptra meamruim* of which the glossator made use? O'Curry translates this phrase "an ancient Scripture on vellum" (MS. Materials, 177); but what evidence is there for the existence of an Irish version of the Bible prior to the seventeenth century? The word *screaptra* may cover any sort of manuscript. My present object is to show that among these *seinscreaptra* was a copy of the *Dindshenchas*. O'Clery could hardly fail to be acquainted with this work, which would form an important item in the education of any Irish scholar of his epoch. In point of fact, one of the most complete copies of the *Dindshenchas* which we possess, the MS. classed B. 3. 1 of the Stowe Collection, is in the handwriting of his cousin, Peregrine O'Clery. It was written, however, in 1654, eleven years after the publication of the Glossary.

The direct proof that O'Clery made use of the *Dindshenchas* for his Glossary is obtained by identifying a series of his quotations. These are often so brief or of so commonplace a character that it would be impossible to refer them with certainty to any given *locus*. This is especially true of metrical quotations, since Irish verse abounds in hackneyed phrases which constantly recur. I shall therefore begin by adducing a number of instances where there can be no doubt as to the provenance of the lemma. O'Clery's words are in each case given in full, from Miller's reprint in *Rev. Celt.*, corrected by Stokes' collation in *Archiv f. Celt. Lexic.*, I. 348.

1. aice .i. i n-aice. Acall ar aice Teamhair, &c.

This is the first line of the *Dindshenchas* of Acall (or Achall): LL 161 a 44 (Todd Lectures, viii. 46).

2. **aidhne** .i. aos. mar atá aidhne na Bóramha 7 aidhne an dinnseanchais.

Cf. dinds. of Ceilbe, 14 (H 3. 3, p. 35 : Todd Lect. x).

Commaoin rea cur romermais
oirb-si a aidhne in dinnsenchais.

The sense of the couplet seems to be "I am able to make return to you, O guardians (?) of the Dindsenchas."

3. **aighe** .i. cnoc. fuil dam aithne áighe, &c.

This is the first line of the ds. of Bend Boguine (BB 397 a 22).

4. **aradhain uile** .i. droichdhíol. fuair an ghéag áradhain uilc.

From ds. of Liamuin 111 (BB 363 b 37 : Todd Lect. x). LL 153 b 43 reads *fuair in gen*, &c.

5. **asadh** .i. adhannadh no lasadh. don tene ba trén asadh.

From ds. of Mide, 14 (LL 199 b 40 ; Todd Lect. ix. 42) :

Secht mbliadna lána ar lassad
don tenid, ba trén-fassad.

Two MSS., the Book of Húi Maine and Stowe, D. ii. 2, have *trén-asadh* like O'Cl., but this is only a miswriting of *fassad* or *fossad* 'truce.' O'Cl. is merely guessing.

6. **airilleadh** .i. dligeadh. is áirilleadh .i. as dlightheach d'Athairne.

From ds. of Ceilbe, 2 (H. 3. 3, p. 35 ; Todd Lect. x):

Mithidh dham comma Ceilbhe
is airilledh d' Athairne.

These lines, like the rest of the composition to which they belong, are very obscure : Athairne has nothing to do with the legend of Ceilbe. Tradition ascribed to him the authorship of the *Dindshenchas* as a whole. The poem on Ceilbe is a late addition ; so that perhaps the composer

means that this work is "a service to Athairne," or else "property for Athairne": see the Lecan Vocabulary, and Atkinson's Glossary to the Laws, s.v. *airilliud*.

7. **baighle** .i. laogh allaidh, mar atá isin rann :

atchonnarc braicheamh 7 brú
7 baighle eatorrú,
sochaidhe dodhéch an magh
7 bréch aga mharbadh.

From ds. of Brechmag (LL 200 *a*, y-z).

8. **caomaigh** *no* **rochaomhaigh** .i. do chomhóghaidh .i. dochoimhiomlánaidh. oir adeirthear mar so : fear rochaomhaidh na cleasa.

From ds. of Rath Cruachan, 23 (LL 157 *a* 18).

9. **coirreheann** **ciogail** .i. coircheann ghabhas fa gcuairt.

From ds. of Ailech, 14 (LL 181 *a* 14 ; Todd Lect. vii. 42) :

dond ail túargaib Corrchend cicuil torged gletin.

For *cicul* = *cyclus* see Meyer's Contributions; but it seems more likely that it is here a place-name. A second gloss on this line will be found under *toirtenn* : see p. 470, *infra*.

10. **comhghaill** .i. comhgaoil. a Máoilseachlainn mheic Domhnaill do chloinn ingine comhgaill .i. comhgaoil.

These are the opening lines of the ds. of Bóand (YBL, col. 420 = 447 *b* 24 of facs. ; Todd Lect. x. 34). But Comgall is a proper name.

11. **deachair** .i. leanmhain. ris gan a dhuain na dheachair .i. sgél gan a dhuain ina leanmhain.

From ds. of Ceilbe, 8 (see Todd Lect. x). The only copies known to me (H. 3. 3, p. 35, and Stowe, B. iii. 1, p. 48) read *dhúar* for *dhuain*. The meaning is, I think, 'a tale without a stave to divide it'—or, perhaps, 'apart from it.'

In the *Dindshenchas* each prose narrative is usually followed by a metrical version.

12. *deachair* .i. *dearsgughadh*. *dealbh an chruim dór do dheachair*.

From the ds. of Mag Slecht, 48 : see "Voyage of Bran," ii. 303. The true reading is (LL 213 *b* z) :

delb in Chruim d' ór dodechaid,

which Meyer renders "the figure of the Cromm was made of gold." O'Cl.'s reading is found in none of the existing MSS.

13. *dheimmheach* i. *díomháoin*. *nirbh obair dhuine dheimmeich, &c.*

From ds. of Temair iii. 112 (BB. 351 *b*. 19 ; Todd Lect. viii. 22).

14. *dlighidh a dhreach is a dath* .i. *is dearsgaithe no saineamhail a dhreach is a dath*.

From ds. of Nás. 10 (LL 194 *a* 22 ; Todd Lect. x. 48) :

Nás máthair Ibic na n-ech

dligid a drech is a dath.

O'Cl. apparently regards *dligid* as an adjective. But the meaning probably is that the mythical eponym of Naas "claims as hers its contours (lit. 'countenance') and its colours." Cf. *dligid a doss, a derb-chail*, Todd Lect. ix. 58 (ds. of Fid nGabli. 18).

15. *dorr* .i. *fearg*. *do dhruim a dhoirre* .i. *a fheirge*.

From ds. of Ceilbe, 41 (H. 3. 3, p. 35 ; Todd Lect. x.) :

Gadhuis do dhruim a dhoirre

cen saoghal fri sentuinne

d'ingin a dherbráthar dhil

a nemhláthar dho noisigh.

16. *éigen* .i. *dligeadh*. *ní héigen dáoi b a fochmarc, &c.*

From ds. of Ráth Esa (LL 163 *a* 34 ; Todd Lect. ix. 2).

This is merely the common word *écen*, 'need.'

17. *fionn no finn .i. lachd. miach maothbhlethe la muic
fhinn .i. maille re muic lachdmhair mar atá cráin.*

From ds. of Mide, 23 (LL 199 *b* 45 ; Todd Lect. ix. 42).

18. *gearg .i. garg. d'fuil riogh roghearg .i. rogharg.*

From ds. of Loch nDerg, 84 (LL 157 *b* 40) :

d'fuil rig rogerg [na] rachor.

Only LL and H. 3. 3 have the reading *rogerg*.

19. *mac .i. glan. seach ba carrmhogal glan mac .i. ba
glan glan an carbuncas.*

From ds. of Temair iv. 75 (LL 28 *b* 34 ; Todd Lect. viii.
34). The true reading is

sech ba carrmocol glan-balc

ba hór ba hargat uile.

But BB and the Rennes MS. read *glan mac*.

20. *óc .i. fili. innilibh óc .i. iomad na bfhileadh.*

From ds. of Ath Clíath (Dublin) 14 (LL 194 *b* 25 ; Todd
Lect. vii. 20) :

diamsat heol i n-ilib óc.

21. *oscar .i. lingeamhain. Loch Eirne árd a oscar .i. as
ard lingeas sé.*

This is the first line of the ds. of Loch Erne (LL 212 *b*
32).

22. *rinne .i. Eirinn. rí uas rinne .i. rí uas Eirinn.*

From ds. of Temair iv. 41, where H. 3. 3. reads :

Adba ind rí, rí uas rinni.

LL 28 *b* 17 has *rí adranna* : see Todd Lect. viii. 30.

Whatever the correct reading may be, O'Clery's explana-
tion seems mere guess-work.

23. *searthonna .i. eigsi no ealadha. nochar sona a
searthonna.*

From ds. of Ceilbe, 100 : see Todd Lect. x ; H. 3. 3,
p. 35.

24. **toinneamh .i. bás. leacht Tea iar dtoinneamh.**

From ds. of Temair ii. 11 (BB 351 a 6 ; Todd Lect. viii. 6) :

forsmbiad lecht Tea iar tuinnem.

LL 161 b 43 reads *lecht Æda cen tuinnem*.

25. **toimhseach treabhaidh .i. treabh no baile da dtoimsidhi cíos.**

From ds. of Ailech ii. 46 (LL 181 a 43 ; Todd Lect. vii. 46) :

A n-am i ndernad in dindgna, demni dolaid,
tomsech trebaid, in tres amser torsech domain.

26. **toirtenn gleidin .i. as tóirtheann a ngleodh é.**

From ds. of Ailech ii. 14 : see Todd Lect. vii. 42 ;
LL 181 a 14 has

dond ail tuargaib Corrcend cicuil torged gletin.

H. 3. 3 and Stowe B. iii. 1 read *tortenn (toirrteann)* for *torged*.

In all these instances there can be no reasonable doubt as to the source whence the lemma was taken ; and they are enough to establish my proposition that the *Dindshenchas* was used by O'Clery in his Glossary. That being so, there is every probability that in a number of other instances he is drawing on the same source, although the lemma is in itself so brief or so commonplace that it might equally well have been borrowed from some other document. For example, the words *glan in mod*, which occur in ds. of Mide, 7 (see *mod*, *infra*), form a tag which may very well be found elsewhere ; but when it appears that O'Clery has certainly quoted two other lines from the same composition (see *asadh* and *fionn*, *supra*), it is natural to infer that this lemma also is drawn from the same source. Here follows a list of such cases as complete as I have been able to make it. I have no doubt that many more have escaped my observation.

1. **breagha Tea** .i. Teamhair bhreagh.

Cf. ds. of Temair ii. 17 (Todd Lect. viii. 6; LL 161 b 47) :

Brega Tea, treb tuilltech.

2. **cédach** .i. brat .cédach Chriomthainn.

Cf. prose ds. of Dún Crimthainn, Rev. Celt. xv. 332.

imon cétaigh Crimthainn.

3. **ceang do rói** .i. chéimnigheas cath, no téid a gcath.

Probably a miswriting of *cengta rói*, ds. of Ochan 57 (BB 356 a 47: Todd Lect. ix. 40).

4. **ceird chrúi** .i. ceird imdheargtha no ceird bhásaighthe.

Cf. ds. of Maistiu, 19 (LL 195 b 6) :

aided Grísi cen cheird chrúi.

Cf. also ds. of Sligi Dala, 85 (LL 155 b 48) :

mac Eogabail co ceird chrúi.

5. **cudal** .i. saoth no olc. bá cudal .i. bá saoth, no ba holc.

Cf. ds. of Dun Gabail, 64 (Todd Lect. x.) :

ba cutul in comthochmarc.

6. **darriogha** .i. ós rioghaibh.

Cf. ds. of Druimm nDairbrech, 34 (Todd Lect. ix. 48: LL 192 a 33) :

mór a recht-blad dar rígaib.

7. **dlomhaisín** .i. milleadh. baoi ag dlomhaisín na hoibhre .i. ag milleadh.

Cf. ds. of Ráth Esa 27 (LL 163 a 39) :

Midir ocon doloim sin
oc admilliud na opre.

Other texts read *dlomad*, *dolmad*, *dolum* : see Todd Lect. ix. 4.

8. **doithir** .i. doidhealbh . ba doithir an fear .i. ba doidhealbhdha.

Cf. ds. of Ráth Cruachan, 29 (LL 157 *a* 20).

ba dothfer in fer rosfuc.

9. **dolas** .i. doicheall. nír bho dolas .i. nír bho doichleach.

Cf. ds. of Temair iv. 30 (LL 28 *b* 11 : Todd Lect. viii. 30):

do dínib nírbo doloss.

10. **ealcmhar** .i. meirbh. nír bhó healcmhar.

Cf. ds. of Brug na Bóinde i. 50: BB 354 *a* 20 reads:—

nirbu elcmar ar gach coir.

For the variants see Todd Lect. ix. 14.

11. **earca rainn** .i. dobheireadh ba ar rannaibh.

Cf. ds. of Achall, 7 (LL 161 *a* 47):

do chumaid Eirc, erctha raínd.

Mistranslated in Todd Lect. viii. 47: the words mean 'which verses declare.'

12. **eisibh** .i. ibhe. asaneisibh .i. asaribh.

Cf. ds. of Brug na Bóinde, ii. 43 (Todd Lect. ix. 20: LL 211 *a* 2):

asa n-essib loimm lúath lib.

13. **fualas no fialas** .i. muinntear. go lion a fualais .i. fialais .i. a muinntire.

Cf. prose ds. of Duibhind, Rev. Celt. xv. 326, and of Druim Cliab, Rev. Celt. xvi. 33, *co lín a fualais*.

14. **fríth** .i. édáil. ba fó fríth .i. ba maith an édáil.

Cf. ds. of Brug na Bóinde ii. 22 (Todd Lect. ix. 18: LL 164 *b* 43):

fri tócbáil tréith, ba fó fríth.

15. **fulla** .i. brég. gan fulla .i. gan bhreig.

Cf. ds. of Ráth Ésa 74 (Todd Lect. ix. 6: BB 353 *b* 36):

Ó Echdaig, rád cen fulla.

16. **galma** .i. crúas. gan galma ngaire .i. gan crúas 7 gan gaire.

Cf. ds. of Brug na Bóinde ii. 10 (Todd Lect. ix. 18):
forsind leirg cen galmai ngaire.

17. **greit** .i. gaisgeadhach. ba greit gháidh .i. ba gaisgeadhach a ngabadh.

Cf. ds. of Móin Gái Glais 15 (Todd Lect. ix. 64: BB 358 b 30):
ba greit gáid cen dil im dul.

The words mean 'he was a champion at need.'

18. **lenne liach** .i. leicne láoch, no aigthe láoch.

Cf. ds. of Alend 21 (Todd. Lect. ix. 80; LL 162 a 46):

Luchdond letrad leicne liach.

Lenne seems due to a misprint.

19. **long** .i. leaba. longa crédhuma .i. leapthacha.

Cf. ds. of Inber Ailbine 36 (Todd Lect. ix. 28; BB 355 b 2):

fon fairge cen tonna tra
for nói longa créduma.

But the phrase occurs also in *Tochmarc Becfola*.

20. **modh** .i. fear. glan an modh .i. glan an fear.

Cf. ds. of Mide, 7 (Todd. Lect. ix. 42; LL 199 b 36):

cía gass gluair garg, glan in mod.

21. **ród súla Miodhair** .i. an turchar tugadh ar shúil Mhiodhair.

See prose ds. of Brug na Bóinde (Rev. Celt. xv. 292)
rout sula Midhir.

22. **rún** .i. cealg. tre run .i. tre cheilg.

Cf. ds. of Ochan, 26 (Todd Lect. ix. 38):

dia ngæt forsin rian tria rún (cen rún LL 154 a 25).

23. *scéile* .i. *truaighe*. *ba mor scéile* .i. *ba mór*. an *truaighe*.

Cf. ds. of *Inber Cichmaine*, 14 (BB 405 a 42) :

ba mudach, *ba mor scele*.

24. *sní* .i. *ón sineadh*. *roda sní* .i. *do shín*.

Cf. ds. of *Ochan*, 39 (Todd Lect. ix. 38 ; BB 356 a 35) :

Lagin, *Mumain*, *rodasní*.

Cf. also ds. of *Slige Dála*, 80 (LL 155 b 46) :

is rempu sain rodasní.

We have then twenty-six certain and twenty-four probable cases of quotations drawn from the *Dindshenchas*. This makes it probable that a great many of the words for which no authority is alleged have been extracted from the same collection. If we could trace these, we could judge better the correctness of the meanings assigned to them by O'Clery. There can be no doubt that he has in many instances based his explanation on a single passage. That can at once be proved by referring to the articles *Comhghaill*, *dlighidh*, *mac*, *rinne*, quoted above. In these cases it is clear, first, that O'Clery is glossing a single passage, and secondly, that he did not understand the words he had before him, and that his explanation is in fact mere guesswork. It is, of course, impossible to say with certainty that a word which is glossed without illustration is taken from the *Dindshenchas* rather than from some other source ; yet in some cases this can be predicated with tolerable confidence. Take, for instance, the *Dindshenchas* of *Ceilbe*. This is quite a late composition. In the copy of the *Dindshenchas* made by Peregrine O'Clery (Stowe Collection, B 3. 1), it is attributed to Maurice Mac Fadden, who died, according to the Four Masters, in 1543. It is an example of the deliberately obscure style of composition which was affected more and more by the erudite and pedantic Irish verse-writers of the fifteenth

and sixteenth centuries. That it was not intelligible even to O'Clery, is sufficiently obvious to anybody who tries to read the poem with the assistance of his glossary. It has been shown that four of his quotations (s. v. *aidhne*, *airilleadh*, *deachair*, *dorr*) are taken from this poem, which proves that he had studied it with care. The third stanza runs as follows (see Todd Lect. x) :

*Frecnairc fri hecnairc anois,
a lucht imdhenma in fenchuis,
Ceilbhe gan chur ic commai,
nochar sona a sherthonnai.*

The last line of this quatrain is quoted by O'Clery s.v. *searthonna*. The other words italicised occur in his Glossary, but without illustration. Is it not natural to conjecture that he took them from this locus? His glosses are :—

econaire .i. an aimsir docuaidh thort.
freacnaire .i. an aimsir atá do lathair.
feanchas .i. seanchas.

Again, line 100 of this poem reads—

budh é [t]h' aithe ar m'eiscebtus.

This is almost certainly the source of O'Clery's gloss

esceptus .i. cur in aghaidh.

Here follow some cases to which the same reasoning may be applied.

We have already seen that he quotes s.v. *baighle* the ds. of Brechmag. The words *braichem* and *bréch* occur in the same stanza, and both these are separately glossed by him, but without illustration.

braicheamh .i. damh allaidh.
bréch .i. cu allaidh.

For the word *libhearn* he gives the correct interpretation *long* = Latin *liburna*; but he adds a second gloss—

libhearn .i. clann no crodh.

This gloss seems due to a confusion with *libedain*, to which it is rightly applied:

libheadhain .i. cruidh no clanna.

The ground of the confusion may be found in the fact that both words occur in the ds. of Loch Rí, lines 12 and 48:

co libernaib lán-crodaich (LL 212 a 32),

and

berass úad ar libedain (LL 212 a 50).

Here again is a gloss which seems to rest on a corrupt lection:—

eos no adeós .i. sloinnfeadh no inneosad.

This may have arisen from ds. of Boand ii. 3, where the true reading is

atcós duit a máil Mide;

but YBL has *adeoss*, and another MS., 'E,' has *ateoss*. See Todd Lect. x. 34.

Similarly, the gloss

oirearghlan .i. aoibhinnghlan

may be traced to the ds. of Ráth Esa, lines 15, 23, 89, where in each case LL reads *aireglan*; but most other MSS. have *airerglan*: see Todd Lect. ix. 2 and 8.

In line 43 of the same poem LL has

ba dál amnas fuachalda;

but all the other MSS. read (with minor variations)

ba scél n-irdairc nuacholla.

See Todd Lect. ix. 4. Hence perhaps O'Clery's gloss:

nuacholla .i. uathbhásach.

Again, at line 30 of this poem, some MSS. have

doluid cóica fer fuilngech,

while others read *furmech*: O'Clery may have drawn from this line his gloss

fuilngeach .i. sleaghach no sgiathach.

The gloss

midhé .i. droichtheine

seems clearly to refer to the etymologising ds. of Mide, where the name is explained as meaning "evil smoke."

Line 27 runs

Is mí-dé tucad dún tair.

See Todd Lect. ix. 44; LL 149 *b* 47.

In ds. of Inber Ailbine, line 22 (Todd Lect. ix. 28), only one manuscript, "H," has preserved what is undoubtedly the true reading:

dar sál fairge sroth-sáeba.

As O'Clery has certainly used this poem several times, this is probably the source of his gloss:

srothsaobha .i. saobh choire .i. coire tuaithbhil bhios ar muiribh no ar uisgeadhaibh.

He seems to regard the word as a substantive; but it is better to take it as a compound adjective.

On the same ground we may suppose that lines 25 and 43 of this poem

ráidset ris tre gle-alt nglan,

and

ba so-alt sochlaind ní suail,

are O'Clery's authority for the glosses

glealt .i. glain innsce, no innsge ghlan,

and

soalt .i. soiléim .i. léim maith.

In line 55 of the same poem,

cen dul co mná tar sruth slecht,

the last word is clearly an adjective. O'Clery, however, writes, having, no doubt, this passage under his eye,

sruth sleacht .i. lorg na srothann.

At line 95, BB has

fi feb fuilliat fer co facht.

The true reading is perhaps *fuiliath* (see Todd Lect. ix. 34; but I do not understand the line). This is probably the source of O'Clery's gloss:

fuiliat .i. fuileach.

The two glosses

caireamhain .i. grésaighthe

and

ciormhaire .i. fúcaire

may be due to the single line in the ds. of Temair iii. 174,

cairemain is cirmairi.

See Todd Lect. viii. 26.

In the ds. of Brug na Bóinde ii. 48 (Todd Lect. ix. 20), the balance of MS. authority is in favour of the reading

diambói thúait for baethla báith.

But some texts read *baethbla*; hence perhaps O'Clery's

baothbla .i. baothbhaile.

Finally, the following rare compounds may probably have been found by O'Clery in the *Dindshenchas*:—

cle .i. olc .clémhana .i. olc urchóid no adgall.

Cf. ds. of Ard Macha, 68 (BB 401 b 4).

ropo clé-mana in marc-slúag.

crín-bhriathrach .i. briscbhriathrach.

Cf. ds. of Ard Macha 44 (BB 401 *a* 41).

do chosnum cruinn crínbriathraig.

cruachbhas .i. deargbhas.

Cf. ds. of Tipra Sengarmna 14 (LL 197 *a* 59):

i nderna crúachbás Crochduind.

fiodhrubha .i. muine 7 fiodh .i. cumasg droighnigh 7 coilleadh no crann tre naroile.

Cf. ds. of Fornocht 10 (Todd Lect. x.; LL 193 *a* 39):

ba fál is ba fídruba.

gairseicle .i. gearrsáoghal.

Cf. ds. of Cend Febrat 64 (BB 376, top margin).

a glé-meth no a gar-secle.

glasmhagh .i. glasmhuir.

Cf. ds. of Bend Boirche ii. 3 (BB 403 *a* 22).

glasmag na rón ris anair.

sithfhir .i. fir sheithearrdha .i. fir laidire.

Cf. ds. of Fornocht 31 (Todd Lect. x.; LL 193 *a* 51).

The word *fionnfili* is glossed .i. *mac finn*. It is probably only a miswriting of *find-bile*, a compound which occurs in ds. of Ráth Esa, 81 (Todd Lect. ix. 8) *gáid Midir in find-bile*. None of the MSS., however, present *fionnfili* in this passage.

O'Clery does not seem to have followed any one of the MSS. of the *Dindshenchas* which now survive. As has been

shown, he used the ds. of Ceilbe, a composition which is found (so far as I know) in only two MSS.—H. 3. 3 (Trinity College) and B. III. 1 (Stowe Collection). The latter of these was written subsequent to the publication of the Glossary, so that there remains only H. 3. 3. In several of the excerpts quoted above, O'Clery's text agrees with this MS. against all or most of the rest: see under *gearg*, *rinne*, *toirtenn*, *srothsaoba*. But, on the other hand, in the quotations given under *mac* and *asadh*, O'Clery differs from H. 3. 3. Either, therefore, he consulted more than one copy of the *Dindshenchas*, or, if he worked on one codex only, it must have closely resembled H. 3. 3, and (as it contained the ds. of Ceilbe) it must have been written between 1543 or so (see p. 474) and 1643.

E. J. GWYNN.

STUDIES IN ATTIC LAW.

II.¹

THE ANTIDOSIS.

§ 1. *Was an exchange of property the essence of the antidosis?*

THE speaker of the oration *Against Phaenippus* ([Dem.] 42) begins by invoking many blessings, first upon the court, and then upon Solon, who had established the law which regulated the ἀντιδόσεις. According to this law an Athenian upon whom a liturgy had been imposed was empowered to present any citizen whom he chose to regard as richer than himself with the option of performing the liturgy or exchanging properties; unless, of course, the citizen thus attacked could prove that he was legally exempt. There seems no reason to question, as Fränkel does, the attribution of the law to Solon. Indeed, it was only at a comparatively early period that an enactment pregnant with so much inconvenience and vexatiousness could have been put upon the Athenian statute-book. While money was still extremely scarce, commerce still undeveloped, and land and the produce of land the sole measures of wealth, it could conceivably be regarded as rational to permit one man to say to another: "I think

¹ The first of these *Studies* appeared as a review of Mr. Wyse's *Isaeus* in *Hermathena* for 1906, under the title *Isaeus and Attic Law*.

that you are richer than I : either discharge this liturgy that has been imposed upon me, or take my estate and give me yours." Even a democracy has limits to its *ἀναιμία* ; and that the antidosis, so perfectly logical and so completely absurd, could have been introduced when Athens had become a comparatively great commercial state, is sheerly incredible.

The high antiquity of the institution being acknowledged, it cannot be doubted that the word *antidosis* in its original signification implied an actual exchange of properties. Had it entirely lost this meaning by the fourth century B.C. ? The question has been warmly discussed : it is answered in the negative by Boeckh, Busolt, Caillemet, Gilbert, Illing, Lipsius, Thalheim, Thumser, and Vollbrecht ; in the affirmative by Beauchet, Blaschke, Dittenberger, Fränkel, and Lécrivain. Dittenberger was the first to put forward this view, which he did in a dissertation published in 1872 ; the various arguments in its favour have been collected by Beauchet in the third volume of *L'Histoire du droit privé de la République Athénienne* (1897). Since *affirmanti non neganti incumbit probatio* is a maxim here clearly applicable, I propose to state and consider these arguments in what follows.

In the first place, great stress is laid on the difficulties and injustices attending a transference of debts. A perusal of Beauchet's own chapter on *Transmission of Obligations* (vol. iv., pp. 536-544) will show that the difficulties are purely imaginary ; the injustices, if any, may be reckoned among the hardships which have always attended those who go a-borrowing. In the next place, it is argued that an exchange of patrimonies would involve the substitution of one family for another : " Le patrimoine étant intimement lié au culte domestique, comprendrait-on qu'il fût l'objet d'une transmission distincte ? " asks Beauchet. The simplest answer is to refer M. Beauchet to his fourth

volume, where the rules governing contracts of sale are set forth with admirable lucidity. In the third place, much ingenuity is spent on elaborating a line of argument which Fränkel, for instance, introduces thus :—

Nicht weniger ungeheuerlich wie in theoretischer Hinsicht muss eine solche Einrichtung aber auch nach ihren praktischen Folgen erscheinen, sobald man einen ernsthaften Versuch macht, sich dieselben vorzustellen.

One resulting *Ungeheuerlichkeit* suggested is that a farmer might find himself a banker. If he did, we can only express our sympathy with the bank's customers—and point out that no proof of a law's non-existence is to be derived from the possibility of its harsh operation on some occasions. Were this mode of argument permissible, one shudders to think what the writers of the fortieth century will make out of the present laws of England. Apart from this consideration, I hope to show that such a case was in practice impossible of occurrence.

We turn now to an entirely different and much more serious question : Is Dittenberger's view supported by the texts ? The most important of these is the account of the trierarchy forced upon Demosthenes when he was suing his guardians. The orator says in the second speech *Against Aphobus* (28. 17) :—

ὥς γὰρ τὰς δίκας ταύτας ἔμελλον εἰσιέναι κατ' αὐτῶν, ἀντίδοσιν ἐπ' ἐμὲ παρεσκεύασαν, ἵν' εἰ μὲν ἀντιδοίην, μὴ ἐξείη μοι πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀντιδικεῖν, ὥς καὶ τῶν δικῶν τούτων τοῦ ἀντιδόντος γιγνομένων, εἰ δὲ μηδὲν τούτων ποιοίην, ἵν' ἐκ βραχείας οὐσίας λητουργῶν παντάπασιν ἀναιρεθείην. καὶ τοῦτ' αὐτοῖς ὑπηρέτησε Θρασύλοχος ὁ 'Αναγυράσιος· ᾧ τούτων οὐδὲν ἐνθυμηθεὶς ἀντέδωκα μὲν, ἀπέκλεισα δ' ὥς διαδικασίας τευξόμενος· οὐ τυχὼν δὲ ταύτης, τῶν χρόνων ὑπογύων ὄντων, ἵνα μὴ στερηθῶ τῶν δικῶν, ἀπέτεισα τὴν λητουργίαν ὑποθεὶς τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ τὰ μαντοῦ πάντα, βουλόμενος εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσελθεῖν τὰς πρὸς τουτουσὶ δίκας.

Along with this passage we must read the account of the same transaction given in the speech *Against Midias* (21. 78-81), where the points of agreement and of variation should be carefully noted :—

ἦνίκα τὰς δίκας ἔλαχον τῶν πατρώων τοῖς ἐπιτρόποις, μεираκύλλιον ὦν κομιδῇ . . . , τότε μοι μελλουσῶν εἰσιέναι τῶν δικῶν εἰς ἡμέραν ὥσπερὶ τετάρτην ἢ πέμπτην, εἰσεπήδησαν ἀδελφὸς ὁ τούτου καὶ οὗτος (*Midias*) εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν ἀντιδιδόντες τριηραρχίαν. τοῦνομα μὲν δὴ παρέσχεν ἐκεῖνος, καὶ ἦν ὁ ἀντιδιδούς Θρασύλοχος· τὰ δ' ἔργα πάντα καὶ τὰ πραττόμεν' ἦν ὑπὸ τούτου. 79. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν κατέσχισαν τὰς θύρας τῶν οἰκημάτων, ὥς αὐτῶν ἤδη γιγνομένας κατὰ τὴν ἀντίδοσιν· εἴτα τῆς ἀδελφῆς ἐναντίον κόρης ἔτι καὶ παιδὸς οὔσης ἐφθέγγοντ' αἰσχρὰ καὶ τοιαῦτα, οἳ ἂν ἄνθρωποι τοιοῦτοι φθέγγαιντο . . . , καὶ τὴν μητέρα κἀμὲ καὶ πάντας ἡμᾶς ῥητὰ κᾶρρητα κακὰ ἐξῆς εἶπον· ὁ δ' οὖν δεινότατον καὶ οὐ λόγος, ἀλλ' ἔργον ἦδη· τὰς δίκας ὥς αὐτῶν οὔσας ἠφίεσαν τοῖς ἐπιτρόποις. 80. καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν μὲν παλαιά, ὅμως δέ τινες μνημονεύειν ὑμῶν οἶομαι· ὅλη γὰρ ἡ πόλις τὴν ἀντίδοσιν καὶ τὴν ἐπιβουλήν τότε ταύτην καὶ τὴν ἀσέλγειαν ᾗσθετο. κἀγὼ τότε παντάπασιν ἔρημος ὦν καὶ νέος κομιδῇ, ἵνα μὴ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἐπιτρόποις ἀποστερηθείην, . . . δίδωμ' εἴκοσι μνᾶς τούτοις, ὅσου τὴν τριηραρχίαν ἦσαν μεμισθωκότες. τὰ μὲν δὴ τόθ' ὑβρίσματα τούτων εἰς ἐμὲ ταῦτ' ἐστίν. 81. δίκην δὲ τούτῳ λαχὼν ὕστερον τῆς κακηγορίας εἶλον ἐρήμην· οὐ γὰρ ἀπήντα.

For the point now under discussion the crucial words are : ὥς καὶ τῶν δικῶν τούτων τοῦ ἀντιδόντος γιγνομένων, 28. 17; ὥς αὐτῶν ἤδη γιγνομένας κατὰ τὴν ἀντίδοσιν, 21. 79; and ὥς αὐτῶν οὔσας, *ibid.* Under certain circumstances, it was a piece of the procedure in an antidosis for each party to sequestrate all the storehouses and property of the other under seal, in order that it might not be dealt with by its owner in any way which could diminish the value of the estate. It was by reference to this rule that Dittenberger and his adherents tried to save their theory in presence of the three ὥς-clauses. They allege that the words ὥς καὶ τῶν δικῶν κτλ. mean 'inasmuch as these suits fall under the power of the other side,' which in turn must be inter-

preted as meaning that they are by law suspended till the antidosis has been settled. But is it conceivable that, if Demosthenes meant, 'since these suits cannot be proceeded with while an antidosis is pending,' he would have said, 'since these suits become the other side's'? Let us grant this for the moment, and consider the effect on the translation of the concluding words in 21. 79. These must mean, 'since my suit could not be proceeded with while the antidosis was pending, they were for quashing it.' One cannot but exclaim, ἄρ' οὐχ ὕβρις τάδ'; and look to see the fate of the remaining clause, ὥς αὐτῶν ἤδη γιγνομένου κατὰ τὴν ἀντίδοσιν. In the case of the other two clauses, it has been maintained that the property of Demosthenes does become the other side's; but that mode of dealing with the genitive will not do here. It would be impossible to represent Demosthenes as saying, 'they broke down the doors, since they were sequestered while the antidosis was pending.' Accordingly the genitive with γίγνεσθαι is here permitted to have its ordinary meaning, ὥς is translated by 'as though,' and ἤδη, which of course must not be temporal, is used in the same idiomatic way, we are told, as in ὁ δ' οὖν δεινύτατον καὶ οὐ λόγος, ἀλλ' ἔργον ἤδη, a few lines below.

Putting aside the question of the true interpretation of these passages for the present, let us turn now to some other statements involving difficulties for those who deny the possibility of an actual exchange of properties. In the speech *Against Phaenippus* ([Dem.] 42), the speaker is attempting to show cause why a liturgy imposed upon himself should be transferred to his opponent. The latter, in making a return (ἀπόφασις) of his debts and assets, had included among the debts his mother's dowry, whereupon the speaker asked indignantly (§ 27) :—

διὰ τί γὰρ ἐγώ, Φαίνιππε, μενούσης μοι τῆς μητρὸς ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ καὶ ζώσης καὶ προῖκ' ἐπενεγκαμένης, οὐκ ἀπογράφω τὴν προῖκα χρέως αὐτῇ,

οὐδὲ παρακρούομαι τοὺς δικαστάς, ἀλλ' ἐὼ μετέχειν τῶν ἐμαντοῦ τὴν μῆτέρα, ἂν τε τὴν Φαινίππου ἂν τε τὴν ἐμαντοῦ ἔχω οὐσίαν; ὅτι οἱ νόμοι ταῦτα κελεύουσιν.

This is explained away as being a mere sophism intended to discredit Phaenippus in the eyes of the judges as an unnatural son. Undoubtedly it is: but a sophism, above all things, must be plausible; and where would the plausibility of this sophism be, if an exchange of properties between the speaker and Phaenippus were impossible? Dittenberger himself was much troubled by the passage. His followers, however, think him needlessly scrupulous, though they are not quite agreed as to how the offending words should be tortured. Another method (proposed by Blaschke and accepted by Lécrivain and Beauchet) is to explain them as meaning 'whether I am rich like Phaenippus or poor like myself.' It is, of course, impossible to prove that the composer of the speech, who was anything but a stylist, could not have intended to express this meaning in the words quoted; but would anyone really believe it, εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων?

However, § 19 of the same speech cannot be explained away at all. The speaker says there that he was and is willing to give all he possesses in exchange for a mere portion of the property of Phaenippus. Dittenberger describes this as a 'Vorschlag zu einem Vergleich, wie er vor der richterlichen Entscheidung natürlich zwischen den Parteien zulässig war'; and adds: 'für das, was in Folge des Richterspruchs zu geschehen hatte, beweist also der Fall gar nichts.' This latter statement I regard as correct, but I maintain that the former is equivalent to a complete surrender of Dittenberger's position. Let me remind the reader of the first step taken by an Athenian citizen who had recourse to the antidosis procedure in order to get rid of a liturgy imposed upon him. Accompanied

by a number of witnesses, he visited the property of some other citizen to whom, as being richer than himself, he asserted that the liturgy should be transferred, and went on to make a careful inspection of the property, and to put his seal on those portions of it which could be thus treated, his own property being of course liable to similar inspection and sequestration by his opponent. If this was done with a view to an exchange of properties, then the Athenian antidosis was really an ἀντίδοσις τῶν χρημάτων, and the ground is cut away from under Dittenberger's feet. Hence he was compelled to interpret in some other way the procedure just described. As Fränkel puts it in the brilliant essay which appeared in the eighteenth volume of *Hermes*,

“die gegenseitige Beschlagnahme des Eigenthums durch die Parteien ist nach Dittenberger lediglich eine processualische Procedur zum Zwecke der Beweisaufnahme. Da es für die Verpflichtung zur Liturgie entscheidend ist, welche der beiden Parteien bei der Einleitung der Antidosis den höheren, welche den geringeren Vermögensstand hatte, so ist ein rechtliches Interesse vorhanden, dass während des Verfahrens der beiderseitige Besitzstand keine Aenderung erfährt, dass die Beweismittel intact erhalten werden.”

This ingenious and plausible explanation, the truth of which is for Dittenberger's position an absolute necessity, is, I venture to assert, demonstrably false. The fell hand of Time has left us accounts of two ἀντιδόσεις, and of two only — those, namely, in which Demosthenes and Phaenippus were concerned; and, curiously enough, in one case our account comes from the person to whom it was sought to transfer the liturgy, while in the other it is given by the person seeking to get rid of that burden. Demosthenes describes minutely his actions and his very thoughts, and nowhere alludes to that visitation of Thrasylochus'

property which was yet on Dittenberger's view absolutely necessary to his success in the *διαδικασία*.¹ The opponent of Phaenippus says definitely that the latter only met him twice between his own visitation and the trial, and in describing what happened on each occasion makes not the faintest allusion to a visitation on the part of Phaenippus ([Dem.] 42. 2, 11, 14). Yet Phaenippus contested the action on the ground that he was the poorer man, and, if Dittenberger be right, came into court without a most important, or rather an indispensable, piece of evidence. Stranger still, his opponent does not attempt to make any capital out of Phaenippus' neglect of the alleged 'processualische Procedur zum Zwecke der Beweisaufnahme'; although obviously, if the visitation had really been what Dittenberger says it was, its neglect would have put the party guilty thereof out of court on the spot. For it would have shown him to be so convinced of his own superior wealth that he looked on the visitation of his opponent's property as sheer waste of time.

It follows irresistibly that Dittenberger, Fränkel, Beauchet, and Lécrivain are wrong, and that the visitations were made with a view not to a legal contest, but to an exchange of property. Now, when Dittenberger acknowledges (see above, p. 486) that [Dem.] 42. 19 is to be taken literally of such an exchange, he has unconsciously surrendered the very point that his essay was written to defend. It is useless for him to say that in this instance the exchange was merely a 'Vorschlagzueinem Vergleich': no proposal for an amicable settlement would be described by the words *ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ πρότερον προεκαλεσάμην Φαίνιππον*. Written out in full, they mean and can only mean: 'I have a right to demand the whole of Phaenippus' property in exchange for mine, if he refused the liturgy;

¹ Curtius' attempt (*Gr. Gesch.* 3^b. mentioned further on. 557) to find it in *ἀπέκλεισα* will be

but I was so convinced of his superior wealth that I challenged him to take all my property, including even such as I was not legally bound to surrender, and leave me only a portion of his, whereupon I would take the liturgy on my shoulders.'

For the sake of completeness, I propose now to consider the other passages which have figured in the discussion of this question. The first I take occurs in Dem. 20. 40 (the speech *Against the Law of Leptines*):—

καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ὅπως οὐκ ἀντιδώσει τῷ Λεύκωνί τις, ἂν βούληται, δύναμαι σκοπούμενος εὐρεῖν. χρήματα μὲν γάρ ἐστιν αἰεὶ παρ' ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ, κατὰ τὸν δὲ νόμον τοῦτον, ἐάν τις ἐπ' αὐτ' ἔλθῃ, ἢ στερήσεται τούτων ἢ λητουργεῖν ἀναγκασθήσεται. ἔστι δ' οὐ τὸ τῆς δαπάνης μέγιστον ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὴν δωρεῖαν ὑμᾶς ἀφηρῆσθαι νομίζει.¹

The words ἢ στερήσεται κτλ. have an ugly look for the supporters of the newer theory. They get over them by urging three considerations: (1) it would be absurd to propose an exchange of property to the Lord of Bosphorus; (2) the words mean merely that, if Leucon refused to discharge the liturgy after a heliastic decision had assigned it to him, his property in Athens would be confiscated; (3) in any case, Demosthenes says not a word here about *exchange* of property, but only about its *loss*: 'ist denn der Begriff des Güterverlustes, von dem Demosthenes allein spricht, identisch mit dem Begriffe des Gütertausches?' The first of these arguments is obviously beside the point. To the third Thumser replied: 'Fränkels Einwurf wiegt nicht schwer, da nach Demosthenes' Darstellung dem bedeutenden Vermögen Leukons in Attika gegenüber, um das es sich hier lediglich handelt, das verhältnismässig geringe Vermögen seiner Provokanten eben nicht in Betracht käme.' But I do not know that

¹ Leucon was the ruler of Bosphorus. Athenians had conferred upon him In return for commercial favours the citizenship and ἀτέλεια.

there is any ground whatever for Thumser's assumption as to the amount of Leucon's property in Athens. The right reply to Fränkel is, I think, that Leucon, by accepting the offered exchange, would really lose his Attic property, and might easily receive instead something—say a farm or a manufactory—which would be in his case quite valueless. The second argument was rejected by Thalheim on the ground that it involved the transposition of the two κ -clauses; but, though this is strictly accurate, Fränkel is perhaps justified in girding at his opponent's 'Gefühl für logische Correctheit.' On no theory of the antidosis can the words of Demosthenes be regarded as describing fully what would have happened in the event supposed by him; nor should we expect anything else, if we remember that he was making a speech, not delivering a law lecture. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the translation 'his money will be confiscated' is absolutely impossible. Such conduct towards a sovereign prince would have aroused his unbounded indignation, and I cannot believe that Demosthenes would have been content with the words that follow as an expression of Leucon's feelings. Furthermore, it is the orator's cue to assume that the Bosporan prince will behave, *quâ* citizen of Athens, with entire obedience to Attic law—otherwise his whole argument against the proposed measure must have pursued a totally different course, in so far as Leucon was concerned. That being so, the new translation of $\sigma\tau\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\alpha\iota$ is at once condemned, for it implies that the prince will obstinately refuse to play the part of a law-abiding citizen, even to the extent of drawing upon himself the extreme wrath of the sovereign people.

There is one more argument to be derived from this passage, which I think is by itself fatal to the theory of Dittenberger and his school, and has yet, so far as I know, been overlooked. If that theory were correct—if the

antidosis did not contemplate an exchange of property—Demosthenes would not and could not have said, *εάν τις ἐπ' αὐτ' ἔλθῃ*. Here *αὐτά* = *τὰ χρήματα*, and *ἐπ' αὐτά* means *ad res petendas*, a phrase as singularly applicable under the old theory as it is inapplicable under the new.

The next passage which requires consideration occurs in a speech written by Lysias (3. 20):—

Σίμων δ' οὕτοσί, ὁ πάντων τῶν κακῶν αἴτιος γενόμενος, τὸν μὲν ἄλλον χρόνον ἡσυχίαν ἦγε δεδιὼς περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἐπειδὴ δὲ δίκας ἰδίας ᾗσθετο κακῶς ἀγωνισάμενον ἐξ ἀντιδόσεως, καταφρονήσας μου τολμηρῶς εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀγῶνά με κατέστησεν.

Gilbert says: 'I cannot consider *δίκας ἰδίας ἐξ ἀντιδόσεως* to be anything else than legal processes connected with claims obtained by the exchange of properties.' Fränkel, on the other hand, asks:

"Warum sollen wir aber nicht gerichtliche Entscheidungen über die Leistung von Liturgien verstehen, wie sie im Laufe von vier Jahren mehrmals gegen den Sprecher in Folge einer Antidosis ergangen sein konnten, sei es, dass er sie angeboten hatte, sei es, dass sie ihm angeboten war? Der Kläger hatte nach der Darstellung des Sprechers erst dann gegen ihn vorzugehen gewagt, als er sein Ansehen durch jene ihm ungünstigen Entscheidungen geschmälert glaubte, indem er hoffte, dass die Richter von vornherein gegen den Sprecher eingenommen sein und ihn um so eher verurtheilen würden."

For several reasons I think this explanation of the passage must be rejected. In the first place, *ἀντιδόσεως* is singular, and to Fränkel's theory the plural is indispensable. In the second place, it is incredible that the speaker would then refer in such an off-hand way to these *δίκαι*, especially if his ill-success in them had encouraged Simo to think that he would be prejudiced thereby in the eyes of his judges. In the third place, the speaker actually makes

a merit (§ 47) of his behaviour as regards liturgies, and there seems no reason to doubt what is said about Midias' discharge of a liturgy ἐξ ἀντιδόσεως by Demosthenes (21.156): οὐ χάριν οὐδεμίαν αὐτῷ δέηπου δικαίως ἂν τις ἔχοι. It might also be urged that Fränkel's explanation makes the word ἰδίας unmeaning, and the whole phrase too contorted for the style of Lysias.¹

Lysias is also the author of our next passage (24. 9) :

δοκεῖ δέ μοι τῆς πενίας τῆς ἐμῆς τὸ μέγεθος ὁ κατήγορος ἂν ἐπιδείξει σαφέστατα μόνος ἀνθρώπων. εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ κατασταθεὶς χορηγὸς τραγῳδοῖς προκαλεσαίμην αὐτὸν εἰς ἀντίδοσιν, δεκάκις ἂν ἔλοιτο χορηγήσαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀντιδοῦναι ἅπαξ.

Dittenberger and his school profess to find no difficulty in this passage; they explain the speaker's meaning as being merely that his opponent would not like the temporary sequestration of his goods, and would rather pay the liturgy ten times over than submit to such inconvenience once. When Thalheim asked what became of the joke, Fränkel retorted: 'Ob bei Lysias 24. 9 der Witz und der Gegensatz von δεκάκις und ἅπαξ bei meiner Auffassung minder angemessen ist als bei der Th.'s, ist lediglich Sache des Geschmacks und muss ich diesem zur Entscheidung überlassen.' But both scholars are neglecting the real *cruce*, which is not whether the wit alleged to be in the passage is preserved, but whether on Fränkel's view the passage can be translated. The word ἀντιδοῦναι never means 'to submit to the inconveniences of a sequestration,' but, on the Dittenberger theory, always means 'to refuse an offered liturgy.' This consideration disposes of any plausibility that Fränkel's view may seem to possess.

¹ Gilbert remarks that Fränkel's view of this passage has been refuted by Illing. I have been unable to procure

Illing's tract; hence, if I have appropriated any of his arguments, it has been done unconsciously.

The fourth speech of Lysias contains another stumbling-block for the theory which expels *exchange of property* from the connotation of *antidosis*. It begins thus :—

θαυμαστόν γε, ὦ βουλή, τὸ διαμάχεσθαι περὶ τούτου, ὥς οὐκ ἐγένοντο ἡμῖν διαλλαγαί, καὶ τὸ μὲν ζεύγος καὶ τὰ ἀνδράποδα, καὶ ὅσα ἐξ ἀγροῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀντίδοσιν ἔλαβον, μὴ ἂν δύνασθαι ἀρνηθῆναι ὥς οὐκ ἀπέδωκε, φανερώς δὲ περὶ πάντων διαλελυμένον ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀνθρώπου, μὴ κοινῇ ἡμᾶς χρῆσθαι συγχωρῆσαι. καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀντίδοσιν δι' ἐκείνην φανερός ἐστι ποιησάμενος, τὴν δ' αἰτίαν δι' ἣν ἀπέδωκεν ἢ ἔλαβεν, οὐκ ἂν ἄλλην ἔχοι εἰπεῖν (βουλόμενος τὰληθῇ λέγειν) ἢ ὅτι οἱ φίλοι περὶ πάντων ἡμᾶς τούτων συνήλλαξαν.

The opponents in this case were lovers of the same woman, an hetaira whom they had jointly purchased from her owner. Some time after, a liturgy was imposed on the plaintiff, who then challenged the speaker (the defendant) to an antidosis. The latter accepted it, and their property was being transferred, when common friends intervened with the result that the speaker agreed to discharge the liturgy. One clause in the settlement was that the girl should remain common property; this at least was the speaker's contention, while the plaintiff denied that any reconciliation had taken place. Such is the explanation given by Blass;¹ if correctly, there is no more to be said. Beauchet, however, represents the matter thus :—

“On ne peut savoir, en effet, s'il s'agit dans ce plaidoyer de l'antidosis dont nous nous occupons ou d'un simple échange entre deux particuliers. En admettant même qu'il y ait là une véritable antidosis, il n'est pas nécessaire de supposer un échange véritable, et l'on peut voir dans la paire de bœufs, les esclaves, et les instruments aratoires, une indemnité reçue, à titre de transaction, par celui qui a payé la liturgie.”

¹ *Die attische Beredsamkeit*, I³. p. 583.

This is not the place to attempt a solution of the difficulties connected with the present speech: I have only to point out why Beauchet's explanation at any rate cannot be accepted. The antidosis could not have been merely 'un simple échange entre deux particuliers,' for in that case it must have been amicable, and the stress laid on the reconciliation brought about by friends during its progress becomes meaningless.¹ It seems to me certain that it must have been 'une véritable antidosis,' and if so, the words *τὴν ἀντίδοσιν δι' ἐκείνην φανερός ἐστι ποιησάμενος* constitute a proof, conclusive and not to be evaded, that the antidosis implied an exchange of property.

§ 2. *The use of the verb ἀντιδιδόναι and the noun ἀντίδοσις.*

I turn now to consider a different line of argument. Much capital has been made out of the following phrases by Lécivain and other adherents of Dittenberger, and Beauchet quotes with approval the conclusion drawn from them by Lécivain: 'On ne saurait donc arguer ni de l'étymologie ni du sens grammatical en faveur de la réalité de l'échange.' On the same grounds Blaschke concluded that the suppressed object of ἀντιδιδόναι was not *τὴν οὐσίαν*, but *τὴν λειτουργίαν*. The phrases on which reliance seems chiefly to be placed by these scholars and their supporters are:—

(1) ἀντιδιδόντες τριηραρχίαν Dem. 21. 78.

(2) σαφῶς διώρισε, τί πρῶτον δεῖ ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀντιδεδωκότας [Dem.] 42. 1.

(3) τοῦ γὰρ μεταγεινιῶνος μηνὸς τῇ δευτέρᾳ ἱσταμένου ἐποίουν οἱ στρατηγοὶ τοῖς τριακοσίοις τὰς ἀντιδόσεις *ibid.* 5.

(4) ὅταν γέ με εἰς ἀντίδοσιν καλῶνται τριηραρχίας ἢ χορηγίας Xen. Oec. 7. 3.

¹ I am waiving the further question, whether an Attic writer of the fourth century could have used the word ἀντίδοσις in any but its technical sense, although I do not regard this as possible.

In the words of Lécivain, commenting on (3):—

“Les stratèges fixent le jour où se font les antidoses, αἱ ἀντιδόσεις, c'est le commencement de la lutte, la première sommation; cette sommation ne peut être que la sommation de payer la liturgie; la logique et la vraisemblance exigent que tel soit le premier acte de la procédure, celui qui contient en germe tous les autres, et qu'à cet acte se soit appliqué le mot ἀντίδοσις.”

Minute verbal criticism is a dangerous weapon to employ, and the present case is no exception to the rule. Let us add two more passages to the list just given:—

(5) εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ κατασταθεὶς χορηγὸς τραγῳδοῖς προκαλεσαίμην αὐτὸν εἰς ἀντίδοσιν Lys. 24. 9.

(6) ἀντιδόσεως γενομένης περὶ τριηραρχίας καὶ περὶ ταύτης ἀγῶνος Isocr. 15. 4.

We cannot translate (5) by ‘if I were appointed choregus and challenged him to a challenge to undertake the liturgy’;¹ whereas ‘exchange of property’ is just the phrase needed, especially when we look at (6) and see that the suppressed conclusion of the sentence is περὶ τῆς χορηγίας. The original phrase, I think, was προκαλεῖσθαι τινα εἰς ἀντίδοσιν τῶν χρημάτων λητουργίας ἔνεκα, and it is surely unnecessary to illustrate the tendency of all languages to abbreviate such phrases, even to the extent of obscuring the sense. Our English legal phrase, ‘equitable waste,’ will serve as well as any: it means such waste committed by a tenant for life as would not be restrained in a common law court, but would be restrained in a court of equity—in short, it is ‘inequitable though not illegal waste.’ After that, anything is possible, and I should regard Lécivain’s argument from the use of

¹ Nor can we use ‘to a refusal to pay the liturgy,’ or ‘to a mutual sequestration of property’—the only other meanings suggested for ἀντίδοσις by this school.

the words *ἀντίδοσις* and *ἀντιδοῦναι* as incapable of proving his point, even if the use were far more difficult to explain in favour of the other view than it actually is. But in truth the difficulty is the other way about; and I think that the onus of reconciling the alleged meaning of *ἀντίδοσις* and *ἀντιδοῦναι* with the phraseology actually employed may still fairly be laid on those who allege it.

But I am also of opinion that its erroneousess may be proved positively. 'Somme de payer la liturgie' can at most translate *δόσις* and *δοῦναι*. What becomes of the *ἀντι*-? One answer is given by Lécritvain's translation of [Dem.] 42. 1, where he renders *τοὺς ἀντιδεδωκότας* by 'ceux qui se sont offerts réciproquement la liturgie litigieuse'; and this seems to be the view tacitly held by all of this school. In order to obtain conviction on the subject of its possibility, we must consider the facts as to the use of *ἀντιδοῦναι* in Attic prose. So far as I know, the verb does not occur at all in the extant works of Aeschines, Andocides, Antiphon, Dinarchus, Hyperides, Isaeus, Isocrates, Lycurgus, or Plato. In Demosthenes it occurs only in connexion with the liturgies. In Thucydides it occurs five times (I. 41. 1; II. 53. 4; III. 40. 3, 63. 4, 66. 3), and on each occasion means 'to give in return or exchange.' The inevitable conclusion is that *ἀντιδοῦναι* as a law term really does mean what every scholiast, grammarian, and lexicographer whose utterance on the subject is extant says it means, viz., 'to offer one's property to another in exchange for his'; and two of the five Thucydidean passages furnish precise parallels—*ἐλέος τε γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους δίκαιος ἀντιδίδοσθαι* 3. 40. 3, and *τὰς ὁμοίας χάριτας ἀντιδιδόναι* 3. 63. 4. In the same way Plato uses *ἀντιδωρεῖσθαι*; cf. *Legg.* xi. 938 A *ἂν ἀντιδωρῇταί τις χρήματα*, and *Euth.* 14 E *ταῦτα ἐκείνοις ἀντιδωρεῖσθαι*.

In my opinion, then, the evidence is altogether against those who assert that the object of *ἀντιδοῦναι* was *λητουργίαν*,

and that the verb meant 'to offer a liturgy reciprocally.' Nevertheless, I do not hold that its use is fully explained by saying that τὰ χρήματα or τὴν οὐσίαν is understood. If that were so, it would be impossible to explain why we never find this object expressed, and why we do find a liturgy as the object once (Dem. 21. 78) ; impossible also to throw light on ἀντέδωκα in Dem. 28. 17, or to account for the technical phrase, τὰς ἀντιδόσεις ποιεῖν, used of the magistrates ([Dem.] 42. 5, 'Αθ. Πολ. 56. 3, 61. 1 quoted on p. 504). I suggest the following account as a reasonable explanation of all the passages in which the word occurs. Originally, the verb ἀντιδοῦναι came into use as an abbreviation of the phrase, προκαλεῖσθαι εἰς ἀντίδοσιν τῶν χρημάτων, where the 'giving in exchange' was by the party challenged: but it did not at the same time lose its proper meaning. In the former sense it occurs in Dem. 20. 40, 20. 130, 21. 78 (ἦν ὁ ἀντιδιδούς Θρασύλοχος), 28. 17 (τοῦ ἀντιδόντος) ; while it is used of the person challenged to the exchange in Dem. 28. 17 (εἰ μὲν ἀντιδοίην), and Lys. 24. 9. When once this confusion had become established, it was natural to use as object the liturgy with which the antidosis was concerned, and we find one instance (Dem. 21. 78 ἀντιδιδόντες τριηραρχίαν), but the feeling that there was a confusion nevertheless operated to prevent the expression of any object, as a general rule. This persistent omission of the object, combined with the application of the verb to *either* party to an antidosis, produced inevitably its application to *both* parties—and this we find in [Dem.] 42. 1 and 18 (τοὺς ἀντιδιδόντας ἀλλήλοις). It is true that this speech is not earlier than 329 B.C.,¹ but we may safely assume that it did not introduce this use of ἀντιδοῦναι. The tenth and last instance of the verb is the ἀντέδωκα of Dem. 28. 17—its third occurrence in this passage, which the reader will find printed on p. 483. On any of the received

¹ Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit*,² III. 1. 505 f.

theories of the antidosis, it defies explanation. The solution given by Boeckh was as follows:—

“Demosthenes sagt: ‘Ich nahm zwar den Umtausch an, machte aber eine Clausel, in Hoffnung eine Diadikasia zu erlangen; da ich sie aber nicht erlangte und die Zeit drängte, leistete ich die Liturgie um der Rechtshändel nicht beraubt zu werden.’ Die Clausel war also eine solche, wodurch eine Beschränkung des Umtausches erreicht werden sollte, und er hat sie gemacht in Hoffnung eine Diadikasia zu erlangen; er leistet aber nachher doch die Trierarchie, weil er die Diadikasia nicht erlangt hat, und in Folge dessen und bei der Kürze der Zeit sein Recht an den Klagen zu verlieren fürchtet. Diese Furcht ist eine Folge dessen, dass er die Diadikasia nicht erlangt hat; durch die Diadikasia hatte er also die Klagen zu erhalten gehofft; die Clausel aber war es, um welcher willen er auf eine Diadikasia gehofft hatte: folglich war der Inhalt der Clausel die Erhaltung oder was einerlei ist der Vorbehalt der Klagen bei dem angenommenen Umtausch: und behauptet Demosthenes dennoch, er habe auf die Künste seiner Gegner keine Rücksicht genommen, so folgt also daraus nur, dass er unabhängig von jenen Künsten schon von selber die Clausel gemacht hatte, wodurch der Plan der Gegner vereitelt werden konnte. Aber, sagt man, wenn das Gesetz den Übergang der das Vermögen betreffenden Rechtshändel beim Umtausch verordnete, wie konnte denn überhaupt ein Vorbehalt hierüber gestattet sein? Die Antwort ist ganz einfach: wir kennen den Übergang solcher Rechtshändel beim Umtausch nur aus diesem Beispiele des Umtausches, den Thrasylochos dem Demosthenes angeboten hatte, und aus eben diesem sehen wir, dass ein Vorbehalt möglich war.”

Vollbrecht's objections to this ingenious explanation, as well as the solution which he proposed in its place, were completely refuted by Boeckh. The latter's view has, however, been almost unanimously rejected, on the ground that ἀποκλείειν never means ‘to reserve’; but Boeckh's

opponents are not agreed on the question as to what it does mean. Fränkel says:—

“Thrasylochos und Meidias hatten sich bei der Besichtigung von Demosthenes' Hause, welche der von ihnen auszuführenden Beschlagnahme vorherging, Uebergriffe erlaubt (g. Meidias, 78 ff.); um eine Wiederholung derselben zu verhindern, hatte Demosthenes auch sein eigenes Siegel auf sein Haus gelegt. . .

“Die Stelle ist also zu deuten: ‘ich nahm die Antidosis an, aber unter Absperrung meines Hauses, da ich noch vor dem Termine gegen die Vormünder die Entscheidung über die Liturgie und damit die Rehabilitirung meiner Processfähigkeit zu erlangen hoffte.’”

It will be observed that Fränkel obtains this explanation only by fusing the two accounts of the affair which Demosthenes gives. I am convinced, however, that we must reject as deliberate falsehoods the details added in the speech against Midias: it is incredible that, if they had really happened, Demosthenes would have omitted all mention of them in a speech made while he was still smarting under a sense of their enormity, especially as such ὕβρις would have been most effective in turning the minds of the dicasts against his guardians, the friends of the guilty men. Furthermore, the use of language surely makes it undeniable that ὡς διαδικασίας τευξόμενος is given as the direct and sole reason why Demosthenes performed the action expressed by ἀπέκλεισα—the Court cannot be supposed to have taken judicial notice of facts which the speaker himself only mentioned to them half a generation later. Finally, Fränkel's explanation will not square with his own view of the antidosis, which requires that Demosthenes should have allowed Thrasylochos free access to all his property.

Lécrivain and others try a different way out. The translation they offer for the phrase is, ‘J’acceptai la

sommation, et je mis de mon côté les scellés (ἀπέκλεισα) sur les biens de Thrasyloque, espérant obtenir la diadicassie.' This has the merit of consistency; and if the view of the procedure in an antidosis which it implies were correct, it could not be rejected either as placing an impossible meaning on ἀπέκλεισα or as disregarding the ὡς-clause. But it must be rejected as unconditionally as Fränkel's view, for, in the first place, it implies that the sealing of the challenger's property was not merely a possible but an indispensable preliminary to the hearing of the action, and this I have shown¹ not to be the case. In the second place, the meaning assigned to ἀπέκλεισα is extremely improbable. This verb does not, I believe, occur at all in Aeschines, Andocides, Antiphon, Dinarchus, Hyperides, Isocrates, or Lycurgus, and is very rare in Isaeus;² Lysias too, has it twice only. Ast gives four examples from Plato; Thucydides has it eleven times, Demosthenes six, Ps.-Demosthenes two. In fifteen of these twenty-six cases it may fairly be said to have its literal sense 'shut out' or 'shut up';³ in all the others it means *check* or *baffle*. These are: Thuc. 2. 76. 2, 4. 34. 3, 6. 34. 6; Plato, *Phaedr.* 251D,⁴ *Rep.* vi., 487 B (bis);⁵ Dem. 19. 339, 45. 19 and 28; and [Dem.] 44. 59, which runs: κωλύει γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ τῶν διαμαρτυριῶν γένος καὶ ἀποκλήει εἰσαγωγῆς ἕκαστα τῆς εἰς τὸ δικάστηριον. The two passages from Dem. 45 are: ὡς ἂν . . . ἐγὼ ἀπεκλείσθην τοῦ λόγου τυχεῖν ὑπὲρ ὧν ἀδικοῦμαι and τούτῳ τῷ γράμματι καὶ τοῦ ζητῆσαί τι τῶν καταλειφθέντων ἀποκλείων ἡμᾶς. In view of this evidence of usage, Lécritvain's translation can only be supported if ἀπέκλεισα is employed literally. This involves the assumption that when the

¹ See above, p. 488.

² Anywhere except 6. 40. 3?

³ Cf. Lys. 1. 17 ἀπεκλείσθην ἐν τῷ δωματίῳ.

⁴ τὰ τῶν διεξόδων στόματα, ἢ τὸ πτερὸν ὁρμῆς, συναυαινόμενα μύσαντα ἀποκλήει

τὴν βλάβστην τοῦ πτεροῦ.

⁵ ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πεττεύειν δειῶν οἱ μὴ τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείονται καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅ τι φέρωσιν, οὕτω καὶ σφεῖς τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείεσθαι καὶ οὐχ ἔχειν ὅ τι λέγωσιν.

parties sealed each other's storehouses, they were shut out from the use of their provisions until the War Office had prepared their case, and it had been decided by the heliasts; and both the twenty-eighth speech and the forty-second show that this was not done immediately. To state such an assumption is to refute it. No doubt the speaker in 42. 8 declares: *παρισημηνάμην τὰ οἰκήματα, τοῦ νόμου μοι δεδωκότος· οὗτος ἀνέψξε. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀφελεῖν τὸ σημεῖον ὁμολογεῖ, τὸ δ' ἀνοῖξαι τὴν θύραν οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ.* The puerility of the defence attributed to Phaenippus is in accordance with rule, and of course never occurred to him: he opened his storehouses because he had determined not to exchange properties, but to take the case into court.¹

Are we, then, to accept Boeckh's explanation of the passage under investigation? I think not, and for this simple, but, as it seems to me, sufficient reason: Demosthenes says merely *ἀπέκλεισα*, not *ἀπέκλεισα τὰς πρὸς τουτουσὶ δίκας*. The objections previously brought against Boeckh's view were either based on false assumptions or answered by anticipation in his discussion.

The view put forward by Thalheim is that *ἀντέδωκα* here means 'I appealed to the tribunal,' but that some explanatory addition was required, on account of the different use of *ἀντιδοίην* just before. Hence Demosthenes inserted *ἀπέκλεισα*, meaning 'ich verschloss, d. h. ich enthielt mich mit Wahrung meiner Eigentumsrechte der Disposition über meinen Besitz.' But it is an essential part of Thalheim's theory of the antidosis that an appeal to the courts suspended the property rights of both parties; nor could *ἀπέκλεισα* by itself express what Thalheim wishes, any more than it could by itself express what Boeckh wishes.

My own view of this passage will be set forth in § 4. Meantime I wish to point out that *ἀντίδοσις* underwent

¹ This explanation will be developed below.

the same process of confusion as ἀντιδοῦναι. Properly it meant 'exchange of property,' as always in Lysias (3. 20 ; 4. 1, 2 ; 24. 9), and in Xen. *Oec.* 7. 3 ; but it was also used as an abbreviation for πρόκλησις εἰς ἀντίδοσιν, and this is always its sense in Isocrates (8. 128 ; 15. 4, 8) and in Demosthenes and Pseudo-Demosthenes, with the exception of Dem. 21. 79.¹ Here, however, there is a distinction to be made. The word is sometimes confined to the expression of the challenge, sometimes applied to the ultimate result in the shape of a trial before the heliasts. Both meanings occur together in [Dem.] 42. 30, where the speaker describes Phaenippus as τὴν ὕλην τὴν τετμημένην πεπρακότα μετὰ τὴν ἀντίδοσιν, 'after I had delivered to him a challenge to exchange or discharge,' and also as χρέα ψευδῇ κατεσκευακότα τῆς ἀντιδόσεως ἔνεκα, 'for use at the trial of the (refused) challenge to exchange or discharge.' So in Dem. 21. 80 (quoted on p. 484) the word means 'challenge,' and not either 'exchange' or 'trial,' while in 21. 156. καταστάς (χορηγός) ἐξ ἀντιδόσεως, 'trial' is the meaning,² as it is in Isocr. 15. 8,³ and 8. 128.⁴ In Isocr. 15. 4 (quoted on p. 495) the word means 'challenge,' as distinct from 'trial.' We might even say that there is a fourth meaning—'registration of challenges.' It results from the use with ποιεῖν as in [Dem.] 42. 5, ἐποιοῦν οἱ στρατηγοὶ τοῖς τριακοσίοις τὰς ἀντιδόσεις, 'registered challenges,' and appears in 42. 10, τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ μετὰ τὰς ἀντιδόσεις, 'after the registration of challenges at the War Office.' In other Demosthenic passages (4. 36 ; 28. 17 ; 42. 4, bis) it means 'challenge,' while in the only one not yet quoted, [Dem.] 42. 1, τὸν περὶ τῶν ἀντιδόσεων νόμον, perhaps all significations are included.

¹ The noun is not used by the other orators, by Thucydides, or by Plato.

² Dr. Goodwin says, "i.e. he took the χορηγία merely to escape ἀντίδοσις." But this deprives καταστάς of all force.

³ κακείνον μὲν ταῖς διαβολαῖς χρόμενον ταῖς ἐπὶ τῆς ἀντιδόσεως ῥηθείσαις.

⁴ τὰ κακὰ τὰ περὶ τὰς συμμορίας καὶ τὰς ἀντιδόσεις.

§ 3. *What was decided at the διαδικασία?*

It is agreed on all sides that when the two parties concerned in an antidosis were unable to agree, the case came before the heliasts for decision; but it is not agreed whether they decided which of the parties should discharge the liturgy, or which of the parties was the richer. If the latter view be correct, the challenged party could still choose, in the event of an adverse decision, between discharge and exchange. This view, which was held by Boeckh, has now been universally abandoned, partly on *a priori* grounds,¹ partly on the strength of certain texts and inscriptions. The latter are C. I. A. II. 945 f., which Koehler² interprets as lists of alterations made by the courts in the liturgic appointments. The texts are Isocr. 15. 5 ἔγνωσαν ἐμὴν εἶναι τὴν λητουργίαν, and the speech against Phaenippus; while great stress is also laid on the fact that in every case which we know to have been tried by the courts, the defeated party discharged the liturgy. But we know the result of two cases only, those in which Isocrates and Midias were concerned, and no safe inference can be drawn from so insufficient a number of instances. Again, the words of Isocrates just quoted might easily have been used to indicate the practical, not the formal, decision of the court. As to the speech against Phaenippus,³ it must be remembered that the speaker's cue is to represent his opponent as far more wealthy than himself, and an obvious means of doing this was to ignore the possibility of his preferring to exchange if he lost the

¹ Most brilliantly and forcibly stated by Fränkel.

² *Athen. Mitt.* 7. 96. (1882).

³ The passages on which reliance is placed are: δέομαι οὖν ὑμῶν ἀπάντων, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εἰάν ἀπιδεικνύω

Φαίνιππον τούτον! . . πλουσιώτερον ὄντ' ἐμαντοῦ, βοηθῆσαί μοι καὶ τοῦτον εἰς τοὺς τριακοσίους ἀντ' ἐμοῦ καταστήσαι § 4; ἄγειν εἰς τοὺς προεισφέροντας § 25; see also §§ 30, 32.

case. Finally, Koehler's view of the inscriptions is itself in need of proof. Although, however, I do not regard the arguments brought forward by Boeckh's opponents as at all decisive, there is one consideration (hitherto, I believe, overlooked) which seems to me to settle the question against Boeckh. This is the use of *καταστήσαι* in Lys. 24. 9, Dem. 21. 156, [Dem.] 42. 4 (all previously quoted), and elsewhere. A comparison of these passages shows that the verb was technically used of the appointing authority.

I may also draw attention to another point. It might have been the case that the court could direct the challenged party, at its discretion, to discharge *or to exchange*. That this, however, was *not* the case is shown by Demosthenes' account of his procedure: he has evidently no fear of losing the right of action against his guardians as a result of the *διαδικασία* there mentioned, about which something must now be said.

Boeckh held that this *διαδικασία* had as its object to decide whether Demosthenes was justified in reserving his suit (see p. 498, above). As, however, no such reservation took place, this interpretation must be dismissed in favour of the view that the *διαδικασία* was concerned with the discharge of the liturgy. That this was the correct technical term is shown by its occurrence in an important section of the 'Αθ. Πολ. (c. 61, § 1):

καὶ τούτους (sc. τοὺς στρατηγούς) διατάττουσι τῇ χειροτονίᾳ ἕνα μὲν. . . , ἕνα δ' ἐπὶ τὰς συμμορίας, ὃς τοὺς τε τριηράρχους καταλέγει καὶ τὰς ἀντιδόσεις αὐτοῖς ποιεῖ καὶ τὰς διαδικασίας αὐτοῖς εἰσάγει.¹

The reason given for Demosthenes' failure to obtain the *διαδικασία* is, that the War Office considered it impossible to settle the question of liability until the action against the guardians had been decided, as the value of Demosthenes' estate would vary greatly according to the verdict

¹ So also the earlier [Xen.] 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 3, § 4.

in that action. I cannot believe that this is sound. No doubt the magistrates who prepared cases for court could decide whether there was a case to go before the court at all;¹ but there is no evidence that they possessed the power here attributed to them. Besides, it is difficult to see what they were waiting for, if they were acting in good faith; as long as the antidosis was pending, Demosthenes could not proceed with the action against his guardians. The true explanation is, I think, that it was impossible to get the case sufficiently high up in the list of *διαδικασίαι*, so that it might be tried in the few days before the other action. This is the explanation given by Demosthenes himself in the words *τῶν χρόνων ὑπογύων ὄντων*, and I see no reason to reject it in favour either of the impossible view just mentioned, or of the suggestion which I had previously entertained, that there was collusion between Midias and the War Office authorities.²

§ 4. *The Antidosis.*

In what follows I shall attempt to give a connected account of the antidosis, with references to the ancient authorities; almost all the texts have been printed already in the course of this essay, and those that are missing will now be supplied in the foot-notes where there is the slightest necessity to do so.

When an Athenian citizen had been appointed by the duly constituted authority to the discharge of one of the burdens known as liturgies, he might protest against his appointment on various grounds, technically called *σκήψεις*.³

¹ Harpocration *s.v.* *ἀνάκρισις* says: *ἐξετάζουσι* (sc. *αἱ ἀρχαί*) *δὲ καὶ εἰ ὅλως εἰσάγειν χρή.*

² For the delay on these occasions, see Dem. 4. 36.

³ *ἔπειτα παραλαβὼν* (sc. *ὁ ἀρχων*) *τοὺς χορηγοὺς τοὺς ἐνηνεγμένους ὑπὸ τῶν*

φυλῶν . . . , τούτοις τὰς ἀντιδόσεις ποιεῖ καὶ τὰς σκήψεις εἰσάγει, εἰάν τις ἢ λελητουργηκέναι φῇ πρότερον ταύτην τὴν λητουργίαν, ἢ ἀτελὴς εἶναι λελητουργηκὼς ἑτέραν λητουργίαν καὶ τῶν χρόνων αὐτῷ τῆς ἀτελείας μὴ ἐξεληλυθότων, ἢ τὰ τετταράκοντα ἔτη

A common claim for exemption consisted in the allegation that another citizen, who had no right to be exempted, and was richer than the claimant, had been improperly passed over by the appointing authority: though at the same time the claimant did not deny that his estate in itself was liable to discharge the liturgy. It is true that the speaker in [Dem.] 42 does deny this, but I think we have here nothing but a rhetorical artifice. Athenian law would never have compelled a genuinely poor man to bear the heavy burden of a liturgy unless he could substitute some wealthier citizen; besides, we have several references to 'estates liable to liturgies,'¹ which imply the existence of 'estates not liable to liturgies.' Under these circumstances the citizen claiming relief could challenge the citizen whom he alleged to be richer to an antidosis: that is to say, to choose between discharging the liturgy and exchanging estates with the claimant. This challenge was registered with the magistrate appointed for that object, who sat on a fixed day for the purpose of receiving challenges.² Immediately after registration, the challenger proceeded to the property of the challengee³ and delivered the challenge to him.⁴ The challengee could then adopt one of three courses: he might accept the liturgy;⁵ he might accept the challenge to exchange properties;⁶ or he might refuse both to exchange and to

μη γεγονέναι· δεῖ γὰρ τὸν τοῖς παισὶν
χορηγοῦντα ὑπὲρ τετταράκοντα ἔτη
γεγονέναι, 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 56. 3 ὅπως δ'
ἂν καὶ αἱ σκήψεις εἰσαχθῶσι, τοὺς
θεσμοθέτας παραπληρῶσαι δικαστήρια
εἰς ἓνα καὶ διακοσίους τῷ στρατηγῷ
τῷ ἐπὶ τὰς συμμορίας ἡιρημένῳ ἐν τῷ
Μουνιχιῶνι μηνὶ τῇ δευτέρῃ ἰσταμένου
καὶ τῇ πέμπτῃ ἰσταμένου, Dittenberger
Syll.² I. p. 253 (= C. I. A. II. 809).
This inscription refers to the trierarchy:
date, probably 325/4.

¹ Cf. Isae. 7. 5, 11. 40, *frag.* 29.

² Sauppe, [Dem.] 42. 22 ὁ τὰς δύο
λητουργούσας οὐσίας παρεληφώς.

³ [Dem.] 42. 5, 'Αθ. Πολ. 56. 3, 61. 1,
C. I. A. II. 809.

⁴ Let this be granted me for
convenience.

⁵ Dem. 21. 78, [Dem.] 42. 5.

⁶ This must be assumed—no Athenian
is known to have done so, without a
struggle.

⁷ Lys. 4. 1.

discharge, as in the cases of Isocrates, Midias, Demosthenes, and Phaenippus. It is probable¹ that the third was the course usually taken. It seems to have cost nothing; furthermore, the challengee could at any moment before verdict given throw up the case and accept the liturgy.

We have now to consider the procedure according as the challengee adopted the second or the third course. In the event of his deciding to exchange, it was laid down by law that the challenger could there and then inspect his property, seal up his storehouses, and leave guardians to see that the estate was in no way diminished. This at least is the statement of the law made by the speaker in [Dem.] 42. 5-7, where we learn also that the challengee had a similar right of procedure. The next step was for each party to give the other, within three days, a sworn inventory (*ἀπόφασις*) of all he possessed and of all debts due to or by him ([Dem.] 42. 11, 26). If these were regarded as satisfactory on both sides, the exchange was then carried out in accordance therewith (Lys. 4. 1). As to what happened when objection was made to either or both inventories, we have no direct information; but I suggest that when either party asserted the other to be guilty of any tortious act in the carrying out of the exchange, he filed a declaration to that effect in the proper office and asked for a *διαδικασία*,² which may possibly have decided whether the complaint was justified, but much more probably settled the liability to the liturgy—otherwise the latter question might have been postponed indefinitely by a series of ingenious complaints. If I am right on this point, the filing of an *ἀπογραφή* had the effect of quashing the *antidosis*. The action in which

¹ At the same time the poverty of our data should be remembered.

² Cf. [Dem.] 42. 16 *τοιαῦτα τοίνυν ὁ*

ἄνδρες δικασταὶ πεπονθὼς ὑπὸ Φαινίππου, ἀπεγραψάμην πρὸς τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ταυτηνὶ τὴν ἀπογραφὴν.

Phaenippus appeared certainly dealt with the question of liability.

We come now to the third possibility, namely, reference by the challengee to the tribunal. It is universally but wrongly believed that the procedure described in the last paragraph applied to this case also—or indeed, some scholars think, to this case only. Such a belief is totally irreconcilable with the only two antidosis-trials of which we know the details. If the procedure in question formed part of the procedure in an antidosis referred by the challengee to a tribunal for settlement, the only possible use it can have had was as furnishing evidence. But in that case, as I have shown above (p. 488), the behaviour of Phaenippus becomes unintelligible. Furthermore, its value as assisting the court is apparent, not real: the dicasts could attach very little weight to statements made in his own interest by a speaker as to what he saw in his opponent's house, more especially as the fact that any given article was there did not in the least prove the sole point at issue, namely, whether it was the opponent's property. The only theory which explains Phaenippus' conduct rationally is, that he intended all along to take the case into court, and being a young man of high spirits ([Dem.] 42. 24), amused himself by fooling his opponent to the top of his bent. He allowed the latter to tramp over his estate, put on seals, and station—and no doubt pay—watchmen, as if he meant to exchange properties; but the very next day he removed the seals and went on as if nothing had happened. Then he befooled him in the matter of the inventories, and got him to agree to a meeting for the purpose of coming to a compromise—which costs the speaker a great flood of words to wash away. He did not attend that meeting, and in fact the wretched speaker could never afterwards lay eyes or hands upon him, although he perambulated Athens with

his inventory for over a month ([Dem.] 42. 28), till at last in despair, feeling no doubt that he must do something with the document, he deposited it in the War Office (*ibid.* 14). By all this, on the accepted view, it is evident that Phaenippus has not left himself a leg to stand on, while on the view here put forward he has done his case no injury whatever. On the contrary, he allowed the speaker the privilege of inspecting his estate when he might have prevented him; he inveigled him into a damaging attempt at compromise; he replied to his ἀπογραφή by a counter-ἀπογραφή which accused the speaker of making a false return (*ibid.* 17); and he filed his inventory at the last possible moment (*ibid.* 14).

So much for the evidence afforded by this speech: let us now consider the case of Demosthenes. He says (28. 17): "A few days before this suit against my guardians came on, they instigated one Thrasylochus to challenge me to exchange properties with him, in default of undertaking a trierarchy. Their object was, either to stop the action in case I refused the burden, or else to cause me serious financial embarrassment, if I decided to discharge the liturgy. I did not doubt the *bona fides* of Thrasylochus. The course which I adopted was to refuse the burden and to bar the challenger from dealing in any way with my estate, as I intended to bring the matter to trial; but the time at my disposal was too short: I could not get the case against Thrasylochus heard, and was therefore compelled to discharge the liturgy, in order to avoid the postponement of my action against my guardians."

Unlike Phaenippus, Demosthenes could not palter with his challenger. He was afraid of delay, and probably also unaware of the precise rights of the parties while an antidosis-suit was pending. In this connexion I wish to lay particular stress on the wording of the account in 21. 78, where Demosthenes emphasizes his youth — καὶ γὰρ τότε

παντάπασιν ἔρημος ὧν καὶ νέος κομιδῇ—as if it were a mistake in law on his part to think that he could not have proceeded with the suit against his guardians. The behaviour of Phaenippus points in the same direction. Furthermore, we must not assume off-hand that Demosthenes has correctly described the intentions of Thrasylochus and the men behind him. He does not repeat this description in 21. 78 f., but speaks there as if the attempt to stop the suit were sheer bluff, and his enemies were calculating upon his inexperience. It may be that they hoped to drive him into an actual exchange, as he says; and he would then have found out, when too late, that his right of action for damage done to his estate by his guardians had passed along with everything else belonging to the estate; or they may only have desired to plunge him into further mental worry on the eve of his great suit, and may have been agreeably surprised to find that they had in addition mulcted him of twenty minae.

Be that as it may, however, the important thing for us just now is to infer from the two cases the procedure when the challenger appealed to the courts. After registering the challenge in the proper office, the challenger went to the challengee, and formally announced the antidosis. So far the procedure is identical in all cases. The challengee in reply stated whether or not he would perform the liturgy: but he was not bound to decide between antidosis and trial ([Dem.] 42. 5). If he left this open, the challenger could inspect his property, and the further procedure was the same as in an antidosis, till the challengee made up his mind. If he elected at once for trial, he signified this to his opponent—perhaps in the very words Demosthenes employs in 28. 17, for if ever a term looked technical, ἀπέκλεισα does there, and no scholar acquainted with the curious condition of our knowledge of Greek legal terminology will question the possibility that ἀπόκλησις was the

technical term regularly employed. The very fact that the word does not occur in the orators in any sense favours this supposition strongly.¹ The effect of this ἀπόκλησις was to bar the challenger from dealing with his opponent's property as he was entitled to do in the case of an exchange, and the challengee was of course similarly barred. Application was then made to the magistrate in charge of the liturgy for a διαδικασία, and this might be made by either party. The next step was for both sides to file an ἀπόφασις or inventory with the magistrate, and to furnish one another with copies: this I infer partly from the rules as to the filing of documents which governed other ἀνακρίσεις, partly from [Dem.] 42. 14. Finally, a court was constituted,² and the two parties addressed it, each supporting his own inventory and eulogising his own character by whatever arguments he could devise, while, with regard to his opponent, χρώμενος ταῖς διαβολαῖς ταῖς ἐπὶ τῆς ἀντιδόσεως ῥηθείσαις, as Isocrates puts it.³ The Court then decided which of them should bear the liturgy—but on what grounds, I refrain from saying. Until the verdict had actually been pronounced, the challenger could withdraw the challenge;⁴ and the challengee could at any rate accept the liturgy. Whether he could also stop the case by exchanging properties has been much discussed; I agree with those scholars who answer in the negative, though not for their reasons. The consideration which seems to me fatal to the affirmative view is, that the challengee has prevented the visitation from being made, and the accuracy of his inventory verified by his opponent at the proper time.⁵

¹ Thucydides has it three times: 4. 85, 6. 99, 7. 60.

² Cf. C. I. A. II. 809, quoted on p. 506.

³ 15. 8. A specimen is preserved in [Dem.] 42. 21-25.

⁴ I think we may apply generally

what is said in a suit for βλάβη by Isocrates (18. 39): ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἔξεστιν αὐτῷ, πρὶν ἀποπειραθῆναι τῆς ὑμετέρας γνώμης, ἀφέντι τὴν δίκην ἀπηλλάχθαι πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων.

⁵ The parties to an antidosis could by common consent settle the matter in

Such, then, was the much-discussed Athenian antidosis. I need not dilate upon its clumsiness and general absurdity,¹ but when scholars of such eminence as MM. Beauchet, Dittenberger, Fränkel, and Lécrivain reject the notion of an actual exchange for those very reasons, it is fitting that I should show why I cannot follow them so far. In the first place, the theory here put forward limits considerably the challengee's rights. He could not take advantage of the law to force an exchange unless he did so immediately after the challenge was delivered; and even then, if upon receiving his inventory the challenger found that he had exaggerated the challengee's wealth, he could save his property by withdrawing the challenge. This answers Fränkel's objection:

“Man wird sich fragen, ob wir uns wirklich die Athener so geistesarm vorstellen müssen, dass sie sich das Reclamationsrecht nicht anders zu sichern gewusst hätten als durch die Gefährdung jeder Stätigkeit des Besitzes.”

It may be said that the answer is too complete—that it makes the antidosis grossly inane instead of grossly unjust, and that the unlikelihood of its existence as a legal institution among the clever Athenians is as great as ever. My reply is twofold. The Athenians were emphatically stupid in the realm of legislation, and the particular stupidities of the antidosis appear in other institutions where no one thinks of denying them. The whole liturgical system, in fact, was stupid. Again, it must not be assumed that the antidosis of the fourth century—the only one we know—had received no alteration since its institution. On the contrary, I believe that at least one change is mentioned in our authorities as of recent date

any way they pleased, including *partial* exchange. I have not discussed this point in the text, as it does not belong to the realm of law.

¹ An excellent denunciation will be found in Dr. Mahaffy's *Social Life in Greece*, p. 409.

—the exemption of property in the mines from the operation of the law. The speaker in [Dem.] 42 says expressly that the judges whom he is addressing made this change (*or. cit.* 18). I infer that the institution had been modified from its original simplicity by successive amendments, which left it considerably less drastic than it had been at first.

In the second place, a genuinely poor man did not need to have recourse to it—in the very unlikely event of such a man being burdened by his tribe or by the War Office with a liturgy. We are told, even in our miserably fragmentary authorities, that there were *σκήψεις* permitted in the case of the choregia ('Αθ. Πολ. 56. 3) and the trierarchy (C. I. A. II. 809), and *διαδικασίαι* in the case of the trierarchy (Dem. 28. 17), and the *προεισφορά* ([Dem.] 42). A *διαδικασία* was therefore not the only way of getting rid of an assigned liturgy—recourse could be had to a claim for exemption; and, as I have already argued on p. 506, it is inconceivable that a man whose estate was not liable to liturgies should be unable to put in a *σκήψις* to that effect. Hence it was only a man rich enough to pay who need have recourse to the antidosis—and this explains why a challenger was looked upon with suspicion. It was felt that, even if technically correct, he was more or less of a *συκοφάντης*, or at any rate lacking in public spirit. We have here also the explanation of the trouble taken by the challenger of Phaenippus in emphasizing his poverty, and in apologizing for his readiness to withdraw his challenge—on conditions.¹

For these reasons I cannot think that the antidosis was attended even in theory, much less in practice, with the evils attributed to it by the scholars who deny an actual exchange. Let us take, for instance, the alleged

¹[Dem.] 42. 11–13. I agree with speaker is not boasting of his readiness, Thalheim against Fränkel that the but excusing it.

danger of a farmer's becoming a banker; and let us assume that the farmer is the challenger. The monstrous transformation would only be possible if the following circumstances concurred, namely, (1) if there was found in Attica a farmer foolish enough to think that he could direct a bank; (2) if there was a banker whom the appointing authorities had overlooked; (3) if the banker thought that he could make more out of farming than banking. Need we pursue the subject any further?

§ 5. *A Bibliographical Note.*

Previous discussions of the antidosis by the following scholars will be found in the places indicated. They are given in alphabetical order.

- BEAUCHET: *Histoire du droit privé de la république athénienne* iii. 722-737. Paris, 1897.
- BLASCHKE: *De Antidosi* (diss.). Berlin, 1876.
- BOECKH: *Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener* (3rd edit. by Max Fränkel), i. 673-683. Berlin, 1886.
- BUSOLT: *Die Griechischen Staats- und Rechtsaltertümer* (in Müller's *Handbuch*), p. 194. Berlin, 1892.
- CAILLEMER: *s.v. Antidosis* in Daremberg and Saglio's *Dictionnaire*, i. 288. Paris, 1877.
- DARESTE: *Plaidoyers civils de Démosthène*, i. 181. Paris, 1875.
- DITTENBERGER: *Ueber den Vermögenstausch und die Trierarchie des Demosthenes* (progr.). Rudolstadt, 1872.
- FRÄNKEL: *Hermes*, xviii. (1883) 442 ff.; and in Boeckh's *Staatshaushaltung* (as above), ii. Anm. 879 ff.
- FRANCOTTE: *L'antidosis en droit athénien* (in *Mémoires couronnés et autres mémoires* li, published by the Royal Belgian Academy). Brussels, 1895.

- GILBERT : *The Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens* (trans. by E. J. Brooks and T. Nicklin), 361-363. London, 1895.
- ILLING : *De Antidosi* (diss.). Berlin, 1884.
- KENNEDY : *The Orations of Demosthenes*, iv. 116-118. London, 1888.
- LÉCRIVAIN : in *Revue historique*, xl. 276-285. Paris, 1889.
- LIPSIUS : in notes to Meier and Schoemann's work, *q.v.*
- MEIER AND
SCHOEMANN : *Der attische Process, neu bearbeitet* von J. H. Lipsius, 737-744. Berlin, 1883-1887.
- THALHEIM : *Jahrbücher für Philologie*, 1877, 613 ff.; *Hermes*, xix. (1884) 80 ff.; and in Pauly-Wissowa's *Real-Encyclopädie*, i. 2397. Stuttgart, 1894.
- THUMSER : *Staatsaltertümer* (in K. F. Hermann's *Lehrbuch*), 703-708. Freiburg i. B., 1889.
- VOLLBRECHT : *De antidosi apud Athenienses* (diss.). Clausthal, 1846.

W. A. GOLIGHER.

POSTSCRIPT.—Dr. Mahaffy (*Social Life in Greece*, p. 409) asserts that the exchange of properties was for a year only. Such a rule would have been perfectly logical; but I can find no authority for assuming it, whether direct or indirect. At the same time, there seems to be no way of disproving it, except by the *argumentum ex silentio*—and that is worthless.

SIR R. C. JEBB'S TRANSLATIONS INTO
GREEK AND LATIN VERSE.¹

WE do not propose to deal at length with the exquisite compositions of one who was, by universal consent, acclaimed as a past master in the charming art of Greek and Latin composition. In HERMATHENA to sing the praises of Jebb would be to gild refined gold—not to pursue further a quotation somewhat soiled with use. His verses are household words with us in Trinity College, and models of supreme excellence. Our notice must be regarded as a thank-offering for the beautiful book with its artistic binding designed by Professor Sidney Colvin, and not as criticism, which the book stands above, or eulogy, which is superfluous.

The present volume differs from that of 1873 only as introducing a few changes and corrections, and some additional pieces. The most important correction is on p. 39:

convivæ volgo qualia forte serunt,

where the great scholar slipped into an unmetrical use of *cottidianus*, just as Elmsley made the first syllable of *σίδηρος* long in his edition of the *Bacchæ*, and Merivale shortened the *e* in *velitor* in his translation of Keats' *Hyperion*, not to mention *bērullon* by the late Dean

¹ By Sir R. C. Jebb, Litt.D., O.M., late Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Cambridge. Second

edition. Cambridge University Press, 1907.

Hayman, and *desiderium* by a writer in the *Times* (evidently a fine scholar) some years ago. A good many changes, all for the better, such as *αὐαίvera* for *αἰκίζερα*, p. 85, last line, were made by Jebb himself. In the fine rendering of Wordsworth's *Ode on the Intimations of Immortality* there are eight violations of the rule forbidding the trochaic caesura of the dactyl in the fourth foot of a Greek hexameter. Two are justified by the polysyllabic ending of the line, but the remaining undoubtedly infringe the law. No doubt Mr. Archer-Hind shrank from making large changes in the text. He may have said, with Hamlet,

"We do it wrong, being so majestic,
To offer it the show of violence."

It is to be observed that in his Latin elegiacs Jebb is Propertian rather than Ovidian, and does not avoid (as Ovid does) the lengthening of a short vowel before a mute and a liquid. Nor does he adhere to the "September, October, November" cadence in the third line of the Alcaic stanza. Like Horace, but unlike the Eton schoolboy, he varies the rhythm.

The additional pieces are Macaulay's beautiful "Epitaph on a Jacobite," "Polyglot Russian Scandal," "A Pindaric version of Leopardi's Ode on the Monument to Dante," another Pindaric Ode written for the eighth centenary of the University of Bologna, a translation in the same metre of a poem by the father of the late Professor Kennedy, and Burns' "To Mary," the last line of which

Coepistique Deo iam propiore frui

is a very graceful turning of

And thy spirit rose to God.

The greatest *tour de force* in the collection is still the Pindaric version of Browning's "Abt Vogler." By means of it a good Pindaric scholar can now gain a fairly clear

apprehension of the meaning of the English poem. Each reader will have his own favourite version. Many will crown "Tithonus" or "Home they brought her Warrior dead." Admirable as are all the translations, we are disposed to accord the palm to Byron's "Darkness" in Greek iambic trimeters. It shall be our only extract. We should not know which to choose of the rest. The first verse is admirably scholarly and poetic, and the whole piece deserves to be committed to memory :—

I had a dream, which was not all a
dream.
The bright sun was extinguished, and
the stars
Did wander darkling in the eternal
space,
Rayless and pathless, and the icy
earth
Swung blind and blackening in the
moonless air ;
Morn came and went—and came, and
brought no day.

The rivers, lakes and ocean all stood
still,
And nothing stirred within their silent
depths ;
Ships sailorless lay rotting on the sea,
And their masts fell down piece-meal :
as they dropp'd
They slept on the abyss without a
surge—
The waves were dead : the tides were
in their grave,
The moon, their mistress, had expired
before ;
The winds were wither'd in the stagnant
air,
And the clouds perish'd ! Darkness
had no need
Of aid from them—She was the
Universe.

ὄνειρον εἶδον ᾧ τι κακ θεοῦ προσῆν·
φλῶξ ἡλίου γὰρ ἔφθιτ', ἐπλανᾶτο δὲ
σκότον δεδορκότ' ἄστρα πρωτάρχη χάει
ἀμαύρ', ἀβουκόλητα· γῆ δ' ἐπάλλετο
κρυσταλλοπῆξ κατ' αἰθέρ' οὐ μῆνης ὕπο
τυφλή, κελαινωθεῖσα· φωσφόρος δ' ἔως
διεξόδοισιν οὐ ξυνείπεθ' ἡμερῶν.
ἠῦδον δὲ λίμναι, ρεῖθρά θ' ἠῦδ', ἠῦδεν
Θέτις,
ἦν δ' οὐδὲν ἀψόφοισιν ἐμψυχον βυθοῖς·
νῆες δ' ἐσήπονθ', ὅστ' ἀποιμάντου
σκάφους
σαθρὸν καταρρεῖν ἰστόν, ὃς καταρρυεῖς
αὐτοῦ θαλάσση νηέμφη κοιμίζεται.
οὐκ ἦν κλυδῶν ἔτ', οὐ παλιρροία σάλου,
μήνη θανούσῃ ξυνθανοῦσα κυρία·
ἔβριζε δ' αἰθήρ πᾶσαν αὔαντα πνοήν,
φρουδαί τε νεφελαί· συμμάχων γὰρ οὐκ
ἔδει
τούτων τυραννεύοντα τοῦ παντὸς σκότον.

R. Y. TYRRELL.

THE LATIN WRITERS OF MEDIAEVAL IRELAND.

IN recent years the study of mediæval Irish literature has attracted a great deal of attention, and admirable work on the subject has been done, chiefly by continental scholars. Consequently, it is surprising that one branch of it, and by no means the least important, should have passed almost entirely neglected. I refer to the works of those Irishmen who wrote in Latin. Their importance will be readily appreciated when we remember that the immense influence of the Irish scholars and ecclesiastics on the culture of the continent, at this period, was exerted entirely through the medium of their writings and lectures in the Latin language. In the present article I have attempted to give a succinct account of these writers, with lists of their works and the necessary bibliographical references collected from a large number of different publications. As far as possible only the best or most recent editions will be mentioned, no notice being taken of the anonymous Latin works found in Irish MSS., such as the Antiphonary of Bangor, the Irish canons, or the collections of lives of the saints. The authors are arranged in chronological order, according to the year of their death, whenever this could be ascertained, but in some cases the dates are very uncertain.

FIFTH CENTURY.

1. Sechnall, or Secundinus, d. 448; author of a hymn printed by Stokes (*Tripartite Life of St. Patrick*, 1887,

p. 386), and by Bernard and Atkinson (*Irish Liber Hymnorum*, 1898, i, p. 7). It is found in the Book of Armagh (s. ix), in the *Liber Hymnorum* (MS., Trin. Coll., Dub., E. 4. 2., s. xi), and in the famous Antiphonary of Bangor (ed. Warren, ii, 1895, p. 14), a seventh-century MS. in the Ambrosian Library, Milan.

2. St. Patrick, 389-461; author of the *Confessio* and *Epistola* edited recently by White (*Proc. R. I. Acad.*, 1905, 25, pp. 201, 542) from several MSS. Other works attributed to St. Patrick are: (a) *De Tribus Habitaculis* (Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, 53, col. 831); (b) *De Duodecim Abusionibus Saeculi* (Migne, 4, col. 869); (c) another *Confessio* (Berger, *Revue Celtique*, 1894, 15, p. 155). Cf. also Bury, *Life of St. Patrick*, 1905.

3. St. Camelac, fl. s. v, author of a hymn in the Antiphonary of Bangor (ed. Warren, ii, p. 19).

4. St. Mugint, fl. s. v(?), author of a hymn in the *Liber Hymnorum* (Bernard and Atkinson, i, p. 23).

SIXTH CENTURY.

5. St. Molaise, fl. 561; author of a hymn in the *Liber Hymnorum* (Bernard and Atkinson, i, p. 158).

6. Aedh, d. 589; author of a hymn published by Mone (*Lateinische Hymnen des Mittelalters*, iii, 1855, p. 181), from a Karlsruhe MS., No. 221 (s. viii). Cf. Reeves (*Proc. R. I. Acad.*, 1857, 7, p. 91).

7. St. Columba, d. 597; four of his hymns are found in the *Liber Hymnorum* (Bernard and Atkinson, i, pp. 66, 84, 88, 157). The prose hymn "Altus Prosator" has been edited by Cuissard (*Rev. Cel.*, 1881-83, 5, p. 205) from an Orleans MS., No. 146 (s. x), and by Boucherie (*Revue des Langues Romanes*, 1882, p. 293).

SEVENTH CENTURY.

8. St. Comgall, d. 602 ; author of a hymn in the Antiphonary of Bangor (ed. Warren, ii, p. 16).

9. St. Columbanus, d. 615 ; a number of his works are extant : (a) a very long commentary on the Psalms, edited from the Ambrosian MS., C. 301 (s. viii) by Ascoli (*Il Codice Irlandese dell' Ambrosiana*, t. i, 1878-89, pp. 1-610). This MS., which is covered with old Irish glosses, has been fully described by Nigra (*Rev. Cel.*, 1870-72, i, p. 60) ; (b) *Regula Coenobialis* (Migne, 80, col. 210 ; cf. also Seebass, *Über Columba von Luxeuils Klosterregel*, 1883) ; (c) *De Poenitentiarum Mensura* (Migne, l. c. col. 224) ; (d) *Instructiones sive Sermones* (l. c. col. 230) ; (e) *Epistolae vii et Carmina iv*, edited by Gundlach (*Mon. Germ. Hist.*, *Epistolae* iii, 1892, p. 154 ; (f) *De Saltu Lunae*, MS. in the library of St. Gall of eleventh century.

10. Cummian, fl. 634 ; author of (a) *Epistola De Controversia Paschali* (Migne, 87, col. 969) ; (b) *De Mensura Poenitentiarum* (l. c. col. 979).

11. S. Gall, d. 645(?) ; author of *Sermo Habitus Constantiae*, edited by Migne (87, col. 14).

12. Augustin, fl. 655 ; author of a tract *De Mirabilibus Sacrae Scripturae Libri Tres*, printed by Migne (35, col. 2149). Cf. also Reeves (*Proc. R. I. Acad.*, 1857-61, 7, p. 514).

13. St. Ultan, d. 656 ; author of a hymn in the *Liber Hymnorum* (Bernard and Atkinson, i, p. 14).

14. St. Cummain, d. 661 ; author of a hymn in the *Liber Hymnorum* (Bernard and Atkinson, i, p. 18).

15. Lathacan, or Laidcenn, d. 661 ; author of a hymn printed by Mone (*Lat. Hymnen*, i, 1853, p. 367) from a MS. at Darmstadt, No. 2106 (s. viii). There is also an abstract of the *Moralia* of St. Gregory, made by Laidcenn, in a MS. at Vienna.

16. St. Aileran, d. 664. By this writer we have an incomplete *Interpretatio Mystica Progenitorum Christi* (Migne, 80, col. 327, from a St. Gall MS.).

17. Tirechan, fl. 668; author of notes on St. Patrick, edited from the Book of Armagh by Whitley Stokes (*Tripartite Life*, p. 302).

18. Cumine, d. 669; seventh abbot of Iona, has left a *Life of St. Columba*, printed by Mabillon (*Acta SS. Ord. S. Benedict*, i, 1733, p. 344).

19. Muirchu Maccu-Mactheni, fl. 698; author of notes about St. Patrick, edited from the Book of Armagh by Stokes (*Tripartite Life*, p. 269), and from a Brussels MS. by Hogan (*Analecta Bollandiana*, i, 1882, p. 531).

EIGHTH CENTURY.

20. Adamnan, d. 704; two of his works are extant: (a) *De Locis Sanctis* (Migne, 88, col. 779), found in many MSS.; (b) the *Life of St. Columba* so admirably edited by Reeves (*Irish Arch. Soc.*, 1857), where a full account of the MSS. is given, and also by Fowler (Oxford, 1894).

21. St. Colman, d. 731; author of a hymn in the *Liber Hymnorum* (Bernard and Atkinson, i, p. 44), also in Mone (*Lat. Hymnen*, i, p. 450).

22. St. Oengus, d. 745; author of a hymn in the *Liber Hymnorum* (Bernard and Atkinson, i, p. 47).

23. St. Cuchuimne, d. 746?, author of a hymn in the *Liber Hymnorum* (Bernard and Atkinson, i, p. 33).

24. Virgil or Fergil, d. 785; bishop of Salzburg, celebrated as an astronomer. He taught publicly the doctrine of the rotundity of the earth, and was censured by the Pope. His knowledge was probably derived from Martianus Capella (cf. elaborate memoir by H. Krabbo, *Mitth. des Inst. für Oesterreichs Geschichtsforschung*, 24, 1903, pp. 1-28). A glossary of his is said to be extant in MS.

NINTH CENTURY.

25. Joseph Scottus,² d. c. 804 ; author of *Carmina vi*, published by Dümmler (*Mon. Germ. Hist., Poetae Latini Aevi Medii*, i, 1881, p. 149). An unpublished commentary on Isaiah by Joseph, in eighteen books, is found in a Paris MS., No. 12, 154 (s. ix), folios 1-192.

26. Dicuil, fl. 825. By this writer we have three works: (a) A treatise on astronomy, written in 814-16, recently edited from a MS. at Valenciennes by M. Esposito (*Proc. R. I. Acad.*, 1907, 26, p. 378); (b) a geographical tract of great importance, *De Mensura Orbis Terrae*, edited by Letronne (Paris, 1814), and Parthey (Berlin, 1870). A revised edition has been prepared by M. Esposito, but it is not yet published; (c) some grammatical verses appended to an edition of a tract of Priscian, prepared by Dicuil for the use of schoolboys, printed by Dümmler (*Poetae*, ii, 1884, p. 667).

27. Clemens Scottus, d. 826 at Würzburg ; two unpublished grammatical works of his are still extant: (a) *Ars*, in MS. Bernensis, No. 123 (s. x), folios 1-31 (Hagen, *Catal. Cod. Bernens.*, 1875, p. 178). An extract from it is given in Hagen's *Anecdota Helvetica*, 1870, p. 189. (b) *De Barbarismo*, cf. Keil (*Grammatici Latini*, i, 1857, p. xx). Cf. also Simson (*Jahrbücher des Frankischen Reichs unter Ludwig dem Frommen*, ii, 1876, p. 257).

28. Dubthach, fl. 838 ; author of a poem appended to an edition of Priscian's *Periegesis*, which he brought out in 838. It was printed by Traube (*Poetae Latini Aevi Medii*, iii, 1896, p. 685).

29. Dungal, c. 850 ; a number of works by authors of this name are extant: (a) *Epistola De Solis Defectione*

¹ It is hardly necessary to mention here that the terms Scottus, Scottia, applied exclusively to Ireland till about

1200 A.D., when they came to be used of the modern Scotland.

anno 810 bis facta, edited by Jaffé (*Monumenta Carolina*, iv, 1867, p. 396); (*b*) *Epistolae vii* (Jaffé, loc. cit., p. 429); (*c*) *Liber adversus Claudium Taurinensem* (Migne, 105, col. 465); (*d*) *Carmina xxv*, edited by Dümmler (*Poetae*, i, p. 393; ii, p. 664). The late Professor Traube, in his very important paper "O Roma Nobilis," read before the Munich Academy in 1891, distinguishes four Dungals (pp. 36-41), among the first three of whom he divides the above works: (1) a recluse at Saint Denis; (2) a professor at Pavia, c. 825; (3) a companion of Sedulius Scottus, probably the Dungal whose name is written in one of the margins of the Berne MS. of Horace, No. 363; (4) a monk of Bobbio in the eleventh century, mentioned as the donor of MSS. to the library there, in the old eleventh-century catalogue published by Muratori (*Antiquitates Italicae*, iii, 1740, col. 817 sq.).

30. Sedulius Scottus, still alive in 858. He must be carefully distinguished from the old Christian poet, Coelius Sedulius, who cannot be proved to have been an Irishman. He was at one time teacher in the cathedral school at Liège. An excellent account of him has been given by Traube (*O Roma Nobilis*, pp. 42-77), and very recently by Hellmann (*Sedulius Scottus*, München 1906, Part 1 of Traube's *Quellen und Untersuchungen zur Lateinischen Philologie des Mittelalters*). A large number of his works are extant: (1) In Migne (103, cols. 9-352), (*a*) *Collectanea in omnes S. Pauli Epistolas*; (*b*) a number of commentaries on the Scriptures reprinted from Mai (*Script. Vet. Nova Collectio*, vol. 9, and *Spicilegium Romanum*, vols. 8 and 9). (2) *Carmina cxiv*, admirably edited by Traube (*Poetae*, iii, 1896, p. 151). (3) (*a*) *Commentum in Eutychis Artem*, printed by Hagen (*Anecdota Helvetica*, pp. 1-38); (*b*) *De Graeca*, edited by Steinmeyer (*Die Althochdeutschen Glossen*, ii, p. 623); (*c*) *De rectoribus Christianis*, edited by Hellmann (loc. cit., pp. 18-91). (4) A *Collectaneum* of Sedulius is found

in the MS., C. 14, nunc 37, of the library of the hospital at Cues-sur Moselle, near Trèves, from which Hellmann has edited (a) *Senex et Adolescens*, and (b) *Proverbia Graecorum* (loc. cit., pp. 120, 122). (5) Unpublished works, (a) *Collectaneum in Mattheum*, in a tenth-century Vienna MS.; (b) *Commentary on Priscian*, MS. at Leyden (Müller, *Rhein. Mus.*, 1865, 20, p. 359); (c) *Commentary on the Ars Minor of Donatus*, MS. at Tours (s. xii), No. 416 (cf. Thurot, *Rev. Cel.*, 1870-72, 1 p. 264; (d) A Greek psalter, written by Sedulius, at Paris, Bib. de l'Arsenal MS. No. 8407.

(31). Martinus Hiberniensis, d. 875; author of five Greek poems published by Traube (*Poetae*, iii, 1896, p. 696). He taught at Laon.

(32). Donatus Scottus, d. 876; Bishop of Fiesole. Author of *Carmina ii*, published by Traube (*Poetae*, iii, p. 691).

(33). Joannes Scottus Eriugena, still alive 877; a number of his works are extant: (1) *Carmina Graeca et Latina xxxviii*, edited with an excellent introduction by Traube (*Poetae*, iii, p. 518). (2) Edited by Floss in Migne (122, 1853), (a) *Commentaries on Dionysius the Areopagite*; (b) a Latin translation of the works of Dionysius; (c) *Commentaries on the Gospel of St. John*; (d) *Liber de Praedestinatione*; (e) *De Divisione Naturae*, his great work; (f) *Liber de Egressu et Regressu Animae ad Deum*; (g) *Versio Ambiguorum S. Maximi*. A new and critical edition of these works is badly needed. (3) *Commentary on Martianus Capella*, discovered by Hauréau (*Notices et Extraits des MSS.*, 1862, 20, pt. 2, pp. 5, sq.), and a *Life of Boethius* printed by Peiper in his edition of the *Consolatio* (Leipzig 1871) from a MS. at Florence (s. xii). Cf. also Huber, *Scotus Erigena*, 1861.

(34). Cruindmel, fl. s. ix. By this author we have: (a) *De Metrica Ratione*, discovered by Hauréau in a Paris

MS. Fonds Saint-Germain, No. 1188 (s. ix); it was printed at Vienna in 1883 by Huemer; (b) *Carmina* iii, edited by Dümmler (*Poetae*, ii, p. 681) from MSS. at Paris and Munich.

(35). Malsachanus or Maelsechlain, fl. s. ix. A grammatical tract of his was discovered by Hauréau in the same MS. with Cruindmel (also numbered 13,026 Bib. Nat.); it has been published by Roger (Paris, 1905, Thèse).

(36). Dubduin, fl. s. ix or x. A poem by an Irishman named Dubduin was printed from a tenth-century St. Gall MS., with a facsimile of the page containing it, by C. P. Cooper, in a very scarce "Appendix A" to a report on historical records relating to Great Britain and Ireland, which report was never published. Copies of the "Appendix," printed in 1854, are in the Library, Trinity College, Dublin (cf. for Dubduin's poem pp. 92-3).

ELEVENTH CENTURY.

(37). Marianus Scottus, d. 1082 at Fulda. His real name was Mael Brigte; he has left a valuable chronicle; it is found in the famous Codex Palatino-Vaticanus, No. 830, written by Marianus himself and finished about 1076, which is fully described by MacCarthy (*R.I. Acad., Todd Lecture Series*, iii, 1892, pp. 1 sq.). Folios 1-25 contain various tracts by Marianus on astronomical subjects, which have not been published; folios 27-101 contain the first two books of the chronicle, which have also not yet been published; folios 101-170 contain the third book, which alone has been edited in 1844 by Waitz (*Pertz, Mon. Germ. Hist. Scriptorum*, v, pp. 500-562). Other MSS. of the chronicle are found at London, Frankfort-on-Main, and Liège.

(38). Marianus Scottus, d. 1088 at Ratisbon, must be carefully distinguished from the chronicler. His real

name was Muredhach Mac Robartaigh. The following works of his are extant, none of which have as yet been printed : (1) MS. No. 1247, at Vienna, of 160 folios, written by himself in 1079, contains the Epistles of St. Paul, with glosses and a commentary said to be of considerable importance (Wattenbach, *Rev. Cel.*, 1870-72, i, p. 262). (2) *Liber Excerptus de Evangelistarum Voluminibus sive Doctoribus*, in MS. Cotton. Tiberius E. iv. 26., ff. 162-178 (British Museum) of twelfth century. (3) Commentary on the Psalms, in the library at Ratisbon. (4) *De Universali Computo*, MS. at Ratisbon. (5) *Emendationes Dionysii*, MS. at Ratisbon. (6) *De Magno Cyclo Paschali*, MS. at Ratisbon. For an account of the life of Marianus, the memoir of Reeves (*Proc. R. I. Acad.*, 1857-61, 7, p. 290) may be consulted.

TWELFTH CENTURY.

(39). David Scottus, fl. 1110, presided over the cathedral school at Würzburg. The Emperor Henry the Fifth took him to Italy as historiographer in 1110. He is known to have written a considerable number of works, all of which are usually stated to have perished (cf. the important article by Wattenbach, "Irish Monasteries in Germany," translated by Reeves, *Ulster Journal of Archæology*, 7, 1859, p. 296); but in the Supplement (p. 84) to Cooper's Appendix mentioned above, reference is made to a MS. at Würzburg containing "David Scottus de Purgatorio Patritii."

In concluding this catalogue, which is probably by no means a complete one, I should like to draw attention to the large number of unprinted works enumerated, and also to the fact that many of those already printed (especially by Migne) require to be critically re-edited from the original MSS. before we can form any truly accurate judgment of

the value of their contents. Sooner or later German philologists will undertake this work; but why should it not be done first in Ireland? This would to a certain extent remove the reproach at present attached to the Irish nation, that it is the only one in Europe which allows its historical and literary remains to be published and investigated almost exclusively in foreign countries.

MARIO ESPOSITO.

SUPPLEMENT.

Since the above was sent to the printer, the following notices have come into my hands :—

10. Cummian's *Poenitentiale* has been recently re-edited by Alfred Holder from a MS. formerly belonging to the monastery at Reichenau, now at Karlsruhe (s. ix.), in his "*Die Reichenauer Handschriften*" (Leipzig, 1906, p. 256).

15. Among the Reichenau MSS. Holder (loc. cit., p. 328) has discovered "*Laidcenn, De Moralibus Job quas Gregorius papa fecit,*" which he hopes to publish shortly.

23. St. Cuchuimne's hymn is re-edited by Holder (loc. cit., p. 50), from a Reichenau MS. (s. ix).

27. On the *Ars* of Clemens Scottus, cf. H. Keil's *Program*, Erlangen, 1868, p. 11.

30. At Vienna there is, according to Cooper (loc. cit., supra, p. 226), a MS. containing "*Sedulii Junioris Catena.*"

31. In addition to the verses, the following works of Martinus Hiberniensis, who, like Sedulius and Joannes Scottus, was evidently fairly well acquainted with Greek, have been discovered by M. Miller in a MS. at Laon, No. 444 (s. ix.), (*Notices et Extraits des MSS.*, t. 29, part 2, 1880, p. 1 sq.):—

(a) A letter, on fol. 3 r° of the MS.; (b) an explanation of the Greek words employed by Priscian (printed by Miller on pp. 118–175; (c) an explanation of the Greek words employed by Joannes Scottus (printed pp. 194–198).

33. A commentary on the *Opuscula Sacra* of Boethius has been recently published by Rand (Pt. 2 of Traube's *Quellen und Untersuchungen*, München, 1906, pp. 30–80). Joannes Scottus is, without doubt, the author. The commentary of Joannes on Martianus Capella is found in a Paris MS., No. 12,960. According to Hauréau and Rand it is a work of great interest, and well worthy of being published. A commentary of Joannes on Macrobius' tract "*De Differentiis et Societatibus Graeci Latinique Verbi*" has been published by Keil (*Grammatici Latini*, v, 1868, p. 599).

40. Marcus fl. 1149; born in Ireland; he emigrated to Ratisbon, and wrote his "*Visio Tondali*," which had an immense success, and was translated into about fifteen different languages and dialects during the late Middle Ages. The Latin text was published by A. Wagner (Göttingen, 1882). Cf. also the recent volume of Friedel and Kuno Meyer (*La Vision de Tondale*, Paris, 1907).

M. E.

REVIEWS.

Q. Asconii Pediani Orationum Ciceronis quinque Enarratio, recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit ALBERTUS CURTIS CLARK, Collegii Reginae Socius. Oxonii e typographeo Clarendoniano. 1907.

ANY student who has ever had to make a minute study of those portions of Cicero which have been annotated by Asconius will gladly greet every advance made in establishing the text of that commentator. His absence of pretentiousness, his clearness, and scrupulous accuracy in details engender confidence and admiration. Accordingly, scholars welcomed the edition by Orelli and Baier, issued in 1833, with open arms; and it was till quite recently the edition by whose pages references were made. But it could not claim with reason the merits of a really critical text, as it gave too much weight to the early editions, which were for the most part based on corrupted copies of those originals, from which all our knowledge of the text of Asconius is derived. Forty-two years later, in 1875, a really critical text was edited by the two Berlin scholars, Kiessling and Schoell, which was dedicated to Madvig, and received the benediction and assistance of that great scholar, as well as of Mommsen and Bücheler. These editors rightly go back to the fountain-head, the ms. which Poggio, along with Bartolommeo of Montepulciano and Sozomenus (Zomino), discovered at St. Gall in July, 1416. Of this ms. copies were made (1) by Poggio — ‘Haec mea manu’ (he says in a letter to Guarino) ‘transcripsi et quidem velociter ut ea mitterem ad Leonardum Aretinum et Nicolaum Florentinum’—(2) by Bartolommeo (M)—as is proved by the colophon to the Laurentian codex liv. 5—and (3) next year by Sozomenus (S)—as is proved by the colophon to the Pistoia ms. (Forteguerra 37). Of these (2) and (3) have been preserved in the libraries indicated, and they were made the basis of the recension by Kiessling and Schoell; and as these scholars were of opinion

that Poggio's copy had been lost, they could only make such divinations in regard to its merits as might be derived from the examination of a number of MSS. which were confessedly derived from that copy. As these MSS. had (as we now know) suffered considerably in the course of tradition, it is not strange that Kiessling and Schoell formed a somewhat low opinion of the merits of Poggio's copy, and in value estimated (3) as the best, (2) as inferior, and (1) as the least satisfactory of the copies of the original 'Sangallensis,' which, after these three copies had been made, disappeared again into the darkness from which it had for a moment emerged.¹

But the whole position has been altered by the discovery of the Madrid MSS. x. 31 and x. 81. These were parts of one MS., and are now acknowledged to be copies of the Sangallensis which Poggio either had made or actually himself made of that exemplar. The former, which contains Manilius and the *Silvae* of Statius, and which had connexion with a copy of Silius Italicus (apparently not as yet discovered), was copied for Poggio by a scribe whom he describes as 'ignorantissimus omnium viventium': the latter, which contains some excerpts from Sigebert's *Chronicon*, Asconius, and Valerius Flaccus, was, as we have seen, copied by Poggio himself hastily (*velociter*). The importance of these Madrid MSS. in all the works which they contain is of the very greatest; but we cannot consider anything except the Asconius.²

Mr. Clark, after some hesitation,³ holds that the Madrid manuscript (he calls it P) was the actual copy made by Poggio and transmitted to his friends in Italy. After having returned to Italy, but only as far as Mantua, Poggio went to England on the invitation

¹ Unless, indeed, Poggio afterwards obtained possession of this codex, and some years later, on his return from England, brought it into Italy. This view seems to be held by Professor Phillimore, because (1) Politian, in reference to the notorious insertion in Statius *Silvae*, i. 4 of line 86a, says that this inserted line did not appear in the 'exemplar Statii Silvarum quod ex Gallia Poggius Gallica scriptum manu in Italiam attulerat,' whereas this line does appear in the *Matriensis*: see below; and (2) Poggio sent his copy into Italy: he did not bring it (Pref. to Professor Phillimore's edition of the *Silvae*, p. vii). If we suppose that this is really a reappearance of the Sangallensis and Politian's statement not a mere error, as Mr. Clark (p. xxxi, note) thinks, at any rate that was the last appearance of the famous

exemplar; for all the known MSS. of the *Silvae* are derived from the *Matriensis*, and none from a copy which omits the verse.

² This MS. was, even in the early part of last century, considered by Knust to have belonged to Poggio; but Kiessling and Schoell held that this opinion was a mere conjecture based on the subscription which appears in many of the MSS. copied from Poggio's *Hoc fragmentum reperiuntur in monasterio St. Galli prope Constantiam xx milibus passuum, una cum parte Q. Asconii Pediani. Deus concedat alteri ut utrumque opus reperiat perfectum, nos quod potuimus egimus. Poggius Florentinus.*

³ See his very careful and elaborate discussions in the *Classical Review* (x. 301-5, esp. 304, and xiii. 119-130, esp. 129).

of Cardinal Beaufort, and did not return until 1423. Even then he did not succeed in rescuing his Asconius from Niccolo Niccoli until about 1430. So that Niccoli, and, doubtless, Leonardo of Arretium, and Guarino (see Poggio's letter to Guarino from Constance in December, 1416) had the use of the ms. during all these years. The ms. has annotations by several hands; in these annotations Mr. Clark unerringly sees the contributions by these various scholars (to whom we may perhaps add Barbaro) to the emendation of Asconius. "From this medley of corrections," continues Mr. Clark, "arises almost all the variety in the other mss. of the Poggian family. Those least tampered with either lack the additions to the notes on the *Or. in Pisonem*¹ altogether or put them in the margin, add conjectures either above the line or in the margin, keep all the original corruptions in the text, and most faithfully reproduce the most trifling errors which appear in the Madrid ms.; while the more recent members of the Poggian family incorporate the additions and corrections into the text, exhibit no trifling errors, and lack all novelties save such as are most patent conjectures." Such is the conclusion of Mr. Clark, after he had, with his usual patience and love of perfection, either collated or examined all the available members of the Poggian group.² To the better class of this family belong at least three English mss., Oxoniensis Canon. Misc. 217, Harl. 2635, and 5238: of the first-named of these Mr. Clark says: '*Ipsius Matritensis imaginem qualem memini fidelissime representat.*' Then Mr. Clark gives in lengthy detail a number of passages showing the gradual deterioration of the copies from the Madrid ms. down to the most ordinary and common type of ms., so that one can see clearly that the Madrid ms. was the fountain-head. Here, then, is the justification of the present edition. No longer with Kiessling and Schoell should we regard S as our chief support, M as next best, and Poggio's family as the least reliable; but S and P are to be regarded as of about equal value—'*ita Sozomenianum exemplar,*' says Mr. Clark, '*Poggiano praestare puto ut nunc hoc nunc illud verum servare videatur*'—while M is relegated to an inferior position, as it was not copied by Bartolommaeus himself, and is in more than thirty places corrected from P.³

Yet even with this well-established estimation of manuscript authority, emendation must still be resorted to in many cases, though it is materially simplified. Mr. Clark is anxious to give each emender his due; and especial distinction must be given to Manutius and Madvig, who have done more than any other scholars

¹ Most appear to be obvious corrections from Cicero.

² Mr. Clark knows of only one ms. which is derived from S, viz., Paris 7833; and of not a single one which can be traced to M as its origin.

³ e.g. 35. 27 (Kiessl. and Schoell) *Postero die qui fuit iudicii summus] qui fuit iudicissimus* SP. In the margin of P Poggio has noted *iudicibus, iudici, primus*: in M we find *iudicibus iudicii primus qui fuit*.

for the restoration of Asconius; a glance at the apparatus will show that. But Mr. Clark found much to do, and, even after his labours, there remain many *obeli* to be removed.

Among the more brilliant of Mr. Clark's emendations are:—

P. 84. 22 (of his edition), Hunc Antonium Gellius et Lentulus censores . . . senatu moverunt TITVLOSQUE subscripserunt quod socios diripuerit, quod, &c. (catulisque S: causasque PM). This is an emendation at once striking and certain.

21. 6. Omission of *multa*, which crept into the text here from the neighbouring *multa*. (For other ejections made by Mr. Clark on the same grounds cp. 26. 11; 27. 9: 48. 5.)

31. 12. cum interregem prodere *hortatus eos esset* (obstatore essent S: oratorem esset P: ostatores esset M). Mr. Clark prints in the text Mommsen's *stata res esset*; but a comparison with 33. 1 hortantibus (an obvious correction for obstantibus of SPM), which Mr. Clark adduces, points to the tradition of P being most probable. We should wish to read *proderent* (so M¹) *hortatores essent*; as *proderent* would more probably pass into *prodere* than vice versa.

38. 5. Dicturum quoque diem Ciceroni Plancus ostendebat *postea*, ante Q. Pompeius idem meditatus erat (postea autem Q. Pompeius SPM). We should prefer to read *postea autem <quam> Q. Pompeius*. Mommsen has already suggested *posteaquam Q. Pompeius* (omitting *autem*; but why omit it? For the tmesis cp. Cic. Clu. 192).

44. 4. Forsitan nunc hoc quoque velitis scire qui fuerit qui id postulaverit. Quod non *fere adicitur* (ferat adiutor SPM. Madvig also ingeniously conjectures *fere traditur*). There is, we think, little doubt about Mr. Clark's *adicitur* from the passages adduced by him (58. 6: 77. 12). We fancy, however, that under *-at* of *ferat* the word *Actis* is concealed.

47. 17. dein Flavio non reddidit Tigranem: *domum misit et* habuit extra catenas (dimisit et SPM). We confess, however, to a preference for Bücheler's conjecture *domi suae*. Would not *domum misit* without *suam* mean that Clodius sent Tigranes back to Armenia?

52. 5. cum senatus in porticu Pompeii haberetur . . . unum eum excuti priusquam in senatum intraret *iusserat* (so ed. Venet.: iusserant SPM: Mr. Clark conjectures *<Clodiani> iusserant*). This is perhaps a little bold. We would adhere to the MSS. *iusserant*, and suppose the nominative to be *senatores* taken out of *senatus*; cp. 74. 2, 3 *senatus decrevit* ne iudicia . . . exercerentur: quod decretum *eorum* in contionibus populi saepe agitatum erat, where we think Mr. Clark's conjecture *senatorum* for *eorum* hardly necessary.

58. 2. providendum ut haberent legati unde *praesenti die* darent. So Mr. Clark for *praesentia* . . . (space of 11 letters) darent of the MSS., comparing with excellent learning Digest 45. 1. 41. 1. But so small a word as *die* would hardly have given rise to such a large lacuna. Mommsen suggested *munera*: perhaps *stipendia*.

The construction is quite allowable; cp. Dig. 42. 8. 17. 2, *si praesentem dotem reddidisset*.

61. 17. apud duas <decurias> *profuit* equitum Romanorum et trib. aer. (decurias omitted by SPM, supplied by Madvig; praeferat SM; praefecturas P. The latter part of P may perhaps be due to *decurias*, which in some early MS. may have been written above the line. We think the tradition leads to *profecit* rather than *profuit*.

64. 4. *esset* tamen ille in libertate (*sed* SPM) This is a excellent correction.

52. 5. Hae sunt suspiciones quas *se dicit* pertimescere (se Cicero dicit S: dicit se Cicero P: dicit Cicero M). We are not clear why Mr. Clark omits *Cicero*, which is retained by KS: but no doubt he has good reasons for doing so.

We wish, indeed, that Mr. Clark had helped the weaker brethren sometimes with a hint why an emendation is made—e.g. 66. 6 *cupiverunt* (*cupierunt* SPM). Why is this? We fancy the alteration is based on Zielinski's law of the clause-endings in Cicero's orations. At any rate, we do not know under which of Zielinski's classes to place this clausula if we read *cupierunt*; and it would present a clausula containing the last two feet of a hexameter.

15. 6. (Scaevola) provinciam, cuius cupiditate plerique etiam boni viri deliquerant, deposuerat ne sumptui esset *foratio* (aerario Manutius): Mr. Clark suggests *populo Romano*, which does not look likely at first sight. We cannot grasp his argument or that of Manutius. Would not the province be as much a cause of expense to the Roman people under any other governor? How was the expense to be avoided, no matter who took the province—unless indeed the Governor should pay the expenses himself or should rob the provincials? A hint here would have been most welcome. With very great hesitation we venture to suggest *ne* <ei> (sc. provinciae) *sumptui esset oratio* 'that the expenses of the provincial governor (*oratio*) should not fall on the province'; and we think that Scaevola, who was a great and good man, was one of those who held, and showed by his conduct, that the provincials should be put to as little expense as possible by the Roman government; and as there was so much competition for provinces at this time, we can well imagine that the State gave the smallest possible supplies for their administration. That the provinces had to a considerable degree to meet the expenses of the governor may be gathered from what Diodorus, Excerpt. p. 394 (= vol. ii., p. 610 ed. Wesseling) says of this very Scaevola καὶ τὰς συνήθεις τοῖς στρατηγοῖς καὶ τοῖς συνεκδήμοις (apparently the *comites*) δαπανὰς ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ποιούμενος ταχὺ τὰς εὐνοίας τῶν συμμάχων εἰς τὴν Ρώμην ἀνεκτήσατο. Scaevola had met the expenses (if not all, at least most) out of his own pocket; but resigned after nine months (Cic. Att. v. 17. 5), possibly because he could not any longer

afford to stay, and was unwilling, as a matter of principle, that any of these charges should be levied on the province. We know how very scrupulous Cicero was as regards any requisitions from the provincials (Cic. Att. v. 10. 2: 16. 3: 21. 5). We cannot think that a man like Scaevola supposed that the Roman State should not bear the costs of the provincial governors.

We feel sure, however, that Mr. Clark will easily demolish this argumentation: we only adduce it to show that the brevity of his notes (perhaps dictated by the rules of the series of Oxford Classics) not infrequently is so extreme that it leaves readers in perplexity.

This volume of the Oxford series is indeed one of the very highest value and importance, and is quite certain to be acknowledged as the definitive edition of Asconius, at least until some new and most important manuscript comes to light—a contingency not very likely to happen.

Some Phases of the Relation of Thought to Verse in Plautus. By HENRY W. PRESCOTT, "University of California Publications in Classical Philology," vol. i., No. 7, pp. 205-262. Berkeley: The University Press.

THE subject of this study was suggested by a passage in Leo's *Der Saturnische Vers*, p. 14. Leo supposes that originally in Latin poetry sentence and verse were identical, i.e. that a verse-end could not fall in the middle of a sentence. This supposed requirement of the earliest poetry cannot, of course, be proved, for lack of material; but Leo asserts that it survives in a modified form in Plautine and other contemporary verse, in the postulated rule that words intimately connected in thought could not be separated by a verse-end without special justification. As Professor Prescott says: "Leo has left to others the task of testing the validity of his law"; and the present study is a contribution towards that task. It does not claim to be a complete treatment of the subject. The author has "attempted to gather and study the evidence offered by one group of examples in Plautus"—the case in which adjectives are separated from their substantives by the verse. Even within these restricted limits the author has not attempted anything definitive. "In many respects," he says, "the study must be descriptive; the lack of similar studies in Greek poetry, and the fragmentary remains of earlier Latin poetry, usually of uncertain metrical constitution, retard a convincing account of Plautus' position in the historical development of verse-technique. Nor will it be just to confirm or refute Leo's theory until other phases of the problem

in Plautus and the corresponding phenomena in Greek poetry are investigated."

Leo divides what he regards as special justifications of such separation into two categories, external and internal. As external justifications he mentions length and alliteration. By the former he means the length of one or both of the words syntactically connected, but separated by the verse-end: by the latter ("alliterirende Wortverbindungen") he implies that a word may, in some cases, be drawn away from the word with which it is syntactically connected to some other word which merely begins with the same sound. By internal justification he understands some gain in emphasis, or some other effect of style. It would seem to be the obvious procedure to begin by collecting instances which seem to transgress Leo's rule. If there then appeared to be a considerable number of objections which could not be justified by special circumstances—either those indicated by Leo or others like to them—then the postulated rule would fall to the ground. Unfortunately, it must often be a matter of opinion whether in any given case a seeming exception is due to any particular cause. For instance, in *Cas.* 992:—

nám tu *maxumo*
me ópsecrauisti *opere*, Casinam ut póscerem uxorem mihi—

it must be a matter of opinion whether the separation is due merely to metrical convenience, or is connected with the alliteration *ópsecrare opere* (Prescott, p. 235). Leo deprecates a purely statistical treatment of the subject ("natürlich soll man nicht sammeln und Procente suchen"), and Prof. Prescott's study is as little as possible statistical. A large number of seeming exceptions are examined, and thoughtfully and skilfully criticised, and many interesting suggestions are made to account for them. It may be doubted whether it is possible to reach any definite result on this question, which is intimately connected with the wider question of Latin word-order. But interesting facts emerge in the course of the inquiry, e.g., the fact that when *meus tuos suos* are separated from their substantives, the possessive nearly always stands at the end of the first verse if it precedes the noun, or at the beginning of the second verse if it follows it. Although the results attained are not very definite, this is a learned and carefully-written study in a field in which little has yet been done. There is a slip in the translation from Leo at the beginning: *sic* (in the third line of note 1) does not mean "itself," but refers to *Forderung*.

Ériu: the Journal of the School of Irish Learning, Dublin.

THE last issue of *Ériu*, vol. iii., part i., furnishes much information on subjects relating to Old- and Middle-Irish, and to Welsh. There is also a melancholy interest attaching to this number of *Ériu*, as to it one of its Editors, the eminent Old-Irish Scholar, Professor Strachan, LL.D., lately deceased, furnished two valuable contributions—the Text and Translation of an Old-Irish Homily, and an Explanation of Certain Mutations of Initial Consonants in the Old-Welsh Verb. R. Thurneysen, in a short article, makes brief suggestions—some disclosing much ingenuity, and even imagination—on “Initial Changes in the Irish Verb after Preverbal Particles.” Dr. Kuno Meyer contributes a short anonymous poem of much interest from the *Leabhar Breac*, with a translation. Messrs. J. H. Lloyd and *Gustamh Hamaltún* endeavour, in short articles, to determine where “*Cnoc Rire*” and “*Bruiden Dá Derga*” were—Mr. *Gustamh Hamaltún*’s article showing considerable research. The eminent Celtic scholar, Mr. Whitley Stokes, has in this issue two short articles, the one “On Two Irish Expressions for ‘Right Hand’ and ‘Left Hand,’” and the other on “The Ever-new Tongue.”

In a short, discursive article, Mr. Eoin Mac Neill suggests a new meaning of the Old-Irish forms *mocu*, *maccu* (placed before proper names of persons), as in *Miliuc maccu Boin*, *Lugbeus mocu Min*. He labours to show that *mocu*, *maccu*, wherever found, is a simple noun, and never a composite word for *mac ú*, or *mac úi*; and he rejects the testimony of Middle-Irish (early and late) writers that *macu*, *maccu*, *mocu* were often Old-Irish ways of writing *macc* (or *mac*) *ui*. We believe that he has only found a mare’s nest. The early Middle-Irish writers, who immediately followed the Old-Irish writers, “had,” Mr. Mac Neill suggests, to discredit their testimony, “lost touch with this form [*mocu*, *maccu*], and supposed it identical with *macc ui*.” We believe that those early Middle-Irish writers, being nearer in time to their Old-Irish predecessors (whose traditions they inherited), and having, no doubt, much more Irish literature at their disposal than we now possess, had very good reasons for regarding *mocu* (*maccu*) in such collocation as identical with *mac ui*. Marianus’ *Miluc filius nepotis Buain*, for *Miliuc mocu Boin*, we think a very good translation. Modern editors generally have held the same opinion. All the literature we possess, from the Old-Middle Irish to the language of to-day, attests it. There is no doubt that *ú*, ‘grandson,’ ‘posterity,’ ‘race,’ makes sometimes *gen.* in *ú*, though not as often as *gen.* in *úi*, as *i ngluinn meic ú Aíann tiar*, SG. 61. Thus *Lugbeus gente mocu Min* and *Lugbeus mocu Min*, made identical by Adamnan, are grammatically correct, according to the testimony of the literature, but are contradictory on the

hypothesis of Mr. Mac Neill. There is, of course, another *mac* (*maca*), nom. and acc. pl. of *mac*, 'a son,' like *feru* (*fera*), nom. and acc. pl. of *fer* (Old Irish for *fear*, 'a man').

The article on Palatalization, by Prof. O. J. Bergin, gives much solid matter; and the two concluding contributions, "The Rule of Ailbe of Emly," by Mr. Joseph O'Neill, and the "Note on the Canonical Hours," by Mr. R. I. Best, furnish interesting information to students of Old-Celtic ecclesiastical history.

Hyperidis Orationes et Fragmenta, recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit F. G. KENYON, Collegiorum B.V.M. Winton, prope Winton, et Beatae Mariae Magdalenae in Univ. Oxon. Socius. Oxonii e typographeo Clarendoniano.

By this edition of the text of Hyperides, the indebtedness of classical scholars to Mr. Kenyon, already so great, is now largely increased. Hyperides, "the Sheridan of Greek eloquence," was popular with his immediate successors; and the author of *Περὶ Ὑψους* refers to him with approval, stating that he has all Demosthenes' good qualities, save his power of composition, and possesses besides the excellences and graces of Lysias. But it was only in the last century that MSS. of his works were found in Egypt, the papyrus called 'Londonensis' being first edited by Mr. Kenyon. Babington produced the *editio princeps* of 'Ardenianus' in 1853; but since his time most of the work on Hyperides had been done by German editors, till Mr. Kenyon came forward to maintain the credit of British scholarship.

The present edition has an interesting preface, which gives full information as to the finding and editing of the four MSS. in 'Ardenianus,' 'Londonensis,' 'Parisinus,' and 'Stobartianus.' This last, which probably dates from the second century A.D., is, in Mr. Kenyon's opinion, the work of a slave, to whom his master dictated it. This may serve to explain why 'erroribus scatet foedissimis.'

Mr. Kenyon's aim is avowedly different from that of Blass. The latter edited Hyperides very carefully from the point of view of the MSS., enclosing in square brackets every letter that is merely the result of restoration. The present editor seeks rather to give a readable text to the ordinary student. In most cases he modestly contents himself with recording the emendations of others; it is seldom that he tries his own hand. Thus Blass, Sauppe, Babington,

and Cobet figure most prominently in the critical notes. This volume is a welcome addition to the Oxford series of texts, and should encourage the more general perusal of a little-known author.

Platonis Opera, recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit IOHANNES BURNET, in Universitate Andreana Litterarum Graecarum Professor, Collegii Mertonensis olim Socius. Tomus V. tetralogiam ix. definitiones et spuria continens. Oxonii e typographeo Clarendoniano.

MR. BURNET is to be congratulated on the completion of his edition of Plato—a task which, we believe, has not been achieved since Stallbaum's time. This last volume is marked by the same excellences which made its predecessors so welcome to classical students. As to MSS., the Parisian A is chiefly relied on, being much the most sound; while L and the marginal notes of the Vatican O are not seldom useful. Unfortunately, Vindobonensis F, which was so valuable for the earlier stages of the work, here fails for the *Laws*, as it does not go further than the *Minos*. In editing the *Laws*, Mr. Burnet tells us that he has followed the traditional reading, even when corrupt, in preference to employing the readings of Musurus from the Aldine; "sunt enim fere vulnera obtegentis, non sanantis, correctiunculae."

In *Laws* v. 739 b, we like the editor's *αἰεί ποτε*; the *ἄν ποτε* and *ἄν δὴ ποτε* of MSS. are impossible after *εἰ*, if we retain the optative *ἐθελήσειεν*. In *Laws* vi. 784 c, Mr. Burnet reads *οἷς ἂν ἐπιτρέψωσιν οἱ δὲ τάξωσι*, where the MSS. have variously *οἷδε τάξωσι*, *οἷδε τάξουσιν*, *οἷδε καὶ τάξωσι*—none of them satisfactory. In 784 d his emendation *γενέθλια τῶν* may be considered as certain. *γενέσεων* of LO is senseless. A has *γενέσια τῶν*; but *γενέσια* means 'a day kept in memory of the dead,' and is out of place here before *τῶν παίδων*, whereas *γενέθλια*, 'birthday feasts,' gives a suitable meaning. The emendation receives support from the marginal *γενεθλίων* found in LO. In *Laws* vii. 816 e, Mr. Burnet reads *αὖ*. This is but a slight change textually from *ἄν*, and the latter is here impossible. In *Laws* ix. 865 a, *τῶν ἀρχόντων* is bracketed; it seems unsuitable with the middle *ποιουμένων*. Among minor improvements may be noted *ἕτερον* in 894 c, where MSS. have *ἑτέραν* and *ἑτερα*; in 925 a, *τούτων* for *τοῦ τῶν*; in 666 b, *λήθην* for *λήθη*; and in 713 a, *του* for *τό*.

The Cults of the Greek States. By LEWIS RICHARD FARNELL, D.LITT., M.A., F.A.S., Fellow and Tutor of Exeter College; University Lecturer in Classical Archæology; Corresponding Member of the Imperial German Archæological Institute. In five volumes: vols. iii. and iv. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1907.

THIS is a work in which immense learning and ingenuity are employed to discover and expound the origin, significance, and interrelationships of the various Greek cults. The whole is clearly and definitely planned. The author aims at tracing the worship of each divinity, in its various forms and phases, through the different Hellenic states; for this purpose, he surveys the records contained in every department of classical literature, from Homer to Hippolytus, as well as the evidence of inscriptions. The modes of worship are described, analysed, compared, and finally illustrated by a series of beautiful plates, reproducing what he calls ideal types of each divinity, as portrayed by the imagination of successive generations of Greek artists, and preserved for us in statues, vases, terra-cottas, and such other material forms as have survived. Apart from its value for special students of Archæology, this work is one of importance for ordinary classical scholars. Aspects and vistas of Greek life and thought, which too often remain closed to such students, are here shown with delightful effect, thus adding a fresh and substantial interest to Greek literature, and demonstrating its inexhaustible value for the historian of human culture. The author is equipped with an admirable apparatus of archæological and philological lore. He is patient and painstaking in the pursuit of truth. His logical faculty (analytic as well as synthetic) is keen and bright. His judgment always seems quite free from misleading bias. In the many long disquisitions by which he endeavours to reach his conclusions, he securely holds attention by his lucidity as well as by the wealth and variety of knowledge which he brings to the service of his arguments. We are sorry that space only allows us to describe Mr. Farnell's book thus in general terms.

The Leizarragan Verb. An Analysis of the 703 Verbal Forms in the Gospel according to St. Matthew. By E. S. DODGSON. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1907.

WE have in this book a fresh instalment of a great work on which the author has been for years engaged, and which forms part of the foundation he is laying for the construction of a complete grammatical dictionary of the Basque New Testament. It is a labour of love, which nothing but the enthusiasm of a scholar could

long sustain. The readers of such books as this are few, the interest of them being almost confined to students of language *per se*. Hence it is to such patrons as the Universities, and especially the delegates of the Clarendon Press, that their authors must look for appreciation, and for the means of giving their writings the permanent form due to their importance. We have not space here to enter minutely into the characteristics of the work before us, and can only add that we wish Mr. Dodgson that success which is the best, if not the only reward, of his noble work.

Demosthenis Orationes, recognovit brevisque adnotatione critica instruxit S. H. BUTCHER, in Universitate Edinburgensi Litterarum Graecarum olim Professor. Tomi ii. Pars i. Oxonii e Typographeo Clarendoniano.

MR. BUTCHER gives us here the second instalment of his text of Demosthenes, comprising the speech against the law of Leptines, and those against Midias, Androtion, Aristocrates, Timocrates, and Aristogiton. His belief in the Parisian manuscript A, whose claims to superiority he so stoutly champions in the Introduction to vol. i., is acted on with discretion. While he usually follows it where it disagrees with the other MSS., his devotion is not slavish, and he gives fair treatment to the readings of L, A, P, etc., and to the conjectures of editors. In *Leptines*, 459 (§ 9) Mr. Butcher retains *τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιτάξασαν τοῖς ἰδιώταις*. Cobet wished to delete these words on the ground that they could not mean "which [i.e., the city] has herself enjoined it on citizens"; but similar constructions are found in *De Falsa Leg.* and in *Contra Timocratem*. In 465 (§ 28) we read *διείρηκεν* of the MSS., as against *διήρηκεν*, Dobree's conjecture on L. The former is supported by the scholiast's explanation *διαρρήδην εἶπεν*, and instances of confusion between the two forms are frequent enough elsewhere in the MS. In 478 (§ 72) Mr. Butcher reads *ἀφαιρήσεται* with Bavaricus and the scholia; the alternative is *ἀφαιρεθήσεται* of other MSS. Blass adopts the middle form, citing in support Dionysius, *Comp.*, *ἀφαιρήσομαι ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀφαιρεθήσομαι*. In 484 (§ 89) there is a misprint of *ἀκούσαντες* for *ἀκούσαντας*. In *Midias*, 526 (§ 38), from among several rival readings, that of A, *φθάσας τὸν λογισμὸν ἀμαρτῶν ἐπαισεν*, is adopted. In *Aristocrates*, 642 (§ 68), Mr. Butcher brackets *τοῦτο ποιήσει*, which looks like a gloss by one who did not understand the seeming lack of a verb to govern *ὄρκον*. In *Timocrates*, 739 (§ 125), he reads, *αἰσχίον* (Vulg. S γρ.), referring us to Thuc. ii. 40, 1 and viii. 27, 3.

The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. Translated by JOHN JACKSON. With an introduction by CHAS. BIGG. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1906.

THE only fault we have to find with this neat and compact little volume is that we are not quite sure (in Matthew Arnold's caustic language) whether there is "any proper reason for its existing." "In this translation," the author tells us, "I have had in view those readers to whom the original is perforce a sealed book. Hence, in the version itself, I have endeavoured, even at some sacrifice of accuracy, to avoid those phrases which would be barely intelligible without reference to the Greek." Judged merely as a translation for the English reader's benefit, this version is rarely better, and sometimes distinctly worse, than the work of George Long, known to every reader of *Essays in Criticism*. To change Mr. Long's version of the saying of Democritus from "Occupy thyself with few things, if thou wouldst be tranquil," into "Do little and be happy," is certainly not an improvement; and surely Mr. Long's "Look at things as a man, as a human being, as a citizen, and as a mortal," need not be changed into: "Look things in the face as becomes a man and a male, a member of the State, and a mortal creature." In the same way, "Take away opinion, and where is the plaint, 'I have been harmed'?" is worse than Mr. Long's "Take away thy opinion," making the idea more difficult to an English reader.

A neat, if elementary, little introduction tells the unlearned reader what he needs to know about Marcus.

Thucydides Mythistoricus: by F. M. CORNFORD, Fellow and Lecturer of Trinity College, Cambridge. London: Edward Arnold.

HAS the influence of Dr. Verrall been a good one on the study of Greek classics? This is the question that rises to every reader's lips as he opens Mr. Cornford's book, for the influence of Dr. Verrall is visible on every page.

Briefly, the book is an attempt to prove that Thucydides gives (for artistic reasons) a completely misleading account of the causes of the Peloponnesian War. Following the lead of the historical school that regards History as largely the make of Geography, Mr. Cornford argues that the Sicilian expedition is not (as Thucydides would paint it) a weird accident in the war, but the central fact round which all the earlier incidents group themselves.

The first point in which this theory comes in contact with the conventional story of the war concerns the Megarian Decrees. As Mr. Cornford sees the issues, Megara, Pylos, Corcyra are all stations on the route to Sicily; and the 'mythistoric' historian is distorting the facts by concealing the links between them. As

Thucydides tells the story, the Athenians had no designs in the direction of Sicily till after the death of Pericles. Mr. Cornford insists that the Megarian Decrees were the first step, of which Pylos was the second—two steps in a systematic and perfectly defined policy.

This viewpoint necessitates the re-writing of the story of Sphacteria; and perhaps the most ingenious part of this book is its skilful 'damaging' of the conventional account of that episode. Every reader must be struck with the amount of *τύχη* in the Thucydidean explanation. It happened that the Athenian fleet sailing to Corcyra was driven in here. Demosthenes happened (with no official command) to be on board. The notion to fortify the place happened to come into his head. Even then the generals in command objected; and nothing would have come of it, only that an impulse happened to seize the soldiers to kill time by building the ramparts. The Spartans happened to be celebrating a festival, which gave Demosthenes time. A Messenian privateer happened to turn up in the nick of time with arms for the Athenians. There is something wrong in the enormous amount of coincidence here; and Mr. Cornford manages from his standpoint to throw a flood of light upon the dark places of Thucydides' narrative.

Of course this theory of the causes of the Peloponnesian War is only part of Mr. Cornford's case that Thucydides 'doctors' his facts throughout at the bidding of a dramatic instinct. The portrait of Cleon, the Melian Decree, the end of Pausanias, are all chosen as examples of the colouring which the great Athenian felt necessary. A mind nurtured on the Greek drama *could* not have written 'trustworthy' history as we understand the word—and Thucydides was steeped in what we would call unscientific conceptions of the world and of natural law. Thucydides' own emphatic disavowal of the mythical is skilfully turned against him. He means that he avoided mere 'inventive embellishment.' He does not and could not mean the dramatic preconception which was the framework of his thought. This is shown by his indictment of Herodotus, which accuses the earlier historian of trivial errors of fact, and leaves unnoticed the dramatic construction of Herodotus' history, which stares a modern reader in the face.

"We cannot, of course, prove what we have here put forward; it is only the analysis of the impression actually produced on us by Thucydides' statement." Every reader must feel the same difficulty as he closes this brilliant and singularly ingenious book. It is sometimes hyper-ingenious; the whole discussion on the Thucydidean notion of 'Fortune' seems to forget that an ancient, like a modern, historian may use the word without having any very definite theory of causation. But no reader can follow the argument of the book without some new light, not merely on the war of which Thucydides wrote, but on the mental limits and idiosyncrasies of the great historian himself.

BOOKS ALSO RECEIVED.

- Priests of Asklepios* (reprint). W. S. FERGUSON, Berkeley Cal., U.S.A. 1907.
- Four Gospels from Codex Corbeiensis.* E. S. BUCHANAN. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1907.
- Rutilius Claudius Namatianus.* C. H. KEENE. BELL & SONS. London. 1907.
- Judah Messer Leon's Commentary on the 'Vetus Logica.'* I. HUSIK. Brill, Leyden. 1906.
- Lucian, Charon and Piscator.* T. R. MILLS. University Tutorial Press, London.
- Papyrus Grecs, Tome Prem^r. Fasc. i.* PIERRE JOUGUET. Paris, Leroux. 1907.
- Anecdota Oxoniensia: Ethiopic Version of Book of Enoch.* R. H. CHARLES. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1906.
- Pelagius on the Pauline Epistles.* ALRX. SOUTER, D.LITT. H. Frowde. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1907.
- The Attic Theatre.* A. E. HAIGH. Third edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press. MCMVII.
- Classical Philology.* University of Chicago. London: D. Nutt. Leipzig: Harrassowitz.
- Helps to Reading of Classical Latin Poetry.* L. H. RICHARDSON. Boston: Ginn & Co.
- Paralipomena Sophoclea.* L. CAMPBELL. Rivingtons, London. 1907.
- Life and Letters of Sir R. C. Jebb, O.M., LITT.D.* By his wife, CAROLINE JEBB. Cambridge: at the University Press. 1907.
- Ovid, Met. xi.* G. A. T. DAVIES. Oxford: Clarendon Press. MCMVII.
- Church Quarterly Review.* Spottiswoode & Co., London. 1907.
- Introduction to Comparative Philology.* J. M. EDMONDS. Cambridge University Press. 1906.

Agamemnon of Aeschylus in English verse. W. R. PATON. D. Nutt, London. 1907.

Lucretius: a selection from Book V. W. D. LOWE. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1907.

Martial—Select Epigrams, vii–xii. R. T. BRIDGE & E. D. C. LAKE. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1906.

Plato's Menexenus. J. A. SHAWYER. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1906.

Aristotle on his Predecessors. A. E. TAYLOR. Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago. 1907.

PROCEEDINGS

COLLEGE CLASSICAL SOCIETY, TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN, 1906-7.

Michaelmas, 1906.

Nov. 16th.—Mr. Alton in the chair. Dr. L. C. Purser read a paper on "Plutarch as an Essayist." Speakers: Messrs. J. H. Craig, D. P. W. Maunsell, J. M. Henry, W. Kennedy, and the Chairman.

Nov. 23rd.—Professor Smyly in the chair. Mr. J. H. Craig: "The Position of the Family in Greek Political Thought." Speakers:—Mr. E. S. Murphy, Professor Goligher, Messrs. W. H. Porter, D. P. W. Maunsell, G. H. W. Davies, W. Kennedy, and the Chairman.

Nov. 30th.—Professor Beare in the chair. (1) Mr. W. H. Porter: "The Peace Policy at Athens, 462-442 B.C." Speakers: Messrs. M. T. Smiley, J. H. Craig, J. H. F. Leland, and the Chairman.

(2) Mr. D. P. W. Maunsell: "Petronius." Speakers: Messrs. M. T. Smiley, J. H. F. Leland, W. Kennedy, and the Chairman.

Dec. 7th.—Dr. L. C. Purser in the chair. Lecture by Mr. R. F. T. Crook on "Historic Athens."

Hilary, 1907.

Feb. 15th.—Rev. R. M. Gwynn in the chair. Mr. R. M'Combe: "Translations from Classical Poetry." Speakers: Messrs. J. E. W. Flood, T. C. Tobias, G. C. Duggan, J. H. F. Leland, W. H. Porter, M. T. Smiley, W. Dawson.

Feb. 22nd.—Mr. Kennedy in the chair: (1) Mr. G. C. Duggan: "Greek Coinage." Speakers: Messrs. Craig, Flood, Smiley, and the Chairman. (2) Mr. G. H. W. Davies: "Travelling among the Ancient Persians." Speakers: Messrs. W. H. A. O'Grady, Leland, Small, Craig, Flood, and the Chairman.

March 1st.—Mr. W. H. Porter in the chair. Mr. C. Bartley: "Euripides the Romanticist, a Study in the *Bacchae*." Speakers: Messrs. Henry, Flood, Davies, M'Combe, Leland, J. Bartley, Duggan, E. M. Bateman, M. A. C. Wilkins, and the Chairman.

March 8th.—Dr. Tyrrell (President of the Society): "The Study of Classics." Speakers: Messrs. Porter, Tate, and Professor Beare.

March 15th.—Rev. R. M. Gwynn in the chair. Mr. R. E. Crook: "Thucydides and the Evolution of History." Speakers: Messrs. Smiley, C. Bartley, Bateman, Craig, Henry, Duggan, M'Combe, and Davies.

Trinity, 1907.

May 10th.—Mr. G.W. Mooney in the chair. Mr. E. M. Bateman: "The Purpose of the *Alcestis*." Speakers: Rev. J. O'Driscoll, Professor Goligher, Messrs. Craig, Henry, M'Combe, and the Chairman.

May 17th.—Rev. G. Wilkins in the chair. Mr. J. M. Henry: "Theocritus, the Poet of Nature." Speakers: Professor Beare, Rev. J. O'Driscoll, Messrs. Craig, J. E. Maguire, Leland, C. Bartley, and the Chairman.

May 24th.—Mr. Alton in the chair. (1) Mr. John Thompson: "The Reformed Pronunciation of Latin." Speakers: Mr. Porter, Professor Beare, Dr. L. C. Purser, Messrs. Smiley, W. Kennedy, Duggan, Henry, Scott, and the Chairman. (2) Mr. W. H. A. O'Grady: "Plutonia." Speakers: Messrs. Leland and Craig.

May 31st.—Professor Smyly in the chair. Professor Beare: "An Interesting Historical Fragment." Speakers: Mr. R. W. Tate, Professor Goligher, Mr. Craig, Dr. L. C. Purser, Messrs. Porter, Smiley, Kennedy, and the Chairman.


June 7th.—Dr. Tyrrell (President) in the chair. Mr. J. H. Craig: "The *Frogs* of Aristophanes." Speakers: Mr. Leland, Professor Beare, Messrs. Duggan, Maguire, and the President.

June 14th.—Rev. R. M. Gwynn in the chair. Mr. R. E. Crook: "A Defence of the Authenticity of *Antigone*, 904-920." Speakers: Messrs. Flood, P. Campling, Professor Beare, Messrs. Kennedy, Craig, M. Wilkins, Davies, Leland, Henry, Porter, and the Chairman.

CONTENTS OF No. XXXIII

- I. A Synopsis, Analytical and Quotational, of the Verbal Forms in the Baskish New Testament printed at La Rochelle in 1571.
- II. Notes on Theon of Smyrna.
- III. On an Inscribed Sarcophagus at Penrice Castle, South Wales.
- IV. Thucydides, Book I., Ch. 69.
- V. The Human Element in the Gospels.
- VI. Note on the Register of Archbishop Alan.
- VII. The Apostolic Preaching of Irenaeus and its Light on his Doctrine of the Trinity.
- VIII. The Contracted Cases of *Deus*.
- IX. Notes on Apuleius.
- X. Notes on Licinianus.
- XI. Ethics and Theism.
- XII. An Old Problem in Logic.
- XIII. On a Source of O'Clery's Glossary.
- XIV. Studies in Attic Law.
- XV. Sir R. C. Jebb's Translations into Greek and Latin Verse.
- XVI. The Latin Writers of Mediæval Ireland.
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